June 2025 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH 5.15 0/9] backport for CVE-2025-37948 and CVE-2025-37963

by Pu Lehui

From: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> The backport mainly refers to the merge tag [0], and the corresponding patches are: arm64: proton-pack: Add new CPUs 'k' values for branch mitigation arm64: bpf: Only mitigate cBPF programs loaded by unprivileged users arm64: bpf: Add BHB mitigation to the epilogue for cBPF programs arm64: proton-pack: Expose whether the branchy loop k value arm64: proton-pack: Expose whether the platform is mitigated by firmware arm64: insn: Add support for encoding DSB Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… [0] Hou Tao (2): arm64: move AARCH64_BREAK_FAULT into insn-def.h arm64: insn: add encoders for atomic operations James Morse (6): arm64: insn: Add support for encoding DSB arm64: proton-pack: Expose whether the platform is mitigated by firmware arm64: proton-pack: Expose whether the branchy loop k value arm64: bpf: Add BHB mitigation to the epilogue for cBPF programs arm64: bpf: Only mitigate cBPF programs loaded by unprivileged users arm64: proton-pack: Add new CPUs 'k' values for branch mitigation Liu Song (1): arm64: spectre: increase parameters that can be used to turn off bhb mitigation individually .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 + arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 2 + arch/arm64/include/asm/debug-monitors.h | 12 -- arch/arm64/include/asm/insn-def.h | 14 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h | 81 ++++++- arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h | 3 + arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 21 +- arch/arm64/lib/insn.c | 199 ++++++++++++++++-- arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit.h | 11 +- arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 58 ++++- 10 files changed, 366 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 weeks, 3 days

2
18
0 0

Mobile World Congress Shanghai 2025 (Verified) Attendee's List!

by Delilah Murray

Hi, We're excited to offer exclusive access to the “Mobile World Congress Shanghai 2025” Visitor Contact List. Event Recap:- Date: 18 - 20 Jun 2025 Location: Shanghai, China Registrants Counts: 42,276 Visitors Contacts Data Fields Available: Individual Email Address, Cell Phone Number, Contact Name, Job Title, Company Name, Website, Physical Address, LinkedIn Profile, and more. This list gives you a direct line to your ideal audience—no gatekeepers, no guesswork. If you're interested in the list, just reply "Send me Pricing" or sample? Best regards, Delilah Murray Sr. Marketing Manager Prefer not to receive these emails? Just reply “NOT INTERESTED”.

2 weeks, 3 days

1
0
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.15 01/10] ksmbd: allow a filename to contain special characters on SMB3.1.1 posix extension

by Sasha Levin

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> [ Upstream commit dc3e0f17f74558e8a2fce00608855f050de10230 ] If client send SMB2_CREATE_POSIX_CONTEXT to ksmbd, Allow a filename to contain special characters. Reported-by: Philipp Kerling <pkerling(a)casix.org> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- Based on my analysis of both the commit message and code changes, examining the Linux kernel repository context: **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. Here's my extensive analysis: ## Nature of the Change This is a **legitimate bug fix** that addresses a functional issue where SMB3.1.1 POSIX extension clients cannot create files with characters that are valid in POSIX filesystems but blocked by ksmbd's Windows- centric filename validation. ## Code Analysis ### Key Changes: 1. **Early POSIX context detection** (lines 2906-2925): The code now checks for SMB2_CREATE_POSIX_CONTEXT early in the function 2. **Conditional validation bypass**: The critical change at lines 3161-3164 where `ksmbd_validate_filename(name)` is only called when `posix_ctxt == false` 3. **Structural improvement**: Moving POSIX context parsing before filename validation, which is the logical order ### What Gets Bypassed: The `ksmbd_validate_filename()` function normally blocks characters like `"`, `<`, `>`, `|`, `?`, `*`, and control characters. For POSIX extensions, these restrictions are inappropriate since POSIX filesystems can safely handle most of these characters. ## Security Assessment ### Low Security Risk: 1. **Limited Scope**: Only affects clients explicitly using SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions (`tcon->posix_extensions` must be enabled) 2. **VFS Protection**: Linux VFS layer provides underlying security validation 3. **No Path Traversal**: Higher-level path validation still prevents `../` sequences 4. **Standards Compliance**: Aligns with Microsoft's SMB3.1.1 POSIX extension specification ### Justification for the Change: - **User Report**: Philipp Kerling reported this as a functional issue - **Interoperability**: Essential for proper POSIX-aware SMB client functionality - **Standards Adherence**: SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions are designed to allow POSIX filename semantics ## Comparison with Similar Commits This follows the pattern of other backported ksmbd commits: - **Similar to Commit #4**: Another filename validation fix that was backported (moving leading slash check) - **Similar scope**: Limited, well-contained change to specific subsystem - **Bug fix nature**: Addresses functional issue rather than adding new features ## Stable Tree Criteria Compliance ✅ **Fixes important bug**: Enables legitimate POSIX client functionality ✅ **Small and contained**: Changes only affect POSIX extension code path ✅ **Minimal regression risk**: Protected by existing VFS validation ✅ **Clear side effects**: Well-understood behavior change ✅ **No architectural changes**: Simple conditional logic modification ## Recommendation This commit represents a **low-risk bug fix** that enables proper SMB3.1.1 POSIX extension functionality without introducing significant security vulnerabilities. The change is well-scoped, addresses a legitimate user issue, and maintains appropriate security boundaries through existing VFS-level protections. fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index f2a2be8467c66..d4058b623e9c4 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -2874,7 +2874,7 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) int req_op_level = 0, open_flags = 0, may_flags = 0, file_info = 0; int rc = 0; int contxt_cnt = 0, query_disk_id = 0; - int maximal_access_ctxt = 0, posix_ctxt = 0; + bool maximal_access_ctxt = false, posix_ctxt = false; int s_type = 0; int next_off = 0; char *name = NULL; @@ -2903,6 +2903,27 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) return create_smb2_pipe(work); } + if (req->CreateContextsOffset && tcon->posix_extensions) { + context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, SMB2_CREATE_TAG_POSIX, 16); + if (IS_ERR(context)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(context); + goto err_out2; + } else if (context) { + struct create_posix *posix = (struct create_posix *)context; + + if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) + + le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) < + sizeof(struct create_posix) - 4) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto err_out2; + } + ksmbd_debug(SMB, "get posix context\n"); + + posix_mode = le32_to_cpu(posix->Mode); + posix_ctxt = true; + } + } + if (req->NameLength) { name = smb2_get_name((char *)req + le16_to_cpu(req->NameOffset), le16_to_cpu(req->NameLength), @@ -2925,9 +2946,11 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) goto err_out2; } - rc = ksmbd_validate_filename(name); - if (rc < 0) - goto err_out2; + if (posix_ctxt == false) { + rc = ksmbd_validate_filename(name); + if (rc < 0) + goto err_out2; + } if (ksmbd_share_veto_filename(share, name)) { rc = -ENOENT; @@ -3085,28 +3108,6 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) rc = -EBADF; goto err_out2; } - - if (tcon->posix_extensions) { - context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, - SMB2_CREATE_TAG_POSIX, 16); - if (IS_ERR(context)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(context); - goto err_out2; - } else if (context) { - struct create_posix *posix = - (struct create_posix *)context; - if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) + - le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) < - sizeof(struct create_posix) - 4) { - rc = -EINVAL; - goto err_out2; - } - ksmbd_debug(SMB, "get posix context\n"); - - posix_mode = le32_to_cpu(posix->Mode); - posix_ctxt = 1; - } - } } if (ksmbd_override_fsids(work)) { -- 2.39.5

