The quilt patch titled
Subject: fork: defer linking file vma until vma is fully initialized
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
fork-defer-linking-file-vma-until-vma-is-fully-initialized.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com>
Subject: fork: defer linking file vma until vma is fully initialized
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2024 17:14:41 +0800
Thorvald reported a WARNING [1]. And the root cause is below race:
CPU 1 CPU 2
fork hugetlbfs_fallocate
dup_mmap hugetlbfs_punch_hole
i_mmap_lock_write(mapping);
vma_interval_tree_insert_after -- Child vma is visible through i_mmap tree.
i_mmap_unlock_write(mapping);
hugetlb_dup_vma_private -- Clear vma_lock outside i_mmap_rwsem!
i_mmap_lock_write(mapping);
hugetlb_vmdelete_list
vma_interval_tree_foreach
hugetlb_vma_trylock_write -- Vma_lock is cleared.
tmp->vm_ops->open -- Alloc new vma_lock outside i_mmap_rwsem!
hugetlb_vma_unlock_write -- Vma_lock is assigned!!!
i_mmap_unlock_write(mapping);
hugetlb_dup_vma_private() and hugetlb_vm_op_open() are called outside
i_mmap_rwsem lock while vma lock can be used in the same time. Fix this
by deferring linking file vma until vma is fully initialized. Those vmas
should be initialized first before they can be used.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240410091441.3539905-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: 8d9bfb260814 ("hugetlb: add vma based lock for pmd sharing")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com>
Reported-by: Thorvald Natvig <thorvald(a)google.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20240129161735.6gmjsswx62o4pbja@revolver/T/ [1]
Reviewed-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Peng Zhang <zhangpeng.00(a)bytedance.com>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tandersen(a)netflix.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
kernel/fork.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/fork.c~fork-defer-linking-file-vma-until-vma-is-fully-initialized
+++ a/kernel/fork.c
@@ -714,6 +714,23 @@ static __latent_entropy int dup_mmap(str
} else if (anon_vma_fork(tmp, mpnt))
goto fail_nomem_anon_vma_fork;
vm_flags_clear(tmp, VM_LOCKED_MASK);
+ /*
+ * Copy/update hugetlb private vma information.
+ */
+ if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(tmp))
+ hugetlb_dup_vma_private(tmp);
+
+ /*
+ * Link the vma into the MT. After using __mt_dup(), memory
+ * allocation is not necessary here, so it cannot fail.
+ */
+ vma_iter_bulk_store(&vmi, tmp);
+
+ mm->map_count++;
+
+ if (tmp->vm_ops && tmp->vm_ops->open)
+ tmp->vm_ops->open(tmp);
+
file = tmp->vm_file;
if (file) {
struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
@@ -730,25 +747,9 @@ static __latent_entropy int dup_mmap(str
i_mmap_unlock_write(mapping);
}
- /*
- * Copy/update hugetlb private vma information.
- */
- if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(tmp))
- hugetlb_dup_vma_private(tmp);
-
- /*
- * Link the vma into the MT. After using __mt_dup(), memory
- * allocation is not necessary here, so it cannot fail.
- */
- vma_iter_bulk_store(&vmi, tmp);
-
- mm->map_count++;
if (!(tmp->vm_flags & VM_WIPEONFORK))
retval = copy_page_range(tmp, mpnt);
- if (tmp->vm_ops && tmp->vm_ops->open)
- tmp->vm_ops->open(tmp);
-
if (retval) {
mpnt = vma_next(&vmi);
goto loop_out;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from linmiaohe(a)huawei.com are
The quilt patch titled
Subject: Squashfs: check the inode number is not the invalid value of zero
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
squashfs-check-the-inode-number-is-not-the-invalid-value-of-zero.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Phillip Lougher <phillip(a)squashfs.org.uk>
Subject: Squashfs: check the inode number is not the invalid value of zero
Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2024 23:02:06 +0100
Syskiller has produced an out of bounds access in fill_meta_index().
