December 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

+ zram-panic-when-use-ext4-over-zram.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: zram: fix panic when using ext4 over zram has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is zram-panic-when-use-ext4-over-zram.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: caiqingfu <caiqingfu(a)ruijie.com.cn> Subject: zram: fix panic when using ext4 over zram Date: Fri, 29 Nov 2024 19:57:35 +0800 [ 52.073080 ] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 52.073511 ] Modules linked in: [ 52.074094 ] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3825 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.12.0-07749-g28eb75e178d3-dirty #3 [ 52.074672 ] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 52.075128 ] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 52.075619 ] pc : obj_malloc+0x5c/0x160 [ 52.076402 ] lr : zs_malloc+0x200/0x570 [ 52.076630 ] sp : ffff80008dd335f0 [ 52.076797 ] x29: ffff80008dd335f0 x28: ffff000004104a00 x27: ffff000004dfc400 [ 52.077319 ] x26: 000000000000ca18 x25: ffff00003fcaf0e0 x24: ffff000006925cf0 [ 52.077785 ] x23: 0000000000000c0a x22: ffff0000032ee780 x21: ffff000006925cf0 [ 52.078257 ] x20: 0000000000088000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000fffc18 [ 52.078701 ] x17: 00000000fffffffd x16: 0000000000000803 x15: 00000000fffffffe [ 52.079203 ] x14: 000000001824429d x13: ffff000006e84000 x12: ffff000006e83fec [ 52.079711 ] x11: ffff000006e83000 x10: 00000000000002a5 x9 : ffff000006e83ff3 [ 52.080269 ] x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 0000000017e80000 x6 : 0000000000017e80 [ 52.080724 ] x5 : 0000000000000003 x4 : ffff00000402a5e8 x3 : 0000000000000066 [ 52.081081 ] x2 : ffff000006925cf0 x1 : ffff00000402a5e8 x0 : ffff000004104a00 [ 52.081595 ] Call trace: [ 52.081925 ] obj_malloc+0x5c/0x160 (P) [ 52.082220 ] zs_malloc+0x200/0x570 (L) [ 52.082504 ] zs_malloc+0x200/0x570 [ 52.082716 ] zram_submit_bio+0x788/0x9e8 [ 52.083017 ] __submit_bio+0x1c4/0x338 [ 52.083343 ] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x128/0x2c0 [ 52.083518 ] submit_bio_noacct+0x1c8/0x308 [ 52.083722 ] submit_bio+0xa8/0x14c [ 52.083942 ] submit_bh_wbc+0x140/0x1bc [ 52.084088 ] __block_write_full_folio+0x23c/0x5f0 [ 52.084232 ] block_write_full_folio+0x134/0x21c [ 52.084524 ] write_cache_pages+0x64/0xd4 [ 52.084778 ] blkdev_writepages+0x50/0x8c [ 52.085040 ] do_writepages+0x80/0x2b0 [ 52.085292 ] filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x6c/0x90 [ 52.085597 ] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x64/0x94 [ 52.085900 ] filemap_fdatawrite+0x1c/0x28 [ 52.086158 ] sync_bdevs+0x170/0x17c [ 52.086374 ] ksys_sync+0x6c/0xb8 [ 52.086597 ] __arm64_sys_sync+0x10/0x20 [ 52.086847 ] invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100 [ 52.087230 ] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 [ 52.087550 ] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ 52.087690 ] el0_svc+0x30/0xd0 [ 52.087818 ] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xcc [ 52.088046 ] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c [ 52.088500 ] Code: 110004a5 6b0500df f9401273 54000160 (f9401664) [ 52.089097 ] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- When using ext4 on zram, the following panic occasionally occurs under high memory usage The reason is that when the handle is obtained using the slow path, it will be re-compressed. If the data in the page changes, the compressed length may exceed the previous one. Overflow occurred when writing to zs_object, which then caused the panic. Comment the fast path and force the slow path. Adding a large number of read and write file systems can quickly reproduce it. The solution is to re-obtain the handle after re-compression if the length is different from the previous one. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241129115735.136033-1-baicaiaichibaicai@gmail.c… Signed-off-by: caiqingfu <caiqingfu(a)ruijie.com.cn> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan(a)kernel.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky(a)chromium.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c~zram-panic-when-use-ext4-over-zram +++ a/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c @@ -1633,6 +1633,7 @@ static int zram_write_page(struct zram * unsigned long alloced_pages; unsigned long handle = -ENOMEM; unsigned int comp_len = 0; + unsigned int last_comp_len = 0; void *src, *dst, *mem; struct zcomp_strm *zstrm; unsigned long element = 0; @@ -1664,6 +1665,11 @@ compress_again: if (comp_len >= huge_class_size) comp_len = PAGE_SIZE; + + if (last_comp_len && (last_comp_len != comp_len)) { + zs_free(zram->mem_pool, handle); + handle = (unsigned long)ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + } /* * handle allocation has 2 paths: * a) fast path is executed with preemption disabled (for @@ -1692,8 +1698,10 @@ compress_again: if (IS_ERR_VALUE(handle)) return PTR_ERR((void *)handle); - if (comp_len != PAGE_SIZE) + if (comp_len != PAGE_SIZE) { + last_comp_len = comp_len; goto compress_again; + } /* * If the page is not compressible, you need to acquire the * lock and execute the code below. The zcomp_stream_get() _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from caiqingfu(a)ruijie.com.cn are zram-panic-when-use-ext4-over-zram.patch

