December 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] btrfs: fix race with memory mapped writes when activating" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 0525064bb82e50d59543b62b9d41a606198a4a44 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024123010-voltage-disobey-16ec@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 0525064bb82e50d59543b62b9d41a606198a4a44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Date: Fri, 29 Nov 2024 12:25:30 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: fix race with memory mapped writes when activating swap file When activating the swap file we flush all delalloc and wait for ordered extent completion, so that we don't miss any delalloc and extents before we check that the file's extent layout is usable for a swap file and activate the swap file. We are called with the inode's VFS lock acquired, so we won't race with buffered and direct IO writes, however we can still race with memory mapped writes since they don't acquire the inode's VFS lock. The race window is between flushing all delalloc and locking the whole file's extent range, since memory mapped writes lock an extent range with the length of a page. Fix this by acquiring the inode's mmap lock before we flush delalloc. CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c index 6baa0269a85b..b2abc0aa5300 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c @@ -9809,6 +9809,15 @@ static int btrfs_swap_activate(struct swap_info_struct *sis, struct file *file, u64 isize; u64 start; + /* + * Acquire the inode's mmap lock to prevent races with memory mapped + * writes, as they could happen after we flush delalloc below and before + * we lock the extent range further below. The inode was already locked + * up in the call chain. + */ + btrfs_assert_inode_locked(BTRFS_I(inode)); + down_write(&BTRFS_I(inode)->i_mmap_lock); + /* * If the swap file was just created, make sure delalloc is done. If the * file changes again after this, the user is doing something stupid and @@ -9816,22 +9825,25 @@ static int btrfs_swap_activate(struct swap_info_struct *sis, struct file *file, */ ret = btrfs_wait_ordered_range(BTRFS_I(inode), 0, (u64)-1); if (ret) - return ret; + goto out_unlock_mmap; /* * The inode is locked, so these flags won't change after we check them. */ if (BTRFS_I(inode)->flags & BTRFS_INODE_COMPRESS) { btrfs_warn(fs_info, "swapfile must not be compressed"); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_unlock_mmap; } if (!(BTRFS_I(inode)->flags & BTRFS_INODE_NODATACOW)) { btrfs_warn(fs_info, "swapfile must not be copy-on-write"); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_unlock_mmap; } if (!(BTRFS_I(inode)->flags & BTRFS_INODE_NODATASUM)) { btrfs_warn(fs_info, "swapfile must not be checksummed"); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_unlock_mmap; } /* @@ -9846,7 +9858,8 @@ static int btrfs_swap_activate(struct swap_info_struct *sis, struct file *file, if (!btrfs_exclop_start(fs_info, BTRFS_EXCLOP_SWAP_ACTIVATE)) { btrfs_warn(fs_info, "cannot activate swapfile while exclusive operation is running"); - return -EBUSY; + ret = -EBUSY; + goto out_unlock_mmap; } /* @@ -9860,7 +9873,8 @@ static int btrfs_swap_activate(struct swap_info_struct *sis, struct file *file, btrfs_exclop_finish(fs_info); btrfs_warn(fs_info, "cannot activate swapfile because snapshot creation is in progress"); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_unlock_mmap; } /* * Snapshots can create extents which require COW even if NODATACOW is @@ -9881,7 +9895,8 @@ static int btrfs_swap_activate(struct swap_info_struct *sis, struct file *file, btrfs_warn(fs_info, "cannot activate swapfile because subvolume %llu is being deleted", btrfs_root_id(root)); - return -EPERM; + ret = -EPERM; + goto out_unlock_mmap; } atomic_inc(&root->nr_swapfiles); spin_unlock(&root->root_item_lock); @@ -10036,6 +10051,8 @@ static int btrfs_swap_activate(struct swap_info_struct *sis, struct file *file, btrfs_exclop_finish(fs_info); +out_unlock_mmap: + up_write(&BTRFS_I(inode)->i_mmap_lock); if (ret) return ret;

