When reading EDID fails and driver reports no modes available, the DRM
core adds an artificial 1024x786 mode to the connector. Unfortunately
some variants of the Exynos HDMI (like the one in Exynos4 SoCs) are not
able to drive such mode, so report a safe 640x480 mode instead of nothing
in case of the EDID reading failure.
This fixes the following issue observed on Trats2 board since commit
13d5b040363c ("drm/exynos: do not return negative values from .get_modes()"):
[drm] Exynos DRM: using 11c00000.fimd device for DMA mapping operations
exynos-drm exynos-drm: bound 11c00000.fimd (ops fimd_component_ops)
exynos-drm exynos-drm: bound 12c10000.mixer (ops mixer_component_ops)
exynos-dsi 11c80000.dsi: [drm:samsung_dsim_host_attach] Attached s6e8aa0 device (lanes:4 bpp:24 mode-flags:0x10b)
exynos-drm exynos-drm: bound 11c80000.dsi (ops exynos_dsi_component_ops)
exynos-drm exynos-drm: bound 12d00000.hdmi (ops hdmi_component_ops)
[drm] Initialized exynos 1.1.0 20180330 for exynos-drm on minor 1
exynos-hdmi 12d00000.hdmi: [drm:hdmiphy_enable.part.0] *ERROR* PLL could not reach steady state
panel-samsung-s6e8aa0 11c80000.dsi.0: ID: 0xa2, 0x20, 0x8c
exynos-mixer 12c10000.mixer: timeout waiting for VSYNC
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 11 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:1682 drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x2b0/0x2b8
[CRTC:70:crtc-1] vblank wait timed out
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-next-20240424 #14913
Hardware name: Samsung Exynos (Flattened Device Tree)
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14
show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x88
dump_stack_lvl from __warn+0x7c/0x1c4
__warn from warn_slowpath_fmt+0x11c/0x1a8
warn_slowpath_fmt from drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x2b0/0x2b8
drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0 from drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail_rpm+0x7c/0x8c
drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail_rpm from commit_tail+0x9c/0x184
commit_tail from drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x168/0x190
drm_atomic_helper_commit from drm_atomic_commit+0xb4/0xe0
drm_atomic_commit from drm_client_modeset_commit_atomic+0x23c/0x27c
drm_client_modeset_commit_atomic from drm_client_modeset_commit_locked+0x60/0x1cc
drm_client_modeset_commit_locked from drm_client_modeset_commit+0x24/0x40
drm_client_modeset_commit from __drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x9c/0xc4
__drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked from drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x2c/0x3c
drm_fb_helper_set_par from fbcon_init+0x3d8/0x550
fbcon_init from visual_init+0xc0/0x108
visual_init from do_bind_con_driver+0x1b8/0x3a4
do_bind_con_driver from do_take_over_console+0x140/0x1ec
do_take_over_console from do_fbcon_takeover+0x70/0xd0
do_fbcon_takeover from fbcon_fb_registered+0x19c/0x1ac
fbcon_fb_registered from register_framebuffer+0x190/0x21c
register_framebuffer from __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x350/0x574
__drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock from exynos_drm_fbdev_client_hotplug+0x6c/0xb0
exynos_drm_fbdev_client_hotplug from drm_client_register+0x58/0x94
drm_client_register from exynos_drm_bind+0x160/0x190
exynos_drm_bind from try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device+0x200/0x2d8
try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device from __component_add+0xb0/0x170
__component_add from mixer_probe+0x74/0xcc
mixer_probe from platform_probe+0x5c/0xb8
platform_probe from really_probe+0xe0/0x3d8
really_probe from __driver_probe_device+0x9c/0x1e4
__driver_probe_device from driver_probe_device+0x30/0xc0
driver_probe_device from __device_attach_driver+0xa8/0x120
__device_attach_driver from bus_for_each_drv+0x80/0xcc
bus_for_each_drv from __device_attach+0xac/0x1fc
__device_attach from bus_probe_device+0x8c/0x90
bus_probe_device from deferred_probe_work_func+0x98/0xe0
deferred_probe_work_func from process_one_work+0x240/0x6d0
process_one_work from worker_thread+0x1a0/0x3f4
worker_thread from kthread+0x104/0x138
kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
Exception stack(0xf0895fb0 to 0xf0895ff8)
...