8 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH v2 6.1] KVM: x86/mmu: Ensure that kvm_release_pfn_clean() takes exact pfn from kvm_faultin_pfn()

by Nikolay Kuratov

Since 5.16 and prior to 6.13 KVM can't be used with FSDAX guest memory (PMD pages). To reproduce the issue you need to reserve guest memory with `memmap=` cmdline, create and mount FS in DAX mode (tested both XFS and ext4), see doc link below. ndctl command for test: ndctl create-namespace -v -e namespace1.0 --map=dev --mode=fsdax -a 2M Then pass memory object to qemu like: -m 8G -object memory-backend-file,id=ram0,size=8G,\ mem-path=/mnt/pmem/guestmem,share=on,prealloc=on,dump=off,align=2097152 \ -numa node,memdev=ram0,cpus=0-1 QEMU fails to run guest with error: kvm run failed Bad address and there are two warnings in dmesg: WARN_ON_ONCE(!page_count(page)) in kvm_is_zone_device_page() and WARN_ON_ONCE(folio_ref_count(folio) <= 0) in try_grab_folio() (v6.6.63) It looks like in the past assumption was made that pfn won't change from faultin_pfn() to release_pfn_clean(), e.g. see commit 4cd071d13c5c ("KVM: x86/mmu: Move calls to thp_adjust() down a level") But kvm_page_fault structure made pfn part of mutable state, so now release_pfn_clean() can take hugepage-adjusted pfn. And it works for all cases (/dev/shm, hugetlb, devdax) except fsdax. Apparently in fsdax mode faultin-pfn and adjusted-pfn may refer to different folios, so we're getting get_page/put_page imbalance. To solve this preserve faultin pfn in separate local variable and pass it in kvm_release_pfn_clean(). Patch tested for all mentioned guest memory backends with tdp_mmu={0,1}. No bug in upstream as it was solved fundamentally by commit 8dd861cc07e2 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Put refcounted pages instead of blindly releasing pfns") and related patch series. Link: https://nvdimm.docs.kernel.org/2mib_fs_dax.html Fixes: 2f6305dd5676 ("KVM: MMU: change kvm_tdp_mmu_map() arguments to kvm_page_fault") Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Kuratov <kniv(a)yandex-team.ru> --- v1 -> v2: * Instead of new struct field prefer local variable to snapshot faultin pfn as suggested by Sean Christopherson. * Tested patch for 6.1 and 6.12 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 5 ++++- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c index 13134954e24d..d392022dcb89 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c @@ -4245,6 +4245,7 @@ static int direct_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault bool is_tdp_mmu_fault = is_tdp_mmu(vcpu->arch.mmu); unsigned long mmu_seq; + kvm_pfn_t orig_pfn; int r; fault->gfn = fault->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; @@ -4272,6 +4273,8 @@ static int direct_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault if (r != RET_PF_CONTINUE) return r; + orig_pfn = fault->pfn; + r = RET_PF_RETRY; if (is_tdp_mmu_fault) @@ -4296,7 +4299,7 @@ static int direct_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); else write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); - kvm_release_pfn_clean(fault->pfn); + kvm_release_pfn_clean(orig_pfn); return r; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h index 1f4f5e703f13..685560a45bf6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h @@ -790,6 +790,7 @@ FNAME(is_self_change_mapping)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault) { struct guest_walker walker; + kvm_pfn_t orig_pfn; int r; unsigned long mmu_seq; bool is_self_change_mapping; @@ -868,6 +869,8 @@ static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault walker.pte_access &= ~ACC_EXEC_MASK; } + orig_pfn = fault->pfn; + r = RET_PF_RETRY; write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); @@ -881,7 +884,7 @@ static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault out_unlock: write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); - kvm_release_pfn_clean(fault->pfn); + kvm_release_pfn_clean(orig_pfn); return r; } -- 2.34.1

8 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH v3 0/3] PCI: endpoint: fix bug for 2 APIs and simplify 1 API

by Zijun Hu

This patch series is to fix bug for APIs - devm_pci_epc_destroy(). - pci_epf_remove_vepf(). and simplify APIs below: - pci_epc_get(). Signed-off-by: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com> --- Changes in v3: - Remove stable tag of patch 1/3 - Add one more patch 3/3 - Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241102-pci-epc-core_fix-v2-0-0785f8435be5@qui… Changes in v2: - Correct tile and commit message for patch 1/2. - Add one more patch 2/2 to simplify API pci_epc_get(). - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241020-pci-epc-core_fix-v1-1-3899705e3537@quici… --- Zijun Hu (3): PCI: endpoint: Fix that API devm_pci_epc_destroy() fails to destroy the EPC device PCI: endpoint: Simplify API pci_epc_get() implementation PCI: endpoint: Fix API pci_epf_add_vepf() returning -EBUSY error drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-epc-core.c | 23 +++++++---------------- drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-epf-core.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 11066801dd4b7c4d75fce65c812723a80c1481ae change-id: 20241020-pci-epc-core_fix-a92512fa9d19 Best regards, -- Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com>

8 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH] btrfs: fix a race in encoded read

