March 2025 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: x86: Load DR6 with guest value only before entering" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x c2fee09fc167c74a64adb08656cb993ea475197e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021815-protract-greasily-cdea@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From c2fee09fc167c74a64adb08656cb993ea475197e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2025 17:18:33 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Load DR6 with guest value only before entering .vcpu_run() loop Move the conditional loading of hardware DR6 with the guest's DR6 value out of the core .vcpu_run() loop to fix a bug where KVM can load hardware with a stale vcpu->arch.dr6. When the guest accesses a DR and host userspace isn't debugging the guest, KVM disables DR interception and loads the guest's values into hardware on VM-Enter and saves them on VM-Exit. This allows the guest to access DRs at will, e.g. so that a sequence of DR accesses to configure a breakpoint only generates one VM-Exit. For DR0-DR3, the logic/behavior is identical between VMX and SVM, and also identical between KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED (userspace debugging the guest) and KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT (guest using DRs), and so KVM handles loading DR0-DR3 in common code, _outside_ of the core kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_run() loop. But for DR6, the guest's value doesn't need to be loaded into hardware for KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED, and SVM provides a dedicated VMCB field whereas VMX requires software to manually load the guest value, and so loading the guest's value into DR6 is handled by {svm,vmx}_vcpu_run(), i.e. is done _inside_ the core run loop. Unfortunately, saving the guest values on VM-Exit is initiated by common x86, again outside of the core run loop. If the guest modifies DR6 (in hardware, when DR interception is disabled), and then the next VM-Exit is a fastpath VM-Exit, KVM will reload hardware DR6 with vcpu->arch.dr6 and clobber the guest's actual value. The bug shows up primarily with nested VMX because KVM handles the VMX preemption timer in the fastpath, and the window between hardware DR6 being modified (in guest context) and DR6 being read by guest software is orders of magnitude larger in a nested setup. E.g. in non-nested, the VMX preemption timer would need to fire precisely between #DB injection and the #DB handler's read of DR6, whereas with a KVM-on-KVM setup, the window where hardware DR6 is "dirty" extends all the way from L1 writing DR6 to VMRESUME (in L1). L1's view: ========== <L1 disables DR interception> CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640961: kvm_entry: vcpu 0 A: L1 Writes DR6 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640963: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff1 B: CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640967: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT intr_info 0x800000ec D: L1 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640969: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640976: kvm_entry: vcpu 0 L2 reads DR6, L1 disables DR interception CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640980: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: kvm_entry: vcpu 0 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 L2 detects failure CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640987: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason HLT L1 reads DR6 (confirms failure) CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640990: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 L0's view: ========== L2 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216 L2 => L1 nested VM-Exit CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit_inject: reason: DR_ACCESS ext_inf1: 0x0000000000000216 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_entry: vcpu 23 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMREAD CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_entry: vcpu 23 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMREAD CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_entry: vcpu 23 L1 writes DR7, L0 disables DR interception CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000007 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005613: kvm_entry: vcpu 23 L0 writes DR6 = 0 (arch.dr6) CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005613: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 A: <L1 writes DR6 = 1, no interception, arch.dr6 is still '0'> B: CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason PREEMPTION_TIMER CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: kvm_entry: vcpu 23 C: L0 writes DR6 = 0 (arch.dr6) CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 L1 => L2 nested VM-Enter CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005616: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMRESUME L0 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0 Reported-by: John Stultz <jstultz(a)google.com> Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANDhNCq5_F3HfFYABqFGCA1bPd_%2BxgNj-iDQhH4tDk%2Bw… Fixes: 375e28ffc0cf ("KVM: X86: Set host DR6 only on VMX and for KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT") Fixes: d67668e9dd76 ("KVM: x86, SVM: isolate vcpu->arch.dr6 from vmcb->save.dr6") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com> Tested-by: John Stultz <jstultz(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250125011833.3644371-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h index c35550581da0..823c0434bbad 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(set_idt) KVM_X86_OP(get_gdt) KVM_X86_OP(set_gdt) KVM_X86_OP(sync_dirty_debug_regs) +KVM_X86_OP(set_dr6) KVM_X86_OP(set_dr7) KVM_X86_OP(cache_reg) KVM_X86_OP(get_rflags) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index b15cde0a9b5c..0b7af5902ff7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -1696,6 +1696,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { void (*get_gdt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); void (*set_gdt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); void (*sync_dirty_debug_regs)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + void (*set_dr6)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value); void (*set_dr7)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value); void (*cache_reg)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg); unsigned long (*get_rflags)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 7640a84e554a..a713c803a3a3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -1991,11 +1991,11 @@ static void new_asid(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct svm_cpu_data *sd) svm->asid = sd->next_asid++; } -static void svm_set_dr6(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned long value) +static void svm_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value) { - struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb; + struct vmcb *vmcb = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb; - if (svm->vcpu.arch.guest_state_protected) + if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected) return; if (unlikely(value != vmcb->save.dr6)) { @@ -4247,10 +4247,8 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, * Run with all-zero DR6 unless needed, so that we can get the exact cause * of a #DB. */ - if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) - svm_set_dr6(svm, vcpu->arch.dr6); - else - svm_set_dr6(svm, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW); + if (likely(!(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))) + svm_set_dr6(vcpu, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW); clgi(); kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu); @@ -5043,6 +5041,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = { .set_idt = svm_set_idt, .get_gdt = svm_get_gdt, .set_gdt = svm_set_gdt, + .set_dr6 = svm_set_dr6, .set_dr7 = svm_set_dr7, .sync_dirty_debug_regs = svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs, .cache_reg = svm_cache_reg, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c index 2427f918e763..43ee9ed11291 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .set_idt = vmx_set_idt, .get_gdt = vmx_get_gdt, .set_gdt = vmx_set_gdt, + .set_dr6 = vmx_set_dr6, .set_dr7 = vmx_set_dr7, .sync_dirty_debug_regs = vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs, .cache_reg = vmx_cache_reg, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index f72835e85b6d..6c56d5235f0f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -5648,6 +5648,12 @@ void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) set_debugreg(DR6_RESERVED, 6); } +void vmx_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val) +{ + lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled(); + set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6); +} + void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val) { vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, val); @@ -7417,10 +7423,6 @@ fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool force_immediate_exit) vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4; } - /* When KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT, dr6 is accessible in guest. */ - if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) - set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6); - /* When single-stepping over STI and MOV SS, we must clear the * corresponding interruptibility bits in the guest state. Otherwise * vmentry fails as it then expects bit 14 (BS) in pending debug diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h index ce3295a67c04..430773a5ef8e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ void vmx_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); void vmx_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); void vmx_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); void vmx_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); +void vmx_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val); void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val); void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 8e77e61d4fbd..02159c967d29 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -10961,6 +10961,9 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[1], 1); set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[2], 2); set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[3], 3); + /* When KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT, dr6 is accessible in guest. */ + if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) + kvm_x86_call(set_dr6)(vcpu, vcpu->arch.dr6); } else if (unlikely(hw_breakpoint_active())) { set_debugreg(0, 7); }