That out of bounds access is ultimately caused because the inode
has an inode number with the invalid value of zero, which was not checked.
The reason this causes the out of bounds access is due to following
sequence of events:
1. Fill_meta_index() is called to allocate (via empty_meta_index())
and fill a metadata index. It however suffers a data read error
and aborts, invalidating the newly returned empty metadata index.
It does this by setting the inode number of the index to zero,
which means unused (zero is not a valid inode number).
2. When fill_meta_index() is subsequently called again on another
read operation, locate_meta_index() returns the previous index
because it matches the inode number of 0. Because this index
has been returned it is expected to have been filled, and because
it hasn't been, an out of bounds access is performed.
This patch adds a sanity check which checks that the inode number
is not zero when the inode is created and returns -EINVAL if it is.
[phillip(a)squashfs.org.uk: whitespace fix]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240409204723.446925-1-phillip@squashfs.org.uk
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240408220206.435788-1-phillip@squashfs.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip(a)squashfs.org.uk>
Reported-by: "Ubisectech Sirius" <bugreport(a)ubisectech.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87f5c007-b8a5-41ae-8b57-431e924c5915.bugreport…
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
fs/squashfs/inode.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/squashfs/inode.c~squashfs-check-the-inode-number-is-not-the-invalid-value-of-zero
+++ a/fs/squashfs/inode.c
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ static int squashfs_new_inode(struct sup
gid_t i_gid;
int err;
+ inode->i_ino = le32_to_cpu(sqsh_ino->inode_number);
+ if (inode->i_ino == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
err = squashfs_get_id(sb, le16_to_cpu(sqsh_ino->uid), &i_uid);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -58,7 +62,6 @@ static int squashfs_new_inode(struct sup
i_uid_write(inode, i_uid);
i_gid_write(inode, i_gid);
- inode->i_ino = le32_to_cpu(sqsh_ino->inode_number);
inode_set_mtime(inode, le32_to_cpu(sqsh_ino->mtime), 0);
inode_set_atime(inode, inode_get_mtime_sec(inode), 0);
inode_set_ctime(inode, inode_get_mtime_sec(inode), 0);
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from phillip(a)squashfs.org.uk are
squashfs-remove-deprecated-strncpy-by-not-copying-the-string.patch
The quilt patch titled
Subject: mm,swapops: update check in is_pfn_swap_entry for hwpoison entries
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mmswapops-update-check-in-is_pfn_swap_entry-for-hwpoison-entries.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.de>
Subject: mm,swapops: update check in is_pfn_swap_entry for hwpoison entries
Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2024 15:05:37 +0200
Tony reported that the Machine check recovery was broken in v6.9-rc1, as
he was hitting a VM_BUG_ON when injecting uncorrectable memory errors to
DRAM.
After some more digging and debugging on his side, he realized that this
went back to v6.1, with the introduction of 'commit 0d206b5d2e0d
("mm/swap: add swp_offset_pfn() to fetch PFN from swap entry")'. That
commit, among other things, introduced swp_offset_pfn(), replacing
hwpoison_entry_to_pfn() in its favour.