2 weeks, 3 days

2
11
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.14 01/10] ksmbd: allow a filename to contain special characters on SMB3.1.1 posix extension

by Sasha Levin

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> [ Upstream commit dc3e0f17f74558e8a2fce00608855f050de10230 ] If client send SMB2_CREATE_POSIX_CONTEXT to ksmbd, Allow a filename to contain special characters. Reported-by: Philipp Kerling <pkerling(a)casix.org> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- Based on my analysis of both the commit message and code changes, examining the Linux kernel repository context: **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. Here's my extensive analysis: ## Nature of the Change This is a **legitimate bug fix** that addresses a functional issue where SMB3.1.1 POSIX extension clients cannot create files with characters that are valid in POSIX filesystems but blocked by ksmbd's Windows- centric filename validation. ## Code Analysis ### Key Changes: 1. **Early POSIX context detection** (lines 2906-2925): The code now checks for SMB2_CREATE_POSIX_CONTEXT early in the function 2. **Conditional validation bypass**: The critical change at lines 3161-3164 where `ksmbd_validate_filename(name)` is only called when `posix_ctxt == false` 3. **Structural improvement**: Moving POSIX context parsing before filename validation, which is the logical order ### What Gets Bypassed: The `ksmbd_validate_filename()` function normally blocks characters like `"`, `<`, `>`, `|`, `?`, `*`, and control characters. For POSIX extensions, these restrictions are inappropriate since POSIX filesystems can safely handle most of these characters. ## Security Assessment ### Low Security Risk: 1. **Limited Scope**: Only affects clients explicitly using SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions (`tcon->posix_extensions` must be enabled) 2. **VFS Protection**: Linux VFS layer provides underlying security validation 3. **No Path Traversal**: Higher-level path validation still prevents `../` sequences 4. **Standards Compliance**: Aligns with Microsoft's SMB3.1.1 POSIX extension specification ### Justification for the Change: - **User Report**: Philipp Kerling reported this as a functional issue - **Interoperability**: Essential for proper POSIX-aware SMB client functionality - **Standards Adherence**: SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions are designed to allow POSIX filename semantics ## Comparison with Similar Commits This follows the pattern of other backported ksmbd commits: - **Similar to Commit #4**: Another filename validation fix that was backported (moving leading slash check) - **Similar scope**: Limited, well-contained change to specific subsystem - **Bug fix nature**: Addresses functional issue rather than adding new features ## Stable Tree Criteria Compliance ✅ **Fixes important bug**: Enables legitimate POSIX client functionality ✅ **Small and contained**: Changes only affect POSIX extension code path ✅ **Minimal regression risk**: Protected by existing VFS validation ✅ **Clear side effects**: Well-understood behavior change ✅ **No architectural changes**: Simple conditional logic modification ## Recommendation This commit represents a **low-risk bug fix** that enables proper SMB3.1.1 POSIX extension functionality without introducing significant security vulnerabilities. The change is well-scoped, addresses a legitimate user issue, and maintains appropriate security boundaries through existing VFS-level protections. fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index f2a2be8467c66..d4058b623e9c4 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -2874,7 +2874,7 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) int req_op_level = 0, open_flags = 0, may_flags = 0, file_info = 0; int rc = 0; int contxt_cnt = 0, query_disk_id = 0; - int maximal_access_ctxt = 0, posix_ctxt = 0; + bool maximal_access_ctxt = false, posix_ctxt = false; int s_type = 0; int next_off = 0; char *name = NULL; @@ -2903,6 +2903,27 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) return create_smb2_pipe(work); } + if (req->CreateContextsOffset && tcon->posix_extensions) { + context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, SMB2_CREATE_TAG_POSIX, 16); + if (IS_ERR(context)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(context); + goto err_out2; + } else if (context) { + struct create_posix *posix = (struct create_posix *)context; + + if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) + + le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) < + sizeof(struct create_posix) - 4) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto err_out2; + } + ksmbd_debug(SMB, "get posix context\n"); + + posix_mode = le32_to_cpu(posix->Mode); + posix_ctxt = true; + } + } + if (req->NameLength) { name = smb2_get_name((char *)req + le16_to_cpu(req->NameOffset), le16_to_cpu(req->NameLength), @@ -2925,9 +2946,11 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) goto err_out2; } - rc = ksmbd_validate_filename(name); - if (rc < 0) - goto err_out2; + if (posix_ctxt == false) { + rc = ksmbd_validate_filename(name); + if (rc < 0) + goto err_out2; + } if (ksmbd_share_veto_filename(share, name)) { rc = -ENOENT; @@ -3085,28 +3108,6 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) rc = -EBADF; goto err_out2; } - - if (tcon->posix_extensions) { - context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, - SMB2_CREATE_TAG_POSIX, 16); - if (IS_ERR(context)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(context); - goto err_out2; - } else if (context) { - struct create_posix *posix = - (struct create_posix *)context; - if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) + - le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) < - sizeof(struct create_posix) - 4) { - rc = -EINVAL; - goto err_out2; - } - ksmbd_debug(SMB, "get posix context\n"); - - posix_mode = le32_to_cpu(posix->Mode); - posix_ctxt = 1; - } - } } if (ksmbd_override_fsids(work)) { -- 2.39.5