by Daniel Vacek

While testing the encoded read feature the following crash was observed and it can be reliably reproduced: [ 2916.441731] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xa3f64e06d5eee2c7: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT_RT SMP NOPTI [ 2916.441736] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 592 Comm: kworker/u38:4 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1+ #4 [ 2916.441739] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 2916.441740] Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_end_bio_work [btrfs] [ 2916.441777] RIP: 0010:__wake_up_common+0x29/0xa0 [ 2916.441808] RSP: 0018:ffffaaec0128fd80 EFLAGS: 00010216 [ 2916.441810] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff95a6429cf020 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 2916.441811] RDX: a3f64e06d5eee2c7 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffff95a6429cf000 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ This comes from `priv->wait.head.next` [ 2916.441823] Call Trace: [ 2916.441833] <TASK> [ 2916.441881] ? __wake_up_common+0x29/0xa0 [ 2916.441883] __wake_up_common_lock+0x37/0x60 [ 2916.441887] btrfs_encoded_read_endio+0x73/0x90 [btrfs] <<< UAF of `priv` object, [ 2916.441921] btrfs_check_read_bio+0x321/0x500 [btrfs] details below. [ 2916.441947] process_scheduled_works+0xc1/0x410 [ 2916.441960] worker_thread+0x105/0x240 crash> btrfs_encoded_read_private.wait.head ffff95a6429cf000 # `priv` from RDI ^^ wait.head = { next = 0xa3f64e06d5eee2c7, # Corrupted as the object was already freed/reused. prev = 0xffff95a6429cf020 # Stale data still point to itself (`&priv->wait.head` } also in RBX ^^) ie. the list was free. Possibly, this is easier (or even only?) reproducible on preemptible kernel. It just happened to build an RT kernel for additional testing coverage. Enabling slab debug gives us further related details, mostly confirming what's expected: [11:23:07] ============================================================================= [11:23:07] BUG kmalloc-64 (Not tainted): Poison overwritten [11:23:07] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [11:23:07] 0xffff8fc7c5b6b542-0xffff8fc7c5b6b543 @offset=5442. First byte 0x4 instead of 0x6b ^ That makes two bytes into the `priv->wait.lock` [11:23:07] FIX kmalloc-64: Restoring Poison 0xffff8fc7c5b6b542-0xffff8fc7c5b6b543=0x6b [11:23:07] Allocated in btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x5e/0x260 [btrfs] age=4 cpu=0 pid=18295 [11:23:07] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x81/0x2a0 [11:23:07] btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x5e/0x260 [btrfs] [11:23:07] btrfs_encoded_read_regular+0xee/0x200 [btrfs] [11:23:07] btrfs_ioctl_encoded_read+0x477/0x600 [btrfs] [11:23:07] btrfs_ioctl+0xefe/0x2a00 [btrfs] [11:23:07] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xa3/0xc0 [11:23:07] do_syscall_64+0x74/0x180 [11:23:07] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e 9121 unsigned long i = 0; 9122 struct btrfs_bio *bbio; 9123 int ret; 9124 * 9125 priv = kmalloc(sizeof(struct btrfs_encoded_read_private), GFP_NOFS); 9126 if (!priv) 9127 return -ENOMEM; 9128 9129 init_waitqueue_head(&priv->wait); [11:23:07] Freed in btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x1f9/0x260 [btrfs] age=4 cpu=0 pid=18295 [11:23:07] btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x1f9/0x260 [btrfs] [11:23:07] btrfs_encoded_read_regular+0xee/0x200 [btrfs] [11:23:07] btrfs_ioctl_encoded_read+0x477/0x600 [btrfs] [11:23:07] btrfs_ioctl+0xefe/0x2a00 [btrfs] [11:23:07] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xa3/0xc0 [11:23:07] do_syscall_64+0x74/0x180 [11:23:07] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e 9171 if (atomic_dec_return(&priv->pending) != 0) 9172 io_wait_event(priv->wait, !atomic_read(&priv->pending)); 9173 /* See btrfs_encoded_read_endio() for ordering. */ 9174 ret = blk_status_to_errno(READ_ONCE(priv->status)); * 9175 kfree(priv); 9176 return ret; 9177 } 9178 } `priv` was freed here but then after that it was further used. The report is comming soon after, see below. Note that the report is a few seconds delayed by the RCU stall timeout. (It is the same example as with the GPF crash above, just that one was reported right away without any delay). Due to the poison this time instead of the GPF exception as observed above the UAF caused a CPU hard lockup (reported by the RCU stall check as this was a VM): [11:23:28] rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: [11:23:28] rcu: 0-...!: (1 GPs behind) idle=48b4/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=0/0 fqs=5 rcuc=5254 jiffies(starved) [11:23:28] rcu: (detected by 1, t=5252 jiffies, g=1631241, q=250054 ncpus=8) [11:23:28] Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0: [11:23:28] NMI backtrace for cpu 0 [11:23:28] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 21445 Comm: kworker/u33:3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B 6.13.0-rc1+ #4 [11:23:28] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE [11:23:28] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [11:23:28] Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_end_bio_work [btrfs] [11:23:28] RIP: 0010:native_halt+0xa/0x10 [11:23:28] RSP: 0018:ffffb42ec277bc48 EFLAGS: 00000046 [11:23:28] Call Trace: [11:23:28] <TASK> [11:23:28] kvm_wait+0x53/0x60 [11:23:28] __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x2ea/0x350 [11:23:28] _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x2b/0x40 [11:23:28] rtlock_slowlock_locked+0x1f3/0xce0 [11:23:28] rt_spin_lock+0x7b/0xb0 [11:23:28] __wake_up_common_lock+0x23/0x60 [11:23:28] btrfs_encoded_read_endio+0x73/0x90 [btrfs] <<< UAF of `priv` object. [11:23:28] btrfs_check_read_bio+0x321/0x500 [btrfs] [11:23:28] process_scheduled_works+0xc1/0x410 [11:23:28] worker_thread+0x105/0x240 9105 if (priv->uring_ctx) { 9106 int err = blk_status_to_errno(READ_ONCE(priv->status)); 9107 btrfs_uring_read_extent_endio(priv->uring_ctx, err); 9108 kfree(priv); 9109 } else { * 9110 wake_up(&priv->wait); <<< So we know UAF/GPF happens here. 9111 } 9112 } 9113 bio_put(&bbio->bio); Now, the wait queue here does not really guarantee a proper synchronization between `btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages()` and `btrfs_encoded_read_endio()` which eventually results in various use-afer-free effects like general protection fault or CPU hard lockup. Using plain wait queue without additional instrumentation on top of the `pending` counter is simply insufficient in this context. The reason wait queue fails here is because the lifespan of that structure is only within the `btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages()` function. In such a case plain wait queue cannot be used to synchronize for it's own destruction. Fix this by correctly using completion instead. Also, while the lifespan of the structures in sync case is strictly limited within the `..._fill_pages()` function, there is no need to allocate from slab. Stack can be safely used instead. Fixes: 1881fba89bd5 ("btrfs: add BTRFS_IOC_ENCODED_READ ioctl") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.18+ Signed-off-by: Daniel Vacek <neelx(a)suse.com> --- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c index fa648ab6fe806..61e0fd5c6a15f 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c @@ -9078,7 +9078,7 @@ static ssize_t btrfs_encoded_read_inline( } struct btrfs_encoded_read_private { - wait_queue_head_t wait; + struct completion *sync_read; void *uring_ctx; atomic_t pending; blk_status_t status; @@ -9090,23 +9090,22 @@ static void btrfs_encoded_read_endio(struct btrfs_bio *bbio) if (bbio->bio.bi_status) { /* - * The memory barrier implied by the atomic_dec_return() here - * pairs with the memory barrier implied by the - * atomic_dec_return() or io_wait_event() in - * btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages() to ensure that this - * write is observed before the load of status in - * btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages(). + * The memory barrier implied by the + * atomic_dec_and_test() here pairs with the memory + * barrier implied by the atomic_dec_and_test() in + * btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages() to ensure + * that this write is observed before the load of + * status in btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages(). */ WRITE_ONCE(priv->status, bbio->bio.bi_status); } if (atomic_dec_and_test(&priv->pending)) { - int err = blk_status_to_errno(READ_ONCE(priv->status)); - if (priv->uring_ctx) { + int err = blk_status_to_errno(READ_ONCE(priv->status)); btrfs_uring_read_extent_endio(priv->uring_ctx, err); kfree(priv); } else { - wake_up(&priv->wait); + complete(priv->sync_read); } } bio_put(&bbio->bio); @@ -9117,16 +9116,21 @@ int btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages(struct btrfs_inode *inode, struct page **pages, void *uring_ctx) { struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = inode->root->fs_info; - struct btrfs_encoded_read_private *priv; + struct completion sync_read; + struct btrfs_encoded_read_private sync_priv, *priv; unsigned long i = 0; struct btrfs_bio *bbio; - int ret; - priv = kmalloc(sizeof(struct btrfs_encoded_read_private), GFP_NOFS); - if (!priv) - return -ENOMEM; + if (uring_ctx) { + priv = kmalloc(sizeof(struct btrfs_encoded_read_private), GFP_NOFS); + if (!priv) + return -ENOMEM; + } else { + priv = &sync_priv; + init_completion(&sync_read); + priv->sync_read = &sync_read; + } - init_waitqueue_head(&priv->wait); atomic_set(&priv->pending, 1); priv->status = 0; priv->uring_ctx = uring_ctx; @@ -9158,23 +9162,23 @@ int btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages(struct btrfs_inode *inode, atomic_inc(&priv->pending); btrfs_submit_bbio(bbio, 0); - if (uring_ctx) { - if (atomic_dec_return(&priv->pending) == 0) { - ret = blk_status_to_errno(READ_ONCE(priv->status)); - btrfs_uring_read_extent_endio(uring_ctx, ret); + if (atomic_dec_and_test(&priv->pending)) { + if (uring_ctx) { + int err = blk_status_to_errno(READ_ONCE(priv->status)); + btrfs_uring_read_extent_endio(uring_ctx, err); kfree(priv); - return ret; + return err; + } else { + complete(&sync_read); } + } + if (uring_ctx) return -EIOCBQUEUED; - } else { - if (atomic_dec_return(&priv->pending) != 0) - io_wait_event(priv->wait, !atomic_read(&priv->pending)); - /* See btrfs_encoded_read_endio() for ordering. */ - ret = blk_status_to_errno(READ_ONCE(priv->status)); - kfree(priv); - return ret; - } + + wait_for_completion_io(&sync_read); + /* See btrfs_encoded_read_endio() for ordering. */ + return blk_status_to_errno(READ_ONCE(priv->status)); } ssize_t btrfs_encoded_read_regular(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter, -- 2.45.2

