November 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH v2] ARM: dts: ti/omap: gta04: fix pm issues caused by spi module

by Andreas Kemnade

Despite CM_IDLEST1_CORE and CM_FCLKEN1_CORE behaving normal, disabling SPI leads to messages like: Powerdomain (core_pwrdm) didn't enter target state 0 and according to /sys/kernel/debug/pm_debug/count off state is not entered. That was not connected to SPI during the discussion of disabling SPI. See: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-omap/20230122100852.32ae082c@aktux/ The reason is that SPI is per default in slave mode. Linux driver will turn it to master per default. It slave mode, the powerdomain seems to be kept active if active chip select input is sensed. Fix that by explicitly disabling the SPI3 pins which are muxed by the bootloader since they are available on an optionally fitted header which would require dtb overlays anyways. Fixes: a622310f7f01 ("ARM: dts: gta04: fix excess dma channel usage") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andreas Kemnade <andreas(a)kemnade.info> --- arch/arm/boot/dts/ti/omap/omap3-gta04.dtsi | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/ti/omap/omap3-gta04.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/ti/omap/omap3-gta04.dtsi index 3661340009e7a..3940909a5aac7 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/ti/omap/omap3-gta04.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/ti/omap/omap3-gta04.dtsi @@ -446,6 +446,7 @@ &omap3_pmx_core2 { pinctrl-names = "default"; pinctrl-0 = < &hsusb2_2_pins + &mcspi3hog_pins >; hsusb2_2_pins: hsusb2-2-pins { @@ -459,6 +460,15 @@ OMAP3630_CORE2_IOPAD(0x25fa, PIN_INPUT_PULLDOWN | MUX_MODE3) /* etk_d15.hsusb2_d >; }; + mcspi3hog_pins: mcspi3hog-pins { + pinctrl-single,pins = < + OMAP3630_CORE2_IOPAD(0x25dc, PIN_OUTPUT_PULLDOWN | MUX_MODE7) /* etk_d0 */ + OMAP3630_CORE2_IOPAD(0x25de, PIN_OUTPUT_PULLDOWN | MUX_MODE7) /* etk_d1 */ + OMAP3630_CORE2_IOPAD(0x25e0, PIN_OUTPUT_PULLDOWN | MUX_MODE7) /* etk_d2 */ + OMAP3630_CORE2_IOPAD(0x25e2, PIN_OUTPUT_PULLDOWN | MUX_MODE7) /* etk_d3 */ + >; + }; + spi_gpio_pins: spi-gpio-pinmux-pins { pinctrl-single,pins = < OMAP3630_CORE2_IOPAD(0x25d8, PIN_OUTPUT | MUX_MODE4) /* clk */ -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH v3] fs/ceph/file: fix buffer overflow in __ceph_sync_read()