The patch also introduced a VM_BUG_ON() check for is_pfn_swap_entry(), but
is_pfn_swap_entry() never got updated to cover hwpoison entries, which
means that we would hit the VM_BUG_ON whenever we would call
swp_offset_pfn() for such entries on environments with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
set. Fix this by updating the check to cover hwpoison entries as well,
and update the comment while we are it.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240407130537.16977-1-osalvador@suse.de
Fixes: 0d206b5d2e0d ("mm/swap: add swp_offset_pfn() to fetch PFN from swap entry")
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.de>
Reported-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck(a)intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Zg8kLSl2yAlA3o5D@agluck-desk3/
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Acked-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.1.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
include/linux/swapops.h | 65 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/swapops.h~mmswapops-update-check-in-is_pfn_swap_entry-for-hwpoison-entries
+++ a/include/linux/swapops.h
@@ -390,6 +390,35 @@ static inline bool is_migration_entry_di
}
#endif /* CONFIG_MIGRATION */
+#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
+
+/*
+ * Support for hardware poisoned pages
+ */
+static inline swp_entry_t make_hwpoison_entry(struct page *page)
+{
+ BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
+ return swp_entry(SWP_HWPOISON, page_to_pfn(page));
+}
+
+static inline int is_hwpoison_entry(swp_entry_t entry)
+{
+ return swp_type(entry) == SWP_HWPOISON;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline swp_entry_t make_hwpoison_entry(struct page *page)
+{
+ return swp_entry(0, 0);
+}
+
+static inline int is_hwpoison_entry(swp_entry_t swp)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
typedef unsigned long pte_marker;
#define PTE_MARKER_UFFD_WP BIT(0)
@@ -483,8 +512,9 @@ static inline struct folio *pfn_swap_ent
/*
* A pfn swap entry is a special type of swap entry that always has a pfn stored
- * in the swap offset. They are used to represent unaddressable device memory
- * and to restrict access to a page undergoing migration.
+ * in the swap offset. They can either be used to represent unaddressable device
+ * memory, to restrict access to a page undergoing migration or to represent a
+ * pfn which has been hwpoisoned and unmapped.
*/
static inline bool is_pfn_swap_entry(swp_entry_t entry)
{
@@ -492,7 +522,7 @@ static inline bool is_pfn_swap_entry(swp
BUILD_BUG_ON(SWP_TYPE_SHIFT < SWP_PFN_BITS);
return is_migration_entry(entry) || is_device_private_entry(entry) ||
- is_device_exclusive_entry(entry);
+ is_device_exclusive_entry(entry) || is_hwpoison_entry(entry);
}
struct page_vma_mapped_walk;
@@ -561,35 +591,6 @@ static inline int is_pmd_migration_entry
}
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION */
-#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
-
-/*
- * Support for hardware poisoned pages
- */
-static inline swp_entry_t make_hwpoison_entry(struct page *page)
-{
- BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
- return swp_entry(SWP_HWPOISON, page_to_pfn(page));
-}
-
-static inline int is_hwpoison_entry(swp_entry_t entry)
-{
- return swp_type(entry) == SWP_HWPOISON;
-}
-
-#else
-
-static inline swp_entry_t make_hwpoison_entry(struct page *page)
-{
- return swp_entry(0, 0);
-}
-
-static inline int is_hwpoison_entry(swp_entry_t swp)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
static inline int non_swap_entry(swp_entry_t entry)
{
return swp_type(entry) >= MAX_SWAPFILES;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from osalvador(a)suse.de are
The quilt patch titled
Subject: mm/memory-failure: fix deadlock when hugetlb_optimize_vmemmap is enabled
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mm-memory-failure-fix-deadlock-when-hugetlb_optimize_vmemmap-is-enabled.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com>
Subject: mm/memory-failure: fix deadlock when hugetlb_optimize_vmemmap is enabled
Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2024 16:54:56 +0800
When I did hard offline test with hugetlb pages, below deadlock occurs:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
bash/46904 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffffabe68910 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0x6c/0x770
page_alloc_cpu_online+0x3c/0x70
cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x397/0x5f0
__cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x71/0xe0
_cpu_up+0xeb/0x210
cpu_up+0x91/0xe0
cpuhp_bringup_mask+0x49/0xb0
bringup_nonboot_cpus+0xb7/0xe0
smp_init+0x25/0xa0
kernel_init_freeable+0x15f/0x3e0
kernel_init+0x15/0x1b0
ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
-> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0
lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0
cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0
static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60
__hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200
dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260
__page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0
memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70
hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0
vfs_write+0x387/0x550
ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(pcp_batch_high_lock);
lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
lock(pcp_batch_high_lock);
rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by bash/46904:
#0: ffff98f6c3bb23f0 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
#1: ffff98f6c328e488 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf8/0x1d0
#2: ffff98ef83b31890 (kn->active#113){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x100/0x1d0
#3: ffffffffabf9db48 (mf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: memory_failure+0x44/0xc70
#4: ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40
stack backtrace:
CPU: 10 PID: 46904 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0
check_noncircular+0x129/0x140
__lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0
lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0
cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0
static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60
__hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200
dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260
__page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0
memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70
hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0
vfs_write+0x387/0x550
ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
RIP: 0033:0x7fc862314887
Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24
RSP: 002b:00007fff19311268 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 00007fc862314887
RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 000056405645fe10 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 000056405645fe10 R08: 00007fc8623d1460 R09: 000000007fffffff
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000c
R13: 00007fc86241b780 R14: 00007fc862417600 R15: 00007fc862416a00
In short, below scene breaks the lock dependency chain:
memory_failure
__page_handle_poison
zone_pcp_disable -- lock(pcp_batch_high_lock)
dissolve_free_huge_page
__hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio
static_key_slow_dec
cpus_read_lock -- rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock)
Fix this by calling drain_all_pages() instead.
