December 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH v4] iio: light: as73211: fix channel handling in only-color triggered buffer

by Javier Carrasco

The channel index is off by one unit if AS73211_SCAN_MASK_ALL is not set (optimized path for color channel readings), and it must be shifted instead of leaving an empty channel for the temperature when it is off. Once the channel index is fixed, the uninitialized channel must be set to zero to avoid pushing uninitialized data. Add available_scan_masks for all channels and only-color channels to let the IIO core demux and repack the enabled channels. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 403e5586b52e ("iio: light: as73211: New driver") Tested-by: Christian Eggers <ceggers(a)arri.de> Signed-off-by: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz(a)gmail.com> --- This issue was found after attempting to make the same mistake for a driver I maintain, which was fortunately spotted by Jonathan [1]. Keeping old sensor values if the channel configuration changes is known and not considered an issue, which is also mentioned in [1], so it has not been addressed by this series. That keeps most of the drivers out of the way because they store the scan element in iio private data, which is kzalloc() allocated. This series only addresses cases where uninitialized i.e. unknown data is pushed to the userspace, either due to holes in structs or uninitialized struct members/array elements. While analyzing involved functions, I found and fixed some triviality (wrong function name) in the documentation of iio_dev_opaque. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iio/20241123151634.303aa860@jic23-huawei/ [1] --- Changes in v4: - Fix as73211_scan_masks[] (first MASK_COLOR, then MASK_ALL, no comma after 0 i.e. the last element). - Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212-iio_memset_scan_holes-v3-1-7f496b6f7222@… Changes in v3: - as73211.c: add available_scan_masks for all channels and only-color channels to let the IIO core demux and repack the enabled channels. - Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241204-iio_memset_scan_holes-v2-0-3f941592a76d@… Changes in v2: - as73211.c: shift channels if no temperature is available and initialize chan[3] to zero. - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241125-iio_memset_scan_holes-v1-0-0cb6e98d895c@… --- drivers/iio/light/as73211.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/as73211.c b/drivers/iio/light/as73211.c index be0068081ebb..11fbdcdd26d6 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/as73211.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/as73211.c @@ -177,6 +177,12 @@ struct as73211_data { BIT(AS73211_SCAN_INDEX_TEMP) | \ AS73211_SCAN_MASK_COLOR) +static const unsigned long as73211_scan_masks[] = { + AS73211_SCAN_MASK_COLOR, + AS73211_SCAN_MASK_ALL, + 0 +}; + static const struct iio_chan_spec as73211_channels[] = { { .type = IIO_TEMP, @@ -672,9 +678,12 @@ static irqreturn_t as73211_trigger_handler(int irq __always_unused, void *p) /* AS73211 starts reading at address 2 */ ret = i2c_master_recv(data->client, - (char *)&scan.chan[1], 3 * sizeof(scan.chan[1])); + (char *)&scan.chan[0], 3 * sizeof(scan.chan[0])); if (ret < 0) goto done; + + /* Avoid pushing uninitialized data */ + scan.chan[3] = 0; } if (data_result) { @@ -682,9 +691,15 @@ static irqreturn_t as73211_trigger_handler(int irq __always_unused, void *p) * Saturate all channels (in case of overflows). Temperature channel * is not affected by overflows. */ - scan.chan[1] = cpu_to_le16(U16_MAX); - scan.chan[2] = cpu_to_le16(U16_MAX); - scan.chan[3] = cpu_to_le16(U16_MAX); + if (*indio_dev->active_scan_mask == AS73211_SCAN_MASK_ALL) { + scan.chan[1] = cpu_to_le16(U16_MAX); + scan.chan[2] = cpu_to_le16(U16_MAX); + scan.chan[3] = cpu_to_le16(U16_MAX); + } else { + scan.chan[0] = cpu_to_le16(U16_MAX); + scan.chan[1] = cpu_to_le16(U16_MAX); + scan.chan[2] = cpu_to_le16(U16_MAX); + } } iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp(indio_dev, &scan, iio_get_time_ns(indio_dev)); @@ -758,6 +773,7 @@ static int as73211_probe(struct i2c_client *client) indio_dev->channels = data->spec_dev->channels; indio_dev->num_channels = data->spec_dev->num_channels; indio_dev->modes = INDIO_DIRECT_MODE; + indio_dev->available_scan_masks = as73211_scan_masks; ret = i2c_smbus_read_byte_data(data->client, AS73211_REG_OSR); if (ret < 0) --- base-commit: 91e71d606356e50f238d7a87aacdee4abc427f07 change-id: 20241123-iio_memset_scan_holes-a673833ef932 Best regards, -- Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz(a)gmail.com>

8 months, 2 weeks

2
1
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] smb: client: fix UAF in smb2_reconnect_server()" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 24a9799aa8efecd0eb55a75e35f9d8e6400063aa # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024040834-magazine-audience-8aa4@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 24a9799aa8ef ("smb: client: fix UAF in smb2_reconnect_server()") 7257bcf3bdc7 ("cifs: cifs_chan_is_iface_active should be called with chan_lock held") 27e1fd343f80 ("cifs: after disabling multichannel, mark tcon for reconnect") fa1d0508bdd4 ("cifs: account for primary channel in the interface list") a6d8fb54a515 ("cifs: distribute channels across interfaces based on speed") c37ed2d7d098 ("smb: client: remove extra @chan_count check in __cifs_put_smb_ses()") ff7d80a9f271 ("cifs: fix session state transition to avoid use-after-free issue") 38c8a9a52082 ("smb: move client and server files to common directory fs/smb") 943fb67b0902 ("cifs: missing lock when updating session status") bc962159e8e3 ("cifs: avoid race conditions with parallel reconnects") 1bcd548d935a ("cifs: prevent data race in cifs_reconnect_tcon()") e77978de4765 ("cifs: update ip_addr for ses only for primary chan setup") 3c0070f54b31 ("cifs: prevent data race in smb2_reconnect()") 05844bd661d9 ("cifs: print last update time for interface list") 25cf01b7c920 ("cifs: set correct status of tcon ipc when reconnecting") abdb1742a312 ("cifs: get rid of mount options string parsing") 9fd29a5bae6e ("cifs: use fs_context for automounts") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 24a9799aa8efecd0eb55a75e35f9d8e6400063aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paulo Alcantara <pc(a)manguebit.com> Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2024 14:13:10 -0300 Subject: [PATCH] smb: client: fix UAF in smb2_reconnect_server() The UAF bug is due to smb2_reconnect_server() accessing a session that is already being teared down by another thread that is executing __cifs_put_smb_ses(). This can happen when (a) the client has connection to the server but no session or (b) another thread ends up setting @ses->ses_status again to something different than SES_EXITING. To fix this, we need to make sure to unconditionally set @ses->ses_status to SES_EXITING and prevent any other threads from setting a new status while we're still tearing it down. The following can be reproduced by adding some delay to right after the ipc is freed in __cifs_put_smb_ses() - which will give smb2_reconnect_server() worker a chance to run and then accessing @ses->ipc: kinit ... mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt/1 -o sec=krb5,nohandlecache,echo_interval=10 [disconnect srv] ls /mnt/1 &>/dev/null sleep 30 kdestroy [reconnect srv] sleep 10 umount /mnt/1 ... CIFS: VFS: Verify user has a krb5 ticket and keyutils is installed CIFS: VFS: \\srv Send error in SessSetup = -126 CIFS: VFS: Verify user has a krb5 ticket and keyutils is installed CIFS: VFS: \\srv Send error in SessSetup = -126 general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 PID: 50 Comm: kworker/3:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39 04/01/2014 Workqueue: cifsiod smb2_reconnect_server [cifs] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x33/0xf0 Code: 4f 08 48 85 d2 74 42 48 85 c9 74 59 48 b8 00 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 48 39 c2 74 61 48 b8 22 01 00 00 00 00 74 69 <48> 8b 01 48 39 f8 75 7b 48 8b 72 08 48 39 c6 0f 85 88 00 00 00 b8 RSP: 0018:ffffc900001bfd70 EFLAGS: 00010a83 RAX: dead000000000122 RBX: ffff88810da53838 RCX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RDX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RSI: ffffffffc02f6878 RDI: ffff88810da53800 RBP: ffff88810da53800 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88810c064000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff88810c064000 R15: ffff8881039cc000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888157c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fe3728b1000 CR3: 000000010caa4000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x36/0x90 ? exc_general_protection+0x1c1/0x3f0 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x33/0xf0 __cifs_put_smb_ses+0x1ae/0x500 [cifs] smb2_reconnect_server+0x4ed/0x710 [cifs] process_one_work+0x205/0x6b0 worker_thread+0x191/0x360 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xe2/0x110 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc(a)manguebit.