irq event stamp: 82357
hardirqs last enabled at (82363): [<c01a96e8>] vprintk_emit+0x308/0x33c
hardirqs last disabled at (82368): [<c01a969c>] vprintk_emit+0x2bc/0x33c
softirqs last enabled at (81614): [<c0101644>] __do_softirq+0x320/0x500
softirqs last disabled at (81609): [<c012dfe0>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x130/0x184
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
exynos-drm exynos-drm: [drm] *ERROR* flip_done timed out
exynos-drm exynos-drm: [drm] *ERROR* [CRTC:70:crtc-1] commit wait timed out
exynos-drm exynos-drm: [drm] *ERROR* flip_done timed out
exynos-drm exynos-drm: [drm] *ERROR* [CONNECTOR:74:HDMI-A-1] commit wait timed out
exynos-drm exynos-drm: [drm] *ERROR* flip_done timed out
exynos-drm exynos-drm: [drm] *ERROR* [PLANE:56:plane-5] commit wait timed out
exynos-mixer 12c10000.mixer: timeout waiting for VSYNC
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 13d5b040363c ("drm/exynos: do not return negative values from .get_modes()")
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski(a)samsung.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_hdmi.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_hdmi.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_hdmi.c
index 5fdeec8a3875..9d246db6ef2b 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_hdmi.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_hdmi.c
@@ -887,11 +887,11 @@ static int hdmi_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
int ret;
if (!hdata->ddc_adpt)
- return 0;
+ goto no_edid;
edid = drm_get_edid(connector, hdata->ddc_adpt);
if (!edid)
- return 0;
+ goto no_edid;
hdata->dvi_mode = !connector->display_info.is_hdmi;
DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(hdata->dev, "%s : width[%d] x height[%d]\n",
@@ -906,6 +906,9 @@ static int hdmi_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
kfree(edid);
return ret;
+
+no_edid:
+ return drm_add_modes_noedid(connector, 640, 480);
}
static int hdmi_find_phy_conf(struct hdmi_context *hdata, u32 pixel_clock)
--
2.34.1
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From d36f6ed761b53933b0b4126486c10d3da7751e7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com>
Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 20:08:16 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] ext4: fix bug_on in __es_tree_search
Hulk Robot reported a BUG_ON:
==================================================================
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:199!
[...]
RIP: 0010:ext4_es_end fs/ext4/extents_status.c:199 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__es_tree_search+0x1e0/0x260 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:217
[...]
Call Trace:
ext4_es_cache_extent+0x109/0x340 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:766
ext4_cache_extents+0x239/0x2e0 fs/ext4/extents.c:561
ext4_find_extent+0x6b7/0xa20 fs/ext4/extents.c:964
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x16b/0x4b70 fs/ext4/extents.c:4384
ext4_map_blocks+0xe26/0x19f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:567
ext4_getblk+0x320/0x4c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:980
ext4_bread+0x2d/0x170 fs/ext4/inode.c:1031
ext4_quota_read+0x248/0x320 fs/ext4/super.c:6257
v2_read_header+0x78/0x110 fs/quota/quota_v2.c:63
v2_check_quota_file+0x76/0x230 fs/quota/quota_v2.c:82
vfs_load_quota_inode+0x5d1/0x1530 fs/quota/dquot.c:2368
dquot_enable+0x28a/0x330 fs/quota/dquot.c:2490
ext4_quota_enable fs/ext4/super.c:6137 [inline]
ext4_enable_quotas+0x5d7/0x960 fs/ext4/super.c:6163
ext4_fill_super+0xa7c9/0xdc00 fs/ext4/super.c:4754
mount_bdev+0x2e9/0x3b0 fs/super.c:1158
mount_fs+0x4b/0x1e4 fs/super.c:1261
[...]
==================================================================
Above issue may happen as follows:
-------------------------------------
ext4_fill_super
ext4_enable_quotas
ext4_quota_enable
ext4_iget
__ext4_iget
ext4_ext_check_inode
ext4_ext_check
__ext4_ext_check
ext4_valid_extent_entries
Check for overlapping extents does't take effect
dquot_enable
vfs_load_quota_inode
v2_check_quota_file
v2_read_header
ext4_quota_read
ext4_bread
ext4_getblk
ext4_map_blocks
ext4_ext_map_blocks
ext4_find_extent
ext4_cache_extents
ext4_es_cache_extent
ext4_es_cache_extent
__es_tree_search
ext4_es_end
BUG_ON(es->es_lblk + es->es_len < es->es_lblk)
The error ext4 extents is as follows:
0af3 0300 0400 0000 00000000 extent_header
00000000 0100 0000 12000000 extent1
00000000 0100 0000 18000000 extent2
02000000 0400 0000 14000000 extent3
In the ext4_valid_extent_entries function,
if prev is 0, no error is returned even if lblock<=prev.
This was intended to skip the check on the first extent, but
in the error image above, prev=0+1-1=0 when checking the second extent,
so even though lblock<=prev, the function does not return an error.
As a result, bug_ON occurs in __es_tree_search and the system panics.
To solve this problem, we only need to check that:
1. The lblock of the first extent is not less than 0.
2. The lblock of the next extent is not less than
the next block of the previous extent.
The same applies to extent_idx.