9 months, 3 weeks

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] btrfs: fix race with memory mapped writes when activating" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 0525064bb82e50d59543b62b9d41a606198a4a44 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024123009-carbon-thrower-2611@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 0525064bb82e50d59543b62b9d41a606198a4a44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Date: Fri, 29 Nov 2024 12:25:30 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: fix race with memory mapped writes when activating swap file When activating the swap file we flush all delalloc and wait for ordered extent completion, so that we don't miss any delalloc and extents before we check that the file's extent layout is usable for a swap file and activate the swap file. We are called with the inode's VFS lock acquired, so we won't race with buffered and direct IO writes, however we can still race with memory mapped writes since they don't acquire the inode's VFS lock. The race window is between flushing all delalloc and locking the whole file's extent range, since memory mapped writes lock an extent range with the length of a page. Fix this by acquiring the inode's mmap lock before we flush delalloc. CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c index 6baa0269a85b..b2abc0aa5300 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c @@ -9809,6 +9809,15 @@ static int btrfs_swap_activate(struct swap_info_struct *sis, struct file *file, u64 isize; u64 start; + /* + * Acquire the inode's mmap lock to prevent races with memory mapped + * writes, as they could happen after we flush delalloc below and before + * we lock the extent range further below. The inode was already locked + * up in the call chain. + */ + btrfs_assert_inode_locked(BTRFS_I(inode)); + down_write(&BTRFS_I(inode)->i_mmap_lock); + /* * If the swap file was just created, make sure delalloc is done. If the * file changes again after this, the user is doing something stupid and @@ -9816,22 +9825,25 @@ static int btrfs_swap_activate(struct swap_info_struct *sis, struct file *file, */ ret = btrfs_wait_ordered_range(BTRFS_I(inode), 0, (u64)-1); if (ret) - return ret; + goto out_unlock_mmap; /* * The inode is locked, so these flags won't change after we check them. */ if (BTRFS_I(inode)->flags & BTRFS_INODE_COMPRESS) { btrfs_warn(fs_info, "swapfile must not be compressed"); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_unlock_mmap; } if (!(BTRFS_I(inode)->flags & BTRFS_INODE_NODATACOW)) { btrfs_warn(fs_info, "swapfile must not be copy-on-write"); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_unlock_mmap; } if (!(BTRFS_I(inode)->flags & BTRFS_INODE_NODATASUM)) { btrfs_warn(fs_info, "swapfile must not be checksummed"); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_unlock_mmap; } /* @@ -9846,7 +9858,8 @@ static int btrfs_swap_activate(struct swap_info_struct *sis, struct file *file, if (!btrfs_exclop_start(fs_info, BTRFS_EXCLOP_SWAP_ACTIVATE)) { btrfs_warn(fs_info, "cannot activate swapfile while exclusive operation is running"); - return -EBUSY; + ret = -EBUSY; + goto out_unlock_mmap; } /* @@ -9860,7 +9873,8 @@ static int btrfs_swap_activate(struct swap_info_struct *sis, struct file *file, btrfs_exclop_finish(fs_info); btrfs_warn(fs_info, "cannot activate swapfile because snapshot creation is in progress"); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_unlock_mmap; } /* * Snapshots can create extents which require COW even if NODATACOW is @@ -9881,7 +9895,8 @@ static int btrfs_swap_activate(struct swap_info_struct *sis, struct file *file, btrfs_warn(fs_info, "cannot activate swapfile because subvolume %llu is being deleted", btrfs_root_id(root)); - return -EPERM; + ret = -EPERM; + goto out_unlock_mmap; } atomic_inc(&root->nr_swapfiles); spin_unlock(&root->root_item_lock); @@ -10036,6 +10051,8 @@ static int btrfs_swap_activate(struct swap_info_struct *sis, struct file *file, btrfs_exclop_finish(fs_info); +out_unlock_mmap: + up_write(&BTRFS_I(inode)->i_mmap_lock); if (ret) return ret;

