The patch below does not apply to the 6.8-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.8.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 7044dcff8301b29269016ebd17df27c4736140d2
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024042938-computing-synthetic-f9fe@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.8.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
7044dcff8301 ("rust: macros: fix soundness issue in `module!` macro")
1b6170ff7a20 ("rust: module: place generated init_module() function in .init.text")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 7044dcff8301b29269016ebd17df27c4736140d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin(a)proton.me>
Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2024 18:52:50 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] rust: macros: fix soundness issue in `module!` macro
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The `module!` macro creates glue code that are called by C to initialize
the Rust modules using the `Module::init` function. Part of this glue
code are the local functions `__init` and `__exit` that are used to
initialize/destroy the Rust module.
These functions are safe and also visible to the Rust mod in which the
`module!` macro is invoked. This means that they can be called by other
safe Rust code. But since they contain `unsafe` blocks that rely on only
being called at the right time, this is a soundness issue.
Wrap these generated functions inside of two private modules, this
guarantees that the public functions cannot be called from the outside.
Make the safe functions `unsafe` and add SAFETY comments.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh(a)protonmail.com>
Closes: https://github.com/Rust-for-Linux/linux/issues/629
Fixes: 1fbde52bde73 ("rust: add `macros` crate")
Signed-off-by: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin(a)proton.me>
Reviewed-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <walmeida(a)microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240401185222.12015-1-benno.lossin@proton.me
[ Moved `THIS_MODULE` out of the private-in-private modules since it
should remain public, as Dirk Behme noticed [1]. Capitalized comments,
avoided newline in non-list SAFETY comments and reworded to add
Reported-by and newline. ]
Link: https://rust-for-linux.zulipchat.com/#narrow/stream/291565-Help/topic/x/nea… [1]
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/rust/macros/module.rs b/rust/macros/module.rs
index 27979e582e4b..acd0393b5095 100644
--- a/rust/macros/module.rs
+++ b/rust/macros/module.rs
@@ -199,17 +199,6 @@ pub(crate) fn module(ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
/// Used by the printing macros, e.g. [`info!`].
const __LOG_PREFIX: &[u8] = b\"{name}\\0\";
- /// The \"Rust loadable module\" mark.
- //
- // This may be best done another way later on, e.g. as a new modinfo
- // key or a new section. For the moment, keep it simple.
- #[cfg(MODULE)]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[used]
- static __IS_RUST_MODULE: () = ();
-
- static mut __MOD: Option<{type_}> = None;
-
// SAFETY: `__this_module` is constructed by the kernel at load time and will not be
// freed until the module is unloaded.
#[cfg(MODULE)]
@@ -221,81 +210,132 @@ pub(crate) fn module(ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
kernel::ThisModule::from_ptr(core::ptr::null_mut())
}};
- // Loadable modules need to export the `{{init,cleanup}}_module` identifiers.
- /// # Safety
- ///
- /// This function must not be called after module initialization, because it may be
- /// freed after that completes.
- #[cfg(MODULE)]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[no_mangle]
- #[link_section = \".init.text\"]
- pub unsafe extern \"C\" fn init_module() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
- __init()
- }}
+ // Double nested modules, since then nobody can access the public items inside.
+ mod __module_init {{
+ mod __module_init {{
+ use super::super::{type_};
- #[cfg(MODULE)]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[no_mangle]
- pub extern \"C\" fn cleanup_module() {{
- __exit()
- }}
+ /// The \"Rust loadable module\" mark.
+ //
+ // This may be best done another way later on, e.g. as a new modinfo
+ // key or a new section. For the moment, keep it simple.
+ #[cfg(MODULE)]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[used]
+ static __IS_RUST_MODULE: () = ();
- // Built-in modules are initialized through an initcall pointer
- // and the identifiers need to be unique.
- #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
- #[cfg(not(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS))]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[link_section = \"{initcall_section}\"]
- #[used]
- pub static __{name}_initcall: extern \"C\" fn() -> core::ffi::c_int = __{name}_init;
+ static mut __MOD: Option<{type_}> = None;
- #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
- #[cfg(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS)]
- core::arch::global_asm!(
- r#\".section \"{initcall_section}\", \"a\"
- __{name}_initcall:
- .long __{name}_init - .
- .previous
- \"#
- );
+ // Loadable modules need to export the `{{init,cleanup}}_module` identifiers.
+ /// # Safety
+ ///
+ /// This function must not be called after module initialization, because it may be
+ /// freed after that completes.
