October 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

Re: [PATCH 5.15 000/691] 5.15.168-rc1 review

by Richard Narron

Builds and runs fine on x86_64 and x86 (Slackware 15.0) Richard Narron

8 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH v6 4/5] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session()

by Jarkko Sakkinen

Move allocation of chip->auth to tpm2_start_auth_session() so that the field can be used as flag to tell whether auth session is active or not. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- v5: - No changes. v4: - Change to bug. v3: - No changes. v2: - A new patch. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 9ffd3da35d21..78d344607b53 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -484,7 +484,8 @@ static void tpm2_KDFe(u8 z[EC_PT_SZ], const char *str, u8 *pt_u, u8 *pt_v, sha256_final(&sctx, out); } -static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) +static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct tpm2_auth *auth) { struct crypto_kpp *kpp; struct kpp_request *req; @@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) sg_set_buf(&s[0], chip->null_ec_key_x, EC_PT_SZ); sg_set_buf(&s[1], chip->null_ec_key_y, EC_PT_SZ); kpp_request_set_input(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2); - sg_init_one(d, chip->auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ); + sg_init_one(d, auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ); kpp_request_set_output(req, d, EC_PT_SZ); crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req); kpp_request_free(req); @@ -554,8 +555,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) * This works because KDFe fully consumes the secret before it * writes the salt */ - tpm2_KDFe(chip->auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, - chip->auth->salt); + tpm2_KDFe(auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, auth->salt); out: crypto_free_kpp(kpp); @@ -854,6 +854,8 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, /* manually close the session if it wasn't consumed */ tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); + kfree(auth); + chip->auth = NULL; } else { /* reset for next use */ auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; @@ -882,6 +884,8 @@ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); + kfree(auth); + chip->auth = NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session); @@ -970,25 +974,29 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) */ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { + struct tpm2_auth *auth; struct tpm_buf buf; - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; - int rc; u32 null_key; + int rc; - if (!auth) { - dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is not active\n"); + if (chip->auth) { + dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is active\n"); return 0; } + auth = kzalloc(sizeof(*auth), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!auth) + return -ENOMEM; + rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key); if (rc) - goto out; + goto err; auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS); if (rc) - goto out; + goto err; /* salt key handle */ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, null_key); @@ -1000,7 +1008,7 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_append(&buf, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce)); /* append encrypted salt and squirrel away unencrypted in auth */ - tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip); + tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip, auth); /* session type (HMAC, audit or policy) */ tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_SE_HMAC); @@ -1021,10 +1029,13 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - if (rc) - goto out; + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) { + chip->auth = auth; + return 0; + } - out: +err: + kfree(auth); return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_start_auth_session); @@ -1375,10 +1386,6 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) if (rc) return rc; - chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->auth) - return -ENOMEM; - return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_sessions_init); -- 2.47.0

8 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH v6 3/5] tpm: flush the null key only when /dev/tpm0 is accessed

