Off-by-one errors happen because nr_snk_pdo and nr_src_pdo are
incorrectly added one. The index of the loop is equal to the number of
PDOs to be updated when leaving the loop and it doesn't need to be added
one.
When doing the power negotiation, TCPM relies on the "nr_snk_pdo" as
the size of the local sink PDO array to match the Source capabilities
of the partner port. If the off-by-one overflow occurs, a wrong RDO
might be sent and unexpected power transfer might happen such as over
voltage or over current (than expected).
"nr_src_pdo" is used to set the Rp level when the port is in Source
role. It is also the array size of the local Source capabilities when
filling up the buffer which will be sent as the Source PDOs (such as
in Power Negotiation). If the off-by-one overflow occurs, a wrong Rp
level might be set and wrong Source PDOs will be sent to the partner
port. This could potentially cause over current or port resets.
Fixes: cd099cde4ed2 ("usb: typec: tcpm: Support multiple capabilities")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kyle Tso <kyletso(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus(a)linux.intel.com>
---
v2 -> v3:
- rebase on top of usb-linus branch and fix conflicts
- add Reviewed-by tag
drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c b/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c
index c26fb70c3ec6..ab6ed6111ed0 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c
@@ -6855,14 +6855,14 @@ static int tcpm_pd_set(struct typec_port *p, struct usb_power_delivery *pd)
if (data->sink_desc.pdo[0]) {
for (i = 0; i < PDO_MAX_OBJECTS && data->sink_desc.pdo[i]; i++)
port->snk_pdo[i] = data->sink_desc.pdo[i];
- port->nr_snk_pdo = i + 1;
+ port->nr_snk_pdo = i;
port->operating_snk_mw = data->operating_snk_mw;
}
if (data->source_desc.pdo[0]) {
for (i = 0; i < PDO_MAX_OBJECTS && data->source_desc.pdo[i]; i++)
port->src_pdo[i] = data->source_desc.pdo[i];
- port->nr_src_pdo = i + 1;
+ port->nr_src_pdo = i;
}
switch (port->state) {
--
2.44.0.478.gd926399ef9-goog
From: Oliver Neukum <oneukum(a)suse.com>
If we get STS_HCE we give up on the interrupt, but for the purpose
of IRQ handling that still counts as ours. We may return IRQ_NONE
only if we are positive that it wasn't ours. Hence correct the default.
Fixes: 2a25e66d676d ("xhci: print warning when HCE was set")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.2+
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 9 ++++-----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
index 52278afea94b..575f0fd9c9f1 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
@@ -3133,7 +3133,7 @@ static int xhci_handle_events(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, struct xhci_interrupter *ir
irqreturn_t xhci_irq(struct usb_hcd *hcd)
{
struct xhci_hcd *xhci = hcd_to_xhci(hcd);
- irqreturn_t ret = IRQ_NONE;
+ irqreturn_t ret = IRQ_HANDLED;
u32 status;
spin_lock(&xhci->lock);
@@ -3141,12 +3141,13 @@ irqreturn_t xhci_irq(struct usb_hcd *hcd)
status = readl(&xhci->op_regs->status);
if (status == ~(u32)0) {
xhci_hc_died(xhci);
- ret = IRQ_HANDLED;
goto out;
}
- if (!(status & STS_EINT))
+ if (!(status & STS_EINT)) {
+ ret = IRQ_NONE;
goto out;
+ }
if (status & STS_HCE) {
xhci_warn(xhci, "WARNING: Host Controller Error\n");
@@ -3156,7 +3157,6 @@ irqreturn_t xhci_irq(struct usb_hcd *hcd)
if (status & STS_FATAL) {
xhci_warn(xhci, "WARNING: Host System Error\n");
xhci_halt(xhci);
- ret = IRQ_HANDLED;
goto out;
}
@@ -3167,7 +3167,6 @@ irqreturn_t xhci_irq(struct usb_hcd *hcd)
*/
status |= STS_EINT;
writel(status, &xhci->op_regs->status);
- ret = IRQ_HANDLED;
/* This is the handler of the primary interrupter */
xhci_handle_events(xhci, xhci->interrupters[0]);
--
2.25.1
There are few uses of CoCo that don't rely on working cryptography and
hence a working RNG. Unfortunately, the CoCo threat model means that the
VM host cannot be trusted and may actively work against guests to
extract secrets or manipulate computation. Since a malicious host can
modify or observe nearly all inputs to guests, the only remaining source
of entropy for CoCo guests is RDRAND.