+ #[cfg(MODULE)]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[no_mangle]
+ #[link_section = \".init.text\"]
+ pub unsafe extern \"C\" fn init_module() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
+ // SAFETY: This function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double
+ // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its
+ // unique name.
+ unsafe {{ __init() }}
+ }}
- #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[no_mangle]
- pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
- __init()
- }}
+ #[cfg(MODULE)]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[no_mangle]
+ pub extern \"C\" fn cleanup_module() {{
+ // SAFETY:
+ // - This function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double
+ // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its
+ // unique name,
+ // - furthermore it is only called after `init_module` has returned `0`
+ // (which delegates to `__init`).
+ unsafe {{ __exit() }}
+ }}
- #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[no_mangle]
- pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_exit() {{
- __exit()
- }}
+ // Built-in modules are initialized through an initcall pointer
+ // and the identifiers need to be unique.
+ #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
+ #[cfg(not(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS))]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[link_section = \"{initcall_section}\"]
+ #[used]
+ pub static __{name}_initcall: extern \"C\" fn() -> core::ffi::c_int = __{name}_init;
- fn __init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
- match <{type_} as kernel::Module>::init(&THIS_MODULE) {{
- Ok(m) => {{
- unsafe {{
- __MOD = Some(m);
+ #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
+ #[cfg(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS)]
+ core::arch::global_asm!(
+ r#\".section \"{initcall_section}\", \"a\"
+ __{name}_initcall:
+ .long __{name}_init - .
+ .previous
+ \"#
+ );
+
+ #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[no_mangle]
+ pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
+ // SAFETY: This function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double
+ // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its
+ // placement above in the initcall section.
+ unsafe {{ __init() }}
+ }}
+
+ #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[no_mangle]
+ pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_exit() {{
+ // SAFETY:
+ // - This function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double
+ // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its
+ // unique name,
+ // - furthermore it is only called after `__{name}_init` has returned `0`
+ // (which delegates to `__init`).
+ unsafe {{ __exit() }}
+ }}
+
+ /// # Safety
+ ///
+ /// This function must only be called once.
+ unsafe fn __init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
+ match <{type_} as kernel::Module>::init(&super::super::THIS_MODULE) {{
+ Ok(m) => {{
+ // SAFETY: No data race, since `__MOD` can only be accessed by this
+ // module and there only `__init` and `__exit` access it. These
+ // functions are only called once and `__exit` cannot be called
+ // before or during `__init`.
+ unsafe {{
+ __MOD = Some(m);
+ }}
+ return 0;
+ }}
+ Err(e) => {{
+ return e.to_errno();
+ }}
}}
- return 0;
}}
- Err(e) => {{
- return e.to_errno();
+
+ /// # Safety
+ ///
+ /// This function must
+ /// - only be called once,
+ /// - be called after `__init` has been called and returned `0`.
+ unsafe fn __exit() {{
+ // SAFETY: No data race, since `__MOD` can only be accessed by this module
+ // and there only `__init` and `__exit` access it. These functions are only
+ // called once and `__init` was already called.
+ unsafe {{
+ // Invokes `drop()` on `__MOD`, which should be used for cleanup.
+ __MOD = None;
+ }}
}}
+
+ {modinfo}
}}
}}
-
- fn __exit() {{
- unsafe {{
- // Invokes `drop()` on `__MOD`, which should be used for cleanup.
- __MOD = None;
- }}
- }}
-
- {modinfo}
",
type_ = info.type_,
name = info.name,
From: Vitaly Lifshits <vitaly.lifshits(a)intel.com>
This is a partial revert of commit 6dbdd4de0362 ("e1000e: Workaround
for sporadic MDI error on Meteor Lake systems"). The referenced commit
used usleep_range inside the PHY access routines, which are sometimes
called from an atomic context. This can lead to a kernel panic in some
scenarios, such as cable disconnection and reconnection on vPro systems.
Solve this by changing the usleep_range calls back to udelay.
Fixes: 6dbdd4de0362 ("e1000e: Workaround for sporadic MDI error on Meteor Lake systems")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Jérôme Carretero <cJ(a)zougloub.eu>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218740
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/a7eb665c74b5efb5140e6979759ed243072cb24a.camel…
Co-developed-by: Sasha Neftin <sasha.neftin(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Neftin <sasha.neftin(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Lifshits <vitaly.lifshits(a)intel.com>
Tested-by: Dima Ruinskiy <dima.ruinskiy(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen(a)intel.com>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/phy.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/phy.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/phy.c
index 93544f1cc2a5..f7ae0e0aa4a4 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/phy.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/phy.c
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ s32 e1000e_read_phy_reg_mdic(struct e1000_hw *hw, u32 offset, u16 *data)
* the lower time out
*/
for (i = 0; i < (E1000_GEN_POLL_TIMEOUT * 3); i++) {
- usleep_range(50, 60);
+ udelay(50);
mdic = er32(MDIC);
if (mdic & E1000_MDIC_READY)
break;
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ s32 e1000e_read_phy_reg_mdic(struct e1000_hw *hw, u32 offset, u16 *data)
* reading duplicate data in the next MDIC transaction.