by Jarkko Sakkinen

Instead of flushing and reloading the null key for every single auth session, flush it only when: 1. User space needs to access /dev/tpm{rm}0. 2. When going to sleep. 3. When unregistering the chip. This removes the need to load and swap the null key between TPM and regular memory per transaction, when the user space is not using the chip. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: d2add27cf2b8 ("tpm: Add NULL primary creation") Tested-by: Pengyu Ma <mapengyu(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- v5: - No changes. v4: - Changed to bug fix as not having the patch there is a major hit to bootup times. v3: - Unchanged. v2: - Refined the commit message. - Added tested-by from Pengyu Ma <mapengyu(a)gmail.com>. - Removed spurious pr_info() statement. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 13 +++++++++++++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 7 +++++++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 9 +++++++-- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 3 +++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- include/linux/tpm.h | 2 ++ 6 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 854546000c92..0ea00e32f575 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -674,6 +674,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_chip_register); */ void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip) { +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + int rc; + + rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); + if (!rc) { + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { + tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->null_key); + chip->null_key = 0; + } + tpm_put_ops(chip); + } +#endif + tpm_del_legacy_sysfs(chip); if (tpm_is_hwrng_enabled(chip)) hwrng_unregister(&chip->hwrng); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c index c3fbbf4d3db7..4bc07963e260 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c @@ -27,6 +27,13 @@ static ssize_t tpm_dev_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, struct tpm_header *header = (void *)buf; ssize_t ret, len; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { + tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->null_key); + chip->null_key = 0; + } +#endif + ret = tpm2_prepare_space(chip, space, buf, bufsiz); /* If the command is not implemented by the TPM, synthesize a * response with a TPM2_RC_COMMAND_CODE return for user-space. diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c index 5da134f12c9a..bfa47d48b0f2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c @@ -379,10 +379,15 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev) rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); if (!rc) { - if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->null_key); + chip->null_key = 0; +#endif tpm2_shutdown(chip, TPM2_SU_STATE); - else + } else { rc = tpm1_pm_suspend(chip, tpm_suspend_pcr); + } tpm_put_ops(chip); } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 1e856259219e..aba024cbe7c5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -364,6 +364,9 @@ void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle) struct tpm_buf buf; int rc; + if (!handle) + return; + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT); if (rc) { dev_warn(&chip->dev, "0x%08x was not flushed, out of memory\n", diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 1215c53f0ae7..9ffd3da35d21 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -920,11 +920,19 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) u32 tmp_null_key; int rc; + /* fast path */ + if (chip->null_key) { + *null_key = chip->null_key; + return 0; + } + rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset, &tmp_null_key); if (rc != -EINVAL) { - if (!rc) + if (!rc) { + chip->null_key = tmp_null_key; *null_key = tmp_null_key; + } goto err; } @@ -934,6 +942,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) /* Return the null key if the name has not been changed: */ if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0) { + chip->null_key = tmp_null_key; *null_key = tmp_null_key; return 0; } @@ -1006,7 +1015,6 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_SHA256); rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "start auth session"); - tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key); if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) rc = tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(auth, &buf); @@ -1338,7 +1346,10 @@ static int tpm2_create_null_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip) rc = tpm2_save_context(chip, null_key, chip->null_key_context, sizeof(chip->null_key_context), &offset); - tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key); + if (rc) + tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key); + else + chip->null_key = null_key; } return rc; diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 587b96b4418e..28a932aa0416 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -205,6 +205,8 @@ struct tpm_chip { #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC /* details for communication security via sessions */ + /* loaded null key */ + u32 null_key; /* saved context for NULL seed */ u8 null_key_context[TPM2_MAX_CONTEXT_SIZE]; /* name of NULL seed */ -- 2.47.0

8 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH v6 2/5] tpm: Implement tpm2_load_null() rollback