If RDRAND is broken -- due to CPU hardware fault -- the RNG as a whole
is meant to gracefully continue on gathering entropy from other sources,
but since there aren't other sources on CoCo, this is catastrophic.
This is mostly a concern at boot time when initially seeding the RNG, as
after that the consequences of a broken RDRAND are much more
theoretical.
So, try at boot to seed the RNG using 256 bits of RDRAND output. If this
fails, panic(). This will also trigger if the system is booted without
RDRAND, as RDRAND is essential for a safe CoCo boot.
This patch is deliberately written to be "just a CoCo x86 driver
feature" and not part of the RNG itself. Many device drivers and
platforms have some desire to contribute something to the RNG, and
add_device_randomness() is specifically meant for this purpose. Any
driver can call this with seed data of any quality, or even garbage
quality, and it can only possibly make the quality of the RNG better or
have no effect, but can never make it worse. Rather than trying to
build something into the core of the RNG, this patch interprets the
particular CoCo issue as just a CoCo issue, and therefore separates this
all out into driver (well, arch/platform) code.
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de>
Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa(a)zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
---
Changes v3->v4:
- Add stable@ tag and reviewed-by lines.
- Add comment for Dave explaining where the "32" comes from.
arch/x86/coco/core.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 2 ++
3 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
index eeec9986570e..0e988bff4aec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
@@ -3,13 +3,16 @@
* Confidential Computing Platform Capability checks
*
* Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2024 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com>
*/
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <asm/archrandom.h>
#include <asm/coco.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -153,3 +156,40 @@ __init void cc_set_mask(u64 mask)
{
cc_mask = mask;
}
+
+__init void cc_random_init(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * The seed is 32 bytes (in units of longs), which is 256 bits, which
+ * is the security level that the RNG is targeting.
+ */
+ unsigned long rng_seed[32 / sizeof(long)];
+ size_t i, longs;
+
+ if (cc_vendor == CC_VENDOR_NONE)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Since the CoCo threat model includes the host, the only reliable
+ * source of entropy that can be neither observed nor manipulated is
+ * RDRAND. Usually, RDRAND failure is considered tolerable, but since
+ * CoCo guests have no other unobservable source of entropy, it's
+ * important to at least ensure the RNG gets some initial random seeds.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(rng_seed); i += longs) {
+ longs = arch_get_random_longs(&rng_seed[i], ARRAY_SIZE(rng_seed) - i);
+
+ /*
+ * A zero return value means that the guest doesn't have RDRAND
+ * or the CPU is physically broken, and in both cases that
+ * means most crypto inside of the CoCo instance will be
+ * broken, defeating the purpose of CoCo in the first place. So
+ * just panic here because it's absolutely unsafe to continue
+ * executing.
+ */
+ if (longs == 0)
+ panic("RDRAND is defective.");
+ }
+ add_device_randomness(rng_seed, sizeof(rng_seed));
+ memzero_explicit(rng_seed, sizeof(rng_seed));
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h
index 76c310b19b11..e9d059449885 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ extern enum cc_vendor cc_vendor;
void cc_set_mask(u64 mask);
u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val);
u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val);
+void cc_random_init(void);
#else
#define cc_vendor (CC_VENDOR_NONE)
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ static inline u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val)
{
return val;
}
+static inline void cc_random_init(void) { }
#endif
#endif /* _ASM_X86_COCO_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 84201071dfac..30a653cfc7d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include <asm/bios_ebda.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/cacheinfo.h>
+#include <asm/coco.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
#include <asm/gart.h>
@@ -994,6 +995,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
* memory size.
*/
mem_encrypt_setup_arch();
+ cc_random_init();
efi_fake_memmap();
efi_find_mirror();
--
2.43.2
On Wed, 3 Apr 2024 at 18:02, Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> wrote:
>
> This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
>
> gpio: protect the list of GPIO devices with SRCU
>
> to the 6.8-stable tree which can be found at:
> http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
>
> The filename of the patch is:
> gpio-protect-the-list-of-gpio-devices-with-srcu.patch
> and it can be found in the queue-6.8 subdirectory.