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> diff --git a/fs/smb/client/connect.c b/fs/smb/client/connect.c index 9b85b5341822..ee29bc57300c 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/connect.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/connect.c @@ -232,7 +232,13 @@ cifs_mark_tcp_ses_conns_for_reconnect(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); list_for_each_entry_safe(ses, nses, &pserver->smb_ses_list, smb_ses_list) { - /* check if iface is still active */ + spin_lock(&ses->ses_lock); + if (ses->ses_status == SES_EXITING) { + spin_unlock(&ses->ses_lock); + continue; + } + spin_unlock(&ses->ses_lock); + spin_lock(&ses->chan_lock); if (cifs_ses_get_chan_index(ses, server) == CIFS_INVAL_CHAN_INDEX) { @@ -1963,31 +1969,6 @@ cifs_setup_ipc(struct cifs_ses *ses, struct smb3_fs_context *ctx) return rc; } -/** - * cifs_free_ipc - helper to release the session IPC tcon - * @ses: smb session to unmount the IPC from - * - * Needs to be called everytime a session is destroyed. - * - * On session close, the IPC is closed and the server must release all tcons of the session. - * No need to send a tree disconnect here. - * - * Besides, it will make the server to not close durable and resilient files on session close, as - * specified in MS-SMB2 3.3.5.6 Receiving an SMB2 LOGOFF Request. - */ -static int -cifs_free_ipc(struct cifs_ses *ses) -{ - struct cifs_tcon *tcon = ses->tcon_ipc; - - if (tcon == NULL) - return 0; - - tconInfoFree(tcon); - ses->tcon_ipc = NULL; - return 0; -} - static struct cifs_ses * cifs_find_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb3_fs_context *ctx) { @@ -2019,48 +2000,52 @@ cifs_find_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb3_fs_context *ctx) void __cifs_put_smb_ses(struct cifs_ses *ses) { struct TCP_Server_Info *server = ses->server; + struct cifs_tcon *tcon; unsigned int xid; size_t i; + bool do_logoff; int rc; - spin_lock(&ses->ses_lock); - if (ses->ses_status == SES_EXITING) { - spin_unlock(&ses->ses_lock); - return; - } - spin_unlock(&ses->ses_lock); - - cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: ses_count=%d\n", __func__, ses->ses_count); - cifs_dbg(FYI, - "%s: ses ipc: %s\n", __func__, ses->tcon_ipc ? ses->tcon_ipc->tree_name : "NONE"); - spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); - if (--ses->ses_count > 0) { + spin_lock(&ses->ses_lock); + cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: id=0x%llx ses_count=%d ses_status=%u ipc=%s\n", + __func__, ses->Suid, ses->ses_count, ses->ses_status, + ses->tcon_ipc ? ses->tcon_ipc->tree_name : "none"); + if (ses->ses_status == SES_EXITING || --ses->ses_count > 0) { + spin_unlock(&ses->ses_lock); spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); return; } - spin_lock(&ses->ses_lock); - if (ses->ses_status == SES_GOOD) - ses->ses_status = SES_EXITING; - spin_unlock(&ses->ses_lock); - spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); - /* ses_count can never go negative */ WARN_ON(ses->ses_count < 0); - spin_lock(&ses->ses_lock); - if (ses->ses_status == SES_EXITING && server->ops->logoff) { - spin_unlock(&ses->ses_lock); - cifs_free_ipc(ses); + spin_lock(&ses->chan_lock); + cifs_chan_clear_need_reconnect(ses, server); + spin_unlock(&ses->chan_lock); + + do_logoff = ses->ses_status == SES_GOOD && server->ops->logoff; + ses->ses_status = SES_EXITING; + tcon = ses->tcon_ipc; + ses->tcon_ipc = NULL; + spin_unlock(&ses->ses_lock); + spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); + + /* + * On session close, the IPC is closed and the server must release all + * tcons of the session. No need to send a tree disconnect here. + * + * Besides, it will make the server to not close durable and resilient + * files on session close, as specified in MS-SMB2 3.3.5.6 Receiving an + * SMB2 LOGOFF Request. + */ + tconInfoFree(tcon); + if (do_logoff) { xid = get_xid(); rc = server->ops->logoff(xid, ses); if (rc) cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "%s: Session Logoff failure rc=%d\n", __func__, rc); _free_xid(xid); - } else { - spin_unlock(&ses->ses_lock); - cifs_free_ipc(ses); } spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);

8 months, 2 weeks

6
12
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] bpf, sockmap: Fix race between element replace and close()" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x ed1fc5d76b81a4d681211333c026202cad4d5649 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024121501-smuggler-daycare-dad0@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From ed1fc5d76b81a4d681211333c026202cad4d5649 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Luczaj <mhal(a)rbox.co> Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2024 12:29:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] bpf, sockmap: Fix race between element replace and close() Element replace (with a socket different from the one stored) may race with socket's close() link popping & unlinking. __sock_map_delete() unconditionally unrefs the (wrong) element: // set map[0] = s0 map_update_elem(map, 0, s0) // drop fd of s0 close(s0) sock_map_close() lock_sock(sk) (s0!) sock_map_remove_links(sk) link = sk_psock_link_pop() sock_map_unlink(sk, link) sock_map_delete_from_link // replace map[0] with s1 map_update_elem(map, 0, s1) sock_map_update_elem (s1!) lock_sock(sk) sock_map_update_common psock = sk_psock(sk) spin_lock(&stab->lock) osk = stab->sks[idx] sock_map_add_link(..., &stab->sks[idx]) sock_map_unref(osk, &stab->sks[idx]) psock = sk_psock(osk) sk_psock_put(sk, psock) if (refcount_dec_and_test(&psock)) sk_psock_drop(sk, psock) spin_unlock(&stab->lock) unlock_sock(sk) __sock_map_delete spin_lock(&stab->lock) sk = *psk // s1 replaced s0; sk == s1 if (!sk_test || sk_test == sk) // sk_test (s0) != sk (s1); no branch sk = xchg(psk, NULL) if (sk) sock_map_unref(sk, psk) // unref s1; sks[idx] will dangle psock = sk_psock(sk) sk_psock_put(sk, psock) if (refcount_dec_and_test()) sk_psock_drop(sk, psock) spin_unlock(&stab->lock) release_sock(sk) Then close(map) enqueues bpf_map_free_deferred, which finally calls sock_map_free(). This results in some refcount_t warnings along with a KASAN splat [1]. Fix __sock_map_delete(), do not allow sock_map_unref() on elements that may have been replaced. [1]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88811f5b9100 by task kworker/u64:12/1063 CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Not tainted 6.12.0+ #125 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90 print_report+0x174/0x4f6 kasan_report+0xb9/0x190 kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0 sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330 bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 1202: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x85/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x131/0x450 