by Max Kellermann

If the inode size gets truncated by another task, __ceph_sync_read() may crash with a buffer overflow because it sets `left` to a huge value: else if (off + ret > i_size) left = i_size - off; Imagine `i_size` was truncated to zero; `off + ret > i_size` is always true, but `i_size - off` can be negative; since `left` is unsigned, it turns into a rather huge number, and thus the `while (left > 0)` loop never stops until it eventually crashes because `pages[idx]` overflows the `pages` allocation. We need to ensure that `i_size` never becomes smaller than `off`. I suggest breaking from the loop as soon as this happens, right after the `i_size = i_size_read(inode)` update. This can be reproduced easily by running a program like this on one Ceph client: ioctl(fd, CEPH_IOC_SYNCIO); char buffer[16384]; while (1) pread(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer), 8192); Then, on another server, truncate and rewrite the file until the first server's kernel crashes (I never needed more than two attempts to trigger the kernel crash): dd if=/dev/urandom of=foo bs=1k count=64 This is how the crash looks like (with KASAN and some debug logs from `__ceph_sync_read` and `ceph_fill_file_size`): ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_size 0 -> 0, encrypted 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 16384 i_size 65536 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: result 16384 retry_op 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_size 0 -> 0, encrypted 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_size 0 -> 0, encrypted 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: size 65536 -> 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_seq 36656 -> 36657 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_size 0 -> 0, encrypted 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_size 0 -> 0, encrypted 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: on inode 0000000035059a6f 1000235edb7.fffffffffffffffe 2000~4000 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: orig 8192~16384 reading 8192~16384 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_size 0 -> 0, encrypted 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 0 i_size 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: result 0 retry_op 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: on inode 0000000035059a6f 1000235edb7.fffffffffffffffe 2000~4000 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: orig 8192~16384 reading 8192~16384 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 0 i_size 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: result 0 retry_op 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: on inode 0000000035059a6f 1000235edb7.fffffffffffffffe 2000~4000 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: orig 8192~16384 reading 8192~16384 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_size 0 -> 0, encrypted 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 0 i_size 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: result 0 retry_op 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: on inode 0000000035059a6f 1000235edb7.fffffffffffffffe 2000~4000 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: orig 8192~16384 reading 8192~16384 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 0 i_size 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: result 0 retry_op 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: on inode 0000000035059a6f 1000235edb7.fffffffffffffffe 2000~4000 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: orig 8192~16384 reading 8192~16384 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 0 i_size 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: result 0 retry_op 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: on inode 0000000035059a6f 1000235edb7.fffffffffffffffe 2000~4000 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: orig 8192~16384 reading 8192~16384 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 0 i_size 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: result 0 retry_op 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: on inode 0000000035059a6f 1000235edb7.fffffffffffffffe 2000~4000 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: orig 8192~16384 reading 8192~16384 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 0 i_size 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: result 0 retry_op 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: on inode 0000000035059a6f 1000235edb7.fffffffffffffffe 2000~4000 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: orig 8192~16384 reading 8192~16384 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 1024 i_size 0 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __ceph_sync_read+0x173f/0x1b10 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881d5dfbea0 by task pread/3276 CPU: 3 UID: 2147488069 PID: 3276 Comm: pread Not tainted 6.11.10-cm4all1-hp+ #254 Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen10/ProLiant DL380 Gen10, BIOS U30 09/05/2019 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x62/0x90 print_report+0xc4/0x5e0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x1e9/0x3a0 ? __ceph_sync_read+0x173f/0x1b10 kasan_report+0xb9/0xf0 ? __ceph_sync_read+0x173f/0x1b10 __ceph_sync_read+0x173f/0x1b10 ? __pfx___ceph_sync_read+0x10/0x10 ? lock_acquire+0x186/0x4d0 ? ceph_read_iter+0xace/0x19f0 ceph_read_iter+0xace/0x19f0 ? lock_release+0x648/0xb50 ? __pfx_ceph_read_iter+0x10/0x10 ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x8ed/0xd40 ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10 ? vfs_read+0x6e0/0xba0 vfs_read+0x6e0/0xba0 ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 __x64_sys_pread64+0x19b/0x1f0 ? __pfx___x64_sys_pread64+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x130 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x275/0x3e0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x275/0x3e0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f8449d18343 Code: 48 8b 6c 24 48 e8 3d 00 f3 ff 41 b8 02 00 00 00 e9 38 f6 ff ff 66 90 80 3d a1 42 0e 00 00 49 89 ca 74 14 b8 11 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 5d c3 0f 1f 40 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 10 RSP: 002b:00007ffd7a2e8b78 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000011 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd7a2e8cc8 RCX: 00007f8449d18343 RDX: 0000000000004000 RSI: 0000557f7917c2a0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffd7a2e8bb0 R08: 0000557f7919d000 R09: 0000000000021001 R10: 0000000000002000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd7a2e8cf0 R14: 0000557f436c2dd8 R15: 00007f8449e43020 </TASK> Allocated by task 3276: kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0x90 __kmalloc_noprof+0x1bf/0x490 ceph_alloc_page_vector+0x36/0x110 __ceph_sync_read+0x769/0x1b10 ceph_read_iter+0xace/0x19f0 vfs_read+0x6e0/0xba0 __x64_sys_pread64+0x19b/0x1f0 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881d5dfbe80 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 32-byte region [ffff8881d5dfbe80, ffff8881d5dfbea0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1d5dfb flags: 0x2fffc0000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3fff) page_type: 0xfdffffff(slab) raw: 02fffc0000000000 ffff888100042780 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080400040 00000001fdffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8881d5dfbd80: fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff8881d5dfbe00: fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc >ffff8881d5dfbe80: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ^ ffff8881d5dfbf00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff8881d5dfbf80: fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe021fc6b8000019a: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x0110035c00000cd0-0x0110035c00000cd7] CPU: 3 UID: 2147488069 PID: 3276 Comm: pread Tainted: G B 6.11.10-cm4all1-hp+ #254 Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen10/ProLiant DL380 Gen10, BIOS U30 09/05/2019 RIP: 0010:__ceph_sync_read+0xc33/0x1b10 Code: 39 e7 4d 0f 47 fc 48 8d 0c c6 48 89 c8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 30 00 0f 85 0b 0b 00 00 48 8b 11 48 8d 7a 08 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 30 00 0f 85 0d 0b 00 00 48 8b 42 08 a8 01 0f 84 ee 04 00 RSP: 0018:ffff8881ed6e78e0 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0022006b8000019a RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8881d5dfbea0 RDX: 0110035c00000ccc RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0110035c00000cd4 RBP: ffff8881ed6e7a80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff28b44ac R10: ffffffff945a2567 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffffffa000 R13: 0000000000000004 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000001000 FS: 00007f8449c1f740(0000) GS:ffff88d2b5a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fb72c6aecf0 CR3: 00000001ed7b6003 CR4: 00000000007706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x3c/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x113/0x200 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 ? __ceph_sync_read+0xc33/0x1b10 ? __pfx___ceph_sync_read+0x10/0x10 ? lock_acquire+0x186/0x4d0 ? ceph_read_iter+0xace/0x19f0 ceph_read_iter+0xace/0x19f0 ? lock_release+0x648/0xb50 ? __pfx_ceph_read_iter+0x10/0x10 ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x8ed/0xd40 ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10 ? vfs_read+0x6e0/0xba0 vfs_read+0x6e0/0xba0 ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 __x64_sys_pread64+0x19b/0x1f0 ? __pfx___x64_sys_pread64+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x130 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x275/0x3e0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x275/0x3e0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f8449d18343 Code: 48 8b 6c 24 48 e8 3d 00 f3 ff 41 b8 02 00 00 00 e9 38 f6 ff ff 66 90 80 3d a1 42 0e 00 00 49 89 ca 74 14 b8 11 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 5d c3 0f 1f 40 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 10 RSP: 002b:00007ffd7a2e8b78 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000011 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd7a2e8cc8 RCX: 00007f8449d18343 RDX: 0000000000004000 RSI: 0000557f7917c2a0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffd7a2e8bb0 R08: 0000557f7919d000 R09: 0000000000021001 R10: 0000000000002000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd7a2e8cf0 R14: 0000557f436c2dd8 R15: 00007f8449e43020 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:__ceph_sync_read+0xc33/0x1b10 Code: 39 e7 4d 0f 47 fc 48 8d 0c c6 48 89 c8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 30 00 0f 85 0b 0b 00 00 48 8b 11 48 8d 7a 08 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 30 00 0f 85 0d 0b 00 00 48 8b 42 08 a8 01 0f 84 ee 04 00 RSP: 0018:ffff8881ed6e78e0 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0022006b8000019a RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8881d5dfbea0 RDX: 0110035c00000ccc RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0110035c00000cd4 RBP: ffff8881ed6e7a80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff28b44ac R10: ffffffff945a2567 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffffffa000 R13: 0000000000000004 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000001000 FS: 00007f8449c1f740(0000) GS:ffff88d2b5a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fb72c6aecf0 CR3: 00000001ed7b6003 CR4: 00000000007706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 workqueue: ceph_con_workfn hogged CPU for >10000us 35 times, consider switching to WQ_UNBOUND ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: size 0 -> 65536 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_size 0 -> 0, encrypted 0 Fixes: 1065da21e5df ("ceph: stop copying to iter at EOF on sync reads") Fixes: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/67524 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann(a)ionos.com> --- v2: public posting; added link to Ceph bug tracker (vulnerability had been known already for 3 months) v3: memory leak fix --- fs/ceph/file.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ceph/file.c b/fs/ceph/file.c index 4b8d59ebda00..1f0aed6cd9d5 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/file.c +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c @@ -1154,6 +1154,16 @@ ssize_t __ceph_sync_read(struct inode *inode, loff_t *ki_pos, doutc(cl, "%llu~%llu got %zd i_size %llu%s\n", off, len, ret, i_size, (more ? " MORE" : "")); + if (off >= i_size) { + /* meanwhile, the file has been truncated by + * another task and the offset is no longer + * valid; stop here + */ + ceph_release_page_vector(pages, num_pages); + ceph_osdc_put_request(req); + break; + } + /* Fix it to go to end of extent map */ if (sparse && ret >= 0) ret = ceph_sparse_ext_map_end(op); -- 2.45.2

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[PATCH v2] fs/ceph/file: fix buffer overflow in __ceph_sync_read()