>
> If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
> please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>
>
>
> commit 077106f97c7d113ebacb00725d83b817d0e89288
> Author: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org>
> Date: Fri Jan 19 16:43:13 2024 +0100
>
> gpio: protect the list of GPIO devices with SRCU
>
> [ Upstream commit e348544f7994d252427ed3ae637c7081cbb90f66 ]
>
> We're working towards removing the "multi-function" GPIO spinlock that's
> implemented terribly wrong. We tried using an RW-semaphore to protect
> the list of GPIO devices but it turned out that we still have old code
> using legacy GPIO calls that need to translate the global GPIO number to
> the address of the associated descriptor and - to that end - traverse
> the list while holding the lock. If we change the spinlock to a sleeping
> lock then we'll end up with "scheduling while atomic" bugs.
>
> Let's allow lockless traversal of the list using SRCU and only use the
> mutex when modyfing the list.
>
> While at it: let's protect the period between when we start the lookup
> and when we finally request the descriptor (increasing the reference
> count of the GPIO device) with the SRCU read lock.
>
> Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org>
> Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij(a)linaro.org>
> Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com>
> Stable-dep-of: 5c887b65bbd1 ("gpiolib: Fix debug messaging in gpiod_find_and_request()")
> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
>
I'm not sure what the reason for picking this up into stable was but I
believe it's not a good idea. This is just the first patch in a big
series[1] of 24 commits total on top of which we had several bug fixes
during the stabilization phase in next. Without the rest of the
rework, it doesn't really improve the situation a lot.
I suggest dropping this and not trying to backport any of the GPIOLIB
locking rework to stable branches.
Best Regards,
Bartosz
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240208095920.8035-22-brgl@bgdev.pl/T/
[2024-04-03 19:58] gregkh linuxfoundation ! org:
> This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
>
> gpio: cdev: sanitize the label before requesting the interrupt
>
> to the 6.1-stable tree which can be found at:
> http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
>
> The filename of the patch is:
> gpio-cdev-sanitize-the-label-before-requesting-the-interrupt.patch
> and it can be found in the queue-6.1 subdirectory.
>
> If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
> please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>
>
> From b34490879baa847d16fc529c8ea6e6d34f004b38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org>
> Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 10:02:42 +0100
> Subject: gpio: cdev: sanitize the label before requesting the interrupt
>
> From: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org>
>
> commit b34490879baa847d16fc529c8ea6e6d34f004b38 upstream.
>
> When an interrupt is requested, a procfs directory is created under
> "/proc/irq/<irqnum>/<label>" where <label> is the string passed to one of
> the request_irq() variants.
>
> What follows is that the string must not contain the "/" character or
> the procfs mkdir operation will fail. We don't have such constraints for
> GPIO consumer labels which are used verbatim as interrupt labels for
> GPIO irqs. We must therefore sanitize the consumer string before
> requesting the interrupt.
>
> Let's replace all "/" with ":".