*/
if (hw->mac.type == e1000_pch2lan)
- usleep_range(100, 150);
+ udelay(100);
if (success) {
*data = (u16)mdic;
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ s32 e1000e_write_phy_reg_mdic(struct e1000_hw *hw, u32 offset, u16 data)
* the lower time out
*/
for (i = 0; i < (E1000_GEN_POLL_TIMEOUT * 3); i++) {
- usleep_range(50, 60);
+ udelay(50);
mdic = er32(MDIC);
if (mdic & E1000_MDIC_READY)
break;
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ s32 e1000e_write_phy_reg_mdic(struct e1000_hw *hw, u32 offset, u16 data)
* reading duplicate data in the next MDIC transaction.
*/
if (hw->mac.type == e1000_pch2lan)
- usleep_range(100, 150);
+ udelay(100);
if (success)
return 0;
--
2.41.0
To be secure, when a userptr is invalidated the pages should be dma
unmapped ensuring the device can no longer touch the invalidated pages.
Fixes: dd08ebf6c352 ("drm/xe: Introduce a new DRM driver for Intel GPUs")
Fixes: 12f4b58a37f4 ("drm/xe: Use hmm_range_fault to populate user pages")
Cc: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.8
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost(a)intel.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c
index dfd31b346021..964a5b4d47d8 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c
@@ -637,6 +637,9 @@ static bool vma_userptr_invalidate(struct mmu_interval_notifier *mni,
XE_WARN_ON(err);
}
+ if (userptr->sg)
+ xe_hmm_userptr_free_sg(uvma);
+
trace_xe_vma_userptr_invalidate_complete(vma);
return true;
--
2.34.1
The arm64 crypto drivers duplicate driver names when adding simd
variants, which after backported commit 27016f75f5ed ("crypto: api -
Disallow identical driver names"), causes an error that leads to the
aes algs not being installed. On weaker processors this results in hangs
due to falling back to SW crypto.
Use simd_skcipher_create() as it will properly namespace the new algs.
This issue does not exist in mainline/latest (and stable v6.1+) as the
driver has been refactored to remove the simd algs from this code path.
Fixes: 27016f75f5ed ("crypto: api - Disallow identical driver names")
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Liam Kearney <liam.kearney(a)canonical.com>
---
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c | 4 +---
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
index aa13344a3a5e..af862e52a36b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
@@ -1028,7 +1028,6 @@ static int __init aes_init(void)
struct simd_skcipher_alg *simd;
const char *basename;
const char *algname;
- const char *drvname;
int err;
int i;
@@ -1045,9 +1044,8 @@ static int __init aes_init(void)
continue;
algname = aes_algs[i].base.cra_name + 2;
- drvname = aes_algs[i].base.cra_driver_name + 2;
basename = aes_algs[i].base.cra_driver_name;
- simd = simd_skcipher_create_compat(algname, drvname, basename);
+ simd = simd_skcipher_create(algname, basename);
err = PTR_ERR(simd);
if (IS_ERR(simd))
goto unregister_simds;
--
2.40.1
Currently all controller IP/revisions except DWC3_usb3 >= 310a
wait 1ms unconditionally for ENDXFER completion when IOC is not
set. This is because DWC_usb3 controller revisions >= 3.10a
supports GUCTL2[14: Rst_actbitlater] bit which allows polling
CMDACT bit to know whether ENDXFER command is completed.
Consider a case where an IN request was queued, and parallelly
soft_disconnect was called (due to ffs_epfile_release). This
eventually calls stop_active_transfer with IOC cleared, hence
send_gadget_ep_cmd() skips waiting for CMDACT cleared during
EndXfer. For DWC3 controllers with revisions >= 310a, we don't
forcefully wait for 1ms either, and we proceed by unmapping the
requests. If ENDXFER didn't complete by this time, it leads to
SMMU faults since the controller would still be accessing those
requests.