by Max Kellermann

If the inode size gets truncated by another task, __ceph_sync_read() may crash with a buffer overflow because it sets `left` to a huge value: else if (off + ret > i_size) left = i_size - off; Imagine `i_size` was truncated to zero; `off + ret > i_size` is always true, but `i_size - off` can be negative; since `left` is unsigned, it turns into a rather huge number, and thus the `while (left > 0)` loop never stops until it eventually crashes because `pages[idx]` overflows the `pages` allocation. We need to ensure that `i_size` never becomes smaller than `off`. I suggest breaking from the loop as soon as this happens, right after the `i_size = i_size_read(inode)` update. This can be reproduced easily by running a program like this on one Ceph client: ioctl(fd, CEPH_IOC_SYNCIO); char buffer[16384]; while (1) pread(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer), 8192); Then, on another server, truncate and rewrite the file until the first server's kernel crashes (I never needed more than two attempts to trigger the kernel crash): dd if=/dev/urandom of=foo bs=1k count=64 This is how the crash looks like (with KASAN and some debug logs from `__ceph_sync_read` and `ceph_fill_file_size`): ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_size 0 -> 0, encrypted 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 16384 i_size 65536 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: result 16384 retry_op 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_size 0 -> 0, encrypted 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_size 0 -> 0, encrypted 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: size 65536 -> 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_seq 36656 -> 36657 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_size 0 -> 0, encrypted 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_size 0 -> 0, encrypted 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: on inode 0000000035059a6f 1000235edb7.fffffffffffffffe 2000~4000 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: orig 8192~16384 reading 8192~16384 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_size 0 -> 0, encrypted 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 0 i_size 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: result 0 retry_op 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: on inode 0000000035059a6f 1000235edb7.fffffffffffffffe 2000~4000 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: orig 8192~16384 reading 8192~16384 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 0 i_size 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: result 0 retry_op 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: on inode 0000000035059a6f 1000235edb7.fffffffffffffffe 2000~4000 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: orig 8192~16384 reading 8192~16384 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_size 0 -> 0, encrypted 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 0 i_size 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: result 0 retry_op 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: on inode 0000000035059a6f 1000235edb7.fffffffffffffffe 2000~4000 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: orig 8192~16384 reading 8192~16384 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 0 i_size 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: result 0 retry_op 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: on inode 0000000035059a6f 1000235edb7.fffffffffffffffe 2000~4000 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: orig 8192~16384 reading 8192~16384 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 0 i_size 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: result 0 retry_op 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: on inode 0000000035059a6f 1000235edb7.fffffffffffffffe 2000~4000 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: orig 8192~16384 reading 8192~16384 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 0 i_size 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: result 0 retry_op 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: on inode 0000000035059a6f 1000235edb7.fffffffffffffffe 2000~4000 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: orig 8192~16384 reading 8192~16384 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 0 i_size 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: result 0 retry_op 0 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: on inode 0000000035059a6f 1000235edb7.fffffffffffffffe 2000~4000 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: orig 8192~16384 reading 8192~16384 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] __ceph_sync_read: 8192~16384 got 1024 i_size 0 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __ceph_sync_read+0x173f/0x1b10 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881d5dfbea0 by task pread/3276 CPU: 3 UID: 2147488069 PID: 3276 Comm: pread Not tainted 6.11.10-cm4all1-hp+ #254 Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen10/ProLiant DL380 Gen10, BIOS U30 09/05/2019 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x62/0x90 print_report+0xc4/0x5e0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x1e9/0x3a0 ? __ceph_sync_read+0x173f/0x1b10 kasan_report+0xb9/0xf0 ? __ceph_sync_read+0x173f/0x1b10 __ceph_sync_read+0x173f/0x1b10 ? __pfx___ceph_sync_read+0x10/0x10 ? lock_acquire+0x186/0x4d0 ? ceph_read_iter+0xace/0x19f0 ceph_read_iter+0xace/0x19f0 ? lock_release+0x648/0xb50 ? __pfx_ceph_read_iter+0x10/0x10 ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x8ed/0xd40 ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10 ? vfs_read+0x6e0/0xba0 vfs_read+0x6e0/0xba0 ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 __x64_sys_pread64+0x19b/0x1f0 ? __pfx___x64_sys_pread64+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x130 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x275/0x3e0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x275/0x3e0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f8449d18343 Code: 48 8b 6c 24 48 e8 3d 00 f3 ff 41 b8 02 00 00 00 e9 38 f6 ff ff 66 90 80 3d a1 42 0e 00 00 49 89 ca 74 14 b8 11 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 5d c3 0f 1f 40 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 10 RSP: 002b:00007ffd7a2e8b78 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000011 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd7a2e8cc8 RCX: 00007f8449d18343 RDX: 0000000000004000 RSI: 0000557f7917c2a0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffd7a2e8bb0 R08: 0000557f7919d000 R09: 0000000000021001 R10: 0000000000002000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd7a2e8cf0 R14: 0000557f436c2dd8 R15: 00007f8449e43020 </TASK> Allocated by task 3276: kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0x90 __kmalloc_noprof+0x1bf/0x490 ceph_alloc_page_vector+0x36/0x110 __ceph_sync_read+0x769/0x1b10 ceph_read_iter+0xace/0x19f0 vfs_read+0x6e0/0xba0 __x64_sys_pread64+0x19b/0x1f0 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881d5dfbe80 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 32-byte region [ffff8881d5dfbe80, ffff8881d5dfbea0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1d5dfb flags: 0x2fffc0000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3fff) page_type: 0xfdffffff(slab) raw: 02fffc0000000000 ffff888100042780 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080400040 00000001fdffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8881d5dfbd80: fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff8881d5dfbe00: fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc >ffff8881d5dfbe80: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ^ ffff8881d5dfbf00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff8881d5dfbf80: fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe021fc6b8000019a: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x0110035c00000cd0-0x0110035c00000cd7] CPU: 3 UID: 2147488069 PID: 3276 Comm: pread Tainted: G B 6.11.10-cm4all1-hp+ #254 Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen10/ProLiant DL380 Gen10, BIOS U30 09/05/2019 RIP: 0010:__ceph_sync_read+0xc33/0x1b10 Code: 39 e7 4d 0f 47 fc 48 8d 0c c6 48 89 c8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 30 00 0f 85 0b 0b 00 00 48 8b 11 48 8d 7a 08 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 30 00 0f 85 0d 0b 00 00 48 8b 42 08 a8 01 0f 84 ee 04 00 RSP: 0018:ffff8881ed6e78e0 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0022006b8000019a RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8881d5dfbea0 RDX: 0110035c00000ccc RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0110035c00000cd4 RBP: ffff8881ed6e7a80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff28b44ac R10: ffffffff945a2567 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffffffa000 R13: 0000000000000004 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000001000 FS: 00007f8449c1f740(0000) GS:ffff88d2b5a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fb72c6aecf0 CR3: 00000001ed7b6003 CR4: 00000000007706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x3c/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x113/0x200 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 ? __ceph_sync_read+0xc33/0x1b10 ? __pfx___ceph_sync_read+0x10/0x10 ? lock_acquire+0x186/0x4d0 ? ceph_read_iter+0xace/0x19f0 ceph_read_iter+0xace/0x19f0 ? lock_release+0x648/0xb50 ? __pfx_ceph_read_iter+0x10/0x10 ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x8ed/0xd40 ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10 ? vfs_read+0x6e0/0xba0 vfs_read+0x6e0/0xba0 ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 __x64_sys_pread64+0x19b/0x1f0 ? __pfx___x64_sys_pread64+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x130 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x275/0x3e0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x275/0x3e0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x190 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f8449d18343 Code: 48 8b 6c 24 48 e8 3d 00 f3 ff 41 b8 02 00 00 00 e9 38 f6 ff ff 66 90 80 3d a1 42 0e 00 00 49 89 ca 74 14 b8 11 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 5d c3 0f 1f 40 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 10 RSP: 002b:00007ffd7a2e8b78 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000011 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd7a2e8cc8 RCX: 00007f8449d18343 RDX: 0000000000004000 RSI: 0000557f7917c2a0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffd7a2e8bb0 R08: 0000557f7919d000 R09: 0000000000021001 R10: 0000000000002000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd7a2e8cf0 R14: 0000557f436c2dd8 R15: 00007f8449e43020 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:__ceph_sync_read+0xc33/0x1b10 Code: 39 e7 4d 0f 47 fc 48 8d 0c c6 48 89 c8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 30 00 0f 85 0b 0b 00 00 48 8b 11 48 8d 7a 08 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 30 00 0f 85 0d 0b 00 00 48 8b 42 08 a8 01 0f 84 ee 04 00 RSP: 0018:ffff8881ed6e78e0 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0022006b8000019a RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8881d5dfbea0 RDX: 0110035c00000ccc RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0110035c00000cd4 RBP: ffff8881ed6e7a80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff28b44ac R10: ffffffff945a2567 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffffffa000 R13: 0000000000000004 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000001000 FS: 00007f8449c1f740(0000) GS:ffff88d2b5a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fb72c6aecf0 CR3: 00000001ed7b6003 CR4: 00000000007706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 workqueue: ceph_con_workfn hogged CPU for >10000us 35 times, consider switching to WQ_UNBOUND ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: size 0 -> 65536 ceph: [8f7ec2f3-0dcb-468f-bd16-37e0a61bf195 4098067] ceph_fill_file_size: truncate_size 0 -> 0, encrypted 0 Fixes: 1065da21e5df ("ceph: stop copying to iter at EOF on sync reads") Fixes: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/67524 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann(a)ionos.com> --- v2: public posting; added link to Ceph bug tracker (vulnerability had been known already for 3 months) --- fs/ceph/file.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ceph/file.c b/fs/ceph/file.c index 4b8d59ebda00..57d7cdda0f87 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/file.c +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c @@ -1154,6 +1154,13 @@ ssize_t __ceph_sync_read(struct inode *inode, loff_t *ki_pos, doutc(cl, "%llu~%llu got %zd i_size %llu%s\n", off, len, ret, i_size, (more ? " MORE" : "")); + if (off >= i_size) + /* meanwhile, the file has been truncated by + * another task and the offset is no longer + * valid; stop here + */ + break; + /* Fix it to go to end of extent map */ if (sparse && ret >= 0) ret = ceph_sparse_ext_map_end(op); -- 2.45.2