8 months, 2 weeks

3
10
0 0

[PATCH v2] mm: convert partially_mapped set/clear operations to be atomic

by Usama Arif

Other page flags in the 2nd page, like PG_hwpoison and PG_anon_exclusive can get modified concurrently. Changes to other page flags might be lost if they are happening at the same time as non-atomic partially_mapped operations. Hence, make partially_mapped operations atomic. Fixes: 8422acdc97ed ("mm: introduce a pageflag for partially mapped folios") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/e53b04ad-1827-43a2-a1ab-864c7efecf6e@redhat.com/ Signed-off-by: Usama Arif <usamaarif642(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin(a)linux.dev> --- v1 -> v2: - Collected acks - Added cc for stable(a)vger.kernel.org and link of initial report (Johannes) --- include/linux/page-flags.h | 12 ++---------- mm/huge_memory.c | 8 ++++---- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/page-flags.h b/include/linux/page-flags.h index cf46ac720802..691506bdf2c5 100644 --- a/include/linux/page-flags.h +++ b/include/linux/page-flags.h @@ -862,18 +862,10 @@ static inline void ClearPageCompound(struct page *page) ClearPageHead(page); } FOLIO_FLAG(large_rmappable, FOLIO_SECOND_PAGE) -FOLIO_TEST_FLAG(partially_mapped, FOLIO_SECOND_PAGE) -/* - * PG_partially_mapped is protected by deferred_split split_queue_lock, - * so its safe to use non-atomic set/clear. - */ -__FOLIO_SET_FLAG(partially_mapped, FOLIO_SECOND_PAGE) -__FOLIO_CLEAR_FLAG(partially_mapped, FOLIO_SECOND_PAGE) +FOLIO_FLAG(partially_mapped, FOLIO_SECOND_PAGE) #else FOLIO_FLAG_FALSE(large_rmappable) -FOLIO_TEST_FLAG_FALSE(partially_mapped) -__FOLIO_SET_FLAG_NOOP(partially_mapped) -__FOLIO_CLEAR_FLAG_NOOP(partially_mapped) +FOLIO_FLAG_FALSE(partially_mapped) #endif #define PG_head_mask ((1UL << PG_head)) diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c index 2da5520bfe24..120cd2cdc614 100644 --- a/mm/huge_memory.c +++ b/mm/huge_memory.c @@ -3583,7 +3583,7 @@ int split_huge_page_to_list_to_order(struct page *page, struct list_head *list, !list_empty(&folio->_deferred_list)) { ds_queue->split_queue_len--; if (folio_test_partially_mapped(folio)) { - __folio_clear_partially_mapped(folio); + folio_clear_partially_mapped(folio); mod_mthp_stat(folio_order(folio), MTHP_STAT_NR_ANON_PARTIALLY_MAPPED, -1); } @@ -3695,7 +3695,7 @@ bool __folio_unqueue_deferred_split(struct folio *folio) if (!list_empty(&folio->_deferred_list)) { ds_queue->split_queue_len--; if (folio_test_partially_mapped(folio)) { - __folio_clear_partially_mapped(folio); + folio_clear_partially_mapped(folio); mod_mthp_stat(folio_order(folio), MTHP_STAT_NR_ANON_PARTIALLY_MAPPED, -1); } @@ -3739,7 +3739,7 @@ void deferred_split_folio(struct folio *folio, bool partially_mapped) spin_lock_irqsave(&ds_queue->split_queue_lock, flags); if (partially_mapped) { if (!folio_test_partially_mapped(folio)) { - __folio_set_partially_mapped(folio); + folio_set_partially_mapped(folio); if (folio_test_pmd_mappable(folio)) count_vm_event(THP_DEFERRED_SPLIT_PAGE); count_mthp_stat(folio_order(folio), MTHP_STAT_SPLIT_DEFERRED); @@ -3832,7 +3832,7 @@ static unsigned long deferred_split_scan(struct shrinker *shrink, } else { /* We lost race with folio_put() */ if (folio_test_partially_mapped(folio)) { - __folio_clear_partially_mapped(folio); + folio_clear_partially_mapped(folio); mod_mthp_stat(folio_order(folio), MTHP_STAT_NR_ANON_PARTIALLY_MAPPED, -1); } -- 2.43.5