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: x86: Load DR6 with guest value only before entering" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x c2fee09fc167c74a64adb08656cb993ea475197e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021809-census-mammal-224b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From c2fee09fc167c74a64adb08656cb993ea475197e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2025 17:18:33 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Load DR6 with guest value only before entering .vcpu_run() loop Move the conditional loading of hardware DR6 with the guest's DR6 value out of the core .vcpu_run() loop to fix a bug where KVM can load hardware with a stale vcpu->arch.dr6. When the guest accesses a DR and host userspace isn't debugging the guest, KVM disables DR interception and loads the guest's values into hardware on VM-Enter and saves them on VM-Exit. This allows the guest to access DRs at will, e.g. so that a sequence of DR accesses to configure a breakpoint only generates one VM-Exit. For DR0-DR3, the logic/behavior is identical between VMX and SVM, and also identical between KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED (userspace debugging the guest) and KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT (guest using DRs), and so KVM handles loading DR0-DR3 in common code, _outside_ of the core kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_run() loop. But for DR6, the guest's value doesn't need to be loaded into hardware for KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED, and SVM provides a dedicated VMCB field whereas VMX requires software to manually load the guest value, and so loading the guest's value into DR6 is handled by {svm,vmx}_vcpu_run(), i.e. is done _inside_ the core run loop. Unfortunately, saving the guest values on VM-Exit is initiated by common x86, again outside of the core run loop. If the guest modifies DR6 (in hardware, when DR interception is disabled), and then the next VM-Exit is a fastpath VM-Exit, KVM will reload hardware DR6 with vcpu->arch.dr6 and clobber the guest's actual value. The bug shows up primarily with nested VMX because KVM handles the VMX preemption timer in the fastpath, and the window between hardware DR6 being modified (in guest context) and DR6 being read by guest software is orders of magnitude larger in a nested setup. E.g. in non-nested, the VMX preemption timer would need to fire precisely between #DB injection and the #DB handler's read of DR6, whereas with a KVM-on-KVM setup, the window where hardware DR6 is "dirty" extends all the way from L1 writing DR6 to VMRESUME (in L1). L1's view: ========== <L1 disables DR interception> CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640961: kvm_entry: vcpu 0 A: L1 Writes DR6 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640963: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff1 B: CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640967: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT intr_info 0x800000ec D: L1 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640969: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640976: kvm_entry: vcpu 0 L2 reads DR6, L1 disables DR interception CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640980: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: kvm_entry: vcpu 0 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 L2 detects failure CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640987: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason HLT L1 reads DR6 (confirms failure) CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640990: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 L0's view: ========== L2 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216 L2 => L1 nested VM-Exit CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit_inject: reason: DR_ACCESS ext_inf1: 0x0000000000000216 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_entry: vcpu 23 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMREAD CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_entry: vcpu 23 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMREAD CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_entry: vcpu 23 L1 writes DR7, L0 disables DR interception CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000007 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005613: kvm_entry: vcpu 23 L0 writes DR6 = 0 (arch.dr6) CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005613: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 A: <L1 writes DR6 = 1, no interception, arch.dr6 is still '0'> B: CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason PREEMPTION_TIMER CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: kvm_entry: vcpu 23 C: L0 writes DR6 = 0 (arch.dr6) CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 L1 => L2 nested VM-Enter CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005616: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMRESUME L0 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0 Reported-by: John Stultz <jstultz(a)google.com> Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANDhNCq5_F3HfFYABqFGCA1bPd_%2BxgNj-iDQhH4tDk%2Bw… Fixes: 375e28ffc0cf ("KVM: X86: Set host DR6 only on VMX and for KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT") Fixes: d67668e9dd76 ("KVM: x86, SVM: isolate vcpu->arch.dr6 from vmcb->save.dr6") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com> Tested-by: John Stultz <jstultz(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250125011833.3644371-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h index c35550581da0..823c0434bbad 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(set_idt) KVM_X86_OP(get_gdt) KVM_X86_OP(set_gdt) KVM_X86_OP(sync_dirty_debug_regs) +KVM_X86_OP(set_dr6) KVM_X86_OP(set_dr7) KVM_X86_OP(cache_reg) KVM_X86_OP(get_rflags) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index b15cde0a9b5c..0b7af5902ff7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -1696,6 +1696,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { void (*get_gdt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); void (*set_gdt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); void (*sync_dirty_debug_regs)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + void (*set_dr6)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value); void (*set_dr7)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value); void (*cache_reg)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg); unsigned long (*get_rflags)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 7640a84e554a..a713c803a3a3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -1991,11 +1991,11 @@ static void new_asid(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct svm_cpu_data *sd) svm->asid = sd->next_asid++; } -static void svm_set_dr6(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned long value) +static void svm_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value) { - struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb; + struct vmcb *vmcb = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb; - if (svm->vcpu.arch.guest_state_protected) + if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected) return; if (unlikely(value != vmcb->save.dr6)) { @@ -4247,10 +4247,8 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, * Run with all-zero DR6 unless needed, so that we can get the exact cause * of a #DB. */ - if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) - svm_set_dr6(svm, vcpu->arch.dr6); - else - svm_set_dr6(svm, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW); + if (likely(!(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))) + svm_set_dr6(vcpu, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW); clgi(); kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu); @@ -5043,6 +5041,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = { .set_idt = svm_set_idt, .get_gdt = svm_get_gdt, .set_gdt = svm_set_gdt, + .set_dr6 = svm_set_dr6, .set_dr7 = svm_set_dr7, .sync_dirty_debug_regs = svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs, .cache_reg = svm_cache_reg, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c index 2427f918e763..43ee9ed11291 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .set_idt = vmx_set_idt, .get_gdt = vmx_get_gdt, .set_gdt = vmx_set_gdt, + .set_dr6 = vmx_set_dr6, .set_dr7 = vmx_set_dr7, .sync_dirty_debug_regs = vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs, .cache_reg = vmx_cache_reg, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index f72835e85b6d..6c56d5235f0f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -5648,6 +5648,12 @@ void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) set_debugreg(DR6_RESERVED, 6); } +void vmx_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val) +{ + lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled(); + set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6); +} + void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val) { vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, val); @@ -7417,10 +7423,6 @@ fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool force_immediate_exit) vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4; } - /* When KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT, dr6 is accessible in guest. */ - if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) - set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6); - /* When single-stepping over STI and MOV SS, we must clear the * corresponding interruptibility bits in the guest state. Otherwise * vmentry fails as it then expects bit 14 (BS) in pending debug diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h index ce3295a67c04..430773a5ef8e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ void vmx_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); void vmx_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); void vmx_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); void vmx_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); +void vmx_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val); void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val); void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 8e77e61d4fbd..02159c967d29 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -10961,6 +10961,9 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[1], 1); set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[2], 2); set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[3], 3); + /* When KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT, dr6 is accessible in guest. */ + if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) + kvm_x86_call(set_dr6)(vcpu, vcpu->arch.dr6); } else if (unlikely(hw_breakpoint_active())) { set_debugreg(0, 7); }