9 months, 3 weeks

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tracing: Prevent bad count for tracing_cpumask_write" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 98feccbf32cfdde8c722bc4587aaa60ee5ac33f0 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024123053-acting-chase-d961@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 98feccbf32cfdde8c722bc4587aaa60ee5ac33f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lizhi Xu <lizhi.xu(a)windriver.com> Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 15:32:38 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] tracing: Prevent bad count for tracing_cpumask_write If a large count is provided, it will trigger a warning in bitmap_parse_user. Also check zero for it. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 9e01c1b74c953 ("cpumask: convert kernel trace functions") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241216073238.2573704-1-lizhi.xu@windriver.com Reported-by: syzbot+0aecfd34fb878546f3fd(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0aecfd34fb878546f3fd Tested-by: syzbot+0aecfd34fb878546f3fd(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Lizhi Xu <lizhi.xu(a)windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c index 957f941a08e7..f8aebcb01e62 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c @@ -5087,6 +5087,9 @@ tracing_cpumask_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf, cpumask_var_t tracing_cpumask_new; int err; + if (count == 0 || count > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&tracing_cpumask_new, GFP_KERNEL)) return -ENOMEM;

9 months, 3 weeks

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tracing: Prevent bad count for tracing_cpumask_write" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 98feccbf32cfdde8c722bc4587aaa60ee5ac33f0 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024123047-unfounded-coil-47c5@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 98feccbf32cfdde8c722bc4587aaa60ee5ac33f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lizhi Xu <lizhi.xu(a)windriver.com> Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 15:32:38 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] tracing: Prevent bad count for tracing_cpumask_write If a large count is provided, it will trigger a warning in bitmap_parse_user. Also check zero for it. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 9e01c1b74c953 ("cpumask: convert kernel trace functions") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241216073238.2573704-1-lizhi.xu@windriver.com Reported-by: syzbot+0aecfd34fb878546f3fd(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0aecfd34fb878546f3fd Tested-by: syzbot+0aecfd34fb878546f3fd(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Lizhi Xu <lizhi.xu(a)windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c index 957f941a08e7..f8aebcb01e62 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c @@ -5087,6 +5087,9 @@ tracing_cpumask_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf, cpumask_var_t tracing_cpumask_new; int err; + if (count == 0 || count > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&tracing_cpumask_new, GFP_KERNEL)) return -ENOMEM;

9 months, 3 weeks

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] dmaengine: loongson2-apb: Change GENMASK to GENMASK_ULL" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 4b65d5322e1d8994acfdb9b867aa00bdb30d177b # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024122721-badge-research-e542@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 4b65d5322e1d8994acfdb9b867aa00bdb30d177b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Binbin Zhou <zhoubinbin(a)loongson.cn> Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2024 17:34:13 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] dmaengine: loongson2-apb: Change GENMASK to GENMASK_ULL Fix the following smatch static checker warning: drivers/dma/loongson2-apb-dma.c:189 ls2x_dma_write_cmd() warn: was expecting a 64 bit value instead of '~(((0)) + (((~((0))) - (((1)) << (0)) + 1) & (~((0)) >> ((8 * 4) - 1 - (4)))))' The GENMASK macro used "unsigned long", which caused build issues when using a 32-bit toolchain because it would try to access bits > 31. This patch switches GENMASK to GENMASK_ULL, which uses "unsigned long long". Fixes: 71e7d3cb6e55 ("dmaengine: ls2x-apb: New driver for the Loongson LS2X APB DMA controller") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/87cdc025-7246-4548-85ca-3d36fdc2be2d@stanley.mo… Signed-off-by: Binbin Zhou <zhoubinbin(a)loongson.cn> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241028093413.1145820-1-zhoubinbin@loongson.cn Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/drivers/dma/loongson2-apb-dma.c b/drivers/dma/loongson2-apb-dma.c index 367ed34ce4da..c528f02b9f84 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/loongson2-apb-dma.c +++ b/drivers/dma/loongson2-apb-dma.c @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ #define LDMA_ASK_VALID BIT(2) #define LDMA_START BIT(3) /* DMA start operation */ #define LDMA_STOP BIT(4) /* DMA stop operation */ -#define LDMA_CONFIG_MASK GENMASK(4, 0) /* DMA controller config bits mask */ +#define LDMA_CONFIG_MASK GENMASK_ULL(4, 0) /* DMA controller config bits mask */ /* Bitfields in ndesc_addr field of HW descriptor */ #define LDMA_DESC_EN BIT(0) /*1: The next descriptor is valid */