2 weeks, 3 days

2
11
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 01/10] ksmbd: allow a filename to contain special characters on SMB3.1.1 posix extension

by Sasha Levin

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> [ Upstream commit dc3e0f17f74558e8a2fce00608855f050de10230 ] If client send SMB2_CREATE_POSIX_CONTEXT to ksmbd, Allow a filename to contain special characters. Reported-by: Philipp Kerling <pkerling(a)casix.org> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- Based on my analysis of both the commit message and code changes, examining the Linux kernel repository context: **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. Here's my extensive analysis: ## Nature of the Change This is a **legitimate bug fix** that addresses a functional issue where SMB3.1.1 POSIX extension clients cannot create files with characters that are valid in POSIX filesystems but blocked by ksmbd's Windows- centric filename validation. ## Code Analysis ### Key Changes: 1. **Early POSIX context detection** (lines 2906-2925): The code now checks for SMB2_CREATE_POSIX_CONTEXT early in the function 2. **Conditional validation bypass**: The critical change at lines 3161-3164 where `ksmbd_validate_filename(name)` is only called when `posix_ctxt == false` 3. **Structural improvement**: Moving POSIX context parsing before filename validation, which is the logical order ### What Gets Bypassed: The `ksmbd_validate_filename()` function normally blocks characters like `"`, `<`, `>`, `|`, `?`, `*`, and control characters. For POSIX extensions, these restrictions are inappropriate since POSIX filesystems can safely handle most of these characters. ## Security Assessment ### Low Security Risk: 1. **Limited Scope**: Only affects clients explicitly using SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions (`tcon->posix_extensions` must be enabled) 2. **VFS Protection**: Linux VFS layer provides underlying security validation 3. **No Path Traversal**: Higher-level path validation still prevents `../` sequences 4. **Standards Compliance**: Aligns with Microsoft's SMB3.1.1 POSIX extension specification ### Justification for the Change: - **User Report**: Philipp Kerling reported this as a functional issue - **Interoperability**: Essential for proper POSIX-aware SMB client functionality - **Standards Adherence**: SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions are designed to allow POSIX filename semantics ## Comparison with Similar Commits This follows the pattern of other backported ksmbd commits: - **Similar to Commit #4**: Another filename validation fix that was backported (moving leading slash check) - **Similar scope**: Limited, well-contained change to specific subsystem - **Bug fix nature**: Addresses functional issue rather than adding new features ## Stable Tree Criteria Compliance ✅ **Fixes important bug**: Enables legitimate POSIX client functionality ✅ **Small and contained**: Changes only affect POSIX extension code path ✅ **Minimal regression risk**: Protected by existing VFS validation ✅ **Clear side effects**: Well-understood behavior change ✅ **No architectural changes**: Simple conditional logic modification ## Recommendation This commit represents a **low-risk bug fix** that enables proper SMB3.1.1 POSIX extension functionality without introducing significant security vulnerabilities. The change is well-scoped, addresses a legitimate user issue, and maintains appropriate security boundaries through existing VFS-level protections. fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index 08d9a7cfba8cd..815ee5a74901e 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -2870,7 +2870,7 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) int req_op_level = 0, open_flags = 0, may_flags = 0, file_info = 0; int rc = 0; int contxt_cnt = 0, query_disk_id = 0; - int maximal_access_ctxt = 0, posix_ctxt = 0; + bool maximal_access_ctxt = false, posix_ctxt = false; int s_type = 0; int next_off = 0; char *name = NULL; @@ -2897,6 +2897,27 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) return create_smb2_pipe(work); } + if (req->CreateContextsOffset && tcon->posix_extensions) { + context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, SMB2_CREATE_TAG_POSIX, 16); + if (IS_ERR(context)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(context); + goto err_out2; + } else if (context) { + struct create_posix *posix = (struct create_posix *)context; + + if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) + + le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) < + sizeof(struct create_posix) - 4) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto err_out2; + } + ksmbd_debug(SMB, "get posix context\n"); + + posix_mode = le32_to_cpu(posix->Mode); + posix_ctxt = true; + } + } + if (req->NameLength) { name = smb2_get_name((char *)req + le16_to_cpu(req->NameOffset), le16_to_cpu(req->NameLength), @@ -2919,9 +2940,11 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) goto err_out2; } - rc = ksmbd_validate_filename(name); - if (rc < 0) - goto err_out2; + if (posix_ctxt == false) { + rc = ksmbd_validate_filename(name); + if (rc < 0) + goto err_out2; + } if (ksmbd_share_veto_filename(share, name)) { rc = -ENOENT; @@ -3079,28 +3102,6 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) rc = -EBADF; goto err_out2; } - - if (tcon->posix_extensions) { - context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, - SMB2_CREATE_TAG_POSIX, 16); - if (IS_ERR(context)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(context); - goto err_out2; - } else if (context) { - struct create_posix *posix = - (struct create_posix *)context; - if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) + - le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) < - sizeof(struct create_posix) - 4) { - rc = -EINVAL; - goto err_out2; - } - ksmbd_debug(SMB, "get posix context\n"); - - posix_mode = le32_to_cpu(posix->Mode); - posix_ctxt = 1; - } - } } if (ksmbd_override_fsids(work)) { -- 2.39.5