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: x86: Load DR6 with guest value only before entering" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x c2fee09fc167c74a64adb08656cb993ea475197e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021812-candied-hamper-7f08@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From c2fee09fc167c74a64adb08656cb993ea475197e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2025 17:18:33 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Load DR6 with guest value only before entering .vcpu_run() loop Move the conditional loading of hardware DR6 with the guest's DR6 value out of the core .vcpu_run() loop to fix a bug where KVM can load hardware with a stale vcpu->arch.dr6. When the guest accesses a DR and host userspace isn't debugging the guest, KVM disables DR interception and loads the guest's values into hardware on VM-Enter and saves them on VM-Exit. This allows the guest to access DRs at will, e.g. so that a sequence of DR accesses to configure a breakpoint only generates one VM-Exit. For DR0-DR3, the logic/behavior is identical between VMX and SVM, and also identical between KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED (userspace debugging the guest) and KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT (guest using DRs), and so KVM handles loading DR0-DR3 in common code, _outside_ of the core kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_run() loop. But for DR6, the guest's value doesn't need to be loaded into hardware for KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED, and SVM provides a dedicated VMCB field whereas VMX requires software to manually load the guest value, and so loading the guest's value into DR6 is handled by {svm,vmx}_vcpu_run(), i.e. is done _inside_ the core run loop. Unfortunately, saving the guest values on VM-Exit is initiated by common x86, again outside of the core run loop. If the guest modifies DR6 (in hardware, when DR interception is disabled), and then the next VM-Exit is a fastpath VM-Exit, KVM will reload hardware DR6 with vcpu->arch.dr6 and clobber the guest's actual value. The bug shows up primarily with nested VMX because KVM handles the VMX preemption timer in the fastpath, and the window between hardware DR6 being modified (in guest context) and DR6 being read by guest software is orders of magnitude larger in a nested setup. E.g. in non-nested, the VMX preemption timer would need to fire precisely between #DB injection and the #DB handler's read of DR6, whereas with a KVM-on-KVM setup, the window where hardware DR6 is "dirty" extends all the way from L1 writing DR6 to VMRESUME (in L1). L1's view: ========== <L1 disables DR interception> CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640961: kvm_entry: vcpu 0 A: L1 Writes DR6 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640963: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff1 B: CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640967: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT intr_info 0x800000ec D: L1 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640969: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640976: kvm_entry: vcpu 0 L2 reads DR6, L1 disables DR interception CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640980: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: kvm_entry: vcpu 0 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 L2 detects failure CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640987: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason HLT L1 reads DR6 (confirms failure) CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640990: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 L0's view: ========== L2 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216 L2 => L1 nested VM-Exit CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit_inject: reason: DR_ACCESS ext_inf1: 0x0000000000000216 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_entry: vcpu 23 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMREAD CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_entry: vcpu 23 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMREAD CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_entry: vcpu 23 L1 writes DR7, L0 disables DR interception CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000007 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005613: kvm_entry: vcpu 23 L0 writes DR6 = 0 (arch.dr6) CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005613: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 A: <L1 writes DR6 = 1, no interception, arch.dr6 is still '0'> B: CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason PREEMPTION_TIMER CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: kvm_entry: vcpu 23 C: L0 writes DR6 = 0 (arch.dr6) CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 L1 => L2 nested VM-Enter CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005616: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMRESUME L0 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0 Reported-by: John Stultz <jstultz(a)google.com> Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANDhNCq5_F3HfFYABqFGCA1bPd_%2BxgNj-iDQhH4tDk%2Bw… Fixes: 375e28ffc0cf ("KVM: X86: Set host DR6 only on VMX and for KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT") Fixes: d67668e9dd76 ("KVM: x86, SVM: isolate vcpu->arch.dr6 from vmcb->save.dr6") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com> Tested-by: John Stultz <jstultz(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250125011833.3644371-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h index c35550581da0..823c0434bbad 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(set_idt) KVM_X86_OP(get_gdt) KVM_X86_OP(set_gdt) KVM_X86_OP(sync_dirty_debug_regs) +KVM_X86_OP(set_dr6) KVM_X86_OP(set_dr7) KVM_X86_OP(cache_reg) KVM_X86_OP(get_rflags) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index b15cde0a9b5c..0b7af5902ff7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -1696,6 +1696,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { void (*get_gdt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); void (*set_gdt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); void (*sync_dirty_debug_regs)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + void (*set_dr6)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value); void (*set_dr7)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value); void (*cache_reg)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg); unsigned long (*get_rflags)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 7640a84e554a..a713c803a3a3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -1991,11 +1991,11 @@ static void new_asid(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct svm_cpu_data *sd) svm->asid = sd->next_asid++; } -static void svm_set_dr6(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned long value) +static void svm_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value) { - struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb; + struct vmcb *vmcb = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb; - if (svm->vcpu.arch.guest_state_protected) + if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected) return; if (unlikely(value != vmcb->save.dr6)) { @@ -4247,10 +4247,8 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, * Run with all-zero DR6 unless needed, so that we can get the exact cause * of a #DB. */ - if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) - svm_set_dr6(svm, vcpu->arch.dr6); - else - svm_set_dr6(svm, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW); + if (likely(!(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))) + svm_set_dr6(vcpu, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW); clgi(); kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu); @@ -5043,6 +5041,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = { .set_idt = svm_set_idt, .get_gdt = svm_get_gdt, .set_gdt = svm_set_gdt, + .set_dr6 = svm_set_dr6, .set_dr7 = svm_set_dr7, .sync_dirty_debug_regs = svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs, .cache_reg = svm_cache_reg, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c index 2427f918e763..43ee9ed11291 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .set_idt = vmx_set_idt, .get_gdt = vmx_get_gdt, .set_gdt = vmx_set_gdt, + .set_dr6 = vmx_set_dr6, .set_dr7 = vmx_set_dr7, .sync_dirty_debug_regs = vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs, .cache_reg = vmx_cache_reg, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index f72835e85b6d..6c56d5235f0f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -5648,6 +5648,12 @@ void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) set_debugreg(DR6_RESERVED, 6); } +void vmx_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val) +{ + lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled(); + set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6); +} + void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val) { vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, val); @@ -7417,10 +7423,6 @@ fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool force_immediate_exit) vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4; } - /* When KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT, dr6 is accessible in guest. */ - if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) - set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6); - /* When single-stepping over STI and MOV SS, we must clear the * corresponding interruptibility bits in the guest state. Otherwise * vmentry fails as it then expects bit 14 (BS) in pending debug diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h index ce3295a67c04..430773a5ef8e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ void vmx_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); void vmx_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); void vmx_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); void vmx_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt); +void vmx_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val); void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val); void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 8e77e61d4fbd..02159c967d29 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -10961,6 +10961,9 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[1], 1); set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[2], 2); set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[3], 3); + /* When KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT, dr6 is accessible in guest. */ + if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) + kvm_x86_call(set_dr6)(vcpu, vcpu->arch.dr6); } else if (unlikely(hw_breakpoint_active())) { set_debugreg(0, 7); }