9 months, 3 weeks

4
4
0 0

[PATCH v5.10] bpf: fix recursive lock when verdict program return SK_PASS

by Srish Srinivasan

From: Jiayuan Chen <mrpre(a)163.com> commit 8ca2a1eeadf09862190b2810697702d803ceef2d upstream. When the stream_verdict program returns SK_PASS, it places the received skb into its own receive queue, but a recursive lock eventually occurs, leading to an operating system deadlock. This issue has been present since v6.9. ''' sk_psock_strp_data_ready write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock) strp_data_ready strp_read_sock read_sock -> tcp_read_sock strp_recv cb.rcv_msg -> sk_psock_strp_read # now stream_verdict return SK_PASS without peer sock assign __SK_PASS = sk_psock_map_verd(SK_PASS, NULL) sk_psock_verdict_apply sk_psock_skb_ingress_self sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue sk_psock_data_ready read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock) <= dead lock ''' This topic has been discussed before, but it has not been fixed. Previous discussion: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6684a5864ec86_403d20898@john.notmuch Fixes: 6648e613226e ("bpf, skmsg: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue") Reported-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch(a)datadoghq.com> Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <mrpre(a)163.com> Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241118030910.36230-2-mrpre@163.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> [srish: Apply to stable branch linux-5.10.y] Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <srishwap4(a)gmail.com> --- net/core/skmsg.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/skmsg.c b/net/core/skmsg.c index 51792dda1..890e16bbc 100644 --- a/net/core/skmsg.c +++ b/net/core/skmsg.c @@ -940,9 +940,9 @@ static void sk_psock_strp_data_ready(struct sock *sk) if (tls_sw_has_ctx_rx(sk)) { psock->parser.saved_data_ready(sk); } else { - write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); strp_data_ready(&psock->parser.strp); - write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); } } rcu_read_unlock(); -- 2.25.1

9 months, 3 weeks

2
1
0 0

[PATCH 5.10/5.15/6.1] nfsd: cancel nfsd_shrinker_work using sync mode in nfs4_state_shutdown_net

by Vasiliy Kovalev

From: Yang Erkun <yangerkun(a)huaweicloud.com> [ Upstream commit d5ff2fb2e7167e9483846e34148e60c0c016a1f6 ] In the normal case, when we excute `echo 0 > /proc/fs/nfsd/threads`, the function `nfs4_state_destroy_net` in `nfs4_state_shutdown_net` will release all resources related to the hashed `nfs4_client`. If the `nfsd_client_shrinker` is running concurrently, the `expire_client` function will first unhash this client and then destroy it. This can lead to the following warning. Additionally, numerous use-after-free errors may occur as well. nfsd_client_shrinker echo 0 > /proc/fs/nfsd/threads expire_client nfsd_shutdown_net unhash_client ... nfs4_state_shutdown_net /* won't wait shrinker exit */ /* cancel_work(&nn->nfsd_shrinker_work) * nfsd_file for this /* won't destroy unhashed client1 */ * client1 still alive nfs4_state_destroy_net */ nfsd_file_cache_shutdown /* trigger warning */ kmem_cache_destroy(nfsd_file_slab) kmem_cache_destroy(nfsd_file_mark_slab) /* release nfsd_file and mark */ __destroy_client ==================================================================== BUG nfsd_file (Not tainted): Objects remaining in nfsd_file on __kmem_cache_shutdown() -------------------------------------------------------------------- CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 764 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #1 dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 slab_err+0xb0/0xf0 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x15c/0x310 kmem_cache_destroy+0x66/0x160 nfsd_file_cache_shutdown+0xac/0x210 [nfsd] nfsd_destroy_serv+0x251/0x2a0 [nfsd] nfsd_svc+0x125/0x1e0 [nfsd] write_threads+0x16a/0x2a0 [nfsd] nfsctl_transaction_write+0x74/0xa0 [nfsd] vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0 ksys_write+0xc1/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e ==================================================================== BUG nfsd_file_mark (Tainted: G B W ): Objects remaining nfsd_file_mark on __kmem_cache_shutdown() -------------------------------------------------------------------- dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 slab_err+0xb0/0xf0 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x15c/0x310 kmem_cache_destroy+0x66/0x160 nfsd_file_cache_shutdown+0xc8/0x210 [nfsd] nfsd_destroy_serv+0x251/0x2a0 [nfsd] nfsd_svc+0x125/0x1e0 [nfsd] write_threads+0x16a/0x2a0 [nfsd] nfsctl_transaction_write+0x74/0xa0 [nfsd] vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0 ksys_write+0xc1/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e To resolve this issue, cancel `nfsd_shrinker_work` using synchronous mode in nfs4_state_shutdown_net. Fixes: 7c24fa225081 ("NFSD: replace delayed_work with work_struct for nfsd_client_shrinker") Signed-off-by: Yang Erkun <yangerkun(a)huaweicloud.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> (cherry picked from commit f965dc0f099a54fca100acf6909abe52d0c85328) Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev(a)altlinux.org> --- Backport to fix CVE-2024-50121 Link: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2024-50121 --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index 8bceae771c1c75..f6fa719ee32668 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -8208,7 +8208,7 @@ nfs4_state_shutdown_net(struct net *net) struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id); unregister_shrinker(&nn->nfsd_client_shrinker); - cancel_work(&nn->nfsd_shrinker_work); + cancel_work_sync(&nn->nfsd_shrinker_work); cancel_delayed_work_sync(&nn->laundromat_work); locks_end_grace(&nn->nfsd4_manager); -- 2.33.8

