July 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH] dm-verity: fix dm_is_verity_target() when dm-verity is builtin

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> When CONFIG_DM_VERITY=y, dm_is_verity_target() returned true for any builtin dm target, not just dm-verity. Fix this by checking for verity_target instead of THIS_MODULE (which is NULL for builtin code). Fixes: b6c1c5745ccc ("dm: Add verity helpers for LoadPin") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka(a)chromium.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c index 0a2399d958b7..cf659c8feb29 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c @@ -1519,18 +1519,10 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv) verity_dtr(ti); return r; } -/* - * Check whether a DM target is a verity target. - */ -bool dm_is_verity_target(struct dm_target *ti) -{ - return ti->type->module == THIS_MODULE; -} - /* * Get the verity mode (error behavior) of a verity target. * * Returns the verity mode of the target, or -EINVAL if 'ti' is not a verity * target. @@ -1580,10 +1572,18 @@ static struct target_type verity_target = { .iterate_devices = verity_iterate_devices, .io_hints = verity_io_hints, }; module_dm(verity); +/* + * Check whether a DM target is a verity target. + */ +bool dm_is_verity_target(struct dm_target *ti) +{ + return ti->type == &verity_target; +} + MODULE_AUTHOR("Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com>"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Mandeep Baines <msb(a)chromium.org>"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Will Drewry <wad(a)chromium.org>"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION(DM_NAME " target for transparent disk integrity checking"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); base-commit: ed28fe59c042e9b5bf3b15050aa6ee67834dc852 -- 2.45.2

1 year, 3 months

2
1
0 0

+ mm-gup-clear-the-lru-flag-of-a-page-before-adding-to-lru-batch.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: mm/gup: clear the LRU flag of a page before adding to LRU batch has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is mm-gup-clear-the-lru-flag-of-a-page-before-adding-to-lru-batch.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: yangge <yangge1116(a)126.com> Subject: mm/gup: clear the LRU flag of a page before adding to LRU batch Date: Wed, 3 Jul 2024 20:02:33 +0800 If a large number of CMA memory are configured in system (for example, the CMA memory accounts for 50% of the system memory), starting a virtual virtual machine with device passthrough, it will call pin_user_pages_remote(..., FOLL_LONGTERM, ...) to pin memory. Normally if a page is present and in CMA area, pin_user_pages_remote() will migrate the page from CMA area to non-CMA area because of FOLL_LONGTERM flag. But the current code will cause the migration failure due to unexpected page refcounts, and will eventually cause the virtual machine to fail to start. If a page is added in LRU batch, its refcount increases one, remove the page from LRU batch decreases one. Page migration requires the page is not referenced by others except page mapping. Before migrating a page, we should try to drain the page from LRU batch in case the page is in it, however, folio_test_lru() is not sufficient to tell whether the page is in LRU batch or not, if the page is in LRU batch, the migration will fail. To solve the problem above, we modify the logic of adding to LRU batch. Before adding a page to LRU batch, we clear the LRU flag of the page so that we can check whether the page is in LRU batch with folio_test_lru(page). Seems making the LRU flag of the page invisible a long time is no problem, because a new page is allocated from buddy and added to the lru batch, its LRU flag is also not visible for a long time. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1720008153-16035-1-git-send-email-yangge1116@126.… Fixes: 9a4e9f3b2d73 ("mm: update get_user_pages_longterm to migrate pages allocated from CMA region") Signed-off-by: yangge <yangge1116(a)126.com> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang(a)linux.alibaba.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Cc: Barry Song <21cnbao(a)gmail.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/swap.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/mm/swap.c~mm-gup-clear-the-lru-flag-of-a-page-before-adding-to-lru-batch +++ a/mm/swap.c @@ -212,10 +212,6 @@ static void folio_batch_move_lru(struct for (i = 0; i < folio_batch_count(fbatch); i++) { struct folio *folio = fbatch->folios[i]; - /* block memcg migration while the folio moves between lru */ - if (move_fn != lru_add_fn && !folio_test_clear_lru(folio)) - continue; - folio_lruvec_relock_irqsave(folio, &lruvec, &flags); move_fn(lruvec, folio); @@ -256,11 +252,16 @@ static void lru_move_tail_fn(struct lruv void folio_rotate_reclaimable(struct folio *folio) { if (!folio_test_locked(folio) && !folio_test_dirty(folio) && - !folio_test_unevictable(folio) && folio_test_lru(folio)) { + !folio_test_unevictable(folio)) { struct folio_batch *fbatch; unsigned long flags; folio_get(folio); + if (!folio_test_clear_lru(folio)) { + folio_put(folio); + return; + } + local_lock_irqsave(&lru_rotate.lock, flags); fbatch = this_cpu_ptr(&lru_rotate.fbatch); folio_batch_add_and_move(fbatch, folio, lru_move_tail_fn); @@ -353,11 +354,15 @@ static void folio_activate_drain(int cpu void folio_activate(struct folio *folio) { - if (folio_test_lru(folio) && !folio_test_active(folio) && - !folio_test_unevictable(folio)) { + if (!folio_test_active(folio) && !folio_test_unevictable(folio)) { struct folio_batch *fbatch; folio_get(folio); + if (!folio_test_clear_lru(folio)) { + folio_put(folio); + return; + } + local_lock(&cpu_fbatches.lock); fbatch = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_fbatches.activate); folio_batch_add_and_move(fbatch, folio, folio_activate_fn); @@ -701,6 +706,11 @@ void deactivate_file_folio(struct folio return; folio_get(folio); + if (!folio_test_clear_lru(folio)) { + folio_put(folio); + return; + } + local_lock(&cpu_fbatches.lock); fbatch = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_fbatches.lru_deactivate_file); folio_batch_add_and_move(fbatch, folio, lru_deactivate_file_fn); @@ -717,11 +727,16 @@ void deactivate_file_folio(struct folio */ void folio_deactivate(struct folio *folio) { - if (folio_test_lru(folio) && !folio_test_unevictable(folio) && - (folio_test_active(folio) || lru_gen_enabled())) { + if (!folio_test_unevictable(folio) && (folio_test_active(folio) || + lru_gen_enabled())) { struct folio_batch *fbatch; folio_get(folio); + if (!folio_test_clear_lru(folio)) { + folio_put(folio); + return; + } + local_lock(&cpu_fbatches.lock); fbatch = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_fbatches.lru_deactivate); folio_batch_add_and_move(fbatch, folio, lru_deactivate_fn); @@ -738,12 +753,16 @@ void folio_deactivate(struct folio *foli */ void folio_mark_lazyfree(struct folio *folio) { - if (folio_test_lru(folio) && folio_test_anon(folio) && - folio_test_swapbacked(folio) && !folio_test_swapcache(folio) && - !folio_test_unevictable(folio)) { + if (folio_test_anon(folio) && folio_test_swapbacked(folio) && + !folio_test_swapcache(folio) && !folio_test_unevictable(folio)) { struct folio_batch *fbatch; folio_get(folio); + if (!folio_test_clear_lru(folio)) { + folio_put(folio); + return; + } + local_lock(&cpu_fbatches.lock); fbatch = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_fbatches.lru_lazyfree); folio_batch_add_and_move(fbatch, folio, lru_lazyfree_fn); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from yangge1116(a)126.com are mm-gup-clear-the-lru-flag-of-a-page-before-adding-to-lru-batch.patch