by Jarkko Sakkinen

tpm2_load_null() has weak and broken error handling: - The return value of tpm2_create_primary() is ignored. - Leaks TPM return codes from tpm2_load_context() to the caller. - If the key name comparison succeeds returns previous error instead of zero to the caller. Implement a proper error rollback. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: eb24c9788cd9 ("tpm: disable the TPM if NULL name changes") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- v6: - Address Stefan's remark: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/def4ec2d-584b-405f-9d5e-99267013c3c… v5: - Fix the TPM error code leak from tpm2_load_context(). v4: - No changes. v3: - Update log messages. Previously the log message incorrectly stated on load failure that integrity check had been failed, even tho the check is done *after* the load operation. v2: - Refined the commit message. - Reverted tpm2_create_primary() changes. They are not required if tmp_null_key is used as the parameter. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 253639767c1e..1215c53f0ae7 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -915,33 +915,36 @@ static int tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(struct tpm2_auth *auth, static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) { - int rc; unsigned int offset = 0; /* dummy offset for null seed context */ u8 name[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2]; + u32 tmp_null_key; + int rc; rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset, - null_key); - if (rc != -EINVAL) - return rc; + &tmp_null_key); + if (rc != -EINVAL) { + if (!rc) + *null_key = tmp_null_key; + goto err; + } - /* an integrity failure may mean the TPM has been reset */ - dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL key integrity failure!\n"); - /* check the null name against what we know */ - tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, NULL, name); - if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0) - /* name unchanged, assume transient integrity failure */ - return rc; - /* - * Fatal TPM failure: the NULL seed has actually changed, so - * the TPM must have been illegally reset. All in-kernel TPM - * operations will fail because the NULL primary can't be - * loaded to salt the sessions, but disable the TPM anyway so - * userspace programmes can't be compromised by it. - */ - dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL name has changed, disabling TPM due to interference\n"); + rc = tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, &tmp_null_key, name); + if (rc) + goto err; + + /* Return the null key if the name has not been changed: */ + if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0) { + *null_key = tmp_null_key; + return 0; + } + + /* Deduce from the name change TPM interference: */ + dev_err(&chip->dev, "the null key integrity check failedh\n"); + tpm2_flush_context(chip, tmp_null_key); chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_DISABLE; - return rc; +err: + return rc ? -ENODEV : 0; } /** -- 2.47.0

8 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH 0/6] arm64: probes: fixes and cleanup

by Mark Rutland

These patches address some issues I spotted while looking at kprobes and uprobes. Patch 1 is the most pressing, as a uprobes user can trigger a kernel BUG(). Patches 2 and 3 fix latent endianness bugs which only manifest on big-endian kernels, and patchs 4-6 clean things up so that it's harder to get this wrong again in future. Mark. Mark Rutland (6): arm64: probes: Remove broken LDR (literal) uprobe support arm64: probes: Fix simulate_ldr*_literal() arm64: probes: Fix uprobes for big-endian kernels arm64: probes: Move kprobes-specific fields arm64: probes: Cleanup kprobes endianness conversions arm64: probes: Remove probe_opcode_t arch/arm64/include/asm/probes.h | 11 +++---- arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h | 8 ++--- arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c | 22 ++++++++----- arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c | 39 ++++++++++++------------ arch/arm64/kernel/probes/simulate-insn.c | 18 +++++------ arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c | 8 ++--- 7 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) -- 2.30.2

8 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH] comedi: Flush partial mappings in error case

by Jann Horn

If some remap_pfn_range() calls succeeded before one failed, we still have buffer pages mapped into the userspace page tables when we drop the buffer reference with comedi_buf_map_put(bm). The userspace mappings are only cleaned up later in the mmap error path. Fix it by explicitly flushing all mappings in our VMA on the comedi_mmap() error path. See commit 79a61cc3fc04 ("mm: avoid leaving partial pfn mappings around in error case"). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: ed9eccbe8970 ("Staging: add comedi core") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> --- Note: compile-tested only; I don't actually have comedi hardware, and I don't know anything about comedi. --- drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c b/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c index 1b481731df96..0e573df8646f 100644 --- a/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c +++ b/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c @@ -2414,6 +2414,15 @@ static int comedi_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) vma->vm_private_data = bm; vma->vm_ops->open(vma); + } else { + /* + * Leaving behind a partial mapping of a buffer we're about to + * drop is unsafe, see remap_pfn_range_notrack(). + * We need to zap the range here ourselves instead of relying + * on the automatic zapping in remap_pfn_range() because we call + * remap_pfn_range() in a loop. + */ + zap_page_range_single(vma, vma->vm_start, size, NULL); } done: --- base-commit: 6485cf5ea253d40d507cd71253c9568c5470cd27 change-id: 20241014-comedi-tlb-400246505961 -- Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>

