May 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

Re: 回复: 回复: 回复: backport a patch for Linux kernel-5.15 kernel-6.1 kenrel-6.6 stable tree

by Greg KH

On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 01:07:18AM +0000, Lin Gui (桂林) wrote: > Dear @Greg KH<mailto:gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, > > Base : kernel-5.15.159 > > diff --git a/drivers/mmc/core/mmc.c b/drivers/mmc/core/mmc.c > index a569066..d656964 100644 > --- a/drivers/mmc/core/mmc.c > +++ b/drivers/mmc/core/mmc.c > @@ -1800,7 +1800,13 @@ static int mmc_init_card(struct mmc_host *host, u32 ocr, > if (err) > goto free_card; > > - } else if (!mmc_card_hs400es(card)) { > + } else if (mmc_card_hs400es(card)){ > + if (host->ops->execute_hs400_tuning) { > + err = host->ops->execute_hs400_tuning(host, card); > + if (err) > + goto free_card; > + } > + } else { > /* Select the desired bus width optionally */ > err = mmc_select_bus_width(card); > if (err > 0 && mmc_card_hs(card)) { > The patch is corrupted, and sent in html format. But most importantly, you did not test this to verify it works at all, which means that you don't really need it? confused, greg k-h

1 year, 6 months

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[PATCH v2 2/2] memfd:add MEMFD_NOEXEC_SEAL documentation

by jeffxu＠chromium.org

From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu(a)google.com> Add documentation for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu(a)google.com> --- Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/userspace-api/mfd_noexec.rst | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 91 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/userspace-api/mfd_noexec.rst diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst index 5926115ec0ed..8a251d71fa6e 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ Security-related interfaces seccomp_filter landlock lsm + mfd_noexec spec_ctrl tee diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/mfd_noexec.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/mfd_noexec.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6f11ad86b076 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/mfd_noexec.rst @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +================================== +Introduction of non executable mfd +================================== +:Author: + Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp(a)chromium.org> + Jeff Xu <jeffxu(a)google.com> + +:Contributor: + Aleksa Sarai <cyphar(a)cyphar.com> + Barnabás Pőcze <pobrn(a)protonmail.com> + David Rheinsberg <david(a)readahead.eu> + +Since Linux introduced the memfd feature, memfd have always had their +execute bit set, and the memfd_create() syscall doesn't allow setting +it differently. + +However, in a secure by default system, such as ChromeOS, (where all +executables should come from the rootfs, which is protected by Verified +boot), this executable nature of memfd opens a door for NoExec bypass +and enables “confused deputy attack”. E.g, in VRP bug [1]: cros_vm +process created a memfd to share the content with an external process, +however the memfd is overwritten and used for executing arbitrary code +and root escalation. [2] lists more VRP in this kind. + +On the other hand, executable memfd has its legit use, runc uses memfd’s +seal and executable feature to copy the contents of the binary then +execute them, for such system, we need a solution to differentiate runc's +use of executable memfds and an attacker's [3]. + +To address those above. + - Let memfd_create() set X bit at creation time. + - Let memfd be sealed for modifying X bit when NX is set. + - A new pid namespace sysctl: vm.memfd_noexec to help applications to + migrating and enforcing non-executable MFD. + +User API +======== +``int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags)`` + +``MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL`` + When MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL bit is set in the ``flags``, memfd is created + with NX. F_SEAL_EXEC is set and the memfd can't be modified to + add X later. + This is the most common case for the application to use memfd. + +``MFD_EXEC`` + When MFD_EXEC bit is set in the ``flags``, memfd is created with X. + +Note: + ``MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL`` and ``MFD_EXEC`` doesn't change the sealable + characteristic of memfd, which is controlled by ``MFD_ALLOW_SEALING``. + + +Sysctl: +======== +``pid namespaced sysctl vm.memfd_noexec`` + +The new pid namespaced sysctl vm.memfd_noexec has 3 values: + + - 0: MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_EXEC + memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like + MFD_EXEC was set. + + - 1: MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEAL + memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like + MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was set. + + - 2: MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_ENFORCED + memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected. + +The sysctl allows finer control of memfd_create for old-software that +doesn't set the executable bit, for example, a container with +vm.memfd_noexec=1 means the old-software will create non-executable memfd +by default while new-software can create executable memfd by setting +MFD_EXEC. + +The value of memfd_noexec is passed to child namespace at creation time, +in addition, the setting is hierarchical, i.e. during memfd_create, +we will search from current ns to root ns and use the most restrictive +setting. + +Reference: +========== +[1] https://crbug.com/1305267 + +[2] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=type%3Dbug-security%20me… + +[3] https://lwn.net/Articles/781013/ -- 2.45.1.288.g0e0cd299f1-goog