4 months, 2 weeks

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AV Expo - InfoComm 2025

by Vanessa Coleman

Hi, Will you be interested in purchasing Attendees List of InfoComm 2025 | The Coolest Pro AV Event. Attendees: 1. AV Integrator / Systems Integrators / IT Integrator 2. Rental / Staging or Live Events Producer / Events Pros 3. Video/Film Production / Technology Managers 4. Consultants / Info COMM Veterans 5. Independent, Reseller / Independent Technical Services 6. Artist/Content / Media Creator/Performer 7. Audio Engineer / Sound Designer 8. Costume/Make-Up/Prop/Scenery/Set Designer Director/Producer 9. Consultant, Content, Creator, Creative Agency, Experience Design Firm 10. Educator / Professor / Trainer 11. Electrician / Engineer / Rigger / Stagehand / Technician 12. Manufacturer / Distributor / Dealer's 13. Promotion/Consulting 14. Others from Audio and Visual Industry This list may be split by Category and Geography. What you obtain: Person details, title, company details, website, physical address, direct line, fax number, SIC, industry type, size, emails, and verification results. Can I send you the pricing breakdown and an example list? Regards, Vanessa Coleman, Event Coordinator Don't want emails from us anymore? Reply to this email with the word "Take out."

4 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH] drm: Select DRM_KMS_HELPER from DRM_DEBUG_DP_MST_TOPOLOGY_REFS