Cc: stable(a)kernel.org
Fixes: 5946d089379a ("ext4: check for overlapping extents in ext4_valid_extent_entries()")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci(a)huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220518120816.1541863-1-libaokun1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu>
diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents.c b/fs/ext4/extents.c
index 474479ce76e0..c148bb97b527 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/extents.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ static int ext4_valid_extent_entries(struct inode *inode,
{
unsigned short entries;
ext4_lblk_t lblock = 0;
- ext4_lblk_t prev = 0;
+ ext4_lblk_t cur = 0;
if (eh->eh_entries == 0)
return 1;
@@ -396,11 +396,11 @@ static int ext4_valid_extent_entries(struct inode *inode,
/* Check for overlapping extents */
lblock = le32_to_cpu(ext->ee_block);
- if ((lblock <= prev) && prev) {
+ if (lblock < cur) {
*pblk = ext4_ext_pblock(ext);
return 0;
}
- prev = lblock + ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ext) - 1;
+ cur = lblock + ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ext);
ext++;
entries--;
}
@@ -420,13 +420,13 @@ static int ext4_valid_extent_entries(struct inode *inode,
/* Check for overlapping index extents */
lblock = le32_to_cpu(ext_idx->ei_block);
- if ((lblock <= prev) && prev) {
+ if (lblock < cur) {
*pblk = ext4_idx_pblock(ext_idx);
return 0;
}
ext_idx++;
entries--;
- prev = lblock;
+ cur = lblock + 1;
}
}
return 1;
Hey all,
I recently used a testing program to test the 4.19 stable branch kernel and found that a crash occurred immediately. The test source code link is:
https://github.com/Backmyheart/src0358/blob/master/vxlan_fdb_destroy.c
The test command is as follows:
gcc vxlan_fdb_destroy.c -o vxlan_fdb_destroy -lpthread
According to its stack, upstream has relevant repair patch, the commit id is 7c31e54aeee517d1318dfc0bde9fa7de75893dc6.
May i ask if the 4.19 kernel will port this patch ?
The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 7044dcff8301b29269016ebd17df27c4736140d2
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024042940-plod-embellish-5a76@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
7044dcff8301 ("rust: macros: fix soundness issue in `module!` macro")
1b6170ff7a20 ("rust: module: place generated init_module() function in .init.text")
41bdc6decda0 ("btf, scripts: rust: drop is_rust_module.sh")
310897659cf0 ("Merge tag 'rust-6.4' of https://github.com/Rust-for-Linux/linux")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 7044dcff8301b29269016ebd17df27c4736140d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin(a)proton.me>
Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2024 18:52:50 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] rust: macros: fix soundness issue in `module!` macro
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The `module!` macro creates glue code that are called by C to initialize
the Rust modules using the `Module::init` function. Part of this glue
code are the local functions `__init` and `__exit` that are used to
initialize/destroy the Rust module.
These functions are safe and also visible to the Rust mod in which the
`module!` macro is invoked. This means that they can be called by other
safe Rust code. But since they contain `unsafe` blocks that rely on only
being called at the right time, this is a soundness issue.
Wrap these generated functions inside of two private modules, this
guarantees that the public functions cannot be called from the outside.
Make the safe functions `unsafe` and add SAFETY comments.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh(a)protonmail.com>
Closes: https://github.com/Rust-for-Linux/linux/issues/629
Fixes: 1fbde52bde73 ("rust: add `macros` crate")
Signed-off-by: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin(a)proton.me>
Reviewed-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <walmeida(a)microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240401185222.12015-1-benno.lossin@proton.me
[ Moved `THIS_MODULE` out of the private-in-private modules since it
should remain public, as Dirk Behme noticed [1]. Capitalized comments,
avoided newline in non-list SAFETY comments and reworded to add
Reported-by and newline. ]
Link: https://rust-for-linux.zulipchat.com/#narrow/stream/291565-Help/topic/x/nea… [1]
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/rust/macros/module.rs b/rust/macros/module.rs
index 27979e582e4b..acd0393b5095 100644
--- a/rust/macros/module.rs
+++ b/rust/macros/module.rs
@@ -199,17 +199,6 @@ pub(crate) fn module(ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
/// Used by the printing macros, e.g. [`info!`].
const __LOG_PREFIX: &[u8] = b\"{name}\\0\";
- /// The \"Rust loadable module\" mark.
- //
- // This may be best done another way later on, e.g. as a new modinfo
- // key or a new section. For the moment, keep it simple.
- #[cfg(MODULE)]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[used]
- static __IS_RUST_MODULE: () = ();
-
- static mut __MOD: Option<{type_}> = None;
-
// SAFETY: `__this_module` is constructed by the kernel at load time and will not be
// freed until the module is unloaded.
#[cfg(MODULE)]
@@ -221,81 +210,132 @@ pub(crate) fn module(ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
kernel::ThisModule::from_ptr(core::ptr::null_mut())
}};
- // Loadable modules need to export the `{{init,cleanup}}_module` identifiers.
- /// # Safety
- ///
- /// This function must not be called after module initialization, because it may be
- /// freed after that completes.
- #[cfg(MODULE)]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[no_mangle]
- #[link_section = \".init.text\"]
- pub unsafe extern \"C\" fn init_module() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
- __init()
- }}
+ // Double nested modules, since then nobody can access the public items inside.
+ mod __module_init {{
+ mod __module_init {{
+ use super::super::{type_};
- #[cfg(MODULE)]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[no_mangle]
- pub extern \"C\" fn cleanup_module() {{
- __exit()
- }}
+ /// The \"Rust loadable module\" mark.
+ //
+ // This may be best done another way later on, e.g. as a new modinfo
+ // key or a new section. For the moment, keep it simple.