1 year, 6 months

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Re: [PATCH v2] net: usb: ax88179_178a: avoid writing the mac address before first reading

by Jeffery Miller

Hello José, I'm testing on the 6.6 kernel with a "0b95:1790 ASIX Electronics Corp. AX88179 Gigabit Ethernet" device. after applying commit 56f78615bcb1 ("net: usb: ax88179_178a: avoid writing the mac address before first reading") the network will no longer work after brining the device down. After plugging in the device, it generally will work with ifconfig: $ ifconfig eth0 <ip address> However, if I then try bringing the devcie down and back up, it no longer works. $ ifconfig eth0 down $ ifconfig eth0 <ip address> $ ethtool eth0 | grep detected Link detected: no The link will continue to report as undetected. If I revert 56f78615bcb1 the device will work after bringing it down and back up. If I build at commit d7a319889498 ("net: usb: ax88179_178a: avoid two consecutive device resets") and its parent d7a319889498^ these also work. Is this something you have seen before with your test devices? Regards, Jeff

1 year, 6 months

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[PATCH 0/4] LoongArch: Bootloader interface fixes

by Jiaxun Yang

Hi all, This series fixed some issues on bootloader - kernel interface. The first two fixed booting with devicetree, the last two enhanced kernel's tolerance on different bootloader implementation. Please review. Thanks Signed-off-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang(a)flygoat.com> --- Jiaxun Yang (4): LoongArch: Fix built-in DTB detection LoongArch: smp: Add all CPUs enabled by fdt to NUMA node 0 LoongArch: Fix entry point in image header LoongArch: Clear higher address bits in JUMP_VIRT_ADDR arch/loongarch/include/asm/stackframe.h | 4 +++- arch/loongarch/kernel/head.S | 2 +- arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c | 6 ++++-- arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c | 5 ++++- 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 124cfbcd6d185d4f50be02d5f5afe61578916773 change-id: 20240521-loongarch-booting-fixes-366e13e7ca55 Best regards, -- Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang(a)flygoat.com>

1 year, 6 months

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[PATCH stable 4.19] mmc: core: Do not force a retune before RPMB switch

by Florian Fainelli

From: Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz <jorge(a)foundries.io> commit 67380251e8bbd3302c64fea07f95c31971b91c22 upstream Requesting a retune before switching to the RPMB partition has been observed to cause CRC errors on the RPMB reads (-EILSEQ). Since RPMB reads can not be retried, the clients would be directly affected by the errors. This commit disables the retune request prior to switching to the RPMB partition: mmc_retune_pause() no longer triggers a retune before the pause period begins. This was verified with the sdhci-of-arasan driver (ZynqMP) configured for HS200 using two separate eMMC cards (DG4064 and 064GB2). In both cases, the error was easy to reproduce triggering every few tenths of reads. With this commit, systems that were utilizing OP-TEE to access RPMB variables will experience an enhanced performance. Specifically, when OP-TEE is configured to employ RPMB as a secure storage solution, it not only writes the data but also the secure filesystem within the partition. As a result, retrieving any variable involves multiple RPMB reads, typically around five. For context, on ZynqMP, each retune request consumed approximately 8ms. Consequently, reading any RPMB variable used to take at the very minimum 40ms. After droping the need to retune before switching to the RPMB partition, this is no longer the case. Signed-off-by: Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz <jorge(a)foundries.io> Acked-by: Avri Altman <avri.altman(a)wdc.com> Acked-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter(a)intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240103112911.2954632-1-jorge@foundries.io Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli(a)broadcom.com> --- drivers/mmc/core/host.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mmc/core/host.c b/drivers/mmc/core/host.c index 3e94401c0eb3..23d95d2bdf05 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/core/host.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/core/host.c @@ -68,13 +68,12 @@ void mmc_retune_enable(struct mmc_host *host) /* * Pause re-tuning for a small set of operations. The pause begins after the - * next command and after first doing re-tuning. + * next command. */ void mmc_retune_pause(struct mmc_host *host) { if (!host->retune_paused) { host->retune_paused = 1; - mmc_retune_needed(host); mmc_retune_hold(host); } } -- 2.34.1