This issue won't occur until commit a6b40850c442 ("mm: hugetlb: replace
hugetlb_free_vmemmap_enabled with a static_key"). As it introduced
rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock) in dissolve_free_huge_page() code path while
lock(pcp_batch_high_lock) is already in the __page_handle_poison().
[linmiaohe(a)huawei.com: extend comment per Oscar]
[akpm(a)linux-foundation.org: reflow block comment]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240407085456.2798193-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: a6b40850c442 ("mm: hugetlb: replace hugetlb_free_vmemmap_enabled with a static_key")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com>
Acked-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi(a)gmail.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/memory-failure.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/memory-failure.c~mm-memory-failure-fix-deadlock-when-hugetlb_optimize_vmemmap-is-enabled
+++ a/mm/memory-failure.c
@@ -154,11 +154,23 @@ static int __page_handle_poison(struct p
{
int ret;
- zone_pcp_disable(page_zone(page));
+ /*
+ * zone_pcp_disable() can't be used here. It will
+ * hold pcp_batch_high_lock and dissolve_free_huge_page() might hold
+ * cpu_hotplug_lock via static_key_slow_dec() when hugetlb vmemmap
+ * optimization is enabled. This will break current lock dependency
+ * chain and leads to deadlock.
+ * Disabling pcp before dissolving the page was a deterministic
+ * approach because we made sure that those pages cannot end up in any
+ * PCP list. Draining PCP lists expels those pages to the buddy system,
+ * but nothing guarantees that those pages do not get back to a PCP
+ * queue if we need to refill those.
+ */
ret = dissolve_free_huge_page(page);
- if (!ret)
+ if (!ret) {
+ drain_all_pages(page_zone(page));
ret = take_page_off_buddy(page);
- zone_pcp_enable(page_zone(page));
+ }
return ret;
}
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from linmiaohe(a)huawei.com are
The quilt patch titled
Subject: mm/userfaultfd: allow hugetlb change protection upon poison entry
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mm-userfaultfd-allow-hugetlb-change-protection-upon-poison-entry.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Peter Xu <peterx(a)redhat.com>
Subject: mm/userfaultfd: allow hugetlb change protection upon poison entry
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2024 19:19:20 -0400
After UFFDIO_POISON, there can be two kinds of hugetlb pte markers, either
the POISON one or UFFD_WP one.
Allow change protection to run on a poisoned marker just like !hugetlb
cases, ignoring the marker irrelevant of the permission.
Here the two bits are mutual exclusive. For example, when install a
poisoned entry it must not be UFFD_WP already (by checking pte_none()
before such install). And it also means if UFFD_WP is set there must have
no POISON bit set. It makes sense because UFFD_WP is a bit to reflect
permission, and permissions do not apply if the pte is poisoned and
destined to sigbus.
So here we simply check uffd_wp bit set first, do nothing otherwise.
