The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x e871abcda3b67d0820b4182ebe93435624e9c6a4
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024041903-pentagon-deceiver-fe1d@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
e871abcda3b6 ("random: handle creditable entropy from atomic process context")
bbc7e1bed1f5 ("random: add back async readiness notifier")
9148de3196ed ("random: reseed in delayed work rather than on-demand")
f62384995e4c ("random: split initialization into early step and later step")
745558f95885 ("random: use hwgenerator randomness more frequently at early boot")
228dfe98a313 ("Merge tag 'char-misc-6.0-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From e871abcda3b67d0820b4182ebe93435624e9c6a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2024 13:38:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] random: handle creditable entropy from atomic process context
The entropy accounting changes a static key when the RNG has
initialized, since it only ever initializes once. Static key changes,
however, cannot be made from atomic context, so depending on where the
last creditable entropy comes from, the static key change might need to
be deferred to a worker.
Previously the code used the execute_in_process_context() helper
function, which accounts for whether or not the caller is
in_interrupt(). However, that doesn't account for the case where the
caller is actually in process context but is holding a spinlock.
This turned out to be the case with input_handle_event() in
drivers/input/input.c contributing entropy:
[<ffffffd613025ba0>] die+0xa8/0x2fc
[<ffffffd613027428>] bug_handler+0x44/0xec
[<ffffffd613016964>] brk_handler+0x90/0x144
[<ffffffd613041e58>] do_debug_exception+0xa0/0x148
[<ffffffd61400c208>] el1_dbg+0x60/0x7c
[<ffffffd61400c000>] el1h_64_sync_handler+0x38/0x90
[<ffffffd613011294>] el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x6c
[<ffffffd613102d88>] __might_resched+0x1fc/0x2e8
[<ffffffd613102b54>] __might_sleep+0x44/0x7c
[<ffffffd6130b6eac>] cpus_read_lock+0x1c/0xec
[<ffffffd6132c2820>] static_key_enable+0x14/0x38
[<ffffffd61400ac08>] crng_set_ready+0x14/0x28
[<ffffffd6130df4dc>] execute_in_process_context+0xb8/0xf8
[<ffffffd61400ab30>] _credit_init_bits+0x118/0x1dc
[<ffffffd6138580c8>] add_timer_randomness+0x264/0x270
[<ffffffd613857e54>] add_input_randomness+0x38/0x48
[<ffffffd613a80f94>] input_handle_event+0x2b8/0x490
[<ffffffd613a81310>] input_event+0x6c/0x98
According to Guoyong, it's not really possible to refactor the various
drivers to never hold a spinlock there. And in_atomic() isn't reliable.
So, rather than trying to be too fancy, just punt the change in the
static key to a workqueue always. There's basically no drawback of doing
this, as the code already needed to account for the static key not
changing immediately, and given that it's just an optimization, there's
not exactly a hurry to change the static key right away, so deferal is
fine.
Reported-by: Guoyong Wang <guoyong.wang(a)mediatek.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f5bda35fba61 ("random: use static branch for crng_ready()")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 456be28ba67c..2597cb43f438 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
{
- static struct execute_work set_ready;
+ static DECLARE_WORK(set_ready, crng_set_ready);
unsigned int new, orig, add;
unsigned long flags;
@@ -718,8 +718,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) {
crng_reseed(NULL); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */
- if (static_key_initialized)
- execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready);
+ if (static_key_initialized && system_unbound_wq)
+ queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &set_ready);
atomic_notifier_call_chain(&random_ready_notifier, 0, NULL);
wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
@@ -890,8 +890,8 @@ void __init random_init(void)
/*
* If we were initialized by the cpu or bootloader before jump labels
- * are initialized, then we should enable the static branch here, where
- * it's guaranteed that jump labels have been initialized.
+ * or workqueues are initialized, then we should enable the static
+ * branch here, where it's guaranteed that these have been initialized.