1 year, 6 months

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[for-linus][PATCH 4/8] tracefs: Clear EVENT_INODE flag in tracefs_drop_inode()

by Steven Rostedt

From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> When the inode is being dropped from the dentry, the TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE flag needs to be cleared to prevent a remount from calling eventfs_remount() on the tracefs_inode private data. There's a race between the inode is dropped (and the dentry freed) to where the inode is actually freed. If a remount happens between the two, the eventfs_inode could be accessed after it is freed (only the dentry keeps a ref count on it). Currently the TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE flag is cleared from the dentry iput() function. But this is incorrect, as it is possible that the inode has another reference to it. The flag should only be cleared when the inode is really being dropped and has no more references. That happens in the drop_inode callback of the inode, as that gets called when the last reference of the inode is released. Remove the tracefs_d_iput() function and move its logic to the more appropriate tracefs_drop_inode() callback function. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240523051539.908205106@goodmis… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy(a)kernel.org> Fixes: baa23a8d4360d ("tracefs: Reset permissions on remount if permissions are options") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> --- fs/tracefs/inode.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/tracefs/inode.c b/fs/tracefs/inode.c index 9252e0d78ea2..7c29f4afc23d 100644 --- a/fs/tracefs/inode.c +++ b/fs/tracefs/inode.c @@ -426,10 +426,26 @@ static int tracefs_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root) return 0; } +static int tracefs_drop_inode(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct tracefs_inode *ti = get_tracefs(inode); + + /* + * This inode is being freed and cannot be used for + * eventfs. Clear the flag so that it doesn't call into + * eventfs during the remount flag updates. The eventfs_inode + * gets freed after an RCU cycle, so the content will still + * be safe if the iteration is going on now. + */ + ti->flags &= ~TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE; + + return 1; +} + static const struct super_operations tracefs_super_operations = { .alloc_inode = tracefs_alloc_inode, .free_inode = tracefs_free_inode, - .drop_inode = generic_delete_inode, + .drop_inode = tracefs_drop_inode, .statfs = simple_statfs, .show_options = tracefs_show_options, }; @@ -455,22 +471,7 @@ static int tracefs_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) return !(ei && ei->is_freed); } -static void tracefs_d_iput(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) -{ - struct tracefs_inode *ti = get_tracefs(inode); - - /* - * This inode is being freed and cannot be used for - * eventfs. Clear the flag so that it doesn't call into - * eventfs during the remount flag updates. The eventfs_inode - * gets freed after an RCU cycle, so the content will still - * be safe if the iteration is going on now. - */ - ti->flags &= ~TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE; -} - static const struct dentry_operations tracefs_dentry_operations = { - .d_iput = tracefs_d_iput, .d_revalidate = tracefs_d_revalidate, .d_release = tracefs_d_release, }; -- 2.43.0

1 year, 6 months

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[for-linus][PATCH 3/8] eventfs: Update all the eventfs_inodes from the events descriptor