+ #[cfg(MODULE)]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[used]
+ static __IS_RUST_MODULE: () = ();
- // Built-in modules are initialized through an initcall pointer
- // and the identifiers need to be unique.
- #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
- #[cfg(not(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS))]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[link_section = \"{initcall_section}\"]
- #[used]
- pub static __{name}_initcall: extern \"C\" fn() -> core::ffi::c_int = __{name}_init;
+ static mut __MOD: Option<{type_}> = None;
- #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
- #[cfg(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS)]
- core::arch::global_asm!(
- r#\".section \"{initcall_section}\", \"a\"
- __{name}_initcall:
- .long __{name}_init - .
- .previous
- \"#
- );
+ // Loadable modules need to export the `{{init,cleanup}}_module` identifiers.
+ /// # Safety
+ ///
+ /// This function must not be called after module initialization, because it may be
+ /// freed after that completes.
+ #[cfg(MODULE)]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[no_mangle]
+ #[link_section = \".init.text\"]
+ pub unsafe extern \"C\" fn init_module() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
+ // SAFETY: This function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double
+ // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its
+ // unique name.
+ unsafe {{ __init() }}
+ }}
- #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[no_mangle]
- pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
- __init()
- }}
+ #[cfg(MODULE)]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[no_mangle]
+ pub extern \"C\" fn cleanup_module() {{
+ // SAFETY:
+ // - This function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double
+ // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its
+ // unique name,
+ // - furthermore it is only called after `init_module` has returned `0`
+ // (which delegates to `__init`).
+ unsafe {{ __exit() }}
+ }}
- #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
- #[doc(hidden)]
- #[no_mangle]
- pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_exit() {{
- __exit()
- }}
+ // Built-in modules are initialized through an initcall pointer
+ // and the identifiers need to be unique.
+ #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
+ #[cfg(not(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS))]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[link_section = \"{initcall_section}\"]
+ #[used]
+ pub static __{name}_initcall: extern \"C\" fn() -> core::ffi::c_int = __{name}_init;
- fn __init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
- match <{type_} as kernel::Module>::init(&THIS_MODULE) {{
- Ok(m) => {{
- unsafe {{
- __MOD = Some(m);
+ #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
+ #[cfg(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS)]
+ core::arch::global_asm!(
+ r#\".section \"{initcall_section}\", \"a\"
+ __{name}_initcall:
+ .long __{name}_init - .
+ .previous
+ \"#
+ );
+
+ #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[no_mangle]
+ pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
+ // SAFETY: This function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double
+ // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its
+ // placement above in the initcall section.
+ unsafe {{ __init() }}
+ }}
+
+ #[cfg(not(MODULE))]
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ #[no_mangle]
+ pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_exit() {{
+ // SAFETY:
+ // - This function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double
+ // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its
+ // unique name,
+ // - furthermore it is only called after `__{name}_init` has returned `0`
+ // (which delegates to `__init`).
+ unsafe {{ __exit() }}
+ }}
+
+ /// # Safety
+ ///
+ /// This function must only be called once.
+ unsafe fn __init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{
+ match <{type_} as kernel::Module>::init(&super::super::THIS_MODULE) {{
+ Ok(m) => {{
+ // SAFETY: No data race, since `__MOD` can only be accessed by this
+ // module and there only `__init` and `__exit` access it. These
+ // functions are only called once and `__exit` cannot be called
+ // before or during `__init`.
+ unsafe {{
+ __MOD = Some(m);
+ }}
+ return 0;
+ }}
+ Err(e) => {{
+ return e.to_errno();
+ }}
}}
- return 0;
}}
- Err(e) => {{
- return e.to_errno();
+
+ /// # Safety
+ ///
+ /// This function must
+ /// - only be called once,
+ /// - be called after `__init` has been called and returned `0`.
+ unsafe fn __exit() {{
+ // SAFETY: No data race, since `__MOD` can only be accessed by this module
+ // and there only `__init` and `__exit` access it. These functions are only
+ // called once and `__init` was already called.
+ unsafe {{
+ // Invokes `drop()` on `__MOD`, which should be used for cleanup.
+ __MOD = None;
+ }}
}}
+
+ {modinfo}
}}
}}
-
- fn __exit() {{
- unsafe {{
- // Invokes `drop()` on `__MOD`, which should be used for cleanup.
- __MOD = None;
- }}
- }}
-
- {modinfo}
",
type_ = info.type_,
name = info.name,
Two enclave threads may try to add and remove the same enclave page
simultaneously (e.g., if the SGX runtime supports both lazy allocation
and `MADV_DONTNEED` semantics). Consider this race:
1. T1 performs page removal in sgx_encl_remove_pages() and stops right
after removing the page table entry and right before re-acquiring the
enclave lock to EREMOVE and xa_erase(&encl->page_array) the page.
2. T2 tries to access the page, and #PF[not_present] is raised. The
condition to EAUG in sgx_vma_fault() is not satisfied because the
page is still present in encl->page_array, thus the SGX driver
assumes that the fault happened because the page was swapped out. The
driver continues on a code path that installs a page table entry
*without* performing EAUG.