Attach the Fixes to UFFDIO_POISON work, as before that it should not be
possible to have poison entry for hugetlb (e.g., hugetlb doesn't do swap,
so no chance of swapin errors).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240405231920.1772199-1-peterx@redhat.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000920d5e0615602dd1@google.com
Fixes: fc71884a5f59 ("mm: userfaultfd: add new UFFDIO_POISON ioctl")
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx(a)redhat.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+b07c8ac8eee3d4d8440f(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen(a)google.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.6+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/hugetlb.c | 10 +++++++---
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/hugetlb.c~mm-userfaultfd-allow-hugetlb-change-protection-upon-poison-entry
+++ a/mm/hugetlb.c
@@ -7044,9 +7044,13 @@ long hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm
if (!pte_same(pte, newpte))
set_huge_pte_at(mm, address, ptep, newpte, psize);
} else if (unlikely(is_pte_marker(pte))) {
- /* No other markers apply for now. */
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!pte_marker_uffd_wp(pte));
- if (uffd_wp_resolve)
+ /*
+ * Do nothing on a poison marker; page is
+ * corrupted, permissons do not apply. Here
+ * pte_marker_uffd_wp()==true implies !poison
+ * because they're mutual exclusive.
+ */
+ if (pte_marker_uffd_wp(pte) && uffd_wp_resolve)
/* Safe to modify directly (non-present->none). */
huge_pte_clear(mm, address, ptep, psize);
} else if (!huge_pte_none(pte)) {
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from peterx(a)redhat.com are
mm-hmm-process-pud-swap-entry-without-pud_huge.patch
mm-gup-cache-p4d-in-follow_p4d_mask.patch
mm-gup-check-p4d-presence-before-going-on.patch
mm-x86-change-pxd_huge-behavior-to-exclude-swap-entries.patch
mm-sparc-change-pxd_huge-behavior-to-exclude-swap-entries.patch
mm-arm-use-macros-to-define-pmd-pud-helpers.patch
mm-arm-redefine-pmd_huge-with-pmd_leaf.patch
mm-arm64-merge-pxd_huge-and-pxd_leaf-definitions.patch
mm-powerpc-redefine-pxd_huge-with-pxd_leaf.patch
mm-gup-merge-pxd-huge-mapping-checks.patch
mm-treewide-replace-pxd_huge-with-pxd_leaf.patch
mm-treewide-remove-pxd_huge.patch
mm-arm-remove-pmd_thp_or_huge.patch
mm-document-pxd_leaf-api.patch
selftests-mm-run_vmtestssh-fix-hugetlb-mem-size-calculation.patch
selftests-mm-run_vmtestssh-fix-hugetlb-mem-size-calculation-fix.patch
mm-kconfig-config_pgtable_has_huge_leaves.patch
mm-hugetlb-declare-hugetlbfs_pagecache_present-non-static.patch
mm-make-hpage_pxd_-macros-even-if-thp.patch
mm-introduce-vma_pgtable_walk_beginend.patch
mm-arch-provide-pud_pfn-fallback.patch
mm-arch-provide-pud_pfn-fallback-fix.patch
mm-gup-drop-folio_fast_pin_allowed-in-hugepd-processing.patch
mm-gup-refactor-record_subpages-to-find-1st-small-page.patch
mm-gup-handle-hugetlb-for-no_page_table.patch
mm-gup-cache-pudp-in-follow_pud_mask.patch
mm-gup-handle-huge-pud-for-follow_pud_mask.patch
mm-gup-handle-huge-pmd-for-follow_pmd_mask.patch
mm-gup-handle-huge-pmd-for-follow_pmd_mask-fix.patch
mm-gup-handle-hugepd-for-follow_page.patch
mm-gup-handle-hugetlb-in-the-generic-follow_page_mask-code.patch
mm-allow-anon-exclusive-check-over-hugetlb-tail-pages.patch
mm-page_table_check-support-userfault-wr-protect-entries.patch
The quilt patch titled
Subject: userfaultfd: change src_folio after ensuring it's unpinned in UFFDIO_MOVE
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
userfaultfd-change-src_folio-after-ensuring-its-unpinned-in-uffdio_move.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra(a)google.com>
Subject: userfaultfd: change src_folio after ensuring it's unpinned in UFFDIO_MOVE
Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2024 10:17:26 -0700
Commit d7a08838ab74 ("mm: userfaultfd: fix unexpected change to src_folio
when UFFDIO_MOVE fails") moved the src_folio->{mapping, index} changing to
after clearing the page-table and ensuring that it's not pinned. This
avoids failure of swapout+migration and possibly memory corruption.