by Janne Grunau via B4 Relay

From: Janne Grunau <j(a)jannau.net> Using "depends on" and "select" for the same Kconfig symbol is known to cause circular dependencies (cmp. "Kconfig recursive dependency limitations" in Documentation/kbuild/kconfig-language.rst. DRM drivers are selecting drm helpers so do the same for DRM_DEBUG_DP_MST_TOPOLOGY_REFS. Fixes following circular dependency reported on x86 for the downstream Asahi Linux tree: error: recursive dependency detected! symbol DRM_KMS_HELPER is selected by DRM_GEM_SHMEM_HELPER symbol DRM_GEM_SHMEM_HELPER is selected by RUST_DRM_GEM_SHMEM_HELPER symbol RUST_DRM_GEM_SHMEM_HELPER is selected by DRM_ASAHI symbol DRM_ASAHI depends on RUST symbol RUST depends on CALL_PADDING symbol CALL_PADDING depends on OBJTOOL symbol OBJTOOL is selected by STACK_VALIDATION symbol STACK_VALIDATION depends on UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER symbol UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER is part of choice block at arch/x86/Kconfig.debug:224 symbol <choice> unknown is visible depending on UNWINDER_GUESS symbol UNWINDER_GUESS prompt is visible depending on STACKDEPOT symbol STACKDEPOT is selected by DRM_DEBUG_DP_MST_TOPOLOGY_REFS symbol DRM_DEBUG_DP_MST_TOPOLOGY_REFS depends on DRM_KMS_HELPER Fixes: 12a280c72868 ("drm/dp_mst: Add topology ref history tracking for debugging") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Janne Grunau <j(a)jannau.net> --- drivers/gpu/drm/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/Kconfig b/drivers/gpu/drm/Kconfig index fbef3f471bd0e5101699cf576542f7350bea3982..bd228dc77e99b4356b09de02d9001237eb2423e2 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/Kconfig @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ config DRM_DEBUG_DP_MST_TOPOLOGY_REFS bool "Enable refcount backtrace history in the DP MST helpers" depends on STACKTRACE_SUPPORT select STACKDEPOT - depends on DRM_KMS_HELPER + select DRM_KMS_HELPER depends on DEBUG_KERNEL depends on EXPERT help --- base-commit: 2014c95afecee3e76ca4a56956a936e23283f05b change-id: 20250304-drm_debug_dp_mst_topo_kconfig-a112904ba611 Best regards, -- Janne Grunau <j(a)jannau.net>

4 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH V3] arm64/boot: Enable EL2 requirements for FEAT_PMUv3p9

by Anshuman Khandual

FEAT_PMUv3p9 registers such as PMICNTR_EL0, PMICFILTR_EL0, and PMUACR_EL1 access from EL1 requires appropriate EL2 fine grained trap configuration via FEAT_FGT2 based trap control registers HDFGRTR2_EL2 and HDFGWTR2_EL2. Otherwise such register accesses will result in traps into EL2. Add a new helper __init_el2_fgt2() which initializes FEAT_FGT2 based fine grained trap control registers HDFGRTR2_EL2 and HDFGWTR2_EL2 (setting the bits nPMICNTR_EL0, nPMICFILTR_EL0 and nPMUACR_EL1) to enable access into PMICNTR_EL0, PMICFILTR_EL0, and PMUACR_EL1 registers. Also update booting.rst with SCR_EL3.FGTEn2 requirement for all FEAT_FGT2 based registers to be accessible in EL2. Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Cc: Rob Herring <robh(a)kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet(a)lwn.net> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz(a)kernel.org> Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton(a)linux.dev> Cc: linux-arm-kernel(a)lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: kvmarm(a)lists.linux.dev Fixes: 0bbff9ed8165 ("perf/arm_pmuv3: Add PMUv3.9 per counter EL0 access control") Fixes: d8226d8cfbaf ("perf: arm_pmuv3: Add support for Armv9.4 PMU instruction counter") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual(a)arm.com> --- Changes in V3: - Added 'MDCR_EL3.EnPM2 = 0b1' as a booting requirement per Mark - Added 'Fixes:' and 'CC: stable' tags per Mark Changes in V2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250203050828.1049370-8-anshuman.khandual@arm.… Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst b/Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst index cad6fdc96b98..dee7b6de864f 100644 --- a/Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst +++ b/Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst @@ -288,6 +288,12 @@ Before jumping into the kernel, the following conditions must be met: - SCR_EL3.FGTEn (bit 27) must be initialised to 0b1. + For CPUs with the Fine Grained Traps 2 (FEAT_FGT2) extension present: + + - If EL3 is present and the kernel is entered at EL2: + + - SCR_EL3.FGTEn2 (bit 59) must be initialised to 0b1. + For CPUs with support for HCRX_EL2 (FEAT_HCX) present: - If EL3 is present and the kernel is entered at EL2: @@ -382,6 +388,22 @@ Before jumping into the kernel, the following conditions must be met: - SMCR_EL2.EZT0 (bit 30) must be initialised to 0b1. + For CPUs with the Performance Monitors Extension (FEAT_PMUv3p9): + + - If EL3 is present: + + - MDCR_EL3.EnPM2 (bit 7) must be initialised to 0b1. + + - If the kernel is entered at EL1 and EL2 is present: + + - HDFGRTR2_EL2.nPMICNTR_EL0 (bit 2) must be initialised to 0b1. + - HDFGRTR2_EL2.nPMICFILTR_EL0 (bit 3) must be initialised to 0b1. + - HDFGRTR2_EL2.nPMUACR_EL1 (bit 4) must be initialised to 0b1. + + - HDFGWTR2_EL2.nPMICNTR_EL0 (bit 2) must be initialised to 0b1. + - HDFGWTR2_EL2.nPMICFILTR_EL0 (bit 3) must be initialised to 0b1. + - HDFGWTR2_EL2.nPMUACR_EL1 (bit 4) must be initialised to 0b1. + For CPUs with Memory Copy and Memory Set instructions (FEAT_MOPS): - If the kernel is entered at EL1 and EL2 is present: diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h index 25e162651750..1a0071faf57e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h @@ -233,6 +233,30 @@ .Lskip_fgt_\@: .endm +.macro __init_el2_fgt2 + mrs x1, id_aa64mmfr0_el1 + ubfx x1, x1, #ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_FGT_SHIFT, #4 + cmp x1, #ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_FGT_FGT2 + b.lt .Lskip_fgt2_\@ + + mov x0, xzr + mrs x1, id_aa64dfr0_el1 + ubfx x1, x1, #ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer_SHIFT, #4 + cmp x1, #ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer_V3P9 + b.lt .Lskip_pmuv3p9_\@ + + orr x0, x0, #HDFGRTR2_EL2_nPMICNTR_EL0 + orr x0, x0, #HDFGRTR2_EL2_nPMICFILTR_EL0 + orr x0, x0, #HDFGRTR2_EL2_nPMUACR_EL1 +.Lskip_pmuv3p9_\@: + msr_s SYS_HDFGRTR2_EL2, x0 + msr_s SYS_HDFGWTR2_EL2, x0 + msr_s SYS_HFGRTR2_EL2, xzr + msr_s SYS_HFGWTR2_EL2, xzr + msr_s SYS_HFGITR2_EL2, xzr +.Lskip_fgt2_\@: +.endm + .macro __init_el2_gcs mrs_s x1, SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1 ubfx x1, x1, #ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_GCS_SHIFT, #4 @@ -283,6 +307,7 @@ __init_el2_nvhe_idregs __init_el2_cptr __init_el2_fgt + __init_el2_fgt2 __init_el2_gcs .endm -- 2.25.1