8 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

[PATCH V2][5.15.y] bnxt_re: avoid shift undefined behavior in bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq

by guocai.he.cn＠windriver.com

From: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt(a)redhat.com> V2: Corrected the upstream commit id. commit 78cfd17142ef70599d6409cbd709d94b3da58659 upstream. Undefined behavior is triggered when bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq is called with hwq_attr->aux_depth != 0 and hwq_attr->aux_stride == 0. In that case, "roundup_pow_of_two(hwq_attr->aux_stride)" gets called. roundup_pow_of_two is documented as undefined for 0. Fix it in the one caller that had this combination. The undefined behavior was detected by UBSAN: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13 shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' CPU: 24 PID: 1075 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6+ #4 Hardware name: Abacus electric, s.r.o. - servis(a)abacus.cz Super Server/H12SSW-iN, BIOS 2.7 10/25/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x30 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x61/0xec __roundup_pow_of_two+0x25/0x35 [bnxt_re] bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0xa1/0x470 [bnxt_re] bnxt_qplib_create_qp+0x19e/0x840 [bnxt_re] bnxt_re_create_qp+0x9b1/0xcd0 [bnxt_re] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __kmalloc+0x1b6/0x4f0 ? create_qp.part.0+0x128/0x1c0 [ib_core] ? __pfx_bnxt_re_create_qp+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] create_qp.part.0+0x128/0x1c0 [ib_core] ib_create_qp_kernel+0x50/0xd0 [ib_core] create_mad_qp+0x8e/0xe0 [ib_core] ? __pfx_qp_event_handler+0x10/0x10 [ib_core] ib_mad_init_device+0x2be/0x680 [ib_core] add_client_context+0x10d/0x1a0 [ib_core] enable_device_and_get+0xe0/0x1d0 [ib_core] ib_register_device+0x53c/0x630 [ib_core] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 bnxt_re_probe+0xbd8/0xe50 [bnxt_re] ? __pfx_bnxt_re_probe+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x49/0x80 ? driver_sysfs_add+0x57/0xc0 really_probe+0xde/0x340 ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x54/0x90 ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0 bus_for_each_dev+0x8f/0xe0 bus_add_driver+0x146/0x220 driver_register+0x72/0xd0 __auxiliary_driver_register+0x6e/0xd0 ? __pfx_bnxt_re_mod_init+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] bnxt_re_mod_init+0x3e/0xff0 [bnxt_re] ? __pfx_bnxt_re_mod_init+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] do_one_initcall+0x5b/0x310 do_init_module+0x90/0x250 init_module_from_file+0x86/0xc0 idempotent_init_module+0x121/0x2b0 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x5e/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x149/0x170 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x75/0x230 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __count_memcg_events+0x69/0x100 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? count_memcg_events.constprop.0+0x1a/0x30 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1f0/0x300 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x34e/0x640 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f4e5132821d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e3 db 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffca9c906a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000563ec8a8f130 RCX: 00007f4e5132821d RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f4e518fa07d RDI: 000000000000003b RBP: 00007ffca9c90760 R08: 00007f4e513f6b20 R09: 00007ffca9c906f0 R10: 0000563ec8a8faa0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4e518fa07d R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000563ec8409e90 R15: 0000563ec8a8fa60 </TASK> ---[ end trace ]--- Fixes: 0c4dcd602817 ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Refactor hardware queue memory allocation") Signed-off-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507103929.30003-1-mschmidt@redhat.com Acked-by: Selvin Xavier <selvin.xavier(a)broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen(a)windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Guocai He <guocai.he.cn(a)windriver.com> --- This commit is backporting 78cfd17142ef70599d6409cbd709d94b3da58659 to the branch linux-5.15.y to solve the CVE-2024-38540. Please merge this commit to linux-5.15.y. drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c index dea70db9ee97..82d7381dbd6d 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c @@ -1013,7 +1013,8 @@ int bnxt_qplib_create_qp(struct bnxt_qplib_res *res, struct bnxt_qplib_qp *qp) hwq_attr.stride = sizeof(struct sq_sge); hwq_attr.depth = bnxt_qplib_get_depth(sq); hwq_attr.aux_stride = psn_sz; - hwq_attr.aux_depth = bnxt_qplib_set_sq_size(sq, qp->wqe_mode); + hwq_attr.aux_depth = psn_sz ? bnxt_qplib_set_sq_size(sq, qp->wqe_mode) + : 0; hwq_attr.type = HWQ_TYPE_QUEUE; rc = bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq(&sq->hwq, &hwq_attr); if (rc) -- 2.34.1