2 weeks, 3 days

2
11
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.6 1/8] ksmbd: allow a filename to contain special characters on SMB3.1.1 posix extension

by Sasha Levin

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> [ Upstream commit dc3e0f17f74558e8a2fce00608855f050de10230 ] If client send SMB2_CREATE_POSIX_CONTEXT to ksmbd, Allow a filename to contain special characters. Reported-by: Philipp Kerling <pkerling(a)casix.org> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- Based on my analysis of both the commit message and code changes, examining the Linux kernel repository context: **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. Here's my extensive analysis: ## Nature of the Change This is a **legitimate bug fix** that addresses a functional issue where SMB3.1.1 POSIX extension clients cannot create files with characters that are valid in POSIX filesystems but blocked by ksmbd's Windows- centric filename validation. ## Code Analysis ### Key Changes: 1. **Early POSIX context detection** (lines 2906-2925): The code now checks for SMB2_CREATE_POSIX_CONTEXT early in the function 2. **Conditional validation bypass**: The critical change at lines 3161-3164 where `ksmbd_validate_filename(name)` is only called when `posix_ctxt == false` 3. **Structural improvement**: Moving POSIX context parsing before filename validation, which is the logical order ### What Gets Bypassed: The `ksmbd_validate_filename()` function normally blocks characters like `"`, `<`, `>`, `|`, `?`, `*`, and control characters. For POSIX extensions, these restrictions are inappropriate since POSIX filesystems can safely handle most of these characters. ## Security Assessment ### Low Security Risk: 1. **Limited Scope**: Only affects clients explicitly using SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions (`tcon->posix_extensions` must be enabled) 2. **VFS Protection**: Linux VFS layer provides underlying security validation 3. **No Path Traversal**: Higher-level path validation still prevents `../` sequences 4. **Standards Compliance**: Aligns with Microsoft's SMB3.1.1 POSIX extension specification ### Justification for the Change: - **User Report**: Philipp Kerling reported this as a functional issue - **Interoperability**: Essential for proper POSIX-aware SMB client functionality - **Standards Adherence**: SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions are designed to allow POSIX filename semantics ## Comparison with Similar Commits This follows the pattern of other backported ksmbd commits: - **Similar to Commit #4**: Another filename validation fix that was backported (moving leading slash check) - **Similar scope**: Limited, well-contained change to specific subsystem - **Bug fix nature**: Addresses functional issue rather than adding new features ## Stable Tree Criteria Compliance ✅ **Fixes important bug**: Enables legitimate POSIX client functionality ✅ **Small and contained**: Changes only affect POSIX extension code path ✅ **Minimal regression risk**: Protected by existing VFS validation ✅ **Clear side effects**: Well-understood behavior change ✅ **No architectural changes**: Simple conditional logic modification ## Recommendation This commit represents a **low-risk bug fix** that enables proper SMB3.1.1 POSIX extension functionality without introducing significant security vulnerabilities. The change is well-scoped, addresses a legitimate user issue, and maintains appropriate security boundaries through existing VFS-level protections. fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index 9bd817427a345..af360ba237a37 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -2861,7 +2861,7 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) int req_op_level = 0, open_flags = 0, may_flags = 0, file_info = 0; int rc = 0; int contxt_cnt = 0, query_disk_id = 0; - int maximal_access_ctxt = 0, posix_ctxt = 0; + bool maximal_access_ctxt = false, posix_ctxt = false; int s_type = 0; int next_off = 0; char *name = NULL; @@ -2888,6 +2888,27 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) return create_smb2_pipe(work); } + if (req->CreateContextsOffset && tcon->posix_extensions) { + context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, SMB2_CREATE_TAG_POSIX, 16); + if (IS_ERR(context)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(context); + goto err_out2; + } else if (context) { + struct create_posix *posix = (struct create_posix *)context; + + if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) + + le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) < + sizeof(struct create_posix) - 4) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto err_out2; + } + ksmbd_debug(SMB, "get posix context\n"); + + posix_mode = le32_to_cpu(posix->Mode); + posix_ctxt = true; + } + } + if (req->NameLength) { name = smb2_get_name((char *)req + le16_to_cpu(req->NameOffset), le16_to_cpu(req->NameLength), @@ -2910,9 +2931,11 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) goto err_out2; } - rc = ksmbd_validate_filename(name); - if (rc < 0) - goto err_out2; + if (posix_ctxt == false) { + rc = ksmbd_validate_filename(name); + if (rc < 0) + goto err_out2; + } if (ksmbd_share_veto_filename(share, name)) { rc = -ENOENT; @@ -3070,28 +3093,6 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) rc = -EBADF; goto err_out2; } - - if (tcon->posix_extensions) { - context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, - SMB2_CREATE_TAG_POSIX, 16); - if (IS_ERR(context)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(context); - goto err_out2; - } else if (context) { - struct create_posix *posix = - (struct create_posix *)context; - if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) + - le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) < - sizeof(struct create_posix) - 4) { - rc = -EINVAL; - goto err_out2; - } - ksmbd_debug(SMB, "get posix context\n"); - - posix_mode = le32_to_cpu(posix->Mode); - posix_ctxt = 1; - } - } } if (ksmbd_override_fsids(work)) { -- 2.39.5