by Steven Rostedt

From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> The change to update the permissions of the eventfs_inode had the misconception that using the tracefs_inode would find all the eventfs_inodes that have been updated and reset them on remount. The problem with this approach is that the eventfs_inodes are freed when they are no longer used (basically the reason the eventfs system exists). When they are freed, the updated eventfs_inodes are not reset on a remount because their tracefs_inodes have been freed. Instead, since the events directory eventfs_inode always has a tracefs_inode pointing to it (it is not freed when finished), and the events directory has a link to all its children, have the eventfs_remount() function only operate on the events eventfs_inode and have it descend into its children updating their uid and gids. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAK7LNARXgaWw3kH9JgrnH4vK6fr8LDkNKf3wq8NhMWJrVw… Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240523051539.754424703@goodmis… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Fixes: baa23a8d4360d ("tracefs: Reset permissions on remount if permissions are options") Reported-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> --- fs/tracefs/event_inode.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c b/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c index 5dfb1ccd56ea..129d0f54ba62 100644 --- a/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c +++ b/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c @@ -305,27 +305,27 @@ static const struct file_operations eventfs_file_operations = { .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; -/* - * On a remount of tracefs, if UID or GID options are set, then - * the mount point inode permissions should be used. - * Reset the saved permission flags appropriately. - */ -void eventfs_remount(struct tracefs_inode *ti, bool update_uid, bool update_gid) +static void eventfs_set_attrs(struct eventfs_inode *ei, bool update_uid, kuid_t uid, + bool update_gid, kgid_t gid, int level) { - struct eventfs_inode *ei = ti->private; + struct eventfs_inode *ei_child; - if (!ei) + /* Update events/<system>/<event> */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(level > 3)) return; if (update_uid) { ei->attr.mode &= ~EVENTFS_SAVE_UID; - ei->attr.uid = ti->vfs_inode.i_uid; + ei->attr.uid = uid; } - if (update_gid) { ei->attr.mode &= ~EVENTFS_SAVE_GID; - ei->attr.gid = ti->vfs_inode.i_gid; + ei->attr.gid = gid; + } + + list_for_each_entry(ei_child, &ei->children, list) { + eventfs_set_attrs(ei_child, update_uid, uid, update_gid, gid, level + 1); } if (!ei->entry_attrs) @@ -334,13 +334,31 @@ void eventfs_remount(struct tracefs_inode *ti, bool update_uid, bool update_gid) for (int i = 0; i < ei->nr_entries; i++) { if (update_uid) { ei->entry_attrs[i].mode &= ~EVENTFS_SAVE_UID; - ei->entry_attrs[i].uid = ti->vfs_inode.i_uid; + ei->entry_attrs[i].uid = uid; } if (update_gid) { ei->entry_attrs[i].mode &= ~EVENTFS_SAVE_GID; - ei->entry_attrs[i].gid = ti->vfs_inode.i_gid; + ei->entry_attrs[i].gid = gid; } } + +} + +/* + * On a remount of tracefs, if UID or GID options are set, then + * the mount point inode permissions should be used. + * Reset the saved permission flags appropriately. + */ +void eventfs_remount(struct tracefs_inode *ti, bool update_uid, bool update_gid) +{ + struct eventfs_inode *ei = ti->private; + + /* Only the events directory does the updates */ + if (!ei || !ei->is_events || ei->is_freed) + return; + + eventfs_set_attrs(ei, update_uid, ti->vfs_inode.i_uid, + update_gid, ti->vfs_inode.i_gid, 0); } /* Return the evenfs_inode of the "events" directory */ -- 2.43.0

1 year, 6 months

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[for-linus][PATCH 2/8] tracefs: Update inode permissions on remount

