October 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

+ fork-do-not-invoke-uffd-on-fork-if-error-occurs.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: fork: do not invoke uffd on fork if error occurs has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is fork-do-not-invoke-uffd-on-fork-if-error-occurs.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> Subject: fork: do not invoke uffd on fork if error occurs Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2024 18:56:05 +0100 Patch series "fork: do not expose incomplete mm on fork". During fork we may place the virtual memory address space into an inconsistent state before the fork operation is complete. In addition, we may encounter an error during the fork operation that indicates that the virtual memory address space is invalidated. As a result, we should not be exposing it in any way to external machinery that might interact with the mm or VMAs, machinery that is not designed to deal with incomplete state. We specifically update the fork logic to defer khugepaged and ksm to the end of the operation and only to be invoked if no error arose, and disallow uffd from observing fork events should an error have occurred. This patch (of 2): Currently on fork we expose the virtual address space of a process to userland unconditionally if uffd is registered in VMAs, regardless of whether an error arose in the fork. This is performed in dup_userfaultfd_complete() which is invoked unconditionally, and performs two duties - invoking registered handlers for the UFFD_EVENT_FORK event via dup_fctx(), and clearing down userfaultfd_fork_ctx objects established in dup_userfaultfd(). This is problematic, because the virtual address space may not yet be correctly initialised if an error arose. The change in commit d24062914837 ("fork: use __mt_dup() to duplicate maple tree in dup_mmap()") makes this more pertinent as we may be in a state where entries in the maple tree are not yet consistent. We address this by, on fork error, ensuring that we roll back state that we would otherwise expect to clean up through the event being handled by userland and perform the memory freeing duty otherwise performed by dup_userfaultfd_complete(). We do this by implementing a new function, dup_userfaultfd_fail(), which performs the same loop, only decrementing reference counts. Note that we perform mmgrab() on the parent and child mm's, however userfaultfd_ctx_put() will mmdrop() this once the reference count drops to zero, so we will avoid memory leaks correctly here. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1729014377.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d3691d58bb58712b6fb3df2be441d175bd3cdf07.17290143… Fixes: d24062914837 ("fork: use __mt_dup() to duplicate maple tree in dup_mmap()") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett(a)Oracle.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Cc: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/userfaultfd.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h | 5 +++++ kernel/fork.c | 5 ++++- 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c~fork-do-not-invoke-uffd-on-fork-if-error-occurs +++ a/fs/userfaultfd.c @@ -692,6 +692,34 @@ void dup_userfaultfd_complete(struct lis } } +void dup_userfaultfd_fail(struct list_head *fcs) +{ + struct userfaultfd_fork_ctx *fctx, *n; + + /* + * An error has occurred on fork, we will tear memory down, but have + * allocated memory for fctx's and raised reference counts for both the + * original and child contexts (and on the mm for each as a result). + * + * These would ordinarily be taken care of by a user handling the event, + * but we are no longer doing so, so manually clean up here. + * + * mm tear down will take care of cleaning up VMA contexts. + */ + list_for_each_entry_safe(fctx, n, fcs, list) { + struct userfaultfd_ctx *octx = fctx->orig; + struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx = fctx->new; + + atomic_dec(&octx->mmap_changing); + VM_BUG_ON(atomic_read(&octx->mmap_changing) < 0); + userfaultfd_ctx_put(octx); + userfaultfd_ctx_put(ctx); + + list_del(&fctx->list); + kfree(fctx); + } +} + void mremap_userfaultfd_prep(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx *vm_ctx) { --- a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h~fork-do-not-invoke-uffd-on-fork-if-error-occurs +++ a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h @@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ static inline bool vma_can_userfault(str extern int dup_userfaultfd(struct vm_area_struct *, struct list_head *); extern void dup_userfaultfd_complete(struct list_head *); +void dup_userfaultfd_fail(struct list_head *); extern void mremap_userfaultfd_prep(struct vm_area_struct *, struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx *); @@ -351,6 +352,10 @@ static inline void dup_userfaultfd_compl { } +static inline void dup_userfaultfd_fail(struct list_head *l) +{ +} + static inline void mremap_userfaultfd_prep(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx *ctx) { --- a/kernel/fork.c~fork-do-not-invoke-uffd-on-fork-if-error-occurs +++ a/kernel/fork.c @@ -775,7 +775,10 @@ out: mmap_write_unlock(mm); flush_tlb_mm(oldmm); mmap_write_unlock(oldmm); - dup_userfaultfd_complete(&uf); + if (!retval) + dup_userfaultfd_complete(&uf); + else + dup_userfaultfd_fail(&uf); fail_uprobe_end: uprobe_end_dup_mmap(); return retval; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com are mm-mmap-correct-error-handling-in-mmap_region.patch maple_tree-correct-tree-corruption-on-spanning-store.patch maple_tree-add-regression-test-for-spanning-store-bug.patch maintainers-add-memory-mapping-vma-co-maintainers.patch fork-do-not-invoke-uffd-on-fork-if-error-occurs.patch fork-only-invoke-khugepaged-ksm-hooks-if-no-error.patch selftests-mm-add-pkey_sighandler_xx-hugetlb_dio-to-gitignore.patch mm-refactor-mm_access-to-not-return-null.patch mm-refactor-mm_access-to-not-return-null-fix.patch mm-madvise-unrestrict-process_madvise-for-current-process.patch maple_tree-do-not-hash-pointers-on-dump-in-debug-mode.patch