2 weeks, 3 days

2
8
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.1 1/5] ksmbd: allow a filename to contain special characters on SMB3.1.1 posix extension

by Sasha Levin

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> [ Upstream commit dc3e0f17f74558e8a2fce00608855f050de10230 ] If client send SMB2_CREATE_POSIX_CONTEXT to ksmbd, Allow a filename to contain special characters. Reported-by: Philipp Kerling <pkerling(a)casix.org> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- Based on my analysis of both the commit message and code changes, examining the Linux kernel repository context: **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. Here's my extensive analysis: ## Nature of the Change This is a **legitimate bug fix** that addresses a functional issue where SMB3.1.1 POSIX extension clients cannot create files with characters that are valid in POSIX filesystems but blocked by ksmbd's Windows- centric filename validation. ## Code Analysis ### Key Changes: 1. **Early POSIX context detection** (lines 2906-2925): The code now checks for SMB2_CREATE_POSIX_CONTEXT early in the function 2. **Conditional validation bypass**: The critical change at lines 3161-3164 where `ksmbd_validate_filename(name)` is only called when `posix_ctxt == false` 3. **Structural improvement**: Moving POSIX context parsing before filename validation, which is the logical order ### What Gets Bypassed: The `ksmbd_validate_filename()` function normally blocks characters like `"`, `<`, `>`, `|`, `?`, `*`, and control characters. For POSIX extensions, these restrictions are inappropriate since POSIX filesystems can safely handle most of these characters. ## Security Assessment ### Low Security Risk: 1. **Limited Scope**: Only affects clients explicitly using SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions (`tcon->posix_extensions` must be enabled) 2. **VFS Protection**: Linux VFS layer provides underlying security validation 3. **No Path Traversal**: Higher-level path validation still prevents `../` sequences 4. **Standards Compliance**: Aligns with Microsoft's SMB3.1.1 POSIX extension specification ### Justification for the Change: - **User Report**: Philipp Kerling reported this as a functional issue - **Interoperability**: Essential for proper POSIX-aware SMB client functionality - **Standards Adherence**: SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions are designed to allow POSIX filename semantics ## Comparison with Similar Commits This follows the pattern of other backported ksmbd commits: - **Similar to Commit #4**: Another filename validation fix that was backported (moving leading slash check) - **Similar scope**: Limited, well-contained change to specific subsystem - **Bug fix nature**: Addresses functional issue rather than adding new features ## Stable Tree Criteria Compliance ✅ **Fixes important bug**: Enables legitimate POSIX client functionality ✅ **Small and contained**: Changes only affect POSIX extension code path ✅ **Minimal regression risk**: Protected by existing VFS validation ✅ **Clear side effects**: Well-understood behavior change ✅ **No architectural changes**: Simple conditional logic modification ## Recommendation This commit represents a **low-risk bug fix** that enables proper SMB3.1.1 POSIX extension functionality without introducing significant security vulnerabilities. The change is well-scoped, addresses a legitimate user issue, and maintains appropriate security boundaries through existing VFS-level protections. fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index 9b1ba4aedbce7..c591255335058 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -2685,7 +2685,7 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) int req_op_level = 0, open_flags = 0, may_flags = 0, file_info = 0; int rc = 0; int contxt_cnt = 0, query_disk_id = 0; - int maximal_access_ctxt = 0, posix_ctxt = 0; + bool maximal_access_ctxt = false, posix_ctxt = false; int s_type = 0; int next_off = 0; char *name = NULL; @@ -2712,6 +2712,27 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) return create_smb2_pipe(work); } + if (req->CreateContextsOffset && tcon->posix_extensions) { + context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, SMB2_CREATE_TAG_POSIX, 16); + if (IS_ERR(context)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(context); + goto err_out2; + } else if (context) { + struct create_posix *posix = (struct create_posix *)context; + + if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) + + le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) < + sizeof(struct create_posix) - 4) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto err_out2; + } + ksmbd_debug(SMB, "get posix context\n"); + + posix_mode = le32_to_cpu(posix->Mode); + posix_ctxt = true; + } + } + if (req->NameLength) { if ((req->CreateOptions & FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE_LE) && *(char *)req->Buffer == '\\') { @@ -2743,9 +2764,11 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) goto err_out2; } - rc = ksmbd_validate_filename(name); - if (rc < 0) - goto err_out2; + if (posix_ctxt == false) { + rc = ksmbd_validate_filename(name); + if (rc < 0) + goto err_out2; + } if (ksmbd_share_veto_filename(share, name)) { rc = -ENOENT; @@ -2860,28 +2883,6 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) rc = -EBADF; goto err_out2; } - - if (tcon->posix_extensions) { - context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, - SMB2_CREATE_TAG_POSIX, 16); - if (IS_ERR(context)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(context); - goto err_out2; - } else if (context) { - struct create_posix *posix = - (struct create_posix *)context; - if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) + - le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) < - sizeof(struct create_posix) - 4) { - rc = -EINVAL; - goto err_out2; - } - ksmbd_debug(SMB, "get posix context\n"); - - posix_mode = le32_to_cpu(posix->Mode); - posix_ctxt = 1; - } - } } if (ksmbd_override_fsids(work)) { -- 2.39.5