8 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH 1/4] efi/libstub: Free correct pointer on failure

by Ard Biesheuvel

From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> cmdline_ptr is an out parameter, which is not allocated by the function itself, and likely points into the caller's stack. cmdline refers to the pool allocation that should be freed when cleaning up after a failure, so pass this instead to free_pool(). Fixes: 42c8ea3dca09 ("efi: libstub: Factor out EFI stub entrypoint ...") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c index f09e277ba210..fc71dcab43e0 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_handle_cmdline(efi_loaded_image_t *image, char **cmdline_ptr) return EFI_SUCCESS; fail_free_cmdline: - efi_bs_call(free_pool, cmdline_ptr); + efi_bs_call(free_pool, cmdline); return status; } -- 2.47.0.rc1.288.g06298d1525-goog

8 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH net v2 0/2] mptcp: prevent MPC handshake on port-based signal endpoints

by Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)

MPTCP connection requests toward a listening socket created by the in-kernel PM for a port based signal endpoint will never be accepted, they need to be explicitly rejected. - Patch 1: Explicitly reject such requests. A fix for >= v5.12. - Patch 2: Cover this case in the MPTCP selftests to avoid regressions. Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - This new version fixes the root cause for the issue Cong Wang sent a patch for a few weeks ago, see the v1, and the explanations below. The new version is very different from the v1, from a different author. Thanks to Cong Wang for the first analysis, and to Paolo for having spot the root cause, and sent a fix for it. - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240908180620.822579-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com - Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a5289a0d-2557-40b8-9575-6f1a0bbf06e4@redhat.com --- Paolo Abeni (2): mptcp: prevent MPC handshake on port-based signal endpoints selftests: mptcp: join: test for prohibited MPC to port-based endp net/mptcp/mib.c | 1 + net/mptcp/mib.h | 1 + net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c | 1 + net/mptcp/protocol.h | 1 + net/mptcp/subflow.c | 11 +++ tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh | 117 +++++++++++++++++------- 6 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 174714f0e505070a16be6fbede30d32b81df789f change-id: 20241014-net-mptcp-mpc-port-endp-4f88bd428ec7 Best regards, -- Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org>

8 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH net v2 1/1] net: macb: Avoid 20s boot delay by skipping MDIO bus registration for fixed-link PHY

by Oleksij Rempel

A boot delay was introduced by commit 79540d133ed6 ("net: macb: Fix handling of fixed-link node"). This delay was caused by the call to `mdiobus_register()` in cases where a fixed-link PHY was present. The MDIO bus registration triggered unnecessary PHY address scans, leading to a 20-second delay due to attempts to detect Clause 45 (C45) compatible PHYs, despite no MDIO bus being attached. The commit 79540d133ed6 ("net: macb: Fix handling of fixed-link node") was originally introduced to fix a regression caused by commit 7897b071ac3b4 ("net: macb: convert to phylink"), which caused the driver to misinterpret fixed-link nodes as PHY nodes. This resulted in warnings like: mdio_bus f0028000.ethernet-ffffffff: fixed-link has invalid PHY address mdio_bus f0028000.ethernet-ffffffff: scan phy fixed-link at address 0 ... mdio_bus f0028000.ethernet-ffffffff: scan phy fixed-link at address 31 This patch reworks the logic to avoid registering and allocation of the MDIO bus when: - The device tree contains a fixed-link node. - There is no "mdio" child node in the device tree. If a child node named "mdio" exists, the MDIO bus will be registered to support PHYs attached to the MACB's MDIO bus. Otherwise, with only a fixed-link, the MDIO bus is skipped. Tested on a sama5d35 based system with a ksz8863 switch attached to macb0. Fixes: 79540d133ed6 ("net: macb: Fix handling of fixed-link node") Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel(a)pengutronix.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew(a)lunn.ch> --- changes v2: - s/some PHYs may be attached/some devices may be attached/ --- drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c index f06babec04a0b..56901280ba047 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c @@ -930,9 +930,6 @@ static int macb_mdiobus_register(struct macb *bp) return ret; } - if (of_phy_is_fixed_link(np)) - return mdiobus_register(bp->mii_bus); - /* Only create the PHY from the device tree if at least one PHY is * described. Otherwise scan the entire MDIO bus. We do this to support * old device tree that did not follow the best practices and did not @@ -953,8 +950,19 @@ static int macb_mdiobus_register(struct macb *bp) static int macb_mii_init(struct macb *bp) { + struct device_node *child, *np = bp->pdev->dev.of_node; int err = -ENXIO; + /* With fixed-link, we don't need to register the MDIO bus, + * except if we have a child named "mdio" in the device tree. + * In that case, some devices may be attached to the MACB's MDIO bus. + */ + child = of_get_child_by_name(np, "mdio"); + if (child) + of_node_put(child); + else if (of_phy_is_fixed_link(np)) + return macb_mii_probe(bp->dev); + /* Enable management port */ macb_writel(bp, NCR, MACB_BIT(MPE)); -- 2.39.5