3. The enclave page metadata is in inconsistent state: the PTE is
installed but there was no EAUG. Thus, T2 in userspace infinitely
receives SIGSEGV on this page (and EACCEPT always fails).
Fix this by making sure that T1 (the page-removing thread) always wins
this data race. In particular, the page-being-removed is marked as such,
and T2 retries until the page is fully removed.
Fixes: 9849bb27152c ("x86/sgx: Support complete page removal")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitrii Kuvaiskii <dmitrii.kuvaiskii(a)intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 1 +
3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
index 41f14b1a3025..7ccd8b2fce5f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
@@ -257,7 +257,8 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *__sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
/* Entry successfully located. */
if (entry->epc_page) {
- if (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED)
+ if (entry->desc & (SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED |
+ SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_REMOVED))
return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
return entry;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
index f94ff14c9486..fff5f2293ae7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@
/* 'desc' bit marking that the page is being reclaimed. */
#define SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED BIT(3)
+/* 'desc' bit marking that the page is being removed. */
+#define SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_REMOVED BIT(2)
+
struct sgx_encl_page {
unsigned long desc;
unsigned long vm_max_prot_bits:8;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
index b65ab214bdf5..c542d4dd3e64 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
@@ -1142,6 +1142,7 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl,
* Do not keep encl->lock because of dependency on
* mmap_lock acquired in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes().
*/
+ entry->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_REMOVED;
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr);
--
2.34.1
Two enclave threads may try to access the same non-present enclave page
simultaneously (e.g., if the SGX runtime supports lazy allocation). The
threads will end up in sgx_encl_eaug_page(), racing to acquire the
enclave lock. The winning thread will perform EAUG, set up the page
table entry, and insert the page into encl->page_array. The losing
thread will then get -EBUSY on xa_insert(&encl->page_array) and proceed
to error handling path.
This error handling path contains two bugs: (1) SIGBUS is sent to
userspace even though the enclave page is correctly installed by another
thread, and (2) sgx_encl_free_epc_page() is called that performs EREMOVE
even though the enclave page was never intended to be removed. The first
bug is less severe because it impacts only the user space; the second
bug is more severe because it also impacts the OS state by ripping the
page (added by the winning thread) from the enclave.
Fix these two bugs (1) by returning VM_FAULT_NOPAGE to the generic Linux
fault handler so that no signal is sent to userspace, and (2) by
replacing sgx_encl_free_epc_page() with sgx_free_epc_page() so that no
EREMOVE is performed.
Fixes: 5a90d2c3f5ef ("x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Marcelina Kościelnicka <mwk(a)invisiblethingslab.com>
Suggested-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitrii Kuvaiskii <dmitrii.kuvaiskii(a)intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
index 279148e72459..41f14b1a3025 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
@@ -382,8 +382,11 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_encl_eaug_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
* If ret == -EBUSY then page was created in another flow while
* running without encl->lock
*/
- if (ret)
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret == -EBUSY)
+ vmret = VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
goto err_out_shrink;
+ }
pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page);
pginfo.addr = encl_page->desc & PAGE_MASK;
@@ -419,7 +422,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_encl_eaug_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
err_out_shrink:
sgx_encl_shrink(encl, va_page);
err_out_epc:
- sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page);
+ sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page);
err_out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
kfree(encl_page);
--
2.34.1
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 6c41468c7c12d74843bb414fc00307ea8a6318c3
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2023041134-curvature-campsite-e51b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
6c41468c7c12 ("KVM: x86: Clear "has_error_code", not "error_code", for RM exception injection")
d4963e319f1f ("KVM: x86: Make kvm_queued_exception a properly named, visible struct")
6ad75c5c99f7 ("KVM: x86: Rename kvm_x86_ops.queue_exception to inject_exception")
5623f751bd9c ("KVM: x86: Treat #DBs from the emulator as fault-like (code and DR7.GD=1)")
8d178f460772 ("KVM: nVMX: Treat General Detect #DB (DR7.GD=1) as fault-like")
eba9799b5a6e ("KVM: VMX: Drop bits 31:16 when shoving exception error code into VMCS")
a61d7c5432ac ("KVM: x86: Trace re-injected exceptions")
6ef88d6e36c2 ("KVM: SVM: Re-inject INT3/INTO instead of retrying the instruction")
3741aec4c38f ("KVM: SVM: Stuff next_rip on emulated INT3 injection if NRIPS is supported")
cd9e6da8048c ("KVM: SVM: Unwind "speculative" RIP advancement if INTn injection "fails"")
00f08d99dd7d ("KVM: nSVM: Sync next_rip field from vmcb12 to vmcb02")
9bd1f0efa859 ("KVM: nVMX: Clear IDT vectoring on nested VM-Exit for double/triple fault")
c3634d25fbee ("KVM: nVMX: Leave most VM-Exit info fields unmodified on failed VM-Entry")
1d5a1b5860ed ("KVM: x86: nSVM: correctly virtualize LBR msrs when L2 is running")
db663af4a001 ("kvm: x86: SVM: use vmcb* instead of svm->vmcb where it makes sense")
b9f3973ab3a8 ("KVM: x86: nSVM: implement nested VMLOAD/VMSAVE")
23e5092b6e2a ("KVM: SVM: Rename hook implementations to conform to kvm_x86_ops' names")
e27bc0440ebd ("KVM: x86: Rename kvm_x86_ops pointers to align w/ preferred vendor names")
068f7ea61895 ("KVM: SVM: improve split between svm_prepare_guest_switch and sev_es_prepare_guest_switch")
e1779c2714c3 ("KVM: x86: nSVM: fix potential NULL derefernce on nested migration")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 6c41468c7c12d74843bb414fc00307ea8a6318c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2023 07:32:59 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Clear "has_error_code", not "error_code", for RM
exception injection
When injecting an exception into a vCPU in Real Mode, suppress the error
code by clearing the flag that tracks whether the error code is valid, not
by clearing the error code itself. The "typo" was introduced by recent
fix for SVM's funky Paged Real Mode.