2 weeks, 3 days

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[PATCH] net: core: fix UNIX-STREAM alignment in /proc/net/protocols

by moyuanhao3676＠163.com

From: MoYuanhao <moyuanhao3676(a)163.com> Widen protocol name column from %-9s to %-11s to properly display UNIX-STREAM and keep table alignment. before modification： console:/ # cat /proc/net/protocols protocol size sockets memory press maxhdr slab module cl co di ac io in de sh ss gs se re sp bi br ha uh gp em PPPOL2TP 920 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n HIDP 808 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n BNEP 808 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n RFCOMM 840 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n KEY 864 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n PACKET 1536 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n PINGv6 1184 0 -1 NI 0 yes kernel y y y n n y n n y y y y n y y y y y n RAWv6 1184 0 -1 NI 0 yes kernel y y y n y y y n y y y y n y y y y n n UDPLITEv6 1344 0 0 NI 0 yes kernel y y y n y y y n y y y y n n n y y y n UDPv6 1344 0 0 NI 0 yes kernel y y y n y y y n y y y y n n n y y y n TCPv6 2352 0 0 no 320 yes kernel y y y y y y y y y y y y y n y y y y y PPTP 920 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n PPPOE 920 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n UNIX-STREAM 1024 29 -1 NI 0 yes kernel y n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n y n n UNIX 1024 193 -1 NI 0 yes kernel y n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n UDP-Lite 1152 0 0 NI 0 yes kernel y y y n y y y n y y y y y n n y y y n PING 976 0 -1 NI 0 yes kernel y y y n n y n n y y y y n y y y y y n RAW 984 0 -1 NI 0 yes kernel y y y n y y y n y y y y n y y y y n n UDP 1152 0 0 NI 0 yes kernel y y y n y y y n y y y y y n n y y y n TCP 2192 0 0 no 320 yes kernel y y y y y y y y y y y y y n y y y y y SCO 848 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n L2CAP 824 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n HCI 888 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n NETLINK 1104 18 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n after modification: console:/ # cat /proc/net/protocols protocol size sockets memory press maxhdr slab module cl co di ac io in de sh ss gs se re sp bi br ha uh gp em PPPOL2TP 920 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n HIDP 808 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n BNEP 808 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n RFCOMM 840 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n KEY 864 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n PACKET 1536 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n PINGv6 1184 0 -1 NI 0 yes kernel y y y n n y n n y y y y n y y y y y n RAWv6 1184 0 -1 NI 0 yes kernel y y y n y y y n y y y y n y y y y n n UDPLITEv6 1344 0 0 NI 0 yes kernel y y y n y y y n y y y y n n n y y y n UDPv6 1344 0 0 NI 0 yes kernel y y y n y y y n y y y y n n n y y y n TCPv6 2352 0 0 no 320 yes kernel y y y y y y y y y y y y y n y y y y y PPTP 920 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n PPPOE 920 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n UNIX-STREAM 1024 29 -1 NI 0 yes kernel y n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n y n n UNIX 1024 193 -1 NI 0 yes kernel y n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n UDP-Lite 1152 0 0 NI 0 yes kernel y y y n y y y n y y y y y n n y y y n PING 976 0 -1 NI 0 yes kernel y y y n n y n n y y y y n y y y y y n RAW 984 0 -1 NI 0 yes kernel y y y n y y y n y y y y n y y y y n n UDP 1152 0 0 NI 0 yes kernel y y y n y y y n y y y y y n n y y y n TCP 2192 0 0 no 320 yes kernel y y y y y y y y y y y y y n y y y y y SCO 848 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n L2CAP 824 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n HCI 888 0 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n NETLINK 1104 18 -1 NI 0 no kernel n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: MoYuanhao <moyuanhao3676(a)163.com> --- net/core/sock.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 3b409bc8ef6d..d2de5459e94f 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -4284,7 +4284,7 @@ static const char *sock_prot_memory_pressure(struct proto *proto) static void proto_seq_printf(struct seq_file *seq, struct proto *proto) { - seq_printf(seq, "%-9s %4u %6d %6ld %-3s %6u %-3s %-10s " + seq_printf(seq, "%-11s %4u %6d %6ld %-3s %6u %-3s %-10s " "%2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c %2c\n", proto->name, proto->obj_size, @@ -4317,7 +4317,7 @@ static void proto_seq_printf(struct seq_file *seq, struct proto *proto) static int proto_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { if (v == &proto_list) - seq_printf(seq, "%-9s %-4s %-8s %-6s %-5s %-7s %-4s %-10s %s", + seq_printf(seq, "%-11s %-4s %-8s %-6s %-5s %-7s %-4s %-10s %s", "protocol", "size", "sockets", -- 2.34.1