8 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH] pstore: Fix uaf when backend is unregistered

by Zach Wade

when unload pstore_blk, we will unlink the pstore file and set pos->dentry to NULL, but simple_unlink(d_inode(root), pos->dentry) may free inode of pos->dentry and free pos by free_pstore_private, this may trigger uaf. kasan report: kernel: ================================================================== kernel: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pstore_put_backend_records+0x3a4/0x480 kernel: Write of size 8 at addr ffff8883efbe0390 by task modprobe/4308 kernel: kernel: CPU: 1 PID: 4308 Comm: modprobe Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.10.9-arch1-2 #2 5fd36c90225554e2cc88363729bd91e76130a89f kernel: Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/TUF GAMING X670E-PLUS, BIOS 3024 08/02/2024 kernel: Call Trace: kernel: <TASK> kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 kernel: print_report+0x174/0x505 kernel: ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 kernel: ? pstore_put_backend_records+0x3a4/0x480 kernel: kasan_report+0xd0/0x150 kernel: ? pstore_put_backend_records+0x3a4/0x480 kernel: pstore_put_backend_records+0x3a4/0x480 kernel: ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 kernel: pstore_unregister+0x88/0x1b0 kernel: unregister_pstore_zone+0x2f/0xd0 [pstore_zone 35171c701a99c31efe207b7a718dc583e4a6503a] kernel: pstore_blk_exit+0x30/0x90 [pstore_blk 589d82101219208d8968e3adda9b96a2d42df635] kernel: __do_sys_delete_module+0x350/0x560 kernel: ? __pfx___do_sys_delete_module+0x10/0x10 kernel: ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 kernel: ? __memcg_slab_free_hook+0x28e/0x470 kernel: ? __pfx___audit_syscall_exit+0x10/0x10 kernel: do_syscall_64+0x82/0x190 kernel: ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x190 kernel: ? seq_read_iter+0x62f/0x1220 kernel: ? __x64_sys_openat+0x300/0x380 kernel: ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 kernel: ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kernel: ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 kernel: ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 kernel: ? vfs_read+0x9a7/0xf00 kernel: ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 kernel: ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x38a/0x520 kernel: ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10 kernel: ? __pfx___audit_syscall_exit+0x10/0x10 kernel: ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 kernel: ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x38a/0x520 kernel: ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 kernel: ? __pfx___audit_syscall_exit+0x10/0x10 kernel: ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 kernel: ? __x64_sys_read+0x162/0x250 kernel: ? __pfx___x64_sys_read+0x10/0x10 kernel: ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x148/0x170 kernel: ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x73/0x1f0 kernel: ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x190 kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x73/0x1f0 kernel: ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 kernel: ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e kernel: RIP: 0033:0x741f9d72946b kernel: Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a5 c8 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 75 c8 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 kernel: RSP: 002b:00007ffed7e621f8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 kernel: RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00006455e060ed30 RCX: 0000741f9d72946b kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 00006455e060ed98 kernel: RBP: 00007ffed7e62220 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000 kernel: R10: 0000741f9d7a5fe0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000 kernel: R13: 00007ffed7e62250 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 kernel: </TASK> kernel: kernel: Allocated by task 3957: kernel: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kernel: kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kernel: __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 kernel: pstore_mkfile+0x47e/0xbe0 kernel: pstore_get_backend_records+0x560/0x920 kernel: pstore_get_records+0xec/0x180 kernel: pstore_register+0x1c3/0x5a0 kernel: register_pstore_zone.cold+0x298/0x3d1 [pstore_zone] kernel: pstore_blk_init+0x63c/0xff0 [pstore_blk] kernel: do_one_initcall+0xa4/0x380 kernel: do_init_module+0x28a/0x7c0 kernel: load_module+0x7b57/0xb020 kernel: init_module_from_file+0xdf/0x150 kernel: idempotent_init_module+0x23c/0x780 kernel: __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x130 kernel: do_syscall_64+0x82/0x190 kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e kernel: kernel: Freed by task 4308: kernel: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kernel: kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kernel: kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 kernel: __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x1b0 kernel: kfree+0x198/0x3b0 kernel: evict+0x33d/0xab0 kernel: __dentry_kill+0x17f/0x590 kernel: dput+0x2d9/0x810 kernel: simple_unlink+0xf4/0x140 kernel: pstore_put_backend_records+0x271/0x480 kernel: pstore_unregister+0x88/0x1b0 kernel: unregister_pstore_zone+0x2f/0xd0 [pstore_zone] kernel: pstore_blk_exit+0x30/0x90 [pstore_blk] kernel: __do_sys_delete_module+0x350/0x560 kernel: do_syscall_64+0x82/0x190 kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e kernel: kernel: The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8883efbe0380 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 kernel: The buggy address is located 16 bytes inside of freed 64-byte region [ffff8883efbe0380, ffff8883efbe03c0) kernel: kernel: The buggy address belongs to the physical page: kernel: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x3efbe0 kernel: memcg:ffff8883ef245801 kernel: flags: 0x2ffff8000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) kernel: page_type: 0xffffefff(slab) kernel: raw: 02ffff8000000000 ffff88810004c8c0 ffffea00043dcc40 dead000000000004 kernel: raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffefff ffff8883ef245801 kernel: page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected kernel: kernel: Memory state around the buggy address: kernel: ffff8883efbe0280: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc kernel: ffff8883efbe0300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc kernel: >ffff8883efbe0380: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc kernel: ^ kernel: ffff8883efbe0400: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc kernel: ffff8883efbe0480: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc kernel: ================================================================== kernel: Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint kernel: pstore: Unregistered pstore_blk as persistent store backend kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------ place the pos->dentry = NULL before simple_unlink(d_inode(root), pos->dentry) Fixes: 609e28bb139e ("pstore: Remove filesystem records when backend is unregistered") Signed-off-by: Li XingYang <lixingyang1(a)qq.com> Signed-off-by: Zach Wade <zachwade.k(a)gmail.com> --- fs/pstore/inode.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/pstore/inode.c b/fs/pstore/inode.c index 56815799ce79..7561693e0f32 100644 --- a/fs/pstore/inode.c +++ b/fs/pstore/inode.c @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ static struct dentry *psinfo_lock_root(void) int pstore_put_backend_records(struct pstore_info *psi) { struct pstore_private *pos, *tmp; - struct dentry *root; + struct dentry *root, *unlink_dentry; root = psinfo_lock_root(); if (!root) @@ -316,9 +316,10 @@ int pstore_put_backend_records(struct pstore_info *psi) list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, tmp, &records_list, list) { if (pos->record->psi == psi) { list_del_init(&pos->list); - d_invalidate(pos->dentry); - simple_unlink(d_inode(root), pos->dentry); + unlink_dentry = pos->dentry; pos->dentry = NULL; + d_invalidate(unlink_dentry); + simple_unlink(d_inode(root), unlink_dentry); } } } -- 2.46.2

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Linux-stable-mirror October 2024