However, the commit missed fixing it in the huge-page case.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240404171726.2302435-1-lokeshgidra@google.com
Fixes: adef440691ba ("userfaultfd: UFFDIO_MOVE uABI")
Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra(a)google.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh(a)google.com>
Cc: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra(a)google.com>
Cc: Nicolas Geoffray <ngeoffray(a)google.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/huge_memory.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c~userfaultfd-change-src_folio-after-ensuring-its-unpinned-in-uffdio_move
+++ a/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -2259,9 +2259,6 @@ int move_pages_huge_pmd(struct mm_struct
goto unlock_ptls;
}
- folio_move_anon_rmap(src_folio, dst_vma);
- WRITE_ONCE(src_folio->index, linear_page_index(dst_vma, dst_addr));
-
src_pmdval = pmdp_huge_clear_flush(src_vma, src_addr, src_pmd);
/* Folio got pinned from under us. Put it back and fail the move. */
if (folio_maybe_dma_pinned(src_folio)) {
@@ -2270,6 +2267,9 @@ int move_pages_huge_pmd(struct mm_struct
goto unlock_ptls;
}
+ folio_move_anon_rmap(src_folio, dst_vma);
+ WRITE_ONCE(src_folio->index, linear_page_index(dst_vma, dst_addr));
+
_dst_pmd = mk_huge_pmd(&src_folio->page, dst_vma->vm_page_prot);
/* Follow mremap() behavior and treat the entry dirty after the move */
_dst_pmd = pmd_mkwrite(pmd_mkdirty(_dst_pmd), dst_vma);
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from lokeshgidra(a)google.com are
The quilt patch titled
Subject: mm/memory-failure: fix deadlock when hugetlb_optimize_vmemmap is enabled
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mm-memory-failure-fix-deadlock-when-hugetlb_optimize_vmemmap-is-enabled-v2.patch
This patch was dropped because it was folded into mm-memory-failure-fix-deadlock-when-hugetlb_optimize_vmemmap-is-enabled.patch
------------------------------------------------------
From: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com>
Subject: mm/memory-failure: fix deadlock when hugetlb_optimize_vmemmap is enabled
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2024 10:57:54 +0800
extend comment per Oscar
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240412025754.1897615-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: a6b40850c442 ("mm: hugetlb: replace hugetlb_free_vmemmap_enabled with a static_key")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com>
Acked-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.de>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/memory-failure.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/mm/memory-failure.c~mm-memory-failure-fix-deadlock-when-hugetlb_optimize_vmemmap-is-enabled-v2
+++ a/mm/memory-failure.c
@@ -159,6 +159,10 @@ static int __page_handle_poison(struct p
* dissolve_free_huge_page() might hold cpu_hotplug_lock via static_key_slow_dec()
* when hugetlb vmemmap optimization is enabled. This will break current lock
* dependency chain and leads to deadlock.
+ * Disabling pcp before dissolving the page was a deterministic approach because
+ * we made sure that those pages cannot end up in any PCP list. Draining PCP lists
+ * expels those pages to the buddy system, but nothing guarantees that those pages
+ * do not get back to a PCP queue if we need to refill those.
*/
ret = dissolve_free_huge_page(page);
if (!ret) {
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from linmiaohe(a)huawei.com are
mm-memory-failure-fix-deadlock-when-hugetlb_optimize_vmemmap-is-enabled.patch
fork-defer-linking-file-vma-until-vma-is-fully-initialized.patch
The `module!` macro creates glue code that are called by C to initialize
the Rust modules using the `Module::init` function. Part of this glue
code are the local functions `__init` and `__exit` that are used to
initialize/destroy the Rust module.