1 year, 3 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 6.1] scsi: ufs: ufshpb: Fix NULL deallocation in ufshpb_pre_req_mempool_destroy()

by Aleksandr Mishin

No upstream commit exists for this commit. The issue was introduced with commit 41d8a9333cc9 ("scsi: ufs: ufshpb: Add HPB 2.0 support"). In ufshpb_pre_req_mempool_destroy() __free_page() is called only if pointer contains NULL value. Fix this bug by modifying check condition. Upstream branch code has been significantly refactored and can't be backported directly. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: 41d8a9333cc9 ("scsi: ufs: ufshpb: Add HPB 2.0 support") Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Mishin <amishin(a)t-argos.ru> --- drivers/ufs/core/ufshpb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/ufs/core/ufshpb.c b/drivers/ufs/core/ufshpb.c index b7f412d0f301..c649e8a10a23 100644 --- a/drivers/ufs/core/ufshpb.c +++ b/drivers/ufs/core/ufshpb.c @@ -2120,7 +2120,7 @@ static void ufshpb_pre_req_mempool_destroy(struct ufshpb_lu *hpb) for (i = 0; i < hpb->throttle_pre_req; i++) { pre_req = hpb->pre_req + i; bio_put(hpb->pre_req[i].bio); - if (!pre_req->wb.m_page) + if (pre_req->wb.m_page) __free_page(hpb->pre_req[i].wb.m_page); list_del_init(&pre_req->list_req); } -- 2.30.2