*/
if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) && crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
crng_set_ready(NULL);
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x e871abcda3b67d0820b4182ebe93435624e9c6a4
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024041905-obvious-blush-10d8@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
e871abcda3b6 ("random: handle creditable entropy from atomic process context")
bbc7e1bed1f5 ("random: add back async readiness notifier")
9148de3196ed ("random: reseed in delayed work rather than on-demand")
f62384995e4c ("random: split initialization into early step and later step")
745558f95885 ("random: use hwgenerator randomness more frequently at early boot")
228dfe98a313 ("Merge tag 'char-misc-6.0-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From e871abcda3b67d0820b4182ebe93435624e9c6a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2024 13:38:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] random: handle creditable entropy from atomic process context
The entropy accounting changes a static key when the RNG has
initialized, since it only ever initializes once. Static key changes,
however, cannot be made from atomic context, so depending on where the
last creditable entropy comes from, the static key change might need to
be deferred to a worker.
Previously the code used the execute_in_process_context() helper
function, which accounts for whether or not the caller is
in_interrupt(). However, that doesn't account for the case where the
caller is actually in process context but is holding a spinlock.
This turned out to be the case with input_handle_event() in
drivers/input/input.c contributing entropy:
[<ffffffd613025ba0>] die+0xa8/0x2fc
[<ffffffd613027428>] bug_handler+0x44/0xec
[<ffffffd613016964>] brk_handler+0x90/0x144
[<ffffffd613041e58>] do_debug_exception+0xa0/0x148
[<ffffffd61400c208>] el1_dbg+0x60/0x7c
[<ffffffd61400c000>] el1h_64_sync_handler+0x38/0x90
[<ffffffd613011294>] el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x6c
[<ffffffd613102d88>] __might_resched+0x1fc/0x2e8
[<ffffffd613102b54>] __might_sleep+0x44/0x7c
[<ffffffd6130b6eac>] cpus_read_lock+0x1c/0xec
[<ffffffd6132c2820>] static_key_enable+0x14/0x38
[<ffffffd61400ac08>] crng_set_ready+0x14/0x28
[<ffffffd6130df4dc>] execute_in_process_context+0xb8/0xf8
[<ffffffd61400ab30>] _credit_init_bits+0x118/0x1dc
[<ffffffd6138580c8>] add_timer_randomness+0x264/0x270
[<ffffffd613857e54>] add_input_randomness+0x38/0x48
[<ffffffd613a80f94>] input_handle_event+0x2b8/0x490
[<ffffffd613a81310>] input_event+0x6c/0x98
According to Guoyong, it's not really possible to refactor the various
drivers to never hold a spinlock there. And in_atomic() isn't reliable.
So, rather than trying to be too fancy, just punt the change in the
static key to a workqueue always. There's basically no drawback of doing
this, as the code already needed to account for the static key not
changing immediately, and given that it's just an optimization, there's
not exactly a hurry to change the static key right away, so deferal is
fine.
Reported-by: Guoyong Wang <guoyong.wang(a)mediatek.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f5bda35fba61 ("random: use static branch for crng_ready()")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 456be28ba67c..2597cb43f438 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
{
- static struct execute_work set_ready;
+ static DECLARE_WORK(set_ready, crng_set_ready);
unsigned int new, orig, add;
unsigned long flags;
@@ -718,8 +718,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) {
crng_reseed(NULL); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */
- if (static_key_initialized)
- execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready);
+ if (static_key_initialized && system_unbound_wq)
+ queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &set_ready);
atomic_notifier_call_chain(&random_ready_notifier, 0, NULL);
wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
@@ -890,8 +890,8 @@ void __init random_init(void)
/*
* If we were initialized by the cpu or bootloader before jump labels
- * are initialized, then we should enable the static branch here, where
- * it's guaranteed that jump labels have been initialized.
+ * or workqueues are initialized, then we should enable the static
+ * branch here, where it's guaranteed that these have been initialized.
*/
if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) && crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
crng_set_ready(NULL);
There is a recent report on UFFDIO_COPY over hugetlb:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000ee06de0616177560@google.com/
350: lockdep_assert_held(&hugetlb_lock);
Should be an issue in hugetlb but triggered in an userfault context, where
it goes into the unlikely path where two threads modifying the resv map
together. Mike has a fix in that path for resv uncharge but it looks like
the locking criteria was overlooked: hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio_rsvd()
will update the cgroup pointer, so it requires to be called with the lock
held.