8 months, 2 weeks

3
2
0 0

[PATCH 6.1] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()

by bin.lan.cn＠eng.windriver.com

From: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2 ] The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX, bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via AIO and can be found in [1]. The PoC: $ cat > test.c int main(void) { size_t pagesz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); int mfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, "test", 0); const char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4 * pagesz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, mfd, 0); unsigned int old = syscall(SYS_personality, 0xffffffff); syscall(SYS_personality, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | old); syscall(SYS_remap_file_pages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0); syscall(SYS_personality, old); // show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); unsigned char buf2[1024]; while (1) { int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024); if (ret <= 0) break; write(1, buf2, ret); } close(fd); } $ gcc test.c -o test $ ./test | grep rwx 7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted) Link: https://project-zero.issues.chromium.org/issues/42452389 [1] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com> [PM: subject line tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [ Resolve merge conflict in mm/mmap.c. ] Signed-off-by: Bin Lan <bin.lan.cn(a)windriver.com> --- mm/mmap.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index 9a9933ede542..ebc3583fa612 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -3021,8 +3021,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size, flags |= MAP_LOCKED; file = get_file(vma->vm_file); + ret = security_mmap_file(vma->vm_file, prot, flags); + if (ret) + goto out_fput; ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size, prot, flags, pgoff, &populate, NULL); +out_fput: fput(file); out: mmap_write_unlock(mm); -- 2.43.0

8 months, 2 weeks

2
1
0 0

[PATCH 6.1] bpf: Fix helper writes to read-only maps

by bin.lan.cn＠eng.windriver.com

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> [ Upstream commit 32556ce93bc45c730829083cb60f95a2728ea48b ] Lonial found an issue that despite user- and BPF-side frozen BPF map (like in case of .rodata), it was still possible to write into it from a BPF program side through specific helpers having ARG_PTR_TO_{LONG,INT} as arguments. In check_func_arg() when the argument is as mentioned, the meta->raw_mode is never set. Later, check_helper_mem_access(), under the case of PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE as register base type, it assumes BPF_READ for the subsequent call to check_map_access_type() and given the BPF map is read-only it succeeds. The helpers really need to be annotated as ARG_PTR_TO_{LONG,INT} | MEM_UNINIT when results are written into them as opposed to read out of them. The latter indicates that it's okay to pass a pointer to uninitialized memory as the memory is written to anyway. However, ARG_PTR_TO_{LONG,INT} is a special case of ARG_PTR_TO_FIXED_SIZE_MEM just with additional alignment requirement. So it is better to just get rid of the ARG_PTR_TO_{LONG,INT} special cases altogether and reuse the fixed size memory types. For this, add MEM_ALIGNED to additionally ensure alignment given these helpers write directly into the args via *<ptr> = val. The .arg*_size has been initialized reflecting the actual sizeof(*<ptr>). MEM_ALIGNED can only be used in combination with MEM_FIXED_SIZE annotated argument types, since in !MEM_FIXED_SIZE cases the verifier does not know the buffer size a priori and therefore cannot blindly write *<ptr> = val. Fixes: 57c3bb725a3d ("bpf: Introduce ARG_PTR_TO_{INT,LONG} arg types") Reported-by: Lonial Con <kongln9170(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu(a)suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240913191754.13290-3-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> [ Resolve merge conflict in include/linux/bpf.h and merge conflict in kernel/bpf/verifier.c.] Signed-off-by: Bin Lan <bin.lan.cn(a)windriver.com> --- include/linux/bpf.h | 7 +++++-- kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 6 ++++-- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 3 ++- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 41 +++++----------------------------------- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 6 ++++-- net/core/filter.c | 6 ++++-- 6 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index 6b18b8da025f..7f4ce183dcb0 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -475,6 +475,11 @@ enum bpf_type_flag { /* Size is known at compile time. */ MEM_FIXED_SIZE = BIT(10 + BPF_BASE_TYPE_BITS), + /* Memory must be aligned on some architectures, used in combination with + * MEM_FIXED_SIZE. + */ + MEM_ALIGNED = BIT(17 + BPF_BASE_TYPE_BITS), + __BPF_TYPE_FLAG_MAX, __BPF_TYPE_LAST_FLAG = __BPF_TYPE_FLAG_MAX - 1, }; @@ -510,8 +515,6 @@ enum bpf_arg_type { ARG_ANYTHING, /* any (initialized) argument is ok */ ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK, /* pointer to bpf_spin_lock */ ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, /* pointer to sock_common */ - ARG_PTR_TO_INT, /* pointer to int */ - ARG_PTR_TO_LONG, /* pointer to long */ ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET, /* pointer to bpf_sock (fullsock) */ ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID, /* pointer to in-kernel struct */ ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM, /* pointer to dynamically allocated memory */ diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c index a3fc4e2e8256..14ad6856257c 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c @@ -531,7 +531,8 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_strtol_proto = { .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY, .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE, .arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING, - .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_LONG, + .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_FIXED_SIZE_MEM | MEM_UNINIT | MEM_ALIGNED, + .arg4_size = sizeof(s64), }; BPF_CALL_4(bpf_strtoul, const char *, buf, size_t, buf_len, u64, flags, @@ -560,7 +561,8 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_strtoul_proto = { .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY, .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE, .arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING, - .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_LONG, + .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_FIXED_SIZE_MEM | MEM_UNINIT | MEM_ALIGNED, + .arg4_size = sizeof(u64), }; BPF_CALL_3(bpf_strncmp, const char *, s1, u32, s1_sz, const char *, s2) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index 42f5b37a74c6..f9906e5ad2e5 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -5260,7 +5260,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_kallsyms_lookup_name_proto = { .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM, .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO, .arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING, - .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_LONG, + .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_FIXED_SIZE_MEM | MEM_UNINIT | MEM_ALIGNED, + .arg4_size = sizeof(u64), }; static const struct bpf_func_proto * diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index da90f565317d..b68572c41e96 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -5818,16 +5818,6 @@ static bool arg_type_is_dynptr(enum bpf_arg_type type) return base_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; } -static int int_ptr_type_to_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) -{ - if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_INT) - return sizeof(u32); - else if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_LONG) - return sizeof(u64); - - return -EINVAL; -} - static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, enum bpf_arg_type *arg_type) @@ -5908,16 +5898,6 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = { }, }; -static const struct bpf_reg_types int_ptr_types = { - .types = { - PTR_TO_STACK, - PTR_TO_PACKET, - PTR_TO_PACKET_META, - PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, - PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, - }, -}; - static const struct bpf_reg_types fullsock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_SOCKET } }; static const struct bpf_reg_types scalar_types = { .types = { SCALAR_VALUE } }; static const struct bpf_reg_types context_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_CTX } }; @@ -5955,8 +5935,6 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = { [ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK] = &spin_lock_types, [ARG_PTR_TO_MEM] = &mem_types, [ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM] = &alloc_mem_types, - [ARG_PTR_TO_INT] = &int_ptr_types, - [ARG_PTR_TO_LONG] = &int_ptr_types, [ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = &percpu_btf_ptr_types, [ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC] = &func_ptr_types, [ARG_PTR_TO_STACK] = &stack_ptr_types, @@ -6303,9 +6281,11 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, */ meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; if (arg_type & MEM_FIXED_SIZE) { - err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, - fn->arg_size[arg], false, - meta); + err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, fn->arg_size[arg], false, meta); + if (err) + return err; + if (arg_type & MEM_ALIGNED) + err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, fn->arg_size[arg], true); } break; case ARG_CONST_SIZE: @@ -6373,17 +6353,6 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, if (err) return err; break; - case ARG_PTR_TO_INT: - case ARG_PTR_TO_LONG: - { - int size = int_ptr_type_to_size(arg_type); - - err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, size, false, meta); - if (err) - return err; - err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, size, true); - break; - } case ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR: { struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index 583961a9e539..d8212fea1e99 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -1192,7 +1192,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_func_arg_proto = { .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, .arg2_type = ARG_ANYTHING, - .arg3_type = ARG_PTR_TO_LONG, + .arg3_type = ARG_PTR_TO_FIXED_SIZE_MEM | MEM_UNINIT | MEM_ALIGNED, + .arg3_size = sizeof(u64), }; BPF_CALL_2(get_func_ret, void *, ctx, u64 *, value) @@ -1208,7 +1209,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_func_ret_proto = { .func = get_func_ret, .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, - .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_LONG, + .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_FIXED_SIZE_MEM | MEM_UNINIT | MEM_ALIGNED, + .arg2_size = sizeof(u64), }; BPF_CALL_1(get_func_arg_cnt, void *, ctx) diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 2f6fef5f5864..9a7899c986de 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -6219,7 +6219,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_skb_check_mtu_proto = { .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, .arg2_type = ARG_ANYTHING, - .arg3_type = ARG_PTR_TO_INT, + .arg3_type = ARG_PTR_TO_FIXED_SIZE_MEM | MEM_UNINIT | MEM_ALIGNED, + .arg3_size = sizeof(u32), .arg4_type = ARG_ANYTHING, .arg5_type = ARG_ANYTHING, }; @@ -6230,7 +6231,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_xdp_check_mtu_proto = { .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, .arg2_type = ARG_ANYTHING, - .arg3_type = ARG_PTR_TO_INT, + .arg3_type = ARG_PTR_TO_FIXED_SIZE_MEM | MEM_UNINIT | MEM_ALIGNED, + .arg3_size = sizeof(u32), .arg4_type = ARG_ANYTHING, .arg5_type = ARG_ANYTHING, }; -- 2.43.0