9 months, 3 weeks

2
1
0 0

[tip: x86/urgent] x86/fred: Clear WFE in missing-ENDBRANCH #CPs

by tip-bot2 for Xin Li (Intel)

The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip: Commit-ID: dc81e556f2a017d681251ace21bf06c126d5a192 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/dc81e556f2a017d681251ace21bf06c126d5a192 Author: Xin Li (Intel) <xin(a)zytor.com> AuthorDate: Wed, 13 Nov 2024 09:59:34 -08:00 Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> CommitterDate: Sun, 29 Dec 2024 10:18:10 +01:00 x86/fred: Clear WFE in missing-ENDBRANCH #CPs An indirect branch instruction sets the CPU indirect branch tracker (IBT) into WAIT_FOR_ENDBRANCH (WFE) state and WFE stays asserted across the instruction boundary. When the decoder finds an inappropriate instruction while WFE is set ENDBR, the CPU raises a #CP fault. For the "kernel IBT no ENDBR" selftest where #CPs are deliberately triggered, the WFE state of the interrupted context needs to be cleared to let execution continue. Otherwise when the CPU resumes from the instruction that just caused the previous #CP, another missing-ENDBRANCH #CP is raised and the CPU enters a dead loop. This is not a problem with IDT because it doesn't preserve WFE and IRET doesn't set WFE. But FRED provides space on the entry stack (in an expanded CS area) to save and restore the WFE state, thus the WFE state is no longer clobbered, so software must clear it. Clear WFE to avoid dead looping in ibt_clear_fred_wfe() and the !ibt_fatal code path when execution is allowed to continue. Clobbering WFE in any other circumstance is a security-relevant bug. [ dhansen: changelog rewording ] Fixes: a5f6c2ace997 ("x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler") Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin(a)zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241113175934.3897541-1-xin%40zytor.com --- arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c index d2c732a..303bf74 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c @@ -81,6 +81,34 @@ static void do_user_cp_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code) static __ro_after_init bool ibt_fatal = true; +/* + * By definition, all missing-ENDBRANCH #CPs are a result of WFE && !ENDBR. + * + * For the kernel IBT no ENDBR selftest where #CPs are deliberately triggered, + * the WFE state of the interrupted context needs to be cleared to let execution + * continue. Otherwise when the CPU resumes from the instruction that just + * caused the previous #CP, another missing-ENDBRANCH #CP is raised and the CPU + * enters a dead loop. + * + * This is not a problem with IDT because it doesn't preserve WFE and IRET doesn't + * set WFE. But FRED provides space on the entry stack (in an expanded CS area) + * to save and restore the WFE state, thus the WFE state is no longer clobbered, + * so software must clear it. + */ +static void ibt_clear_fred_wfe(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + /* + * No need to do any FRED checks. + * + * For IDT event delivery, the high-order 48 bits of CS are pushed + * as 0s into the stack, and later IRET ignores these bits. + * + * For FRED, a test to check if fred_cs.wfe is set would be dropped + * by compilers. + */ + regs->fred_cs.wfe = 0; +} + static void do_kernel_cp_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code) { if ((error_code & CP_EC) != CP_ENDBR) { @@ -90,6 +118,7 @@ static void do_kernel_cp_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code) if (unlikely(regs->ip == (unsigned long)&ibt_selftest_noendbr)) { regs->ax = 0; + ibt_clear_fred_wfe(regs); return; } @@ -97,6 +126,7 @@ static void do_kernel_cp_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code) if (!ibt_fatal) { printk(KERN_DEFAULT CUT_HERE); __warn(__FILE__, __LINE__, (void *)regs->ip, TAINT_WARN, regs, NULL); + ibt_clear_fred_wfe(regs); return; } BUG();