sk_prot_alloc+0x5b/0x220 sk_alloc+0x2c/0x870 unix_create1+0x88/0x8a0 unix_create+0xc5/0x180 __sock_create+0x241/0x650 __sys_socketpair+0x1ce/0x420 __x64_sys_socketpair+0x92/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 46: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x70 kmem_cache_free+0x1a1/0x590 __sk_destruct+0x388/0x5a0 sk_psock_destroy+0x73e/0xa50 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88811f5b9080 which belongs to the cache UNIX-STREAM of size 1984 The buggy address is located 128 bytes inside of freed 1984-byte region [ffff88811f5b9080, ffff88811f5b9840) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x11f5b8 head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 memcg:ffff888127d49401 flags: 0x17ffffc0000040(head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0017ffffc0000040 ffff8881042e4500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001f5000000 ffff888127d49401 head: 0017ffffc0000040 ffff8881042e4500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001f5000000 ffff888127d49401 head: 0017ffffc0000003 ffffea00047d6e01 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88811f5b9000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88811f5b9080: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88811f5b9180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88811f5b9200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 1063 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Tainted: G B 6.12.0+ #125 Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 Code: 34 73 eb 03 01 e8 82 53 ad fe 0f 0b eb b1 80 3d 27 73 eb 03 00 75 a8 48 c7 c7 80 bd 95 84 c6 05 17 73 eb 03 01 e8 62 53 ad fe <0f> 0b eb 91 80 3d 06 73 eb 03 00 75 88 48 c7 c7 e0 bd 95 84 c6 05 RSP: 0018:ffff88815c49fc70 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811f5b9100 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10bcde6349 R10: ffff8885e6f31a4b R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88813be0b000 R13: ffff88811f5b9100 R14: ffff88811f5b9080 R15: ffff88813be0b024 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8885e6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055dda99b0250 CR3: 000000015dbac000 CR4: 0000000000752ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn.cold+0x5f/0x1ff ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 ? report_bug+0x1ec/0x390 ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x40 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 sock_map_free+0x2e5/0x330 bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> irq event stamp: 10741 hardirqs last enabled at (10741): [<ffffffff84400ec6>] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 hardirqs last disabled at (10740): [<ffffffff811e532d>] handle_softirqs+0x60d/0x770 softirqs last enabled at (10506): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210 softirqs last disabled at (10301): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210 refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 1063 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Tainted: G B W 6.12.0+ #125 Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 Code: 17 73 eb 03 01 e8 62 53 ad fe 0f 0b eb 91 80 3d 06 73 eb 03 00 75 88 48 c7 c7 e0 bd 95 84 c6 05 f6 72 eb 03 01 e8 42 53 ad fe <0f> 0b e9 6e ff ff ff 80 3d e6 72 eb 03 00 0f 85 61 ff ff ff 48 c7 RSP: 0018:ffff88815c49fc70 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811f5b9100 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10bcde6349 R10: ffff8885e6f31a4b R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88813be0b000 R13: ffff88811f5b9100 R14: ffff88811f5b9080 R15: ffff88813be0b024 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8885e6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055dda99b0250 CR3: 000000015dbac000 CR4: 0000000000752ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn.cold+0x5f/0x1ff ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 ? report_bug+0x1ec/0x390 ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x40 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 sock_map_free+0x2d3/0x330 bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> irq event stamp: 10741 hardirqs last enabled at (10741): [<ffffffff84400ec6>] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 hardirqs last disabled at (10740): [<ffffffff811e532d>] handle_softirqs+0x60d/0x770 softirqs last enabled at (10506): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210 softirqs last disabled at (10301): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210 Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal(a)rbox.co> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241202-sockmap-replace-v1-3-1e88579e7bd5@rbox… diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c index 20b348b1964a..f1b9b3958792 100644 --- a/net/core/sock_map.c +++ b/net/core/sock_map.c @@ -412,12 +412,11 @@ static void *sock_map_lookup_sys(struct bpf_map *map, void *key) static int __sock_map_delete(struct bpf_stab *stab, struct sock *sk_test, struct sock **psk) { - struct sock *sk; + struct sock *sk = NULL; int err = 0; spin_lock_bh(&stab->lock); - sk = *psk; - if (!sk_test || sk_test == sk) + if (!sk_test || sk_test == *psk) sk = xchg(psk, NULL); if (likely(sk))

8 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] bpf, sockmap: Fix race between element replace and close()" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x ed1fc5d76b81a4d681211333c026202cad4d5649 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024121558-greeter-gigabyte-0c2a@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From ed1fc5d76b81a4d681211333c026202cad4d5649 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Luczaj <mhal(a)rbox.co> Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2024 12:29:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] bpf, sockmap: Fix race between element replace and close() Element replace (with a socket different from the one stored) may race with socket's close() link popping & unlinking. __sock_map_delete() unconditionally unrefs the (wrong) element: // set map[0] = s0 map_update_elem(map, 0, s0) // drop fd of s0 close(s0) sock_map_close() lock_sock(sk) (s0!) sock_map_remove_links(sk) link = sk_psock_link_pop() sock_map_unlink(sk, link) sock_map_delete_from_link // replace map[0] with s1 map_update_elem(map, 0, s1) sock_map_update_elem (s1!) lock_sock(sk) sock_map_update_common psock = sk_psock(sk) spin_lock(&stab->lock) osk = stab->sks[idx] sock_map_add_link(..., &stab->sks[idx]) sock_map_unref(osk, &stab->sks[idx]) psock = sk_psock(osk) sk_psock_put(sk, psock) if (refcount_dec_and_test(&psock)) sk_psock_drop(sk, psock) spin_unlock(&stab->lock) unlock_sock(sk) __sock_map_delete spin_lock(&stab->lock) sk = *psk // s1 replaced s0; sk == s1 if (!sk_test || sk_test == sk) // sk_test (s0) != sk (s1); no branch sk = xchg(psk, NULL) if (sk) sock_map_unref(sk, psk) // unref s1; sks[idx] will dangle psock = sk_psock(sk) sk_psock_put(sk, psock) if (refcount_dec_and_test()) sk_psock_drop(sk, psock) spin_unlock(&stab->lock) release_sock(sk) Then close(map) enqueues bpf_map_free_deferred, which finally calls sock_map_free(). This results in some refcount_t warnings along with a KASAN splat [1]. Fix __sock_map_delete(), do not allow sock_map_unref() on elements that may have been replaced. [1]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88811f5b9100 by task kworker/u64:12/1063 CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Not tainted 6.12.0+ #125 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90 print_report+0x174/0x4f6 kasan_report+0xb9/0x190 kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0 sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330 bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 1202: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x85/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x131/0x450 