by Steven Rostedt

From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> When a remount happens, if a gid or uid is specified update the inodes to have the same gid and uid. This will allow the simplification of the permissions logic for the dynamically created files and directories. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240523051539.592429986@goodmis… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy(a)kernel.org> Fixes: baa23a8d4360d ("tracefs: Reset permissions on remount if permissions are options") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> --- fs/tracefs/event_inode.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- fs/tracefs/inode.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c b/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c index 55a40a730b10..5dfb1ccd56ea 100644 --- a/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c +++ b/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c @@ -317,20 +317,29 @@ void eventfs_remount(struct tracefs_inode *ti, bool update_uid, bool update_gid) if (!ei) return; - if (update_uid) + if (update_uid) { ei->attr.mode &= ~EVENTFS_SAVE_UID; + ei->attr.uid = ti->vfs_inode.i_uid; + } + - if (update_gid) + if (update_gid) { ei->attr.mode &= ~EVENTFS_SAVE_GID; + ei->attr.gid = ti->vfs_inode.i_gid; + } if (!ei->entry_attrs) return; for (int i = 0; i < ei->nr_entries; i++) { - if (update_uid) + if (update_uid) { ei->entry_attrs[i].mode &= ~EVENTFS_SAVE_UID; - if (update_gid) + ei->entry_attrs[i].uid = ti->vfs_inode.i_uid; + } + if (update_gid) { ei->entry_attrs[i].mode &= ~EVENTFS_SAVE_GID; + ei->entry_attrs[i].gid = ti->vfs_inode.i_gid; + } } } diff --git a/fs/tracefs/inode.c b/fs/tracefs/inode.c index a827f6a716c4..9252e0d78ea2 100644 --- a/fs/tracefs/inode.c +++ b/fs/tracefs/inode.c @@ -373,12 +373,21 @@ static int tracefs_apply_options(struct super_block *sb, bool remount) rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(ti, &tracefs_inodes, list) { - if (update_uid) + if (update_uid) { ti->flags &= ~TRACEFS_UID_PERM_SET; + ti->vfs_inode.i_uid = fsi->uid; + } - if (update_gid) + if (update_gid) { ti->flags &= ~TRACEFS_GID_PERM_SET; - + ti->vfs_inode.i_gid = fsi->gid; + } + + /* + * Note, the above ti->vfs_inode updates are + * used in eventfs_remount() so they must come + * before calling it. + */ if (ti->flags & TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE) eventfs_remount(ti, update_uid, update_gid); } -- 2.43.0

1 year, 6 months

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[for-linus][PATCH 1/8] eventfs: Keep the directories from having the same inode number as files

by Steven Rostedt

From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> The directories require unique inode numbers but all the eventfs files have the same inode number. Prevent the directories from having the same inode numbers as the files as that can confuse some tooling. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240523051539.428826685@goodmis… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy(a)kernel.org> Fixes: 834bf76add3e6 ("eventfs: Save directory inodes in the eventfs_inode structure") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> --- fs/tracefs/event_inode.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c b/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c index 0256afdd4acf..55a40a730b10 100644 --- a/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c +++ b/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c @@ -50,8 +50,12 @@ static struct eventfs_root_inode *get_root_inode(struct eventfs_inode *ei) /* Just try to make something consistent and unique */ static int eventfs_dir_ino(struct eventfs_inode *ei) { - if (!ei->ino) + if (!ei->ino) { ei->ino = get_next_ino(); + /* Must not have the file inode number */ + if (ei->ino == EVENTFS_FILE_INODE_INO) + ei->ino = get_next_ino(); + } return ei->ino; } -- 2.43.0

1 year, 6 months

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[PATCH] hwmon: (nzxt-smart2) add another USB ID

by Aleksandr Mezin

Fan speed control reported to be working with existing userspace (hidraw) software, so I assume it's compatible. Fan channel count is the same. No known differences from already supported devices, at least regarding fan speed control and initialization. Discovered in liquidctl project: https://github.com/liquidctl/liquidctl/pull/702 Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Mezin <mezin.alexander(a)gmail.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.1+ --- drivers/hwmon/nzxt-smart2.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/nzxt-smart2.c b/drivers/hwmon/nzxt-smart2.c index 7aa586eb74be..df6fa72a6b59 100644 --- a/drivers/hwmon/nzxt-smart2.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/nzxt-smart2.c @@ -799,6 +799,7 @@ static const struct hid_device_id nzxt_smart2_hid_id_table[] = { { HID_USB_DEVICE(0x1e71, 0x2010) }, /* NZXT RGB & Fan Controller */ { HID_USB_DEVICE(0x1e71, 0x2011) }, /* NZXT RGB & Fan Controller (6 RGB) */ { HID_USB_DEVICE(0x1e71, 0x2019) }, /* NZXT RGB & Fan Controller (6 RGB) */ + { HID_USB_DEVICE(0x1e71, 0x2020) }, /* NZXT RGB & Fan Controller (6 RGB) */ {}, }; -- 2.45.1

1 year, 6 months

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