Fix this by ensuring ENDXFER completion by adding 1ms delay in
__dwc3_stop_active_transfer() unconditionally.
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: b353eb6dc285 ("usb: dwc3: gadget: Skip waiting for CMDACT cleared during endxfer")
Signed-off-by: Prashanth K <quic_prashk(a)quicinc.com>
---
Changes in v2:
Changed the patch logic from CMDACT polling to 1ms mdelay.
Updated subject and commit accordingly.
Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240422090539.3986723-1-quic_prashk@quicinc.co…
drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c
index 4df2661f6675..666eae94524f 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c
@@ -1724,8 +1724,7 @@ static int __dwc3_stop_active_transfer(struct dwc3_ep *dep, bool force, bool int
dep->resource_index = 0;
if (!interrupt) {
- if (!DWC3_IP_IS(DWC3) || DWC3_VER_IS_PRIOR(DWC3, 310A))
- mdelay(1);
+ mdelay(1);
dep->flags &= ~DWC3_EP_TRANSFER_STARTED;
} else if (!ret) {
dep->flags |= DWC3_EP_END_TRANSFER_PENDING;
--
2.25.1
The length of Physical Address in General Media Event Record/DRAM Event
Record is 64-bit, so the field mask should be defined as such length.
Otherwise, this causes cxl_general_media and cxl_dram tracepoints to
mask off the upper-32-bits of DPA addresses. The cxl_poison event is
unaffected.
If userspace was doing its own DPA-to-HPA translation this could lead to
incorrect page retirement decisions, but there is no known consumer
(like rasdaemon) of this event today.
Fixes: d54a531a430b ("cxl/mem: Trace General Media Event Record")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave(a)stgolabs.net>
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shiyang Ruan <ruansy.fnst(a)fujitsu.com>
---
drivers/cxl/core/trace.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/trace.h b/drivers/cxl/core/trace.h
index e5f13260fc52..cdfce932d5b1 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/core/trace.h
+++ b/drivers/cxl/core/trace.h
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(cxl_generic_event,
* DRAM Event Record
* CXL rev 3.0 section 8.2.9.2.1.2; Table 8-44
*/
-#define CXL_DPA_FLAGS_MASK 0x3F
+#define CXL_DPA_FLAGS_MASK 0x3FULL
#define CXL_DPA_MASK (~CXL_DPA_FLAGS_MASK)
#define CXL_DPA_VOLATILE BIT(0)
--
2.34.1
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x f489c948028b69cea235d9c0de1cc10eeb26a172
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024042905-puppy-heritage-e422@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
f489c948028b ("ACPI: CPPC: Fix access width used for PCC registers")
2f4a4d63a193 ("ACPI: CPPC: Use access_width over bit_width for system memory accesses")
0651ab90e4ad ("ACPI: CPPC: Check _OSC for flexible address space")
c42fa24b4475 ("ACPI: bus: Avoid using CPPC if not supported by firmware")
2ca8e6285250 ("Revert "ACPI: Pass the same capabilities to the _OSC regardless of the query flag"")
f684b1075128 ("ACPI: CPPC: Drop redundant local variable from cpc_read()")
5f51c7ce1dc3 ("ACPI: CPPC: Fix up I/O port access in cpc_read()")
a2c8f92bea5f ("ACPI: CPPC: Implement support for SystemIO registers")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From f489c948028b69cea235d9c0de1cc10eeb26a172 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vanshidhar Konda <vanshikonda(a)os.amperecomputing.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 16:18:44 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] ACPI: CPPC: Fix access width used for PCC registers
commit 2f4a4d63a193 ("ACPI: CPPC: Use access_width over bit_width for system
memory accesses") modified cpc_read()/cpc_write() to use access_width to
read CPC registers.
However, for PCC registers the access width field in the ACPI register
macro specifies the PCC subspace ID. For non-zero PCC subspace ID it is
incorrectly treated as access width. This causes errors when reading
from PCC registers in the CPPC driver.
For PCC registers, base the size of read/write on the bit width field.
The debug message in cpc_read()/cpc_write() is updated to print relevant
information for the address space type used to read the register.