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+ nilfs2-fix-kernel-bug-due-to-missing-clearing-of-buffer-delay-flag.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: nilfs2: fix kernel bug due to missing clearing of buffer delay flag has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is nilfs2-fix-kernel-bug-due-to-missing-clearing-of-buffer-delay-flag.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke(a)gmail.com> Subject: nilfs2: fix kernel bug due to missing clearing of buffer delay flag Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2024 06:32:07 +0900 Syzbot reported that after nilfs2 reads a corrupted file system image and degrades to read-only, the BUG_ON check for the buffer delay flag in submit_bh_wbc() may fail, causing a kernel bug. This is because the buffer delay flag is not cleared when clearing the buffer state flags to discard a page/folio or a buffer head. So, fix this. This became necessary when the use of nilfs2's own page clear routine was expanded. This state inconsistency does not occur if the buffer is written normally by log writing. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241015213300.7114-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Fixes: 8c26c4e2694a ("nilfs2: fix issue with flush kernel thread after remount in RO mode because of driver's internal error or metadata corruption") Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot+985ada84bf055a575c07(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=985ada84bf055a575c07 Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/nilfs2/page.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/fs/nilfs2/page.c~nilfs2-fix-kernel-bug-due-to-missing-clearing-of-buffer-delay-flag +++ a/fs/nilfs2/page.c @@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ void nilfs_forget_buffer(struct buffer_h const unsigned long clear_bits = (BIT(BH_Uptodate) | BIT(BH_Dirty) | BIT(BH_Mapped) | BIT(BH_Async_Write) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Volatile) | - BIT(BH_NILFS_Checked) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Redirected)); + BIT(BH_NILFS_Checked) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Redirected) | + BIT(BH_Delay)); lock_buffer(bh); set_mask_bits(&bh->b_state, clear_bits, 0); @@ -406,7 +407,8 @@ void nilfs_clear_folio_dirty(struct foli const unsigned long clear_bits = (BIT(BH_Uptodate) | BIT(BH_Dirty) | BIT(BH_Mapped) | BIT(BH_Async_Write) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Volatile) | - BIT(BH_NILFS_Checked) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Redirected)); + BIT(BH_NILFS_Checked) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Redirected) | + BIT(BH_Delay)); bh = head; do { _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from konishi.ryusuke(a)gmail.com are nilfs2-propagate-directory-read-errors-from-nilfs_find_entry.patch nilfs2-fix-kernel-bug-due-to-missing-clearing-of-buffer-delay-flag.patch