Opportunistically hoist the logic above the tracepoint so that the trace
is coherent with respect to what is actually injected (this was also the
behavior prior to the buggy commit).
Fixes: b97f07458373 ("KVM: x86: determine if an exception has an error code only when injecting it.")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Message-Id: <20230322143300.2209476-2-seanjc(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 45017576ad5e..7d6f98b7635f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -9908,13 +9908,20 @@ int kvm_check_nested_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static void kvm_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
+ /*
+ * Suppress the error code if the vCPU is in Real Mode, as Real Mode
+ * exceptions don't report error codes. The presence of an error code
+ * is carried with the exception and only stripped when the exception
+ * is injected as intercepted #PF VM-Exits for AMD's Paged Real Mode do
+ * report an error code despite the CPU being in Real Mode.
+ */
+ vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code &= is_protmode(vcpu);
+
trace_kvm_inj_exception(vcpu->arch.exception.vector,
vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code,
vcpu->arch.exception.error_code,
vcpu->arch.exception.injected);
- if (vcpu->arch.exception.error_code && !is_protmode(vcpu))
- vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = false;
static_call(kvm_x86_inject_exception)(vcpu);
}
There is nothing preventing kernel memory allocators from allocating a
page that overlaps with PTR_ERR(), except for architecture-specific
code that setup memblock.
It was discovered that RISCV architecture doesn't setup memblock
corectly, leading to a page overlapping with PTR_ERR() being allocated,
and subsequently crashing the kernel (link in Close: )
The reported crash has nothing to do with PTR_ERR(): the last page
(at address 0xfffff000) being allocated leads to an unexpected
arithmetic overflow in ext4; but still, this page shouldn't be
allocated in the first place.
Because PTR_ERR() is an architecture-independent thing, we shouldn't
ask every single architecture to set this up. There may be other
architectures beside RISCV that have the same problem.
Fix this one and for all by reserving the physical memory page that
may be mapped to the last virtual memory page as part of low memory.
Unfortunately, this means if there is actual memory at this reserved
location, that memory will become inaccessible. However, if this page
is not reserved, it can only be accessed as high memory, so this
doesn't matter if high memory is not supported. Even if high memory is
supported, it is still only one page.
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/878r1ibpdn.fsf@all.your.base.are.belong…
Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # all versions
---
init/main.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index 881f6230ee59..f8d2793c4641 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -900,6 +900,7 @@ void start_kernel(void)
page_address_init();
pr_notice("%s", linux_banner);
early_security_init();
+ memblock_reserve(__pa(-PAGE_SIZE), PAGE_SIZE); /* reserve last page for ERR_PTR */
setup_arch(&command_line);
setup_boot_config();
setup_command_line(command_line);
--
2.39.2
Fuzzing reports a possible deadlock in jbd2_log_wait_commit.
The problem occurs in ext4_ind_migrate due to an incorrect order of
unlocking of the journal and write semaphores - the order of unlocking
must be the reverse of the order of locking.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with syzkaller.
Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Artem Sadovnikov <ancowi69(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Ukhin <mish.uxin2012(a)yandex.ru>
---
v2: New addresses have been added and Ritesh Harjani has been noted as a
reviewer.
fs/ext4/migrate.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/migrate.c b/fs/ext4/migrate.c
index b0ea646454ac..59290356aa5b 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/migrate.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/migrate.c
@@ -663,8 +663,8 @@ int ext4_ind_migrate(struct inode *inode)
if (unlikely(ret2 && !ret))
ret = ret2;
errout:
- ext4_journal_stop(handle);
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
+ ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_unlock:
percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem);
return ret;
--
2.25.1
Hi,
Greg and Sasha add the "X-stable: review" to their patch bombs, with the
intention that people will be able to filter these out should they
desire to do so. For example, I usually want all threads that match code
I care about, but I don't regularly want to see thousand-patch stable
series. So this header is helpful.
However, I'm not able to formulate a query for lore (to pass to `lei q`)
that will match on negating it. The idea would be to exclude the thread
if the parent has this header. It looks like public inbox might only
index on some headers, but can't generically search all? I'm not sure
how it works, but queries only seem to half way work when searching for
that header.