Fixes: 2f4a4d63a193 ("ACPI: CPPC: Use access_width over bit_width for system memory accesses")
Signed-off-by: Vanshidhar Konda <vanshikonda(a)os.amperecomputing.com>
Tested-by: Jarred White <jarredwhite(a)linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarred White <jarredwhite(a)linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Easwar Hariharan <eahariha(a)linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: 5.15+ <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 5.15+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki(a)intel.com>
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c b/drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c
index 00a30ca35e78..a40b6f3946ef 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c
@@ -1002,14 +1002,14 @@ static int cpc_read(int cpu, struct cpc_register_resource *reg_res, u64 *val)
}
*val = 0;
+ size = GET_BIT_WIDTH(reg);
if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_IO) {
- u32 width = GET_BIT_WIDTH(reg);
u32 val_u32;
acpi_status status;
status = acpi_os_read_port((acpi_io_address)reg->address,
- &val_u32, width);
+ &val_u32, size);
if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) {
pr_debug("Error: Failed to read SystemIO port %llx\n",
reg->address);
@@ -1018,17 +1018,22 @@ static int cpc_read(int cpu, struct cpc_register_resource *reg_res, u64 *val)
*val = val_u32;
return 0;
- } else if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_PLATFORM_COMM && pcc_ss_id >= 0)
+ } else if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_PLATFORM_COMM && pcc_ss_id >= 0) {
+ /*
+ * For registers in PCC space, the register size is determined
+ * by the bit width field; the access size is used to indicate
+ * the PCC subspace id.
+ */
+ size = reg->bit_width;
vaddr = GET_PCC_VADDR(reg->address, pcc_ss_id);
+ }
else if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY)
vaddr = reg_res->sys_mem_vaddr;
else if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_FIXED_HARDWARE)
return cpc_read_ffh(cpu, reg, val);
else
return acpi_os_read_memory((acpi_physical_address)reg->address,
- val, reg->bit_width);
-
- size = GET_BIT_WIDTH(reg);
+ val, size);
switch (size) {
case 8:
@@ -1044,8 +1049,13 @@ static int cpc_read(int cpu, struct cpc_register_resource *reg_res, u64 *val)
*val = readq_relaxed(vaddr);
break;
default:
- pr_debug("Error: Cannot read %u bit width from PCC for ss: %d\n",
- reg->bit_width, pcc_ss_id);
+ if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY) {
+ pr_debug("Error: Cannot read %u bit width from system memory: 0x%llx\n",
+ size, reg->address);
+ } else if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_PLATFORM_COMM) {
+ pr_debug("Error: Cannot read %u bit width from PCC for ss: %d\n",
+ size, pcc_ss_id);
+ }
return -EFAULT;
}
@@ -1063,12 +1073,13 @@ static int cpc_write(int cpu, struct cpc_register_resource *reg_res, u64 val)
int pcc_ss_id = per_cpu(cpu_pcc_subspace_idx, cpu);
struct cpc_reg *reg = ®_res->cpc_entry.reg;
+ size = GET_BIT_WIDTH(reg);
+
if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_IO) {
- u32 width = GET_BIT_WIDTH(reg);
acpi_status status;
status = acpi_os_write_port((acpi_io_address)reg->address,
- (u32)val, width);
+ (u32)val, size);
if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) {
pr_debug("Error: Failed to write SystemIO port %llx\n",
reg->address);
@@ -1076,17 +1087,22 @@ static int cpc_write(int cpu, struct cpc_register_resource *reg_res, u64 val)
}
return 0;
- } else if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_PLATFORM_COMM && pcc_ss_id >= 0)
+ } else if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_PLATFORM_COMM && pcc_ss_id >= 0) {
+ /*
+ * For registers in PCC space, the register size is determined
+ * by the bit width field; the access size is used to indicate
+ * the PCC subspace id.
+ */
+ size = reg->bit_width;
vaddr = GET_PCC_VADDR(reg->address, pcc_ss_id);
+ }
else if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY)
vaddr = reg_res->sys_mem_vaddr;
else if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_FIXED_HARDWARE)
return cpc_write_ffh(cpu, reg, val);
else
return acpi_os_write_memory((acpi_physical_address)reg->address,
- val, reg->bit_width);
-
- size = GET_BIT_WIDTH(reg);
+ val, size);
if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY)
val = MASK_VAL(reg, val);
@@ -1105,8 +1121,13 @@ static int cpc_write(int cpu, struct cpc_register_resource *reg_res, u64 val)
writeq_relaxed(val, vaddr);
break;
default:
- pr_debug("Error: Cannot write %u bit width to PCC for ss: %d\n",
- reg->bit_width, pcc_ss_id);
+ if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY) {
+ pr_debug("Error: Cannot write %u bit width to system memory: 0x%llx\n",
+ size, reg->address);
+ } else if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_PLATFORM_COMM) {
+ pr_debug("Error: Cannot write %u bit width to PCC for ss: %d\n",
+ size, pcc_ss_id);
+ }
ret_val = -EFAULT;
break;
}