Looks like a stable material, so have it copied.
Reported-by: syzbot+4b8077a5fccc61c385a1(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Mina Almasry <almasrymina(a)google.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Cc: linux-stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 79aa925bf239 ("hugetlb_cgroup: fix reservation accounting")
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx(a)redhat.com>
---
mm/hugetlb.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/hugetlb.c b/mm/hugetlb.c
index 26ab9dfc7d63..3158a55ce567 100644
--- a/mm/hugetlb.c
+++ b/mm/hugetlb.c
@@ -3247,9 +3247,12 @@ struct folio *alloc_hugetlb_folio(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
rsv_adjust = hugepage_subpool_put_pages(spool, 1);
hugetlb_acct_memory(h, -rsv_adjust);
- if (deferred_reserve)
+ if (deferred_reserve) {
+ spin_lock_irq(&hugetlb_lock);
hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio_rsvd(hstate_index(h),
pages_per_huge_page(h), folio);
+ spin_unlock_irq(&hugetlb_lock);
+ }
}
if (!memcg_charge_ret)
--
2.44.0
Hi,
Roland Rosenfeld reported in Debian a regression after the update to
the 6.1.85 based kernel, with his USB ethernet device not anymore
able to use the usb ethernet names.
https://bugs.debian.org/1069082
it is somehow linked to the already reported regression
https://lore.kernel.org/regressions/ZhFl6xueHnuVHKdp@nuc/ but has
another aspect. I'm quoting his original report:
> Dear Maintainer,
>
> when upgrading from 6.1.76-1 to 6.1.85-1 my USB ethernet device
> ID 0b95:1790 ASIX Electronics Corp. AX88179 Gigabit Ethernet
> is no longer named enx00249bXXXXXX but eth0.
>
> I see the following in dmsg:
>
> [ 1.484345] usb 4-5: Manufacturer: ASIX Elec. Corp.
> [ 1.484661] usb 4-5: SerialNumber: 0000249BXXXXXX
> [ 1.496312] ax88179_178a 4-5:1.0 eth0: register 'ax88179_178a' at usb-0000:00:14.0-5, ASIX AX88179 USB 3.0 Gigabit Ethernet, d2:60:4c:YY:YY:YY
> [ 1.497746] usbcore: registered new interface driver ax88179_178a
>
> Unplugging and plugging again does not solve the issue, but the
> interface still is named eth0.
>
> Maybe it has to do with the following commit from
> https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/ChangeLog-6.1.85
>
> commit fc77240f6316d17fc58a8881927c3732b1d75d51
> Author: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <jtornosm(a)redhat.com>
> Date: Wed Apr 3 15:21:58 2024 +0200
>
> net: usb: ax88179_178a: avoid the interface always configured as random address
>
> commit 2e91bb99b9d4f756e92e83c4453f894dda220f09 upstream.
>
> After the commit d2689b6a86b9 ("net: usb: ax88179_178a: avoid two
> consecutive device resets"), reset is not executed from bind operation and
> mac address is not read from the device registers or the devicetree at that
> moment. Since the check to configure if the assigned mac address is random
> or not for the interface, happens after the bind operation from
> usbnet_probe, the interface keeps configured as random address, although the
> address is correctly read and set during open operation (the only reset
> now).
>
> In order to keep only one reset for the device and to avoid the interface
> always configured as random address, after reset, configure correctly the
> suitable field from the driver, if the mac address is read successfully from
> the device registers or the devicetree. Take into account if a locally
> administered address (random) was previously stored.
>
> cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.6+
> Fixes: d2689b6a86b9 ("net: usb: ax88179_178a: avoid two consecutive device resets")
> Reported-by: Dave Stevenson <dave.stevenson(a)raspberrypi.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <jtornosm(a)redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240403132158.344838-1-jtornosm@redhat.com
> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
>
> Seems, that I'm not alone with this issue, there are also reports in
> https://www.reddit.com/r/debian/comments/1c304xn/linuximageamd64_61851_usb_…
> and https://infosec.space/@topher/112276500329020316
>
>
> All other (pci based) network interfaces still use there static names
> (enp0s25, enp2s0, enp3s0), only the usb ethernet name is broken with
> the new kernel.