In the meantime, I've been using this ugly bash script, which gets the
job done, but means I have to download everything locally first:
#!/bin/bash
PWD="${BASH_SOURCE[0]}"
PWD="${PWD%/*}"
set -e
cd "$PWD"
echo "[+] Syncing new mail" >&2
lei up "$PWD"
echo "[+] Cleaning up stable patch bombs" >&2
mapfile -d $'\0' -t parents < <(grep -F -x -Z -r -l 'X-stable: review' cur tmp new)
{
[[ -f stable-message-ids ]] && cat stable-message-ids
[[ ${#parents[@]} -gt 0 ]] && sed -n 's/^Message-ID: <\(.*\)>$/\1/p' "${parents[@]}"
} | sort -u > stable-message-ids.new
mv stable-message-ids.new stable-message-ids
[[ -s stable-message-ids ]] || exit 0
mapfile -d $'\0' -t children < <(grep -F -Z -r -l -f - cur tmp new < stable-message-ids)
total=$(( ${#parents[@]} + ${#children[@]} ))
[[ $total -gt 0 ]] || exit 0
echo "# rm <...$total messages...>" >&2
rm -f "${parents[@]}" "${children[@]}"
This results in something like:
zx2c4@thinkpad ~/Projects/lkml $ ./update.bash
[+] Syncing new mail
# https://lore.kernel.org/all/ limiting ...
# /usr/bin/curl -gSf -s -d '' https://lore.kernel.org/all/?x=m&t=1&q=(...
[+] Cleaning up stable patch bombs
# rm <...24593 messages...>
It works, but it'd be nice to not even download these messages in the
first place. Since I'm deleting message I don't want, I have to keep
track of the message IDs of those deleted messages with the stable
header in case replies come in later. That's some book keeping, sheesh!
Any thoughts on this workflow?
Jason
From: Joakim Sindholt <opensource(a)zhasha.com>
[ Upstream commit cd25e15e57e68a6b18dc9323047fe9c68b99290b ]
Garbage in plain 9P2000's perm bits is allowed through, which causes it
to be able to set (among others) the suid bit. This was presumably not
the intent since the unix extended bits are handled explicitly and
conditionally on .u.
Signed-off-by: Joakim Sindholt <opensource(a)zhasha.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
fs/9p/vfs_inode.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c b/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c
index b82423a72f685..b1107b424bf64 100644
--- a/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c
+++ b/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static int p9mode2perm(struct v9fs_session_info *v9ses,
int res;
int mode = stat->mode;
- res = mode & S_IALLUGO;
+ res = mode & 0777; /* S_IRWXUGO */
if (v9fs_proto_dotu(v9ses)) {
if ((mode & P9_DMSETUID) == P9_DMSETUID)
res |= S_ISUID;
--
2.43.0
There is an issue with ACPI overlay table removal specifically related
to I2C multiplexers.
Consider an ACPI SSDT Overlay that defines a PCA9548 I2C mux on an
existing I2C bus. When this table is loaded we see the creation of a
device for the overall PCA9548 chip and 8 further devices - one
i2c_adapter each for the mux channels. These are all bound to their
ACPI equivalents via an eventual invocation of acpi_bind_one().
When we unload the SSDT overlay we run into the problem. The ACPI
devices are deleted as normal via acpi_device_del_work_fn() and the
acpi_device_del_list.
However, the following warning and stack trace is output as the
deletion does not go smoothly:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernfs: can not remove 'physical_node', no directory
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 11 at fs/kernfs/dir.c:1674 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xb9/0xc0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u128:0 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6+ #1
Hardware name: congatec AG conga-B7E3/conga-B7E3, BIOS 5.13 05/16/2023
Workqueue: kacpi_hotplug acpi_device_del_work_fn
RIP: 0010:kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xb9/0xc0
Code: e4 00 48 89 ef e8 07 71 db ff 5b b8 fe ff ff ff 5d 41 5c 41 5d e9 a7 55 e4 00 0f 0b eb a6 48 c7 c7 f0 38 0d 9d e8 97 0a d5 ff <0f> 0b eb dc 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 0018:ffff9f864008fb28 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8ef90a8d4940 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff8f000e267d10 RSI: ffff8f000e25c780 RDI: ffff8f000e25c780
RBP: ffff8ef9186f9870 R08: 0000000000013ffb R09: 00000000ffffbfff
R10: 00000000ffffbfff R11: ffff8f000e0a0000 R12: ffff9f864008fb50
R13: ffff8ef90c93dd60 R14: ffff8ef9010d0958 R15: ffff8ef9186f98c8
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8f000e240000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f48f5253a08 CR3: 00000003cb82e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xb9/0xc0
? __warn+0x7c/0x130
? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xb9/0xc0
? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xb9/0xc0
? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xb9/0xc0
acpi_unbind_one+0x108/0x180
device_del+0x18b/0x490
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
device_unregister+0xd/0x30
i2c_del_adapter.part.0+0x1bf/0x250
i2c_mux_del_adapters+0xa1/0xe0
i2c_device_remove+0x1e/0x80
device_release_driver_internal+0x19a/0x200
bus_remove_device+0xbf/0x100
device_del+0x157/0x490
? __pfx_device_match_fwnode+0x10/0x10
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
device_unregister+0xd/0x30
i2c_acpi_notify+0x10f/0x140
notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xd0
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x3a/0x60
acpi_device_del_work_fn+0x85/0x1d0
process_one_work+0x134/0x2f0
worker_thread+0x2f0/0x410
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xe3/0x110
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
...
repeated 7 more times, 1 for each channel of the mux
...