1 year, 3 months

2
1
0 0

[PATCH v2 1/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm2_*_auth_session()

by Jarkko Sakkinen

Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can cause a null derefence in tpm2_*_auth_session(). Thus, address !chip->auth in tpm2_*_auth_session(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.9+ Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@li… Fixes: 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- v2: - Use dev_warn_once() instead of pr_warn_once(). --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 907ac9956a78..2f1d96a5a5a7 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -824,8 +824,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_check_hmac_response); */ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->auth->handle); - memzero_explicit(chip->auth, sizeof(*chip->auth)); + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + + if (!auth) + return; + + tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); + memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session); @@ -907,6 +912,11 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) int rc; u32 null_key; + if (!auth) { + dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is not active\n"); + return 0; + } + rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key); if (rc) goto out; -- 2.45.2

1 year, 3 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH] tpm: Limit TCG_TPM2_HMAC to known good drivers

by Jarkko Sakkinen

IBM vTPM driver lacks a call to tpm2_sessions_init() and reports: [ 2.987131] tpm tpm0: tpm2_load_context: failed with a TPM error 0x01C4 [ 2.987140] ima: Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: -14 HMAC encryption code also has a risk of null derefence, given that when uninitialized, chip->auth is a null pointer. Limit TCG_TPM2_HMAC to known good drivers until these issues have been properly fixed. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: d2add27cf2b8 ("tpm: Add NULL primary creation") Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@li… Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig index cf0be8a7939d..c310588a5958 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ if TCG_TPM config TCG_TPM2_HMAC bool "Use HMAC and encrypted transactions on the TPM bus" default X86_64 + depends on TCG_CRB || TCG_TIS_CORE select CRYPTO_ECDH select CRYPTO_LIB_AESCFB select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 -- 2.45.2

1 year, 3 months

1
2
0 0

[PATCH 3/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*()

by Jarkko Sakkinen

Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can cause a null derefence in tpm_buf_hmac_session*(). Thus, address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_hmac_session*() and remove the fallback implementation for !TCG_TPM2_HMAC. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.9+ Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@li… Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 181 ++++++++++++++++++------------- include/linux/tpm.h | 67 ++++-------- 2 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 7102a417f3f2..530eb218b9c3 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -268,6 +268,105 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); +/** + * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: The buffer to be appended + * @attributes: The session attributes + * @passphrase: The session authority (NULL if none) + * @passphrase_len: The length of the session authority (0 if none) + * + * This fills in a session structure in the TPM command buffer, except + * for the HMAC which cannot be computed until the command buffer is + * complete. The type of session is controlled by the @attributes, + * the main ones of which are TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION which means the + * session won't terminate after tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), + * TPM2_SA_DECRYPT which means this buffers first parameter should be + * encrypted with a session key and TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, which means the + * response buffer's first parameter needs to be decrypted (confusing, + * but the defines are written from the point of view of the TPM). + * + * Any session appended by this command must be finalized by calling + * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() otherwise the HMAC will be incorrect + * and the TPM will reject the command. + * + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a + * kernel message. + */ +void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, + int passphrase_len) +{ + u8 nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u32 len; + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + + if (!chip->auth) { + /* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */ + int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u32 len = 9 + passphrase_len; + + if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) { + /* not the first session so update the existing length */ + len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]); + put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]); + } else { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len); + } + /* auth handle */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW); + /* nonce */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0); + /* attributes */ + tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0); + /* passphrase */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, passphrase_len); + tpm_buf_append(buf, passphrase, passphrase_len); + return; + } + + /* + * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros + * before computing the HMAC + */ + while (passphrase && passphrase_len > 0 && passphrase[passphrase_len - 1] == '\0') + passphrase_len--; + + auth->attrs = attributes; + auth->passphrase_len = passphrase_len; + if (passphrase_len) + memcpy(auth->passphrase, passphrase, passphrase_len); + + if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + /* we're not the first session */ + len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]); + if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append"); + return; + } + + /* add our new session */ + len += 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[auth->session]); + } else { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + } + + /* random number for our nonce */ + get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + memcpy(auth->our_nonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, auth->handle); + /* our new nonce */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, auth->attrs); + /* and