These functions are safe and also visible to the Rust mod in which the
`module!` macro is invoked. This means that they can be called by other
safe Rust code. But since they contain `unsafe` blocks that rely on only
being called at the right time, this is a soundness issue.
Wrap these generated functions inside of two private modules, this
guarantees that the public functions cannot be called from the outside.
Make the safe functions `unsafe` and add SAFETY comments.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Closes: https://github.com/Rust-for-Linux/linux/issues/629
Fixes: 1fbde52bde73 ("rust: add `macros` crate")
Signed-off-by: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin(a)proton.me>
---
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/rust-for-linux/20240327160346.22442-1-benno.lossin@…
v1 -> v2:
- wrapped `__init` and `__exit` calls in `unsafe` blocks and added
SAFETY comments,
- fixed safety requirement on `__exit` and `__init`,
- rebased onto rust-next.
rust/macros/module.rs | 213 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 127 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
diff --git a/rust/macros/module.rs b/rust/macros/module.rs
index 27979e582e4b..293beca0a583 100644
--- a/rust/macros/module.rs
+++ b/rust/macros/module.rs
@@ -199,103 +199,144 @@ pub(crate) fn module(ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
/// Used by the printing macros, e.g. [`info!`].
const __LOG_PREFIX: &[u8] = b\"{name}\\0\";
- /// The \"Rust loadable module\" mark.
- //
- // This may be best done another way later on, e.g. as a new modinfo
- // key or a new section. For the moment, keep it simple.
- #[cfg(MODULE)]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[used]
- static __IS_RUST_MODULE: () = ();
-
- static mut __MOD: Option<{type_}> = None;
-
- // SAFETY: `__this_module` is constructed by the kernel at load time and will not be
- // freed until the module is unloaded.
- #[cfg(MODULE)]
- static THIS_MODULE: kernel::ThisModule = unsafe {{
- kernel::ThisModule::from_ptr(&kernel::bindings::__this_module as *const _ as *mut _)
- }};
- #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
- static THIS_MODULE: kernel::ThisModule = unsafe {{
- kernel::ThisModule::from_ptr(core::ptr::null_mut())
- }};
-
- // Loadable modules need to export the `{{init,cleanup}}_module` identifiers.
- /// # Safety
- ///
- /// This function must not be called after module initialization, because it may be
- /// freed after that completes.
- #[cfg(MODULE)]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[no_mangle]
- #[link_section = \".init.text\"]
- pub unsafe extern \"C\" fn init_module() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
- __init()
- }}
+ // Double nested modules, since then nobody can access the public items inside.
+ mod __module_init {{
+ mod __module_init {{
+ use super::super::{type_};
+
+ /// The \"Rust loadable module\" mark.
+ //
+ // This may be best done another way later on, e.g. as a new modinfo
+ // key or a new section. For the moment, keep it simple.
+ #[cfg(MODULE)]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[used]
+ static __IS_RUST_MODULE: () = ();
+
+ static mut __MOD: Option<{type_}> = None;
+
+ // SAFETY: `__this_module` is constructed by the kernel at load time and will not be
+ // freed until the module is unloaded.
+ #[cfg(MODULE)]
+ static THIS_MODULE: kernel::ThisModule = unsafe {{
+ kernel::ThisModule::from_ptr(&kernel::bindings::__this_module as *const _ as *mut _)
+ }};
+ #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
+ static THIS_MODULE: kernel::ThisModule = unsafe {{
+ kernel::ThisModule::from_ptr(core::ptr::null_mut())
+ }};
+
+ // Loadable modules need to export the `{{init,cleanup}}_module` identifiers.
+ /// # Safety
+ ///
+ /// This function must not be called after module initialization, because it may be
+ /// freed after that completes.
+ #[cfg(MODULE)]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[no_mangle]
+ #[link_section = \".init.text\"]
+ pub unsafe extern \"C\" fn init_module() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
+ // SAFETY: this function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double
+ // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its
+ // unique name.