sk_prot_alloc+0x5b/0x220 sk_alloc+0x2c/0x870 unix_create1+0x88/0x8a0 unix_create+0xc5/0x180 __sock_create+0x241/0x650 __sys_socketpair+0x1ce/0x420 __x64_sys_socketpair+0x92/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 46: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x70 kmem_cache_free+0x1a1/0x590 __sk_destruct+0x388/0x5a0 sk_psock_destroy+0x73e/0xa50 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88811f5b9080 which belongs to the cache UNIX-STREAM of size 1984 The buggy address is located 128 bytes inside of freed 1984-byte region [ffff88811f5b9080, ffff88811f5b9840) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x11f5b8 head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 memcg:ffff888127d49401 flags: 0x17ffffc0000040(head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0017ffffc0000040 ffff8881042e4500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001f5000000 ffff888127d49401 head: 0017ffffc0000040 ffff8881042e4500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001f5000000 ffff888127d49401 head: 0017ffffc0000003 ffffea00047d6e01 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88811f5b9000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88811f5b9080: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88811f5b9180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88811f5b9200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 1063 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Tainted: G B 6.12.0+ #125 Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 Code: 34 73 eb 03 01 e8 82 53 ad fe 0f 0b eb b1 80 3d 27 73 eb 03 00 75 a8 48 c7 c7 80 bd 95 84 c6 05 17 73 eb 03 01 e8 62 53 ad fe <0f> 0b eb 91 80 3d 06 73 eb 03 00 75 88 48 c7 c7 e0 bd 95 84 c6 05 RSP: 0018:ffff88815c49fc70 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811f5b9100 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10bcde6349 R10: ffff8885e6f31a4b R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88813be0b000 R13: ffff88811f5b9100 R14: ffff88811f5b9080 R15: ffff88813be0b024 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8885e6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055dda99b0250 CR3: 000000015dbac000 CR4: 0000000000752ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn.cold+0x5f/0x1ff ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 ? report_bug+0x1ec/0x390 ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x40 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 sock_map_free+0x2e5/0x330 bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> irq event stamp: 10741 hardirqs last enabled at (10741): [<ffffffff84400ec6>] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 hardirqs last disabled at (10740): [<ffffffff811e532d>] handle_softirqs+0x60d/0x770 softirqs last enabled at (10506): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210 softirqs last disabled at (10301): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210 refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 1063 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Tainted: G B W 6.12.0+ #125 Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 Code: 17 73 eb 03 01 e8 62 53 ad fe 0f 0b eb 91 80 3d 06 73 eb 03 00 75 88 48 c7 c7 e0 bd 95 84 c6 05 f6 72 eb 03 01 e8 42 53 ad fe <0f> 0b e9 6e ff ff ff 80 3d e6 72 eb 03 00 0f 85 61 ff ff ff 48 c7 RSP: 0018:ffff88815c49fc70 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811f5b9100 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10bcde6349 R10: ffff8885e6f31a4b R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88813be0b000 R13: ffff88811f5b9100 R14: ffff88811f5b9080 R15: ffff88813be0b024 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8885e6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055dda99b0250 CR3: 000000015dbac000 CR4: 0000000000752ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn.cold+0x5f/0x1ff ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 ? report_bug+0x1ec/0x390 ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x40 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 sock_map_free+0x2d3/0x330 bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> irq event stamp: 10741 hardirqs last enabled at (10741): [<ffffffff84400ec6>] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 hardirqs last disabled at (10740): [<ffffffff811e532d>] handle_softirqs+0x60d/0x770 softirqs last enabled at (10506): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210 softirqs last disabled at (10301): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210 Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal(a)rbox.co> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241202-sockmap-replace-v1-3-1e88579e7bd5@rbox… diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c index 20b348b1964a..f1b9b3958792 100644 --- a/net/core/sock_map.c +++ b/net/core/sock_map.c @@ -412,12 +412,11 @@ static void *sock_map_lookup_sys(struct bpf_map *map, void *key) static int __sock_map_delete(struct bpf_stab *stab, struct sock *sk_test, struct sock **psk) { - struct sock *sk; + struct sock *sk = NULL; int err = 0; spin_lock_bh(&stab->lock); - sk = *psk; - if (!sk_test || sk_test == sk) + if (!sk_test || sk_test == *psk) sk = xchg(psk, NULL); if (likely(sk))

8 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] bpf, sockmap: Fix race between element replace and close()" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x ed1fc5d76b81a4d681211333c026202cad4d5649 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024121554-tightly-prayer-0638@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From ed1fc5d76b81a4d681211333c026202cad4d5649 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Luczaj <mhal(a)rbox.co> Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2024 12:29:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] bpf, sockmap: Fix race between element replace and close() Element replace (with a socket different from the one stored) may race with socket's close() link popping & unlinking. __sock_map_delete() unconditionally unrefs the (wrong) element: // set map[0] = s0 map_update_elem(map, 0, s0) // drop fd of s0 close(s0) sock_map_close() lock_sock(sk) (s0!) sock_map_remove_links(sk) link = sk_psock_link_pop() sock_map_unlink(sk, link) sock_map_delete_from_link // replace map[0] with s1 map_update_elem(map, 0, s1) sock_map_update_elem (s1!) lock_sock(sk) sock_map_update_common psock = sk_psock(sk) spin_lock(&stab->lock) osk = stab->sks[idx] sock_map_add_link(..., &stab->sks[idx]) sock_map_unref(osk, &stab->sks[idx]) psock = sk_psock(osk) sk_psock_put(sk, psock) if (refcount_dec_and_test(&psock)) sk_psock_drop(sk, psock) spin_unlock(&stab->lock) unlock_sock(sk) __sock_map_delete spin_lock(&stab->lock) sk = *psk // s1 replaced s0; sk == s1 if (!sk_test || sk_test == sk) // sk_test (s0) != sk (s1); no branch sk = xchg(psk, NULL) if (sk) sock_map_unref(sk, psk) // unref s1; sks[idx] will dangle psock = sk_psock(sk) sk_psock_put(sk, psock) if (refcount_dec_and_test()) sk_psock_drop(sk, psock) spin_unlock(&stab->lock) release_sock(sk) Then close(map) enqueues bpf_map_free_deferred, which finally calls sock_map_free(). This results in some refcount_t warnings along with a KASAN splat [1]. Fix __sock_map_delete(), do not allow sock_map_unref() on elements that may have been replaced. [1]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88811f5b9100 by task kworker/u64:12/1063 CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Not tainted 6.12.0+ #125 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90 print_report+0x174/0x4f6 kasan_report+0xb9/0x190 kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0 sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330 bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 1202: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x85/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x131/0x450 sk_prot_alloc+0x5b/0x220 sk_alloc+0x2c/0x870 