8 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH V2][5.15.y] bnxt_re: avoid shift undefined behavior in bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq

by guocai.he.cn＠windriver.com

From: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt(a)redhat.com> commit 78cfd17142ef70599d6409cbd709d94b3da58659 upstream. Undefined behavior is triggered when bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq is called with hwq_attr->aux_depth != 0 and hwq_attr->aux_stride == 0. In that case, "roundup_pow_of_two(hwq_attr->aux_stride)" gets called. roundup_pow_of_two is documented as undefined for 0. Fix it in the one caller that had this combination. The undefined behavior was detected by UBSAN: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13 shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' CPU: 24 PID: 1075 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6+ #4 Hardware name: Abacus electric, s.r.o. - servis(a)abacus.cz Super Server/H12SSW-iN, BIOS 2.7 10/25/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x30 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x61/0xec __roundup_pow_of_two+0x25/0x35 [bnxt_re] bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0xa1/0x470 [bnxt_re] bnxt_qplib_create_qp+0x19e/0x840 [bnxt_re] bnxt_re_create_qp+0x9b1/0xcd0 [bnxt_re] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __kmalloc+0x1b6/0x4f0 ? create_qp.part.0+0x128/0x1c0 [ib_core] ? __pfx_bnxt_re_create_qp+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] create_qp.part.0+0x128/0x1c0 [ib_core] ib_create_qp_kernel+0x50/0xd0 [ib_core] create_mad_qp+0x8e/0xe0 [ib_core] ? __pfx_qp_event_handler+0x10/0x10 [ib_core] ib_mad_init_device+0x2be/0x680 [ib_core] add_client_context+0x10d/0x1a0 [ib_core] enable_device_and_get+0xe0/0x1d0 [ib_core] ib_register_device+0x53c/0x630 [ib_core] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 bnxt_re_probe+0xbd8/0xe50 [bnxt_re] ? __pfx_bnxt_re_probe+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x49/0x80 ? driver_sysfs_add+0x57/0xc0 really_probe+0xde/0x340 ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x54/0x90 ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0 bus_for_each_dev+0x8f/0xe0 bus_add_driver+0x146/0x220 driver_register+0x72/0xd0 __auxiliary_driver_register+0x6e/0xd0 ? __pfx_bnxt_re_mod_init+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] bnxt_re_mod_init+0x3e/0xff0 [bnxt_re] ? __pfx_bnxt_re_mod_init+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] do_one_initcall+0x5b/0x310 do_init_module+0x90/0x250 init_module_from_file+0x86/0xc0 idempotent_init_module+0x121/0x2b0 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x5e/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x149/0x170 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x75/0x230 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __count_memcg_events+0x69/0x100 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? count_memcg_events.constprop.0+0x1a/0x30 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1f0/0x300 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x34e/0x640 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f4e5132821d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e3 db 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffca9c906a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000563ec8a8f130 RCX: 00007f4e5132821d RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f4e518fa07d RDI: 000000000000003b RBP: 00007ffca9c90760 R08: 00007f4e513f6b20 R09: 00007ffca9c906f0 R10: 0000563ec8a8faa0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4e518fa07d R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000563ec8409e90 R15: 0000563ec8a8fa60 </TASK> ---[ end trace ]--- Fixes: 0c4dcd602817 ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Refactor hardware queue memory allocation") Signed-off-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507103929.30003-1-mschmidt@redhat.com Acked-by: Selvin Xavier <selvin.xavier(a)broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen(a)windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Guocai He <guocai.he.cn(a)windriver.com> --- This commit is backporting 78cfd17142ef70599d6409cbd709d94b3da58659 to the branch linux-5.15.y to solve the CVE-2024-38540. Please merge this commit to linux-5.15.y. drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c index dea70db9ee97..82d7381dbd6d 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c @@ -1013,7 +1013,8 @@ int bnxt_qplib_create_qp(struct bnxt_qplib_res *res, struct bnxt_qplib_qp *qp) hwq_attr.stride = sizeof(struct sq_sge); hwq_attr.depth = bnxt_qplib_get_depth(sq); hwq_attr.aux_stride = psn_sz; - hwq_attr.aux_depth = bnxt_qplib_set_sq_size(sq, qp->wqe_mode); + hwq_attr.aux_depth = psn_sz ? bnxt_qplib_set_sq_size(sq, qp->wqe_mode) + : 0; hwq_attr.type = HWQ_TYPE_QUEUE; rc = bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq(&sq->hwq, &hwq_attr); if (rc) -- 2.34.1 V2: Corrected the upstream commit id.