9 months, 3 weeks

1
0
0 0

[tip: x86/urgent] virt: tdx-guest: Just leak decrypted memory on unrecoverable errors

by tip-bot2 for Li RongQing

The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip: Commit-ID: 27834971f616c5e154423c578fa95e0444444ce1 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/27834971f616c5e154423c578fa95e0444444ce1 Author: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> AuthorDate: Wed, 19 Jun 2024 19:18:01 +08:00 Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> CommitterDate: Sun, 29 Dec 2024 10:18:44 +01:00 virt: tdx-guest: Just leak decrypted memory on unrecoverable errors In CoCo VMs it is possible for the untrusted host to cause set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared) memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security issues. Leak the decrypted memory when set_memory_decrypted() fails, and don't need to print an error since set_memory_decrypted() will call WARN_ONCE(). Fixes: f4738f56d1dc ("virt: tdx-guest: Add Quote generation support using TSM_REPORTS") Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240619111801.25630-1-lirongqing%40baidu.com --- drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/tdx-guest.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/tdx-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/tdx-guest.c index d7db6c8..224e7dd 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/tdx-guest.c +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/tdx-guest.c @@ -124,10 +124,8 @@ static void *alloc_quote_buf(void) if (!addr) return NULL; - if (set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)addr, count)) { - free_pages_exact(addr, len); + if (set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)addr, count)) return NULL; - } return addr; }

9 months, 3 weeks

1
0
0 0

[PATCH v7 1/5] libfs: Return ENOSPC when the directory offset range is exhausted

by cel＠kernel.org

From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Testing shows that the EBUSY error return from mtree_alloc_cyclic() leaks into user space. The ERRORS section of "man creat(2)" says: > EBUSY O_EXCL was specified in flags and pathname refers > to a block device that is in use by the system > (e.g., it is mounted). ENOSPC is closer to what applications expect in this situation. Note that the normal range of simple directory offset values is 2..2^63, so hitting this error is going to be rare to impossible. Fixes: 6faddda69f62 ("libfs: Add directory operations for stable offsets") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.9+ Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Yang Erkun <yangerkun(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> --- fs/libfs.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/libfs.c b/fs/libfs.c index 748ac5923154..3da58a92f48f 100644 --- a/fs/libfs.c +++ b/fs/libfs.c @@ -292,8 +292,8 @@ int simple_offset_add(struct offset_ctx *octx, struct dentry *dentry) ret = mtree_alloc_cyclic(&octx->mt, &offset, dentry, DIR_OFFSET_MIN, LONG_MAX, &octx->next_offset, GFP_KERNEL); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) + return ret == -EBUSY ? -ENOSPC : ret; offset_set(dentry, offset); return 0; -- 2.47.0

9 months, 3 weeks

1
0
0 0

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Linux-stable-mirror December 2024