1 month

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[PATCH 2/4] drm/i915/color: Stop using non-posted DSB writes for legacy LUT

by Ville Syrjala

From: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com> DSB LUT register writes vs. palette anti-collision logic appear to interact in interesting ways: - posted DSB writes simply vanish into thin air while anti-collision is active - non-posted DSB writes actually get blocked by the anti-collision logic, but unfortunately this ends up hogging the bus for long enough that unrelated parallel CPU MMIO accesses start to disappear instead Even though we are updating the LUT during vblank we aren't immune to the anti-collision logic because it kicks in brifly for pipe prefill (initiated at frame start). The safe time window for performing the LUT update is thus between the undelayed vblank and frame start. Turns out that with low enough CDCLK frequency (DSB execution speed depends on CDCLK) we can exceed that. As we are currently using non-posted writes for the legacy LUT updates, in which case we can hit the far more severe failure mode. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that non-posted writes are much slower than posted writes (~4x it seems). To mititage the problem let's switch to using posted DSB writes for legacy LUT updates (which will involve using the double write approach to avoid other problems with DSB vs. legacy LUT writes). Despite writing each register twice this will in fact make the legacy LUT update faster when compared to the non-posted write approach, making the problem less likely to appear. The failure mode is also less severe. This isn't the 100% solution we need though. That will involve estimating how long the LUT update will take, and pushing frame start and/or delayed vblank forward to guarantee that the update will have finished by the time the pipe prefill starts... Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 34d8311f4a1c ("drm/i915/dsb: Re-instate DSB for LUT updates") Fixes: 25ea3411bd23 ("drm/i915/dsb: Use non-posted register writes for legacy LUT") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/12494 Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_color.c | 30 ++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_color.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_color.c index 6ea3d5c58cb1..7cd902bbd244 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_color.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_color.c @@ -1368,19 +1368,29 @@ static void ilk_load_lut_8(const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state, lut = blob->data; /* - * DSB fails to correctly load the legacy LUT - * unless we either write each entry twice, - * or use non-posted writes + * DSB fails to correctly load the legacy LUT unless + * we either write each entry twice when using posted + * writes, or we use non-posted writes. + * + * If palette anti-collision is active during LUT + * register writes: + * - posted writes simply get dropped and thus the LUT + * contents may not be correctly updated + * - non-posted writes are blocked and thus the LUT + * contents are always correct, but simultaneous CPU + * MMIO access will start to fail + * + * Choose the lesser of two evils and use posted writes. + * Using posted writes is also faster, even when having + * to write each register twice. */ - if (crtc_state->dsb_color_vblank) - intel_dsb_nonpost_start(crtc_state->dsb_color_vblank); - - for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { ilk_lut_write(crtc_state, LGC_PALETTE(pipe, i), i9xx_lut_8(&lut[i])); - - if (crtc_state->dsb_color_vblank) - intel_dsb_nonpost_end(crtc_state->dsb_color_vblank); + if (crtc_state->dsb_color_vblank) + ilk_lut_write(crtc_state, LGC_PALETTE(pipe, i), + i9xx_lut_8(&lut[i])); + } } static void ilk_load_lut_10(const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state, -- 2.45.2

1 month

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[PATCH 1/4] drm/i915/dsb: Don't use indexed register writes needlessly