4 months, 3 weeks

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Re: FW: Wireless speed regression issue with >6.12.12/6.13.x + firmware update for mediatek MT7925

by Mingyen Hsieh (謝明諺)

Hi, Thanks for reporting this issue. We will conduct testing again. And it is already known that the patch added in 6.12.13 does have some issues, but we have also submitted new patches to fix. Currently, these patches are in the maintainer’s tree. It should soon be included in 6.14 and then ported Back to 6.12.x and 6.13.x. Perhaps you can test the driver from here: https://github.com/nbd168/wireless and apply this patch: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-wireless/patch/20250317011724.33… Thanks Best Regards, Yen.

4 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH v3 0/2] media: uvcvideo: Fix Fix deferred probing error

by Ricardo Ribalda

uvc_gpio_parse() can return -EPROBE_DEFER when the GPIOs it depends on have not yet been probed. Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda(a)chromium.org> --- Changes in v3: - Remove duplicated error messages in uvc_probe() - Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250303-uvc-eprobedefer-v2-0-be7c987cc3ca@chromi… Changes in v2: - Add follow-up patch for using dev_err_probe - Avoid error_retcode style - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250129-uvc-eprobedefer-v1-1-643b2603c0d2@chromi… --- Ricardo Ribalda (2): media: uvcvideo: Fix deferred probing error media: uvcvideo: Use dev_err_probe for devm_gpiod_get_optional drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- base-commit: f4b211714bcc70effa60c34d9fa613d182e3ef1e change-id: 20250129-uvc-eprobedefer-b5ebb4db63cc Best regards, -- Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda(a)chromium.org>

4 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH v3] mips: Add -std= flag specified in KBUILD_CFLAGS to vdso CFLAGS

by Khem Raj

GCC 15 changed the default C standard dialect from gnu17 to gnu23, which should not have impacted the kernel because it explicitly requests the gnu11 standard in the main Makefile. However, mips/vdso code uses its own CFLAGS without a '-std=' value, which break with this dialect change because of the kernel's own definitions of bool, false, and true conflicting with the C23 reserved keywords. include/linux/stddef.h:11:9: error: cannot use keyword 'false' as enumeration constant 11 | false = 0, | ^~~~~ include/linux/stddef.h:11:9: note: 'false' is a keyword with '-std=c23' onwards include/linux/types.h:35:33: error: 'bool' cannot be defined via 'typedef' 35 | typedef _Bool bool; | ^~~~ include/linux/types.h:35:33: note: 'bool' is a keyword with '-std=c23' onwards Add -std as specified in KBUILD_CFLAGS to the decompressor and purgatory CFLAGS to eliminate these errors and make the C standard version of these areas match the rest of the kernel. Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem(a)gmail.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- v2: Filter the -std flag from KBUILD_CFLAGS instead of hardcoding v3: Adjust subject and commit message arch/mips/vdso/Makefile | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/mips/vdso/Makefile b/arch/mips/vdso/Makefile index fb4c493aaffa..69d4593f64fe 100644 --- a/arch/mips/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/mips/vdso/Makefile @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ endif # offsets. cflags-vdso := $(ccflags-vdso) \ $(filter -W%,$(filter-out -Wa$(comma)%,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS))) \ + $(filter -std=%,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) \ -O3 -g -fPIC -fno-strict-aliasing -fno-common -fno-builtin -G 0 \ -mrelax-pic-calls $(call cc-option, -mexplicit-relocs) \ -fno-stack-protector -fno-jump-tables -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \

4 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH v2] usb: dwc3: Abort suspend on soft disconnect failure

by Kuen-Han Tsai

When dwc3_gadget_soft_disconnect() fails, dwc3_suspend_common() keeps going with the suspend, resulting in a period where the power domain is off, but the gadget driver remains connected. Within this time frame, invoking vbus_event_work() will cause an error as it attempts to access DWC3 registers for endpoint disabling after the power domain has been completely shut down. Abort the suspend sequence when dwc3_gadget_suspend() cannot halt the controller and proceeds with a soft connect. Fixes: c8540870af4c ("usb: dwc3: gadget: Improve dwc3_gadget_suspend() and dwc3_gadget_resume()") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kuen-Han Tsai <khtsai(a)google.com> --- Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt Workqueue: events vbus_event_work Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xf4/0x118 show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x7c dump_stack+0x18/0x3c panic+0x16c/0x390 nmi_panic+0xa4/0xa8 arm64_serror_panic+0x6c/0x94 do_serror+0xc4/0xd0 el1h_64_error_handler+0x34/0x48 el1h_64_error+0x68/0x6c readl+0x4c/0x8c __dwc3_gadget_ep_disable+0x48/0x230 dwc3_gadget_ep_disable+0x50/0xc0 usb_ep_disable+0x44/0xe4 ffs_func_eps_disable+0x64/0xc8 ffs_func_set_alt+0x74/0x368 ffs_func_disable+0x18/0x28 composite_disconnect+0x90/0xec configfs_composite_disconnect+0x64/0x88 usb_gadget_disconnect_locked+0xc0/0x168 vbus_event_work+0x3c/0x58 process_one_work+0x1e4/0x43c worker_thread+0x25c/0x430 kthread+0x104/0x1d4 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 --- Changelog: v2: - move declarations in separate lines - add the Fixes tag drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c | 9 +++++++-- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 22 +++++++++------------- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c index 66a08b527165..1cf1996ae1fb 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c @@ -2388,6 +2388,7 @@ static int dwc3_suspend_common(struct dwc3 *dwc, pm_message_t msg) { u32 reg; int i; + int ret; if (!pm_runtime_suspended(dwc->dev) && !PMSG_IS_AUTO(msg)) { dwc->susphy_state = (dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG(0)) & @@ -2406,7 +2407,9 @@ static int dwc3_suspend_common(struct dwc3 *dwc, pm_message_t msg) case DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_DEVICE: if (pm_runtime_suspended(dwc->dev)) break; - dwc3_gadget_suspend(dwc); + ret = dwc3_gadget_suspend(dwc); + if (ret) + return ret synchronize_irq(dwc->irq_gadget); dwc3_core_exit(dwc); break; @@ -2441,7 +2444,9 @@ static int dwc3_suspend_common(struct dwc3 *dwc, pm_message_t msg) break; if (dwc->current_otg_role == DWC3_OTG_ROLE_DEVICE) { - dwc3_gadget_suspend(dwc); + ret = dwc3_gadget_suspend(dwc); + if (ret) + return ret; synchronize_irq(dwc->irq_gadget); } diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c index 89a4dc8ebf94..316c1589618e 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c @@ -4776,26 +4776,22 @@ int dwc3_gadget_suspend(struct dwc3 *dwc) int ret; ret = dwc3_gadget_soft_disconnect(dwc); - if (ret) - goto err; - - spin_lock_irqsave(&dwc->lock, flags); - if (dwc->gadget_driver) - dwc3_disconnect_gadget(dwc); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags); - - return 0; - -err: /* * Attempt to reset the controller's state. Likely no * communication can be established until the host * performs a port reset. */ - if (dwc->softconnect) + if (ret && dwc->softconnect) { dwc3_gadget_soft_connect(dwc); + return ret; + } - return ret; + spin_lock_irqsave(&dwc->lock, flags); + if (dwc->gadget_driver) + dwc3_disconnect_gadget(dwc); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags); + + return 0; } int dwc3_gadget_resume(struct dwc3 *dwc) -- 2.49.0.395.g12beb8f557-goog

4 months, 3 weeks

3
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