2 weeks, 3 days

3
2
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[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 1/2] Revert "iommu/amd: Prevent binding other PCI drivers to IOMMU PCI devices"

by Sasha Levin

From: Lukas Wunner <lukas(a)wunner.de> [ Upstream commit 3be5fa236649da6404f1bca1491bf02d4b0d5cce ] Commit 991de2e59090 ("PCI, x86: Implement pcibios_alloc_irq() and pcibios_free_irq()") changed IRQ handling on PCI driver probing. It inadvertently broke resume from system sleep on AMD platforms: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20150926164651.GA3640@pd.tnic/ This was fixed by two independent commits: * 8affb487d4a4 ("x86/PCI: Don't alloc pcibios-irq when MSI is enabled") * cbbc00be2ce3 ("iommu/amd: Prevent binding other PCI drivers to IOMMU PCI devices") The breaking change and one of these two fixes were subsequently reverted: * fe25d078874f ("Revert "x86/PCI: Don't alloc pcibios-irq when MSI is enabled"") * 6c777e8799a9 ("Revert "PCI, x86: Implement pcibios_alloc_irq() and pcibios_free_irq()"") This rendered the second fix unnecessary, so revert it as well. It used the match_driver flag in struct pci_dev, which is internal to the PCI core and not supposed to be touched by arbitrary drivers. Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas(a)wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Wilczyński <kwilczynski(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel(a)suse.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/9a3ddff5cc49512044f963ba0904347bd404094d.174557234… Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. **Extensive Analysis:** **1. Context and Purpose:** This commit is part of a coordinated series of reverts addressing regressions introduced by commit 991de2e59090 ("PCI, x86: Implement pcibios_alloc_irq() and pcibios_free_irq()") which broke system suspend/resume on AMD platforms in v4.3. The original issue was fixed by two independent commits, one of which (cbbc00be2ce3) added the line `iommu->dev->match_driver = false;` to prevent other PCI drivers from binding to IOMMU devices. **2. Code Change Analysis:** The commit removes exactly one line from `drivers/iommu/amd/init.c:2034`: ```c /* Prevent binding other PCI device drivers to IOMMU devices */ iommu->dev->match_driver = false; ``` This line was setting the `match_driver` field of `struct pci_dev`, which the commit message correctly identifies as "internal to the PCI core and not supposed to be touched by arbitrary drivers." **3. Why This Should Be Backported:** **a) Part of Coordinated Fix Series:** This revert is the logical completion of a series of reverts that fixed major regressions. Looking at the similar commits provided as examples: - Similar Commit #1 (YES): Revert of x86/PCI pcibios-irq allocation - Similar Commit #2 (YES): Revert of PCI IRQ management helpers - Similar Commit #5 (YES): Revert of the original problematic pcibios_alloc_irq implementation All these related reverts were marked for backporting, making this commit part of the same logical fix series. **b) Removes Inappropriate Code:** The commit eliminates code that violates kernel design principles by accessing internal PCI core structures from a driver. The `match_driver` field is not meant to be manipulated by individual drivers. **c) Cleanup After Main Fix:** Once the root cause (commit 991de2e59090) was reverted by commit 6c777e8799a9, the workaround became unnecessary. Keeping unnecessary workaround code, especially code that inappropriately accesses internal structures, is problematic. **d) Minimal Risk:** The change is extremely small and low-risk - it simply removes one line that was setting an internal field inappropriately. **e) Consistency and Completeness:** Since the other reverts in this series addressing the 991de2e59090 regressions were backported, this should be included for consistency and to ensure the cleanup is complete. **4. Stable Tree Criteria Met:** - ✅ Fixes inappropriate driver behavior (accessing internal PCI structures) - ✅ Small and contained change - ✅ Part of a series addressing known regressions - ✅ Minimal risk of introducing new issues - ✅ Consistent with backporting decisions for related commits The commit represents necessary cleanup after a coordinated regression fix and should be backported to maintain consistency with the related reverts and to remove code that inappropriately accesses internal kernel structures. drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c index de29512c75ccc..cd17deeedf349 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c @@ -1751,9 +1751,6 @@ static int __init iommu_init_pci(struct amd_iommu *iommu) if (!iommu->dev) return -ENODEV; - /* Prevent binding other PCI device drivers to IOMMU devices */ - iommu->dev->match_driver = false; - /* ACPI _PRT won't have an IRQ for IOMMU */ iommu->dev->irq_managed = 1; -- 2.39.5