unix_create1+0x88/0x8a0 unix_create+0xc5/0x180 __sock_create+0x241/0x650 __sys_socketpair+0x1ce/0x420 __x64_sys_socketpair+0x92/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 46: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x70 kmem_cache_free+0x1a1/0x590 __sk_destruct+0x388/0x5a0 sk_psock_destroy+0x73e/0xa50 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88811f5b9080 which belongs to the cache UNIX-STREAM of size 1984 The buggy address is located 128 bytes inside of freed 1984-byte region [ffff88811f5b9080, ffff88811f5b9840) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x11f5b8 head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 memcg:ffff888127d49401 flags: 0x17ffffc0000040(head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0017ffffc0000040 ffff8881042e4500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001f5000000 ffff888127d49401 head: 0017ffffc0000040 ffff8881042e4500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001f5000000 ffff888127d49401 head: 0017ffffc0000003 ffffea00047d6e01 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88811f5b9000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88811f5b9080: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88811f5b9180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88811f5b9200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 1063 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Tainted: G B 6.12.0+ #125 Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 Code: 34 73 eb 03 01 e8 82 53 ad fe 0f 0b eb b1 80 3d 27 73 eb 03 00 75 a8 48 c7 c7 80 bd 95 84 c6 05 17 73 eb 03 01 e8 62 53 ad fe <0f> 0b eb 91 80 3d 06 73 eb 03 00 75 88 48 c7 c7 e0 bd 95 84 c6 05 RSP: 0018:ffff88815c49fc70 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811f5b9100 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10bcde6349 R10: ffff8885e6f31a4b R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88813be0b000 R13: ffff88811f5b9100 R14: ffff88811f5b9080 R15: ffff88813be0b024 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8885e6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055dda99b0250 CR3: 000000015dbac000 CR4: 0000000000752ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn.cold+0x5f/0x1ff ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 ? report_bug+0x1ec/0x390 ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x40 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 sock_map_free+0x2e5/0x330 bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> irq event stamp: 10741 hardirqs last enabled at (10741): [<ffffffff84400ec6>] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 hardirqs last disabled at (10740): [<ffffffff811e532d>] handle_softirqs+0x60d/0x770 softirqs last enabled at (10506): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210 softirqs last disabled at (10301): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210 refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 1063 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Tainted: G B W 6.12.0+ #125 Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 Code: 17 73 eb 03 01 e8 62 53 ad fe 0f 0b eb 91 80 3d 06 73 eb 03 00 75 88 48 c7 c7 e0 bd 95 84 c6 05 f6 72 eb 03 01 e8 42 53 ad fe <0f> 0b e9 6e ff ff ff 80 3d e6 72 eb 03 00 0f 85 61 ff ff ff 48 c7 RSP: 0018:ffff88815c49fc70 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811f5b9100 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10bcde6349 R10: ffff8885e6f31a4b R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88813be0b000 R13: ffff88811f5b9100 R14: ffff88811f5b9080 R15: ffff88813be0b024 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8885e6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055dda99b0250 CR3: 000000015dbac000 CR4: 0000000000752ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn.cold+0x5f/0x1ff ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 ? report_bug+0x1ec/0x390 ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x40 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 sock_map_free+0x2d3/0x330 bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> irq event stamp: 10741 hardirqs last enabled at (10741): [<ffffffff84400ec6>] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 hardirqs last disabled at (10740): [<ffffffff811e532d>] handle_softirqs+0x60d/0x770 softirqs last enabled at (10506): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210 softirqs last disabled at (10301): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210 Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal(a)rbox.co> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241202-sockmap-replace-v1-3-1e88579e7bd5@rbox… diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c index 20b348b1964a..f1b9b3958792 100644 --- a/net/core/sock_map.c +++ b/net/core/sock_map.c @@ -412,12 +412,11 @@ static void *sock_map_lookup_sys(struct bpf_map *map, void *key) static int __sock_map_delete(struct bpf_stab *stab, struct sock *sk_test, struct sock **psk) { - struct sock *sk; + struct sock *sk = NULL; int err = 0; spin_lock_bh(&stab->lock); - sk = *psk; - if (!sk_test || sk_test == sk) + if (!sk_test || sk_test == *psk) sk = xchg(psk, NULL); if (likely(sk))

8 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] bpf, sockmap: Fix race between element replace and close()" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x ed1fc5d76b81a4d681211333c026202cad4d5649 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024121551-chasing-tilt-a0c8@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From ed1fc5d76b81a4d681211333c026202cad4d5649 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Luczaj <mhal(a)rbox.co> Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2024 12:29:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] bpf, sockmap: Fix race between element replace and close() Element replace (with a socket different from the one stored) may race with socket's close() link popping & unlinking. __sock_map_delete() unconditionally unrefs the (wrong) element: // set map[0] = s0 map_update_elem(map, 0, s0) // drop fd of s0 close(s0) sock_map_close() lock_sock(sk) (s0!) sock_map_remove_links(sk) link = sk_psock_link_pop() sock_map_unlink(sk, link) sock_map_delete_from_link // replace map[0] with s1 map_update_elem(map, 0, s1) sock_map_update_elem (s1!) lock_sock(sk) sock_map_update_common psock = sk_psock(sk) spin_lock(&stab->lock) osk = stab->sks[idx] sock_map_add_link(..., &stab->sks[idx]) sock_map_unref(osk, &stab->sks[idx]) psock = sk_psock(osk) sk_psock_put(sk, psock) if (refcount_dec_and_test(&psock)) sk_psock_drop(sk, psock) spin_unlock(&stab->lock) unlock_sock(sk) __sock_map_delete spin_lock(&stab->lock) sk = *psk // s1 replaced s0; sk == s1 if (!sk_test || sk_test == sk) // sk_test (s0) != sk (s1); no branch sk = xchg(psk, NULL) if (sk) sock_map_unref(sk, psk) // unref s1; sks[idx] will dangle psock = sk_psock(sk) sk_psock_put(sk, psock) if (refcount_dec_and_test()) sk_psock_drop(sk, psock) spin_unlock(&stab->lock) release_sock(sk) Then close(map) enqueues bpf_map_free_deferred, which finally calls sock_map_free(). This results in some refcount_t warnings along with a KASAN splat [1]. Fix __sock_map_delete(), do not allow sock_map_unref() on elements that may have been replaced. [1]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88811f5b9100 by task kworker/u64:12/1063 CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Not tainted 6.12.0+ #125 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90 print_report+0x174/0x4f6 kasan_report+0xb9/0x190 kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0 sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330 bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 1202: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x85/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x131/0x450 sk_prot_alloc+0x5b/0x220 sk_alloc+0x2c/0x870 unix_create1+0x88/0x8a0 unix_create+0xc5/0x180 __sock_create+0x241/0x650 __sys_socketpair+0x1ce/0x420 __x64_sys_socketpair+0x92/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 46: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x70 kmem_cache_free+0x1a1/0x590 __sk_destruct+0x388/0x5a0 sk_psock_destroy+0x73e/0xa50 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88811f5b9080 which belongs to the cache UNIX-STREAM of size 1984 The buggy address is located 128 bytes inside of freed 1984-byte region [ffff88811f5b9080, ffff88811f5b9840) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x11f5b8 head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 memcg:ffff888127d49401 flags: 0x17ffffc0000040(head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0017ffffc0000040 ffff8881042e4500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001f5000000 ffff888127d49401 head: 0017ffffc0000040 ffff8881042e4500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001f5000000 ffff888127d49401 head: 0017ffffc0000003 ffffea00047d6e01 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88811f5b9000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88811f5b9080: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88811f5b9180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88811f5b9200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 1063 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Tainted: G B 6.12.0+ #125 Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 Code: 34 73 eb 03 01 e8 82 53 ad fe 0f 0b eb b1 80 3d 27 73 eb 03 00 75 a8 48 c7 c7 80 bd 95 84 c6 05 17 73 eb 03 01 e8 62 53 ad fe <0f> 0b eb 91 80 3d 06 73 eb 03 00 75 88 48 c7 c7 e0 bd 95 84 c6 05 RSP: 0018:ffff88815c49fc70 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811f5b9100 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10bcde6349 R10: ffff8885e6f31a4b R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88813be0b000 R13: ffff88811f5b9100 R14: ffff88811f5b9080 R15: ffff88813be0b024 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8885e6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055dda99b0250 CR3: 000000015dbac000 CR4: 0000000000752ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn.cold+0x5f/0x1ff ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 ? report_bug+0x1ec/0x390 ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x40 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 sock_map_free+0x2e5/0x330 bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> irq event stamp: 10741 hardirqs last enabled at (10741): [<ffffffff84400ec6>] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 hardirqs last disabled at (10740): [<ffffffff811e532d>] handle_softirqs+0x60d/0x770 softirqs last enabled at (10506): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210 softirqs last disabled at (10301): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210 refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 1063 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Tainted: G B W 6.12.0+ #125 Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 Code: 17 73 eb 03 01 e8 62 53 ad fe 0f 0b eb 91 80 3d 06 73 eb 03 00 75 88 48 c7 c7 e0 bd 95 84 c6 05 f6 72 eb 03 01 e8 42 53 ad fe <0f> 0b e9 6e ff ff ff 80 3d e6 72 eb 03 00 0f 85 61 ff ff ff 48 c7 RSP: 0018:ffff88815c49fc70 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811f5b9100 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10bcde6349 R10: ffff8885e6f31a4b R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88813be0b000 R13: ffff88811f5b9100 R14: ffff88811f5b9080 R15: ffff88813be0b024 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8885e6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055dda99b0250 CR3: 000000015dbac000 CR4: 0000000000752ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn.cold+0x5f/0x1ff ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 ? report_bug+0x1ec/0x390 ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x40 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 sock_map_free+0x2d3/0x330 bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> irq event stamp: 10741 hardirqs last enabled at (10741): [<ffffffff84400ec6>] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 hardirqs last disabled at (10740): [<ffffffff811e532d>] handle_softirqs+0x60d/0x770 softirqs last enabled at (10506): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210 softirqs last disabled at (10301): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210 Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal(a)rbox.co> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241202-sockmap-replace-v1-3-1e88579e7bd5@rbox… diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c index 20b348b1964a..f1b9b3958792 100644 --- a/net/core/sock_map.c +++ b/net/core/sock_map.c @@ -412,12 +412,11 @@ static void *sock_map_lookup_sys(struct bpf_map *map, void *key) static int __sock_map_delete(struct bpf_stab *stab, struct sock *sk_test, struct sock **psk) { - struct sock *sk; + struct sock *sk = NULL; int err = 0; spin_lock_bh(&stab->lock); - sk = *psk; - if (!sk_test || sk_test == sk) + if (!sk_test || sk_test == *psk) sk = xchg(psk, NULL); if (likely(sk))

8 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] bpf: Check size for BTF-based ctx access of pointer members" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 659b9ba7cb2d7adb64618b87ddfaa528a143766e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024121504-cloak-campfire-b8a9@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 659b9ba7cb2d7adb64618b87ddfaa528a143766e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2024 01:20:49 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] bpf: Check size for BTF-based ctx access of pointer members Robert Morris reported the following program type which passes the verifier in [0]: SEC("struct_ops/bpf_cubic_init") void BPF_PROG(bpf_cubic_init, struct sock *sk) { asm volatile("r2 = *(u16*)(r1 + 0)"); // verifier should demand u64 asm volatile("*(u32 *)(r2 +1504) = 0"); // 1280 in some configs } The second line may or may not work, but the first instruction shouldn't pass, as it's a narrow load into the context structure of the struct ops callback. The code falls back to btf_ctx_access to ensure correctness and obtaining the types of pointers. Ensure that the size of the access is correctly checked to be 8 bytes, otherwise the verifier thinks the narrow load obtained a trusted BTF pointer and will permit loads/stores as it sees fit. Perform the check on size after we've verified that the load is for a pointer field, as for scalar values narrow loads are fine. Access to structs passed as arguments to a BPF program are also treated as scalars, therefore no adjustment is needed in their case. Existing verifier selftests are broken by this change, but because they were incorrect. Verifier tests for d_path were performing narrow load into context to obtain path pointer, had this program actually run it would cause a crash. The same holds for verifier_btf_ctx_access tests. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/51338.1732985814@localhost Fixes: 9e15db66136a ("bpf: Implement accurate raw_tp context access via BTF") Reported-by: Robert Morris <rtm(a)mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212092050.3204165-2-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c index e7a59e6462a9..a63a03582f02 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c @@ -6543,6 +6543,12 @@ bool btf_ctx_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type, return false; } + if (size != sizeof(u64)) { + bpf_log(log, "func '%s' size %d must be 8\n", + tname, size); + return false; + } + /* check for PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL or PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL */ for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->ctx_arg_info_size; i++) { const struct bpf_ctx_arg_aux *ctx_arg_info = &prog->aux->ctx_arg_info[i]; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_btf_ctx_access.