by Ville Syrjala

From: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com> Turns out the DSB indexed register write command has rather significant initial overhead compared to the normal MMIO write command. Based on some quick experiments on TGL you have to write the register at least ~5 times for the indexed write command to come out ahead. If you write the register less times than that the MMIO write is faster. So it seems my automagic indexed write logic was a bit misguided. Go back to the original approach only use indexed writes for the cases we know will benefit from it (indexed LUT register updates). Currently we shouldn't have any cases where this truly matters (just some rare double writes to the precision LUT index registers), but we will need to switch the legacy LUT updates to write each LUT register twice (to avoid some palette anti-collision logic troubles). This would be close to the worst case for using indexed writes (two writes per register, and 256 separate registers). Using the MMIO write command should shave off around 30% of the execution time compared to using the indexed write command. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 34d8311f4a1c ("drm/i915/dsb: Re-instate DSB for LUT updates") Fixes: 25ea3411bd23 ("drm/i915/dsb: Use non-posted register writes for legacy LUT") Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_color.c | 51 +++++++++++++--------- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dsb.c | 19 ++++++-- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dsb.h | 2 + 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_color.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_color.c index 174753625bca..6ea3d5c58cb1 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_color.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_color.c @@ -1343,6 +1343,17 @@ static void ilk_lut_write(const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state, intel_de_write_fw(display, reg, val); } +static void ilk_lut_write_indexed(const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state, + i915_reg_t reg, u32 val) +{ + struct intel_display *display = to_intel_display(crtc_state); + + if (crtc_state->dsb_color_vblank) + intel_dsb_reg_write_indexed(crtc_state->dsb_color_vblank, reg, val); + else + intel_de_write_fw(display, reg, val); +} + static void ilk_load_lut_8(const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state, const struct drm_property_blob *blob) { @@ -1458,8 +1469,8 @@ static void bdw_load_lut_10(const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state, prec_index); for (i = 0; i < lut_size; i++) - ilk_lut_write(crtc_state, PREC_PAL_DATA(pipe), - ilk_lut_10(&lut[i])); + ilk_lut_write_indexed(crtc_state, PREC_PAL_DATA(pipe), + ilk_lut_10(&lut[i])); /* * Reset the index, otherwise it prevents the legacy palette to be @@ -1612,16 +1623,16 @@ static void glk_load_degamma_lut(const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state, * ToDo: Extend to max 7.0. Enable 32 bit input value * as compared to just 16 to achieve this. */ - ilk_lut_write(crtc_state, PRE_CSC_GAMC_DATA(pipe), - DISPLAY_VER(display) >= 14 ? - mtl_degamma_lut(&lut[i]) : glk_degamma_lut(&lut[i])); + ilk_lut_write_indexed(crtc_state, PRE_CSC_GAMC_DATA(pipe), + DISPLAY_VER(display) >= 14 ? + mtl_degamma_lut(&lut[i]) : glk_degamma_lut(&lut[i])); } /* Clamp values > 1.0. */ while (i++ < glk_degamma_lut_size(display)) - ilk_lut_write(crtc_state, PRE_CSC_GAMC_DATA(pipe), - DISPLAY_VER(display) >= 14 ? - 1 << 24 : 1 << 16); + ilk_lut_write_indexed(crtc_state, PRE_CSC_GAMC_DATA(pipe), + DISPLAY_VER(display) >= 14 ? + 1 << 24 : 1 << 16); ilk_lut_write(crtc_state, PRE_CSC_GAMC_INDEX(pipe), 0); } @@ -1687,10 +1698,10 @@ icl_program_gamma_superfine_segment(const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state) for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) { const struct drm_color_lut *entry = &lut[i]; - ilk_lut_write(crtc_state, PREC_PAL_MULTI_SEG_DATA(pipe), - ilk_lut_12p4_ldw(entry)); - ilk_lut_write(crtc_state, PREC_PAL_MULTI_SEG_DATA(pipe), - ilk_lut_12p4_udw(entry)); + ilk_lut_write_indexed(crtc_state, PREC_PAL_MULTI_SEG_DATA(pipe), + ilk_lut_12p4_ldw(entry)); + ilk_lut_write_indexed(crtc_state, PREC_PAL_MULTI_SEG_DATA(pipe), + ilk_lut_12p4_udw(entry)); } ilk_lut_write(crtc_state, PREC_PAL_MULTI_SEG_INDEX(pipe), @@ -1726,10 +1737,10 @@ icl_program_gamma_multi_segment(const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state) for (i = 1; i < 257; i++) { entry = &lut[i * 8]; - ilk_lut_write(crtc_state, PREC_PAL_DATA(pipe), - ilk_lut_12p4_ldw(entry)); - ilk_lut_write(crtc_state, PREC_PAL_DATA(pipe), - ilk_lut_12p4_udw(entry)); + ilk_lut_write_indexed(crtc_state, PREC_PAL_DATA(pipe), + ilk_lut_12p4_ldw(entry)); + ilk_lut_write_indexed(crtc_state, PREC_PAL_DATA(pipe), + ilk_lut_12p4_udw(entry)); } /* @@ -1747,10 +1758,10 @@ icl_program_gamma_multi_segment(const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state) for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { entry = &lut[i * 8 * 128]; - ilk_lut_write(crtc_state, PREC_PAL_DATA(pipe), - ilk_lut_12p4_ldw(entry)); - ilk_lut_write(crtc_state, PREC_PAL_DATA(pipe), - ilk_lut_12p4_udw(entry)); + ilk_lut_write_indexed(crtc_state, PREC_PAL_DATA(pipe), + ilk_lut_12p4_ldw(entry)); + ilk_lut_write_indexed(crtc_state, PREC_PAL_DATA(pipe), + ilk_lut_12p4_udw(entry)); } ilk_lut_write(crtc_state, PREC_PAL_INDEX(pipe), diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dsb.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dsb.c index b7b44399adaa..4d3785f5cb52 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dsb.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dsb.c @@ -273,16 +273,20 @@ static bool intel_dsb_prev_ins_is_indexed_write(struct intel_dsb *dsb, i915_reg_ } /** - * intel_dsb_reg_write() - Emit register wriite to the DSB context + * intel_dsb_reg_write_indexed() - Emit register wriite to the DSB context * @dsb: DSB context * @reg: register address. * @val: value. * * This function is used for writing register-value pair in command * buffer of DSB. + * + * Note that indexed writes are slower than normal MMIO writes + * for a small number (less than 5 or so) of writes to the same + * register. */ -void intel_dsb_reg_write(struct intel_dsb *dsb, - i915_reg_t reg, u32 val) +void intel_dsb_reg_write_indexed(struct intel_dsb *dsb, + i915_reg_t reg, u32 val) { /* * For example the buffer will look like below for 3 dwords for auto @@ -340,6 +344,15 @@ void intel_dsb_reg_write(struct intel_dsb *dsb, } } +void intel_dsb_reg_write(struct intel_dsb *dsb, + i915_reg_t reg, u32 val) +{ + intel_dsb_emit(dsb, val, + (DSB_OPCODE_MMIO_WRITE << DSB_OPCODE_SHIFT) | + (DSB_BYTE_EN << DSB_BYTE_EN_SHIFT) | + i915_mmio_reg_offset(reg)); +} + static u32 intel_dsb_mask_to_byte_en(u32 mask) { return (!!(mask & 0xff000000) << 3 | diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dsb.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dsb.h index 33e0fc2ab380..da6df07a3c83 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dsb.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dsb.h @@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ void intel_dsb_finish(struct intel_dsb *dsb); void intel_dsb_cleanup(struct intel_dsb *dsb); void intel_dsb_reg_write(struct intel_dsb *dsb, i915_reg_t reg, u32 val); +void intel_dsb_reg_write_indexed(struct intel_dsb *dsb, + i915_reg_t reg, u32 val); void intel_dsb_reg_write_masked(struct intel_dsb *dsb, i915_reg_t reg, u32 mask, u32 val); void intel_dsb_noop(struct intel_dsb *dsb, int count); -- 2.45.2