2 weeks, 4 days

1
1
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[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 1/2] Revert "iommu/amd: Prevent binding other PCI drivers to IOMMU PCI devices"

by Sasha Levin

From: Lukas Wunner <lukas(a)wunner.de> [ Upstream commit 3be5fa236649da6404f1bca1491bf02d4b0d5cce ] Commit 991de2e59090 ("PCI, x86: Implement pcibios_alloc_irq() and pcibios_free_irq()") changed IRQ handling on PCI driver probing. It inadvertently broke resume from system sleep on AMD platforms: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20150926164651.GA3640@pd.tnic/ This was fixed by two independent commits: * 8affb487d4a4 ("x86/PCI: Don't alloc pcibios-irq when MSI is enabled") * cbbc00be2ce3 ("iommu/amd: Prevent binding other PCI drivers to IOMMU PCI devices") The breaking change and one of these two fixes were subsequently reverted: * fe25d078874f ("Revert "x86/PCI: Don't alloc pcibios-irq when MSI is enabled"") * 6c777e8799a9 ("Revert "PCI, x86: Implement pcibios_alloc_irq() and pcibios_free_irq()"") This rendered the second fix unnecessary, so revert it as well. It used the match_driver flag in struct pci_dev, which is internal to the PCI core and not supposed to be touched by arbitrary drivers. Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas(a)wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Wilczyński <kwilczynski(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel(a)suse.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/9a3ddff5cc49512044f963ba0904347bd404094d.174557234… Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. **Extensive Analysis:** **1. Context and Purpose:** This commit is part of a coordinated series of reverts addressing regressions introduced by commit 991de2e59090 ("PCI, x86: Implement pcibios_alloc_irq() and pcibios_free_irq()") which broke system suspend/resume on AMD platforms in v4.3. The original issue was fixed by two independent commits, one of which (cbbc00be2ce3) added the line `iommu->dev->match_driver = false;` to prevent other PCI drivers from binding to IOMMU devices. **2. Code Change Analysis:** The commit removes exactly one line from `drivers/iommu/amd/init.c:2034`: ```c /* Prevent binding other PCI device drivers to IOMMU devices */ iommu->dev->match_driver = false; ``` This line was setting the `match_driver` field of `struct pci_dev`, which the commit message correctly identifies as "internal to the PCI core and not supposed to be touched by arbitrary drivers." **3. Why This Should Be Backported:** **a) Part of Coordinated Fix Series:** This revert is the logical completion of a series of reverts that fixed major regressions. Looking at the similar commits provided as examples: - Similar Commit #1 (YES): Revert of x86/PCI pcibios-irq allocation - Similar Commit #2 (YES): Revert of PCI IRQ management helpers - Similar Commit #5 (YES): Revert of the original problematic pcibios_alloc_irq implementation All these related reverts were marked for backporting, making this commit part of the same logical fix series. **b) Removes Inappropriate Code:** The commit eliminates code that violates kernel design principles by accessing internal PCI core structures from a driver. The `match_driver` field is not meant to be manipulated by individual drivers. **c) Cleanup After Main Fix:** Once the root cause (commit 991de2e59090) was reverted by commit 6c777e8799a9, the workaround became unnecessary. Keeping unnecessary workaround code, especially code that inappropriately accesses internal structures, is problematic. **d) Minimal Risk:** The change is extremely small and low-risk - it simply removes one line that was setting an internal field inappropriately. **e) Consistency and Completeness:** Since the other reverts in this series addressing the 991de2e59090 regressions were backported, this should be included for consistency and to ensure the cleanup is complete. **4. Stable Tree Criteria Met:** - ✅ Fixes inappropriate driver behavior (accessing internal PCI structures) - ✅ Small and contained change - ✅ Part of a series addressing known regressions - ✅ Minimal risk of introducing new issues - ✅ Consistent with backporting decisions for related commits The commit represents necessary cleanup after a coordinated regression fix and should be backported to maintain consistency with the related reverts and to remove code that inappropriately accesses internal kernel structures. drivers/iommu/amd/init.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c index e09391ab3deb0..752edbf529f5f 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c @@ -1876,9 +1876,6 @@ static int __init iommu_init_pci(struct amd_iommu *iommu) if (!iommu->dev) return -ENODEV; - /* Prevent binding other PCI device drivers to IOMMU devices */ - iommu->dev->match_driver = false; - /* ACPI _PRT won't have an IRQ for IOMMU */ iommu->dev->irq_managed = 1; -- 2.39.5

2 weeks, 4 days

1
1
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