+ unsafe {{ __init() }}
+ }}
- #[cfg(MODULE)]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[no_mangle]
- pub extern \"C\" fn cleanup_module() {{
- __exit()
- }}
+ #[cfg(MODULE)]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[no_mangle]
+ pub extern \"C\" fn cleanup_module() {{
+ // SAFETY:
+ // - this function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double
+ // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its
+ // unique name,
+ // - furthermore it is only called after `init_module` has returned `0`
+ // (which delegates to `__init`).
+ unsafe {{ __exit() }}
+ }}
- // Built-in modules are initialized through an initcall pointer
- // and the identifiers need to be unique.
- #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
- #[cfg(not(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS))]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[link_section = \"{initcall_section}\"]
- #[used]
- pub static __{name}_initcall: extern \"C\" fn() -> core::ffi::c_int = __{name}_init;
-
- #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
- #[cfg(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS)]
- core::arch::global_asm!(
- r#\".section \"{initcall_section}\", \"a\"
- __{name}_initcall:
- .long __{name}_init - .
- .previous
- \"#
- );
+ // Built-in modules are initialized through an initcall pointer
+ // and the identifiers need to be unique.
+ #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
+ #[cfg(not(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS))]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[link_section = \"{initcall_section}\"]
+ #[used]
+ pub static __{name}_initcall: extern \"C\" fn() -> core::ffi::c_int = __{name}_init;
+
+ #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
+ #[cfg(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS)]
+ core::arch::global_asm!(
+ r#\".section \"{initcall_section}\", \"a\"
+ __{name}_initcall:
+ .long __{name}_init - .
+ .previous
+ \"#
+ );
+
+ #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[no_mangle]
+ pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
+ // SAFETY: this function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double
+ // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its
+ // placement above in the initcall section.
+ unsafe {{ __init() }}
+ }}
- #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[no_mangle]
- pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
- __init()
- }}
+ #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[no_mangle]
+ pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_exit() {{
+ // SAFETY:
+ // - this function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double
+ // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its
+ // unique name,
+ // - furthermore it is only called after `__{name}_init` has returned `0`
+ // (which delegates to `__init`).
+ unsafe {{ __exit() }}
+ }}
- #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[no_mangle]
- pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_exit() {{
- __exit()
- }}
+ /// # Safety
+ ///
+ /// This function must only be called once.
+ unsafe fn __init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
+ match <{type_} as kernel::Module>::init(&THIS_MODULE) {{
+ Ok(m) => {{
+ // SAFETY:
+ // no data race, since `__MOD` can only be accessed by this module and
+ // there only `__init` and `__exit` access it. These functions are only
+ // called once and `__exit` cannot be called before or during `__init`.
+ unsafe {{
+ __MOD = Some(m);
+ }}
+ return 0;
+ }}
+ Err(e) => {{
+ return e.to_errno();
+ }}
+ }}
+ }}
- fn __init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
- match <{type_} as kernel::Module>::init(&THIS_MODULE) {{
- Ok(m) => {{
+ /// # Safety
+ ///
+ /// This function must
+ /// - only be called once,
+ /// - be called after `__init` has been called and returned `0`.
+ unsafe fn __exit() {{
+ // SAFETY:
+ // no data race, since `__MOD` can only be accessed by this module and there
+ // only `__init` and `__exit` access it. These functions are only called once
+ // and `__init` was already called.
unsafe {{
- __MOD = Some(m);
+ // Invokes `drop()` on `__MOD`, which should be used for cleanup.
+ __MOD = None;
}}
- return 0;
}}
- Err(e) => {{
- return e.to_errno();
- }}
- }}
- }}
- fn __exit() {{
- unsafe {{
- // Invokes `drop()` on `__MOD`, which should be used for cleanup.
- __MOD = None;
+ {modinfo}
}}
}}
-
- {modinfo}
",
type_ = info.type_,
name = info.name,
base-commit: 9ffe2a730313f27cebd0859ea856247ac59c576c
--
2.44.0