The issue is that the binding of the ACPI devices to their peer I2C
adapters is not correctly cleaned up. Digging deeper into the issue we
see that the deletion order is such that the ACPI devices matching the
mux channel i2c adapters are deleted first during the SSDT overlay
removal. For each of the channels we see a call to i2c_acpi_notify()
with ACPI_RECONFIG_DEVICE_REMOVE but, because these devices are not
actually i2c_clients, nothing is done for them.
Later on, after each of the mux channels has been dealt with, we come
to delete the i2c_client representing the PCA9548 device. This is the
call stack we see above, whereby the kernel cleans up the i2c_client
including destruction of the mux and its channel adapters. At this
point we do attempt to unbind from the ACPI peers but those peers no
longer exist and so we hit the kernfs errors.
The fix is to augment i2c_acpi_notify() to handle i2c_adapters. But,
given that the life cycle of the adapters is linked to the i2c_client,
instead of deleting the i2c_adapters during the i2c_acpi_notify(), we
just trigger unbinding of the ACPI device from the adapter device, and
allow the clean up of the adapter to continue in the way it always has.
Signed-off-by: Hamish Martin <hamish.martin(a)alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg(a)linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti(a)kernel.org>
Fixes: 525e6fabeae2 ("i2c / ACPI: add support for ACPI reconfigure notifications")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+
---
Notes:
v4:
Resolve Build failure noted by:
Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft(a)linaro.org>, and
kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com>
These failures led to revert of the v3 version of this patch that had been accepted earlier.
v3:
Add reviewed by tags (Mika Westerberg and Andi Shyti) and Fixes tag.
v2:
Moved long problem description from cover letter to commit description at Mika's suggestion
drivers/i2c/i2c-core-acpi.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-acpi.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-acpi.c
index d6037a328669..14ae0cfc325e 100644
--- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-acpi.c
+++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-acpi.c
@@ -445,6 +445,11 @@ static struct i2c_client *i2c_acpi_find_client_by_adev(struct acpi_device *adev)
return i2c_find_device_by_fwnode(acpi_fwnode_handle(adev));
}
+static struct i2c_adapter *i2c_acpi_find_adapter_by_adev(struct acpi_device *adev)
+{
+ return i2c_find_adapter_by_fwnode(acpi_fwnode_handle(adev));
+}
+
static int i2c_acpi_notify(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long value,
void *arg)
{
@@ -471,11 +476,17 @@ static int i2c_acpi_notify(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long value,
break;
client = i2c_acpi_find_client_by_adev(adev);
- if (!client)
- break;
+ if (client) {
+ i2c_unregister_device(client);
+ put_device(&client->dev);
+ }
+
+ adapter = i2c_acpi_find_adapter_by_adev(adev);
+ if (adapter) {
+ acpi_unbind_one(&adapter->dev);
+ put_device(&adapter->dev);
+ }
- i2c_unregister_device(client);
- put_device(&client->dev);
break;
}
--
2.43.2
Commit 5ec27ec735ba ("fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c: fix the default values of i_uid/i_gid on /proc/sys inodes.")
added defaults for i_uid/i_gid when set_ownership() is not implemented.
It missed to also adjust net_ctl_set_ownership() to use the same default
values in case the computation of a better value fails.
Instead always initialize i_uid/i_gid inside the sysfs core so
set_ownership() can safely skip setting them.
Fixes: 5ec27ec735ba ("fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c: fix the default values of i_uid/i_gid on /proc/sys inodes.")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux(a)weissschuh.net>
---
Changes in v3:
- Rebase onto v6.9-rc1
- Reword commit message and mention correct fixed commit
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240322-sysctl-net-ownership-v2-1-a8b4a3306542@w…
Changes in v2:
- Move the fallback logic to the sysctl core
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240315-sysctl-net-ownership-v1-1-2b465555a292@w…
---
fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c | 6 ++----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
index 37cde0efee57..9e34ab9c21e4 100644
--- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
@@ -479,12 +479,10 @@ static struct inode *proc_sys_make_inode(struct super_block *sb,
make_empty_dir_inode(inode);
}
+ inode->i_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
+ inode->i_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
if (root->set_ownership)
root->set_ownership(head, table, &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid);
- else {
- inode->i_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
- inode->i_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
- }
return inode;
}
---
base-commit: 4cece764965020c22cff7665b18a012006359095
change-id: 20240315-sysctl-net-ownership-bc4e17eaeea6
Best regards,
--
Thomas Weißschuh <linux(a)weissschuh.net>