>
> Greetings
> Roland
Roland confirmed that reverting both fc77240f6316 ("net: usb:
ax88179_178a: avoid the interface always configured as random
address") and 5c4cbec5106d ("net: usb: ax88179_178a: avoid two
consecutive device resets") fixes the problem.
Confirmation: https://bugs.debian.org/1069082#27
Regards,
Salvatore
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 325f3fb551f8cd672dbbfc4cf58b14f9ee3fc9e8
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024041524-monoxide-kilobyte-1c44@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
325f3fb551f8 ("kprobes: Fix possible use-after-free issue on kprobe registration")
1efda38d6f9b ("kprobes: Prohibit probes in gate area")
28f6c37a2910 ("kprobes: Forbid probing on trampoline and BPF code areas")
223a76b268c9 ("kprobes: Fix coding style issues")
9c89bb8e3272 ("kprobes: treewide: Cleanup the error messages for kprobes")
02afb8d6048d ("kprobe: Simplify prepare_kprobe() by dropping redundant version")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 325f3fb551f8cd672dbbfc4cf58b14f9ee3fc9e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2024 09:58:02 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] kprobes: Fix possible use-after-free issue on kprobe
registration
When unloading a module, its state is changing MODULE_STATE_LIVE ->
MODULE_STATE_GOING -> MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED. Each change will take
a time. `is_module_text_address()` and `__module_text_address()`
works with MODULE_STATE_LIVE and MODULE_STATE_GOING.
If we use `is_module_text_address()` and `__module_text_address()`
separately, there is a chance that the first one is succeeded but the
next one is failed because module->state becomes MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED
between those operations.
In `check_kprobe_address_safe()`, if the second `__module_text_address()`
is failed, that is ignored because it expected a kernel_text address.
But it may have failed simply because module->state has been changed
to MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED. In this case, arm_kprobe() will try to modify
non-exist module text address (use-after-free).
To fix this problem, we should not use separated `is_module_text_address()`
and `__module_text_address()`, but use only `__module_text_address()`
once and do `try_module_get(module)` which is only available with
MODULE_STATE_LIVE.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240410015802.265220-1-zhengyejian1@huawei.com/
Fixes: 28f6c37a2910 ("kprobes: Forbid probing on trampoline and BPF code areas")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/kernel/kprobes.c b/kernel/kprobes.c
index 9d9095e81792..65adc815fc6e 100644
--- a/kernel/kprobes.c
+++ b/kernel/kprobes.c
@@ -1567,10 +1567,17 @@ static int check_kprobe_address_safe(struct kprobe *p,
jump_label_lock();
preempt_disable();
- /* Ensure it is not in reserved area nor out of text */
- if (!(core_kernel_text((unsigned long) p->addr) ||
- is_module_text_address((unsigned long) p->addr)) ||
- in_gate_area_no_mm((unsigned long) p->addr) ||
+ /* Ensure the address is in a text area, and find a module if exists. */
+ *probed_mod = NULL;
+ if (!core_kernel_text((unsigned long) p->addr)) {
+ *probed_mod = __module_text_address((unsigned long) p->addr);
+ if (!(*probed_mod)) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Ensure it is not in reserved area. */
+ if (in_gate_area_no_mm((unsigned long) p->addr) ||
within_kprobe_blacklist((unsigned long) p->addr) ||
jump_label_text_reserved(p->addr, p->addr) ||
static_call_text_reserved(p->addr, p->addr) ||
@@ -1580,8 +1587,7 @@ static int check_kprobe_address_safe(struct kprobe *p,
goto out;
}
- /* Check if 'p' is probing a module. */
- *probed_mod = __module_text_address((unsigned long) p->addr);
+ /* Get module refcount and reject __init functions for loaded modules. */
if (*probed_mod) {
/*
* We must hold a refcount of the probed module while updating