>
> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
> Reported-by: Stefan Wahren <wahrenst(a)gmx.net>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-gpio/39fe95cb-aa83-4b8b-8cab-63947a726754@gmx…
> Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org>
> Reviewed-by: Kent Gibson <warthog618(a)gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
> ---
> drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c
> +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c
> @@ -999,10 +999,20 @@ static u32 gpio_v2_line_config_debounce_
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static inline char *make_irq_label(const char *orig)
> +{
> + return kstrdup_and_replace(orig, '/', ':', GFP_KERNEL);
> +}
> +
> +static inline void free_irq_label(const char *label)
> +{
> + kfree(label);
> +}
> +
> static void edge_detector_stop(struct line *line)
> {
> if (line->irq) {
> - free_irq(line->irq, line);
> + free_irq_label(free_irq(line->irq, line));
> line->irq = 0;
> }
>
> @@ -1027,6 +1037,7 @@ static int edge_detector_setup(struct li
> unsigned long irqflags = 0;
> u64 eflags;
> int irq, ret;
> + char *label;
>
> eflags = edflags & GPIO_V2_LINE_EDGE_FLAGS;
> if (eflags && !kfifo_initialized(&line->req->events)) {
> @@ -1063,11 +1074,17 @@ static int edge_detector_setup(struct li
> IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING : IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING;
> irqflags |= IRQF_ONESHOT;
>
> + label = make_irq_label(line->req->label);
> + if (!label)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> /* Request a thread to read the events */
> ret = request_threaded_irq(irq, edge_irq_handler, edge_irq_thread,
> - irqflags, line->req->label, line);
> - if (ret)
> + irqflags, label, line);
> + if (ret) {
> + free_irq_label(label);
> return ret;
> + }
>
> line->irq = irq;
> return 0;
> @@ -1910,7 +1927,7 @@ static ssize_t lineevent_read(struct fil
> static void lineevent_free(struct lineevent_state *le)
> {
> if (le->irq)
> - free_irq(le->irq, le);
> + free_irq_label(free_irq(le->irq, le));
> if (le->desc)
> gpiod_free(le->desc);
> kfree(le->label);
> @@ -2058,6 +2075,7 @@ static int lineevent_create(struct gpio_
> int fd;
> int ret;
> int irq, irqflags = 0;
> + char *label;
>
> if (copy_from_user(&eventreq, ip, sizeof(eventreq)))
> return -EFAULT;
> @@ -2138,15 +2156,23 @@ static int lineevent_create(struct gpio_
> INIT_KFIFO(le->events);
> init_waitqueue_head(&le->wait);
>
> + label = make_irq_label(le->label);
> + if (!label) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto out_free_le;
> + }
> +
> /* Request a thread to read the events */
> ret = request_threaded_irq(irq,
> lineevent_irq_handler,
> lineevent_irq_thread,
> irqflags,
> - le->label,
> + label,
> le);
> - if (ret)
> + if (ret) {
> + free_irq_label(label);
> goto out_free_le;
> + }
>
> le->irq = irq;
>
>
>
> Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org are
>
> queue-6.1/gpio-cdev-sanitize-the-label-before-requesting-the-interrupt.patch
Hi,
this breaks the build because kstrdup_and_replace() does not exist in
version branch 6.1.
Regards
Pascal
commit ad3ac13c6ec318b43e769cc9ffde67528e58e555 upstream.
Most of clocks and their parents are defined in contiguous range,
But in few cases, there is gap in clock numbers[0].
Driver assumes clocks to be in contiguous range, and add their clock
ids incrementally.
New firmware started returning error while calling get_freq and is_on
API for non-available clock ids.
In this fix, driver checks and adds only valid clock ids.
[0] https://software-dl.ti.com/tisci/esd/latest/5_soc_doc/j7200/clocks.html
Section Clocks for NAVSS0_CPTS_0 Device, clock id 12-15 not present.
Fixes: 3c13933c6033 ("clk: keystone: sci-clk: add support for dynamically probing clocks")
Signed-off-by: Udit Kumar <u-kumar1(a)ti.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213082640.457316-1-u-kumar1@ti.com
Reviewed-by: Nishanth Menon <nm(a)ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd(a)kernel.org>
---
Patch needs manual backporting only for LTS kernel version 4.19
drivers/clk/keystone/sci-clk.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/clk/keystone/sci-clk.c b/drivers/clk/keystone/sci-clk.c
index 35fe197dd303..eb2ef44869b2 100644
--- a/drivers/clk/keystone/sci-clk.c
+++ b/drivers/clk/keystone/sci-clk.c
@@ -516,6 +516,7 @@ static int ti_sci_scan_clocks_from_dt(struct sci_clk_provider *provider)
struct sci_clk *sci_clk, *prev;
int num_clks = 0;
int num_parents;
+ bool state;
int clk_id;
const char * const clk_names[] = {
"clocks", "assigned-clocks", "assigned-clock-parents", NULL
@@ -586,6 +587,15 @@ static int ti_sci_scan_clocks_from_dt(struct sci_clk_provider *provider)
clk_id = args.args[1] + 1;
while (num_parents--) {
+ /* Check if this clock id is valid */
+ ret = provider->ops->is_auto(provider->sci,
+ sci_clk->dev_id, clk_id, &state);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ clk_id++;
+ continue;
+ }
+
sci_clk = devm_kzalloc(dev,
sizeof(*sci_clk),
GFP_KERNEL);
--
2.34.1