8 months, 2 weeks

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Re: Patch "[PATCH 6.1.y] drm/amd/display: Don't refer to dc_sink in is_dsc_need_re_compute" has been added to the 5.4-stable tree

by Sasha Levin

[ Sasha's backport helper bot ] Hi, The upstream commit SHA1 provided is correct: fcf6a49d79923a234844b8efe830a61f3f0584e4 WARNING: Author mismatch between patch and upstream commit: Backport author: <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Commit author: Wayne Lin <wayne.lin(a)amd.com> Status in newer kernel trees: 6.12.y | Present (exact SHA1) 6.6.y | Present (different SHA1: c7e65cab54a8) 6.1.y | Not found Note: The patch differs from the upstream commit: --- 1: fcf6a49d79923 ! 1: 79f06b6c107fd drm/amd/display: Don't refer to dc_sink in is_dsc_need_re_compute @@ ## Metadata ## -Author: Wayne Lin <wayne.lin(a)amd.com> +Author: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> ## Commit message ## - drm/amd/display: Don't refer to dc_sink in is_dsc_need_re_compute + Patch "[PATCH 6.1.y] drm/amd/display: Don't refer to dc_sink in is_dsc_need_re_compute" has been added to the 5.4-stable tree + + This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled + + [PATCH 6.1.y] drm/amd/display: Don't refer to dc_sink in is_dsc_need_re_compute + + to the 5.4-stable tree which can be found at: + http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… + + The filename of the patch is: + drm-amd-display-don-t-refer-to-dc_sink-in-is_dsc_need_re_compute.patch + and it can be found in the queue-5.4 subdirectory. + + If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, + please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. + + From jianqi.ren.cn(a)windriver.com Thu Dec 12 13:11:21 2024 + From: <jianqi.ren.cn(a)windriver.com> + Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2024 18:15:44 +0800 + Subject: [PATCH 6.1.y] drm/amd/display: Don't refer to dc_sink in is_dsc_need_re_compute + To: <wayne.lin(a)amd.com>, <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> + Cc: <patches(a)lists.linux.dev>, <jerry.zuo(a)amd.com>, <zaeem.mohamed(a)amd.com>, <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com>, <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com>, <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>, <harry.wentland(a)amd.com>, <sunpeng.li(a)amd.com>, <Rodrigo.Siqueira(a)amd.com>, <christian.koenig(a)amd.com>, <airlied(a)gmail.com>, <daniel(a)ffwll.ch>, <Jerry.Zuo(a)amd.com>, <amd-gfx(a)lists.freedesktop.org>, <dri-devel(a)lists.freedesktop.org>, <linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org> + Message-ID: <20241211101544.2121147-1-jianqi.ren.cn(a)windriver.com> + + From: Wayne Lin <wayne.lin(a)amd.com> + + [ Upstream commit fcf6a49d79923a234844b8efe830a61f3f0584e4 ] [Why] When unplug one of monitors connected after mst hub, encounter null pointer dereference. @@ Commit message Signed-off-by: Wayne Lin <wayne.lin(a)amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> + Signed-off-by: Jianqi Ren <jianqi.ren.cn(a)windriver.com> ## drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_mst_types.c ## @@ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_mst_types.c: amdgpu_dm_mst_connector_early_unregister(struct drm_connector *connector) @@ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_mst_types.c: dm_dp_mst_detect(st amdgpu_dm_set_mst_status(&aconnector->mst_status, MST_REMOTE_EDID | MST_ALLOCATE_NEW_PAYLOAD | MST_CLEAR_ALLOCATED_PAYLOAD, -@@ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_mst_types.c: static bool is_dsc_need_re_compute( - if (!aconnector || !aconnector->dsc_aux) - continue; - -- /* -- * check if cached virtual MST DSC caps are available and DSC is supported -- * as per specifications in their Virtual DPCD registers. -- */ -- if (!(aconnector->dc_sink->dsc_caps.dsc_dec_caps.is_dsc_supported || -- aconnector->dc_link->dpcd_caps.dsc_caps.dsc_basic_caps.fields.dsc_support.DSC_PASSTHROUGH_SUPPORT)) -- continue; -- - stream_on_link[new_stream_on_link_num] = aconnector; - new_stream_on_link_num++; - --- Results of testing on various branches: | Branch | Patch Apply | Build Test | |---------------------------|-------------|------------| | stable/linux-6.1.y | Success | Success | | stable/linux-5.4.y | Failed | N/A |

8 months, 2 weeks

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Linux-stable-mirror December 2024