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[PATCH 3/9] serial: sh-sci: Clean sci_ports[0] after at earlycon exit

by Claudiu

From: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea.uj(a)bp.renesas.com> The early_console_setup() function initializes the sci_ports[0].port with an object of type struct uart_port obtained from the object of type struct earlycon_device received as argument by the early_console_setup(). It may happen that later, when the rest of the serial ports are probed, the serial port that was used as earlycon (e.g., port A) to be mapped to a different position in sci_ports[] and the slot 0 to be used by a different serial port (e.g., port B), as follows: sci_ports[0] = port A sci_ports[X] = port B In this case, the new port mapped at index zero will have associated data that was used for earlycon. In case this happens, after Linux boot, any access to the serial port that maps on sci_ports[0] (port A) will block the serial port that was used as earlycon (port B). To fix this, add early_console_exit() that clean the sci_ports[0] at earlycon exit time. Fixes: 0b0cced19ab1 ("serial: sh-sci: Add CONFIG_SERIAL_EARLYCON support") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea.uj(a)bp.renesas.com> --- drivers/tty/serial/sh-sci.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/sh-sci.c b/drivers/tty/serial/sh-sci.c index 8e2d534401fa..2f8188bdb251 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/sh-sci.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/sh-sci.c @@ -3546,6 +3546,32 @@ sh_early_platform_init_buffer("earlyprintk", &sci_driver, #ifdef CONFIG_SERIAL_SH_SCI_EARLYCON static struct plat_sci_port port_cfg __initdata; +static int early_console_exit(struct console *co) +{ + struct sci_port *sci_port = &sci_ports[0]; + struct uart_port *port = &sci_port->port; + unsigned long flags; + int locked = 1; + + if (port->sysrq) + locked = 0; + else if (oops_in_progress) + locked = uart_port_trylock_irqsave(port, &flags); + else + uart_port_lock_irqsave(port, &flags); + + /* + * Clean the slot used by earlycon. A new SCI device might + * map to this slot. + */ + memset(sci_ports, 0, sizeof(*sci_port)); + + if (locked) + uart_port_unlock_irqrestore(port, flags); + + return 0; +} + static int __init early_console_setup(struct earlycon_device *device, int type) { @@ -3562,6 +3588,8 @@ static int __init early_console_setup(struct earlycon_device *device, SCSCR_RE | SCSCR_TE | port_cfg.scscr); device->con->write = serial_console_write; + device->con->exit = early_console_exit; + return 0; } static int __init sci_early_console_setup(struct earlycon_device *device, -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH 6.1 1/1] scsi: lpfc: Validate hdwq pointers before dereferencing in reset/errata paths

by Xiangyu Chen

From: Justin Tee <justin.tee(a)broadcom.com> [ Upstream commit 2be1d4f11944cd6283cb97268b3e17c4424945ca ] When the HBA is undergoing a reset or is handling an errata event, NULL ptr dereference crashes may occur in routines such as lpfc_sli_flush_io_rings(), lpfc_dev_loss_tmo_callbk(), or lpfc_abort_handler(). Add NULL ptr checks before dereferencing hdwq pointers that may have been freed due to operations colliding with a reset or errata event handler. Signed-off-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee(a)broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240726231512.92867-4-justintee8345@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> [Xiangyu: BP to fix CVE: CVE-2024-49891, no test_bit() conflict resolution] Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen(a)windriver.com> --- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hbadisc.c | 3 ++- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_scsi.c | 13 +++++++++++-- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli.c | 11 +++++++++++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hbadisc.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hbadisc.c index aaa98a006fdc..d3a5f10b8b83 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hbadisc.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hbadisc.c @@ -177,7 +177,8 @@ lpfc_dev_loss_tmo_callbk(struct fc_rport *rport) /* Don't schedule a worker thread event if the vport is going down. * The teardown process cleans up the node via lpfc_drop_node. */ - if (vport->load_flag & FC_UNLOADING) { + if ((vport->load_flag & FC_UNLOADING) || + !(phba->hba_flag & HBA_SETUP)) { ((struct lpfc_rport_data *)rport->dd_data)->pnode = NULL; ndlp->rport = NULL; diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_scsi.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_scsi.c index 2a81a42de5c1..ed32aa01c711 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_scsi.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_scsi.c @@ -5554,11 +5554,20 @@ lpfc_abort_handler(struct scsi_cmnd *cmnd) iocb = &lpfc_cmd->cur_iocbq; if (phba->sli_rev == LPFC_SLI_REV4) { - pring_s4 = phba->sli4_hba.hdwq[iocb->hba_wqidx].io_wq->pring; - if (!pring_s4) { + /* if the io_wq & pring are gone, the port was reset. */ + if (!phba->sli4_hba.hdwq[iocb->hba_wqidx].io_wq || + !phba->sli4_hba.hdwq[iocb->hba_wqidx].io_wq->pring) { + lpfc_printf_vlog(vport, KERN_WARNING, LOG_FCP, + "2877 SCSI Layer I/O Abort Request " + "IO CMPL Status x%x ID %d LUN %llu " + "HBA_SETUP %d\n", FAILED, + cmnd->device->id, + (u64)cmnd->device->lun, + (HBA_SETUP & phba->hba_flag)); ret = FAILED; goto out_unlock_hba; } + pring_s4 = phba->sli4_hba.hdwq[iocb->hba_wqidx].io_wq->pring; spin_lock(&pring_s4->ring_lock); } /* the command is in process of being cancelled */ diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli.c index 587e3c2f7c48..1e04b6fc127a 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli.c @@ -4668,6 +4668,17 @@ lpfc_sli_flush_io_rings(struct lpfc_hba *phba) /* Look on all the FCP Rings for the iotag */ if (phba->sli_rev >= LPFC_SLI_REV4) { for (i = 0; i < phba->cfg_hdw_queue; i++) { + if (!phba->sli4_hba.hdwq || + !phba->sli4_hba.hdwq[i].io_wq) { + lpfc_printf_log(phba, KERN_ERR, LOG_SLI, + "7777 hdwq's deleted %lx " + "%lx %x %x\n", + (unsigned long)phba->pport->load_flag, + (unsigned long)phba->hba_flag, + phba->link_state, + phba->sli.sli_flag); + return; + } pring = phba->sli4_hba.hdwq[i].io_wq->pring; spin_lock_irq(&pring->ring_lock); -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH 6.6] dm: fix a crash if blk_alloc_disk fails

by Bin Lan

From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> [ Upstream commit fed13a5478680614ba97fc87e71f16e2e197912e ] If blk_alloc_disk fails, the variable md->disk is set to an error value. cleanup_mapped_device will see that md->disk is non-NULL and it will attempt to access it, causing a crash on this statement "md->disk->private_data = NULL;". Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> Reported-by: Chenyuan Yang <chenyuan0y(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://marc.info/?l=dm-devel&m=172824125004329&w=2 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Nitesh Shetty <nj.shetty(a)samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Bin Lan <bin.lan.cn(a)windriver.com> --- drivers/md/dm.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm.c b/drivers/md/dm.c index 5dd0a42463a2..f45427291ea6 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm.c @@ -2077,8 +2077,10 @@ static struct mapped_device *alloc_dev(int minor) * override accordingly. */ md->disk = blk_alloc_disk(md->numa_node_id); - if (!md->disk) + if (!md->disk){ + md->disk = NULL; goto bad; + } md->queue = md->disk->queue; init_waitqueue_head(&md->wait); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH 6.1.y] rcu-tasks: Fix access non-existent percpu rtpcp variable in rcu_tasks_need_gpcb()