put a placeholder for the hmac */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session); + #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC /* * It turns out the crypto hmac(sha256) is hard for us to consume @@ -449,82 +548,6 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) crypto_free_kpp(kpp); } -/** - * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element - * @chip: the TPM chip structure - * @buf: The buffer to be appended - * @attributes: The session attributes - * @passphrase: The session authority (NULL if none) - * @passphrase_len: The length of the session authority (0 if none) - * - * This fills in a session structure in the TPM command buffer, except - * for the HMAC which cannot be computed until the command buffer is - * complete. The type of session is controlled by the @attributes, - * the main ones of which are TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION which means the - * session won't terminate after tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), - * TPM2_SA_DECRYPT which means this buffers first parameter should be - * encrypted with a session key and TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, which means the - * response buffer's first parameter needs to be decrypted (confusing, - * but the defines are written from the point of view of the TPM). - * - * Any session appended by this command must be finalized by calling - * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() otherwise the HMAC will be incorrect - * and the TPM will reject the command. - * - * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure - * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a - * kernel message. - */ -void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, - int passphrase_len) -{ - u8 nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; - u32 len; - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; - - /* - * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros - * before computing the HMAC - */ - while (passphrase && passphrase_len > 0 - && passphrase[passphrase_len - 1] == '\0') - passphrase_len--; - - auth->attrs = attributes; - auth->passphrase_len = passphrase_len; - if (passphrase_len) - memcpy(auth->passphrase, passphrase, passphrase_len); - - if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { - /* we're not the first session */ - len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]); - if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { - WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append"); - return; - } - - /* add our new session */ - len += 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; - put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[auth->session]); - } else { - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - } - - /* random number for our nonce */ - get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); - memcpy(auth->our_nonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, auth->handle); - /* our new nonce */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, auth->attrs); - /* and put a placeholder for the hmac */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session); - /** * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() - finalize the session HMAC * @chip: the TPM chip structure @@ -555,6 +578,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; struct sha256_state sctx; + if (!auth) + return; + /* save the command code in BE format */ auth->ordinal = head->ordinal; @@ -713,6 +739,9 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 cc = be32_to_cpu(auth->ordinal); int parm_len, len, i, handles; + if (!auth) + return rc; + if (auth->session >= TPM_HEADER_SIZE) { WARN(1, "tpm session not filled correctly\n"); goto out; diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 2844fea4a12a..912fd0d2646d 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -493,22 +493,35 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle) void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle, u8 *name); - -#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC - -int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); + static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen) { - tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, attributes, passphrase, - passphraselen); + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + + if (chip->auth) { + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, attributes, passphrase, + passphraselen); + } else { + /* + * If the only sessions are optional, the command tag must change to + * TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS. + */ + if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset) + head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS); + } } + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + +int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc); @@ -523,48 +536,6 @@ static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) static inline void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { } -static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct tpm_buf *buf, - u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, - int passphraselen) -{ - /* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */ - int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - u32 len = 9 + passphraselen; - - if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) { - /* not the first session so update the existing length */ - len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]); - put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]); - } else { - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len); - } - /* auth handle */ - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW); - /* nonce */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0); - /* attributes */ - tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0); - /* passphrase */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, passphraselen); - tpm_buf_append(buf, passphrase, passphraselen); -} -static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct tpm_buf *buf, - u8 attributes, - u8 *passphrase, - int passphraselen) -{ - int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *) buf->data; - - /* - * if the only sessions are optional, the command tag - * must change to TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS - */ - if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset) - head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS); -} static inline void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) { -- 2.45.2