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_btf_ctx_access.c index a570e48b917a..bfc3bf18fed4 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_btf_ctx_access.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_btf_ctx_access.c @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ __success __retval(0) __naked void btf_ctx_access_accept(void) { asm volatile (" \ - r2 = *(u32*)(r1 + 8); /* load 2nd argument value (int pointer) */\ + r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 8); /* load 2nd argument value (int pointer) */\ r0 = 0; \ exit; \ " ::: __clobber_all); @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ __success __retval(0) __naked void ctx_access_u32_pointer_accept(void) { asm volatile (" \ - r2 = *(u32*)(r1 + 0); /* load 1nd argument value (u32 pointer) */\ + r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); /* load 1nd argument value (u32 pointer) */\ r0 = 0; \ exit; \ " ::: __clobber_all); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_d_path.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_d_path.c index ec79cbcfde91..87e51a215558 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_d_path.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_d_path.c @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ __success __retval(0) __naked void d_path_accept(void) { asm volatile (" \ - r1 = *(u32*)(r1 + 0); \ + r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); \ r2 = r10; \ r2 += -8; \ r6 = 0; \ @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ __failure __msg("helper call is not allowed in probe") __naked void d_path_reject(void) { asm volatile (" \ - r1 = *(u32*)(r1 + 0); \ + r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); \ r2 = r10; \ r2 += -8; \ r6 = 0; \

8 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] bpf: Check size for BTF-based ctx access of pointer members" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 659b9ba7cb2d7adb64618b87ddfaa528a143766e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024121503-footwork-harness-0128@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 659b9ba7cb2d7adb64618b87ddfaa528a143766e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2024 01:20:49 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] bpf: Check size for BTF-based ctx access of pointer members Robert Morris reported the following program type which passes the verifier in [0]: SEC("struct_ops/bpf_cubic_init") void BPF_PROG(bpf_cubic_init, struct sock *sk) { asm volatile("r2 = *(u16*)(r1 + 0)"); // verifier should demand u64 asm volatile("*(u32 *)(r2 +1504) = 0"); // 1280 in some configs } The second line may or may not work, but the first instruction shouldn't pass, as it's a narrow load into the context structure of the struct ops callback. The code falls back to btf_ctx_access to ensure correctness and obtaining the types of pointers. Ensure that the size of the access is correctly checked to be 8 bytes, otherwise the verifier thinks the narrow load obtained a trusted BTF pointer and will permit loads/stores as it sees fit. Perform the check on size after we've verified that the load is for a pointer field, as for scalar values narrow loads are fine. Access to structs passed as arguments to a BPF program are also treated as scalars, therefore no adjustment is needed in their case. Existing verifier selftests are broken by this change, but because they were incorrect. Verifier tests for d_path were performing narrow load into context to obtain path pointer, had this program actually run it would cause a crash. The same holds for verifier_btf_ctx_access tests. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/51338.1732985814@localhost Fixes: 9e15db66136a ("bpf: Implement accurate raw_tp context access via BTF") Reported-by: Robert Morris <rtm(a)mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212092050.3204165-2-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c index e7a59e6462a9..a63a03582f02 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c @@ -6543,6 +6543,12 @@ bool btf_ctx_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type, return false; } + if (size != sizeof(u64)) { + bpf_log(log, "func '%s' size %d must be 8\n", + tname, size); + return false; + } + /* check for PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL or PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL */ for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->ctx_arg_info_size; i++) { const struct bpf_ctx_arg_aux *ctx_arg_info = &prog->aux->ctx_arg_info[i]; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_btf_ctx_access.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_btf_ctx_access.c index a570e48b917a..bfc3bf18fed4 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_btf_ctx_access.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_btf_ctx_access.c @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ __success __retval(0) __naked void btf_ctx_access_accept(void) { asm volatile (" \ - r2 = *(u32*)(r1 + 8); /* load 2nd argument value (int pointer) */\ + r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 8); /* load 2nd argument value (int pointer) */\ r0 = 0; \ exit; \ " ::: __clobber_all); @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ __success __retval(0) __naked void ctx_access_u32_pointer_accept(void) { asm volatile (" \ - r2 = *(u32*)(r1 + 0); /* load 1nd argument value (u32 pointer) */\ + r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); /* load 1nd argument value (u32 pointer) */\ r0 = 0; \ exit; \ " ::: __clobber_all); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_d_path.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_d_path.c index ec79cbcfde91..87e51a215558 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_d_path.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_d_path.c @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ __success __retval(0) __naked void d_path_accept(void) { asm volatile (" \ - r1 = *(u32*)(r1 + 0); \ + r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); \ r2 = r10; \ r2 += -8; \ r6 = 0; \ @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ __failure __msg("helper call is not allowed in probe") __naked void d_path_reject(void) { asm volatile (" \ - r1 = *(u32*)(r1 + 0); \ + r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); \ r2 = r10; \ r2 += -8; \ r6 = 0; \

8 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] bpf: Check size for BTF-based ctx access of pointer members" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 659b9ba7cb2d7adb64618b87ddfaa528a143766e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024121502-patriarch-unguarded-b4c5@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 659b9ba7cb2d7adb64618b87ddfaa528a143766e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2024 01:20:49 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] bpf: Check size for BTF-based ctx access of pointer members Robert Morris reported the following program type which passes the verifier in [0]: SEC("struct_ops/bpf_cubic_init") void BPF_PROG(bpf_cubic_init, struct sock *sk) { asm volatile("r2 = *(u16*)(r1 + 0)"); // verifier should demand u64 asm volatile("*(u32 *)(r2 +1504) = 0"); // 1280 in some configs } The second line may or may not work, but the first instruction shouldn't pass, as it's a narrow load into the context structure of the struct ops callback. The code falls back to btf_ctx_access to ensure correctness and obtaining the types of pointers. Ensure that the size of the access is correctly checked to be 8 bytes, otherwise the verifier thinks the narrow load obtained a trusted BTF pointer and will permit loads/stores as it sees fit. Perform the check on size after we've verified that the load is for a pointer field, as for scalar values narrow loads are fine. Access to structs passed as arguments to a BPF program are also treated as scalars, therefore no adjustment is needed in their case. Existing verifier selftests are broken by this change, but because they were incorrect. Verifier tests for d_path were performing narrow load into context to obtain path pointer, had this program actually run it would cause a crash. The same holds for verifier_btf_ctx_access tests. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/51338.1732985814@localhost Fixes: 9e15db66136a ("bpf: Implement accurate raw_tp context access via BTF") Reported-by: Robert Morris <rtm(a)mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212092050.3204165-2-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c index e7a59e6462a9..a63a03582f02 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c @@ -6543,6 +6543,12 @@ bool btf_ctx_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type, return false; } + if (size != sizeof(u64)) { + bpf_log(log, "func '%s' size %d must be 8\n", + tname, size); + return false; + } + /* check for PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL or PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL */ for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->ctx_arg_info_size; i++) { const struct bpf_ctx_arg_aux *ctx_arg_info = &prog->aux->ctx_arg_info[i]; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_btf_ctx_access.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_btf_ctx_access.c index a570e48b917a..bfc3bf18fed4 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_btf_ctx_access.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_btf_ctx_access.c @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ __success __retval(0) __naked void btf_ctx_access_accept(void) { asm volatile (" \ - r2 = *(u32*)(r1 + 8); /* load 2nd argument value (int pointer) */\ + r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 8); /* load 2nd argument value (int pointer) */\ r0 = 0; \ exit; \ " ::: __clobber_all); @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ __success __retval(0) __naked void ctx_access_u32_pointer_accept(void) { asm volatile (" \ - r2 = *(u32*)(r1 + 0); /* load 1nd argument value (u32 pointer) */\ + r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); /* load 1nd argument value (u32 pointer) */\ r0 = 0; \ exit; \ " ::: __clobber_all); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_d_path.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_d_path.c index ec79cbcfde91..87e51a215558 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_d_path.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_d_path.c @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ __success __retval(0) __naked void d_path_accept(void) { asm volatile (" \ - r1 = *(u32*)(r1 + 0); \ + r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); \ r2 = r10; \ r2 += -8; \ r6 = 0; \ @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ __failure __msg("helper call is not allowed in probe") __naked void d_path_reject(void) { asm volatile (" \ - r1 = *(u32*)(r1 + 0); \ + r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); \ r2 = r10; \ r2 += -8; \ r6 = 0; \

8 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] xfs: fix off-by-one error in fsmap's end_daddr usage" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x a440a28ddbdcb861150987b4d6e828631656b92f # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024121553-prison-usage-c221@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From a440a28ddbdcb861150987b4d6e828631656b92f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong(a)kernel.org> Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2024 10:57:24 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] xfs: fix off-by-one error in fsmap's end_daddr usage In commit ca6448aed4f10a, we created an "end_daddr" variable to fix fsmap reporting when the end of the range requested falls in the middle of an unknown (aka free on the rmapbt) region. Unfortunately, I didn't notice that the the code sets end_daddr to the last sector of the device but then uses that quantity to compute the length of the synthesized mapping. Zizhi Wo later observed that when end_daddr isn't set, we still don't report the last fsblock on a device because in that case (aka when info->last is true), the info->high mapping that we pass to xfs_getfsmap_group_helper has a startblock that points to the last fsblock. This is also wrong because the code uses startblock to compute the length of the synthesized mapping. Fix the second problem by setting end_daddr unconditionally, and fix the first problem by setting start_daddr to one past the end of the range to query. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.11 Fixes: ca6448aed4f10a ("xfs: Fix missing interval for missing_owner in xfs fsmap") Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong(a)kernel.org> Reported-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c index 82f2e0dd2249..3290dd8524a6 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c @@ -163,7 +163,8 @@ struct xfs_getfsmap_info { xfs_daddr_t next_daddr; /* next daddr we expect */ /* daddr of low fsmap key when we're using the rtbitmap */ xfs_daddr_t low_daddr; - xfs_daddr_t end_daddr; /* daddr of high fsmap key */ + /* daddr of high fsmap key, or the last daddr on the device */ + xfs_daddr_t end_daddr; u64 missing_owner; /* owner of holes */ u32 dev; /* device id */ /* @@ -387,8 +388,8 @@ xfs_getfsmap_group_helper( * we calculated from userspace's high key to synthesize the record. * Note that if the btree query found a mapping, there won't be a gap. */ - if (info->last && info->end_daddr != XFS_BUF_DADDR_NULL) - frec->start_daddr = info->end_daddr; + if (info->last) + frec->start_daddr = info->end_daddr + 1; else frec->start_daddr = xfs_gbno_to_daddr(xg, startblock); @@ -736,11 +737,10 @@ xfs_getfsmap_rtdev_rtbitmap_helper( * we calculated from userspace's high key to synthesize the record. * Note that if the btree query found a mapping, there won't be a gap. */ - if (info->last && info->end_daddr != XFS_BUF_DADDR_NULL) { - frec.start_daddr = info->end_daddr; - } else { + if (info->last) + frec.start_daddr = info->end_daddr + 1; + else frec.start_daddr = xfs_rtb_to_daddr(mp, start_rtb); - } frec.len_daddr = XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, rtbcount); return xfs_getfsmap_helper(tp, info, &frec); @@ -933,7 +933,10 @@ xfs_getfsmap( struct xfs_trans *tp = NULL; struct xfs_fsmap dkeys[2]; /* per-dev keys */ struct xfs_getfsmap_dev handlers[XFS_GETFSMAP_DEVS]; - struct xfs_getfsmap_info info = { NULL }; + struct xfs_getfsmap_info info = { + .fsmap_recs = fsmap_recs, + .head = head, + }; bool use_rmap; int i; int error = 0; @@ -998,9 +1001,6 @@ xfs_getfsmap( info.next_daddr = head->fmh_keys[0].fmr_physical + head->fmh_keys[0].fmr_length; - info.end_daddr = XFS_BUF_DADDR_NULL; - info.fsmap_recs = fsmap_recs; - info.head = head; /* For each device we support... */ for (i = 0; i < XFS_GETFSMAP_DEVS; i++) { @@ -1013,17 +1013,23 @@ xfs_getfsmap( break; /* - * If this device number matches the high key, we have - * to pass the high key to the handler to limit the - * query results. If the device number exceeds the - * low key, zero out the low key so that we get - * everything from the beginning. + * If this device number matches the high key, we have to pass + * the high key to the handler to limit the query results, and + * set the end_daddr so that we can synthesize records at the + * end of the query range or device. */ if (handlers[i].dev == head->fmh_keys[1].fmr_device) { dkeys[1] = head->fmh_keys[1]; info.end_daddr = min(handlers[i].nr_sectors - 1, dkeys[1].fmr_physical); + } else { + info.end_daddr = handlers[i].nr_sectors - 1; } + + /* + * If the device number exceeds the low key, zero out the low + * key so that we get everything from the beginning. + */ if (handlers[i].dev > head->fmh_keys[0].fmr_device) memset(&dkeys[0], 0, sizeof(struct xfs_fsmap));

8 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Linux-stable-mirror December 2024