by Xiangyu Chen

From: Zqiang <qiang.zhang1211(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit fd70e9f1d85f5323096ad313ba73f5fe3d15ea41 ] For kernels built with CONFIG_FORCE_NR_CPUS=y, the nr_cpu_ids is defined as NR_CPUS instead of the number of possible cpus, this will cause the following system panic: smpboot: Allowing 4 CPUs, 0 hotplug CPUs ... setup_percpu: NR_CPUS:512 nr_cpumask_bits:512 nr_cpu_ids:512 nr_node_ids:1 ... BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff9911c8c8 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 15 Comm: rcu_tasks_trace Tainted: G W 6.6.21 #1 5dc7acf91a5e8e9ac9dcfc35bee0245691283ea6 RIP: 0010:rcu_tasks_need_gpcb+0x25d/0x2c0 RSP: 0018:ffffa371c00a3e60 EFLAGS: 00010082 CR2: ffffffff9911c8c8 CR3: 000000040fa20005 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x23/0x80 ? page_fault_oops+0xa4/0x180 ? exc_page_fault+0x152/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x40 ? rcu_tasks_need_gpcb+0x25d/0x2c0 ? __pfx_rcu_tasks_kthread+0x40/0x40 rcu_tasks_one_gp+0x69/0x180 rcu_tasks_kthread+0x94/0xc0 kthread+0xe8/0x140 ? __pfx_kthread+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x80 ? __pfx_kthread+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x80 </TASK> Considering that there may be holes in the CPU numbers, use the maximum possible cpu number, instead of nr_cpu_ids, for configuring enqueue and dequeue limits. [ neeraj.upadhyay: Fix htmldocs build error reported by Stephen Rothwell ] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-input/CALMA0xaTSMN+p4xUXkzrtR5r6k7hgoswcaXx7b… Reported-by: Zhixu Liu <zhixu.liu(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Zqiang <qiang.zhang1211(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraj.upadhyay(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> [Xiangyu: BP to fix CVE:CVE-2024-49926, minor conflict resolution] Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen(a)windriver.com> --- kernel/rcu/tasks.h | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tasks.h b/kernel/rcu/tasks.h index bb6b037ef30f..46b207eac171 100644 --- a/kernel/rcu/tasks.h +++ b/kernel/rcu/tasks.h @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ typedef void (*postgp_func_t)(struct rcu_tasks *rtp); * @barrier_q_head: RCU callback for barrier operation. * @rtp_blkd_tasks: List of tasks blocked as readers. * @cpu: CPU number corresponding to this entry. + * @index: Index of this CPU in rtpcp_array of the rcu_tasks structure. * @rtpp: Pointer to the rcu_tasks structure. */ struct rcu_tasks_percpu { @@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ struct rcu_tasks_percpu { struct rcu_head barrier_q_head; struct list_head rtp_blkd_tasks; int cpu; + int index; struct rcu_tasks *rtpp; }; @@ -68,6 +70,7 @@ struct rcu_tasks_percpu { * @postgp_func: This flavor's post-grace-period function (optional). * @call_func: This flavor's call_rcu()-equivalent function. * @rtpcpu: This flavor's rcu_tasks_percpu structure. + * @rtpcp_array: Array of pointers to rcu_tasks_percpu structure of CPUs in cpu_possible_mask. * @percpu_enqueue_shift: Shift down CPU ID this much when enqueuing callbacks. * @percpu_enqueue_lim: Number of per-CPU callback queues in use for enqueuing. * @percpu_dequeue_lim: Number of per-CPU callback queues in use for dequeuing. @@ -100,6 +103,7 @@ struct rcu_tasks { postgp_func_t postgp_func; call_rcu_func_t call_func; struct rcu_tasks_percpu __percpu *rtpcpu; + struct rcu_tasks_percpu **rtpcp_array; int percpu_enqueue_shift; int percpu_enqueue_lim; int percpu_dequeue_lim; @@ -164,6 +168,8 @@ module_param(rcu_task_contend_lim, int, 0444); static int rcu_task_collapse_lim __read_mostly = 10; module_param(rcu_task_collapse_lim, int, 0444); +static int rcu_task_cpu_ids; + /* RCU tasks grace-period state for debugging. */ #define RTGS_INIT 0 #define RTGS_WAIT_WAIT_CBS 1 @@ -228,6 +234,8 @@ static void cblist_init_generic(struct rcu_tasks *rtp) unsigned long flags; int lim; int shift; + int maxcpu; + int index = 0; raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&rtp->cbs_gbl_lock, flags); if (rcu_task_enqueue_lim < 0) { @@ -238,14 +246,9 @@ static void cblist_init_generic(struct rcu_tasks *rtp) } lim = rcu_task_enqueue_lim; - if (lim > nr_cpu_ids) - lim = nr_cpu_ids; - shift = ilog2(nr_cpu_ids / lim); - if (((nr_cpu_ids - 1) >> shift) >= lim) - shift++; - WRITE_ONCE(rtp->percpu_enqueue_shift, shift); - WRITE_ONCE(rtp->percpu_dequeue_lim, lim); - smp_store_release(&rtp->percpu_enqueue_lim, lim); + rtp->rtpcp_array = kcalloc(num_possible_cpus(), sizeof(struct rcu_tasks_percpu *), GFP_KERNEL); + BUG_ON(!rtp->rtpcp_array); + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { struct rcu_tasks_percpu *rtpcp = per_cpu_ptr(rtp->rtpcpu, cpu); @@ -258,16 +261,33 @@ static void cblist_init_generic(struct rcu_tasks *rtp) INIT_WORK(&rtpcp->rtp_work, rcu_tasks_invoke_cbs_wq); rtpcp->cpu = cpu; rtpcp->rtpp = rtp; + rtpcp->index = index; + rtp->rtpcp_array[index] = rtpcp; + index++; if (!rtpcp->rtp_blkd_tasks.next) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rtpcp->rtp_blkd_tasks); raw_spin_unlock_rcu_node(rtpcp); // irqs remain disabled. + maxcpu = cpu; } raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rtp->cbs_gbl_lock, flags); if (rcu_task_cb_adjust) pr_info("%s: Setting adjustable number of callback queues.\n", __func__); - pr_info("%s: Setting shift to %d and lim to %d.\n", __func__, data_race(rtp->percpu_enqueue_shift), data_race(rtp->percpu_enqueue_lim)); + rcu_task_cpu_ids = maxcpu + 1; + if (lim > rcu_task_cpu_ids) + lim = rcu_task_cpu_ids; + shift = ilog2(rcu_task_cpu_ids / lim); + if (((rcu_task_cpu_ids - 1) >> shift) >= lim) + shift++; + WRITE_ONCE(rtp->percpu_enqueue_shift, shift); + WRITE_ONCE(rtp->percpu_dequeue_lim, lim); + smp_store_release(&rtp->percpu_enqueue_lim, lim); + + pr_info("%s: Setting shift to %d and lim to %d rcu_task_cb_adjust=%d rcu_task_cpu_ids=%d.\n", + rtp->name, data_race(rtp->percpu_enqueue_shift), data_race(rtp->percpu_enqueue_lim), + rcu_task_cb_adjust, rcu_task_cpu_ids); + } // IRQ-work handler that does deferred wakeup for call_rcu_tasks_generic(). @@ -307,7 +327,7 @@ static void call_rcu_tasks_generic(struct rcu_head *rhp, rcu_callback_t func, rtpcp->rtp_n_lock_retries = 0; } if (rcu_task_cb_adjust && ++rtpcp->rtp_n_lock_retries > rcu_task_contend_lim && - READ_ONCE(rtp->percpu_enqueue_lim) != nr_cpu_ids) + READ_ONCE(rtp->percpu_enqueue_lim) != rcu_task_cpu_ids) needadjust = true; // Defer adjustment to avoid deadlock. } if (!rcu_segcblist_is_enabled(&rtpcp->cblist)) { @@ -320,10 +340,10 @@ static void call_rcu_tasks_generic(struct rcu_head *rhp, rcu_callback_t func, raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore_rcu_node(rtpcp, flags); if (unlikely(needadjust)) { raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&rtp->cbs_gbl_lock, flags); - if (rtp->percpu_enqueue_lim != nr_cpu_ids) { + if (rtp->percpu_enqueue_lim != rcu_task_cpu_ids) { WRITE_ONCE(rtp->percpu_enqueue_shift, 0); - WRITE_ONCE(rtp->percpu_dequeue_lim, nr_cpu_ids); - smp_store_release(&rtp->percpu_enqueue_lim, nr_cpu_ids); + WRITE_ONCE(rtp->percpu_dequeue_lim, rcu_task_cpu_ids); + smp_store_release(&rtp->percpu_enqueue_lim, rcu_task_cpu_ids); pr_info("Switching %s to per-CPU callback queuing.\n", rtp->name); } raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rtp->cbs_gbl_lock, flags); @@ -394,6 +414,8 @@ static int rcu_tasks_need_gpcb(struct rcu_tasks *rtp) int needgpcb = 0; for (cpu = 0; cpu < smp_load_acquire(&rtp->percpu_dequeue_lim); cpu++) { + if (!cpu_possible(cpu)) + continue; struct rcu_tasks_percpu *rtpcp = per_cpu_ptr(rtp->rtpcpu, cpu); /* Advance and accelerate any new callbacks. */ @@ -426,7 +448,7 @@ static int rcu_tasks_need_gpcb(struct rcu_tasks *rtp) if (rcu_task_cb_adjust && ncbs <= rcu_task_collapse_lim) { raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&rtp->cbs_gbl_lock, flags); if (rtp->percpu_enqueue_lim > 1) { - WRITE_ONCE(rtp->percpu_enqueue_shift, order_base_2(nr_cpu_ids)); + WRITE_ONCE(rtp->percpu_enqueue_shift, order_base_2(rcu_task_cpu_ids)); smp_store_release(&rtp->percpu_enqueue_lim, 1); rtp->percpu_dequeue_gpseq = get_state_synchronize_rcu(); gpdone = false; @@ -441,7 +463,9 @@ static int rcu_tasks_need_gpcb(struct rcu_tasks *rtp) pr_info("Completing switch %s to CPU-0 callback queuing.\n", rtp->name); } if (rtp->percpu_dequeue_lim == 1) { - for (cpu = rtp->percpu_dequeue_lim; cpu < nr_cpu_ids; cpu++) { + for (cpu = rtp->percpu_dequeue_lim; cpu < rcu_task_cpu_ids; cpu++) { + if (!cpu_possible(cpu)) + continue; struct rcu_tasks_percpu *rtpcp = per_cpu_ptr(rtp->rtpcpu, cpu); WARN_ON_ONCE(rcu_segcblist_n_cbs(&rtpcp->cblist)); @@ -456,30 +480,32 @@ static int rcu_tasks_need_gpcb(struct rcu_tasks *rtp) // Advance callbacks and invoke any that are ready. static void rcu_tasks_invoke_cbs(struct rcu_tasks *rtp, struct rcu_tasks_percpu *rtpcp) { - int cpu; - int cpunext; int cpuwq; unsigned long flags; int len; + int index; struct rcu_head *rhp; struct rcu_cblist rcl = RCU_CBLIST_INITIALIZER(rcl); struct rcu_tasks_percpu *rtpcp_next; - cpu = rtpcp->cpu; - cpunext = cpu * 2 + 1; - if (cpunext < smp_load_acquire(&rtp->percpu_dequeue_lim)) { - rtpcp_next = per_cpu_ptr(rtp->rtpcpu, cpunext); - cpuwq = rcu_cpu_beenfullyonline(cpunext) ? cpunext : WORK_CPU_UNBOUND; - queue_work_on(cpuwq, system_wq, &rtpcp_next->rtp_work); - cpunext++; - if (cpunext < smp_load_acquire(&rtp->percpu_dequeue_lim)) { - rtpcp_next = per_cpu_ptr(rtp->rtpcpu, cpunext); - cpuwq = rcu_cpu_beenfullyonline(cpunext) ? cpunext : WORK_CPU_UNBOUND; + index = rtpcp->index * 2 + 1; + if (index < num_possible_cpus()) { + rtpcp_next = rtp->rtpcp_array[index]; + if (rtpcp_next->cpu < smp_load_acquire(&rtp->percpu_dequeue_lim)) { + cpuwq = rcu_cpu_beenfullyonline(rtpcp_next->cpu) ? rtpcp_next->cpu : WORK_CPU_UNBOUND; queue_work_on(cpuwq, system_wq, &rtpcp_next->rtp_work); + index++; + if (index < num_possible_cpus()) { + rtpcp_next = rtp->rtpcp_array[index]; + if (rtpcp_next->cpu < smp_load_acquire(&rtp->percpu_dequeue_lim)) { + cpuwq = rcu_cpu_beenfullyonline(rtpcp_next->cpu) ? rtpcp_next->cpu : WORK_CPU_UNBOUND; + queue_work_on(cpuwq, system_wq, &rtpcp_next->rtp_work); + } + } } } - if (rcu_segcblist_empty(&rtpcp->cblist) || !cpu_possible(cpu)) + if (rcu_segcblist_empty(&rtpcp->cblist)) return; raw_spin_lock_irqsave_rcu_node(rtpcp, flags); rcu_segcblist_advance(&rtpcp->cblist, rcu_seq_current(&rtp->tasks_gp_seq)); -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH 6.6] xfs: add bounds checking to xlog_recover_process_data