1 year, 3 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 2/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name()

by Jarkko Sakkinen

Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can cause a null derefence in tpm_buf_append_name(). Thus, address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name() and remove the fallback implementation for !TCG_TPM2_HMAC. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.9+ Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@li… Fixes: d0a25bb961e6 ("tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 205 ++++++++++++++++--------------- include/linux/tpm.h | 16 +-- 3 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 110 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile index 4c695b0388f3..9bb142c75243 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ tpm-y += eventlog/common.o tpm-y += eventlog/tpm1.o tpm-y += eventlog/tpm2.o tpm-y += tpm-buf.o +tpm-y += tpm2-sessions.o -tpm-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC) += tpm2-sessions.o tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o eventlog/acpi.o tpm-$(CONFIG_EFI) += eventlog/efi.o tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += eventlog/of.o diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index d94b14757452..7102a417f3f2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -163,6 +163,112 @@ static u8 name_size(const u8 *name) return size_map[alg] + 2; } +static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + u32 val; + + /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ + tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + + /* skip public */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); + if (val > tot_len) + return -EINVAL; + offset += val; + /* name */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); + if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); + /* forget the rest */ + return 0; +} + +static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + int rc; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public"); + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) + rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf); + + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: The buffer to be appended + * @handle: The handle to be appended + * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL) + * + * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the + * objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply + * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name + * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV + * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name + * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to + * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended. For these + * objects, the @name pointer should point to this. If a name is + * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called + * on the handle to obtain the name. + * + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a + * kernel message. + */ +void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name) +{ + enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + int slot; + + if (!chip->auth) { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); + /* count the number of handles in the upper bits of flags */ + buf->handles++; + return; + } + + slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4; + if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); + return; + } + WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), + "name added in wrong place\n"); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); + auth->session += 4; + + if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || + mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || + mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { + if (!name) + tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + } else { + if (name) + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); + } + + auth->name_h[slot] = handle; + if (name) + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC /* * It turns out the crypto hmac(sha256) is hard for us to consume * because it assumes a fixed key and the TPM seems to change the key @@ -567,104 +673,6 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session); -static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) -{ - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; - off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); - u32 val; - - /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ - tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - - /* skip public */ - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val > tot_len) - return -EINVAL; - offset += val; - /* name */ - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) - return -EINVAL; - memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); - /* forget the rest */ - return 0; -} - -static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) -{ - struct tpm_buf buf; - int rc; - - rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC); - if (rc) - return rc; - - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public"); - if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) - rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf); - - tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - - return rc; -} - -/** - * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer - * @chip: the TPM chip structure - * @buf: The buffer to be appended - * @handle: The handle to be appended - * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL) - * - * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the - * objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply - * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name - * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV - * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name - * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to - * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended. For these - * objects, the @name pointer should point to this. If a name is - * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called - * on the handle to obtain the name. - * - * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure - * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a - * kernel message. - */ -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) -{ - enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; - int slot; - - slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE)/4; - if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); - return; - } - WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), - "name added in wrong place\n"); - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); - auth->session += 4; - - if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || - mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || - mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - if (!name) - tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); - } else { - if (name) - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); - } - - auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_append_name); - /** * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() - check the TPM return HMAC for correctness * @chip: the TPM chip structure @@ -1311,3 +1319,4 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) return rc; } +#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 21a67dc9efe8..2844fea4a12a 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -211,8 +211,8 @@ struct tpm_chip { u8 null_key_name[TPM2_NAME_SIZE]; u8 null_ec_key_x[EC_PT_SZ]; u8 null_ec_key_y[EC_PT_SZ]; - struct tpm2_auth *auth; #endif + struct tpm2_auth *auth; }; #define TPM_HEADER_SIZE 10 @@ -490,11 +490,13 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle) { } #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC -int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle, u8 *name); + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + +int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); @@ -521,14 +523,6 @@ static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) static inline void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { } -static inline void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) -{ - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); - /* count the number of handles in the upper bits of flags */ - buf->handles++; -} static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, -- 2.45.2

1 year, 3 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 1/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm2_*_auth_session()

by Jarkko Sakkinen

Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can cause a null derefence in tpm2_*_auth_session(). Thus, address !chip->auth in tpm2_*_auth_session(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.9+ Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@li… Fixes: 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 907ac9956a78..d94b14757452 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -824,8 +824,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_check_hmac_response); */ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->auth->handle); - memzero_explicit(chip->auth, sizeof(*chip->auth)); + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + + if (!auth) + return; + + tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); + memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session); @@ -907,6 +912,11 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) int rc; u32 null_key; + if (!auth) { + pr_warn_once("%s: encryption is not active\n", __func__); + return 0; + } + rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key); if (rc) goto out; -- 2.45.2

1 year, 3 months

1
0
0 0

季度一次性岗位补助通知！

by 财务中心

季度一次性企业职工综合补贴申报表（附件）政策实施期限截至2024年7月15日！

1 year, 3 months

1
0
0 0

patch "iio: light: apds9306: Fix error handing" added to char-misc-linus

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled iio: light: apds9306: Fix error handing to my char-misc git tree which can be found at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git in the char-misc-linus branch. The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree (usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.) The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the next -rc kernel release. If you have any questions about this process, please let me know. From 1a5cba43096c9242fab503a40b053ec6b93d313a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mudit Sharma <muditsharma.info(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2024 22:02:01 +0100 Subject: iio: light: apds9306: Fix error handing The return value of 'iio_gts_find_int_time_by_sel()' is assigned to variable 'intg_old' but value of 'ret' is checked for error. Update to use 'intg_old' for error checking. Fixes: 620d1e6c7a3f ("iio: light: Add support for APDS9306 Light Sensor") Signed-off-by: Mudit Sharma <muditsharma.info(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Subhajit Ghosh <subhajit.ghosh(a)tweaklogic.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240625210203.522179-1-muditsharma.info@gmail.com Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iio/light/apds9306.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/apds9306.c b/drivers/iio/light/apds9306.c index d6627b3e6000..66a063ea3db4 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/apds9306.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/apds9306.c @@ -583,8 +583,8 @@ static int apds9306_intg_time_set(struct apds9306_data *data, int val2) return ret; intg_old = iio_gts_find_int_time_by_sel(&data->gts, intg_time_idx); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; + if (intg_old < 0) + return intg_old; if (intg_old == val2) return 0; -- 2.45.2

1 year, 3 months

1
0
0 0

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Linux-stable-mirror July 2024