by Bin Lan

From: lei lu <llfamsec(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit fb63435b7c7dc112b1ae1baea5486e0a6e27b196 ] There is a lack of verification of the space occupied by fixed members of xlog_op_header in the xlog_recover_process_data. We can create a crafted image to trigger an out of bounds read by following these steps: 1) Mount an image of xfs, and do some file operations to leave records 2) Before umounting, copy the image for subsequent steps to simulate abnormal exit. Because umount will ensure that tail_blk and head_blk are the same, which will result in the inability to enter xlog_recover_process_data 3) Write a tool to parse and modify the copied image in step 2 4) Make the end of the xlog_op_header entries only 1 byte away from xlog_rec_header->h_size 5) xlog_rec_header->h_num_logops++ 6) Modify xlog_rec_header->h_crc Fix: Add a check to make sure there is sufficient space to access fixed members of xlog_op_header. Signed-off-by: lei lu <llfamsec(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Bin Lan <bin.lan.cn(a)windriver.com> --- fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c index 9f9d3abad2cf..d11de0fa5c5f 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c @@ -2456,7 +2456,10 @@ xlog_recover_process_data( ohead = (struct xlog_op_header *)dp; dp += sizeof(*ohead); - ASSERT(dp <= end); + if (dp > end) { + xfs_warn(log->l_mp, "%s: op header overrun", __func__); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } /* errors will abort recovery */ error = xlog_recover_process_ophdr(log, rhash, rhead, ohead, -- 2.34.1

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Linux-stable-mirror November 2024