11 months

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Re: [PATCH 5.15 000/691] 5.15.168-rc1 review

by Richard Narron

Builds and runs fine on x86_64 and x86 (Slackware 15.0) Richard Narron

11 months

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[PATCH v6 4/5] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session()

by Jarkko Sakkinen

Move allocation of chip->auth to tpm2_start_auth_session() so that the field can be used as flag to tell whether auth session is active or not. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- v5: - No changes. v4: - Change to bug. v3: - No changes. v2: - A new patch. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 9ffd3da35d21..78d344607b53 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -484,7 +484,8 @@ static void tpm2_KDFe(u8 z[EC_PT_SZ], const char *str, u8 *pt_u, u8 *pt_v, sha256_final(&sctx, out); } -static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) +static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct tpm2_auth *auth) { struct crypto_kpp *kpp; struct kpp_request *req; @@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) sg_set_buf(&s[0], chip->null_ec_key_x, EC_PT_SZ); sg_set_buf(&s[1], chip->null_ec_key_y, EC_PT_SZ); kpp_request_set_input(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2); - sg_init_one(d, chip->auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ); + sg_init_one(d, auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ); kpp_request_set_output(req, d, EC_PT_SZ); crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req); kpp_request_free(req); @@ -554,8 +555,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) * This works because KDFe fully consumes the secret before it * writes the salt */ - tpm2_KDFe(chip->auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, - chip->auth->salt); + tpm2_KDFe(auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, auth->salt); out: crypto_free_kpp(kpp); @@ -854,6 +854,8 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, /* manually close the session if it wasn't consumed */ tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); + kfree(auth); + chip->auth = NULL; } else { /* reset for next use */ auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; @@ -882,6 +884,8 @@ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); + kfree(auth); + chip->auth = NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session); @@ -970,25 +974,29 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) */ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { + struct tpm2_auth *auth; struct tpm_buf buf; - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; - int rc; u32 null_key; + int rc; - if (!auth) { - dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is not active\n"); + if (chip->auth) { + dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is active\n"); return 0; } + auth = kzalloc(sizeof(*auth), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!auth) + return -ENOMEM; + rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key); if (rc) - goto out; + goto err; auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS); if (rc) - goto out; + goto err; /* salt key handle */ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, null_key); @@ -1000,7 +1008,7 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_append(&buf, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce)); /* append encrypted salt and squirrel away unencrypted in auth */ - tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip); + tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip, auth); /* session type (HMAC, audit or policy) */ tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_SE_HMAC); @@ -1021,10 +1029,13 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - if (rc) - goto out; + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) { + chip->auth = auth; + return 0; + } - out: +err: + kfree(auth); return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_start_auth_session); @@ -1375,10 +1386,6 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) if (rc) return rc; - chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->auth) - return -ENOMEM; - return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_sessions_init); -- 2.47.0

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[PATCH v6 3/5] tpm: flush the null key only when /dev/tpm0 is accessed

by Jarkko Sakkinen

Instead of flushing and reloading the null key for every single auth session, flush it only when: 1. User space needs to access /dev/tpm{rm}0. 2. When going to sleep. 3. When unregistering the chip. This removes the need to load and swap the null key between TPM and regular memory per transaction, when the user space is not using the chip. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: d2add27cf2b8 ("tpm: Add NULL primary creation") Tested-by: Pengyu Ma <mapengyu(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- v5: - No changes. v4: - Changed to bug fix as not having the patch there is a major hit to bootup times. v3: - Unchanged. v2: - Refined the commit message. - Added tested-by from Pengyu Ma <mapengyu(a)gmail.com>. - Removed spurious pr_info() statement. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 13 +++++++++++++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 7 +++++++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 9 +++++++-- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 3 +++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- include/linux/tpm.h | 2 ++ 6 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 854546000c92..0ea00e32f575 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -674,6 +674,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_chip_register); */ void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip) { +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + int rc; + + rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); + if (!rc) { + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { + tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->null_key); + chip->null_key = 0; + } + tpm_put_ops(chip); + } +#endif + tpm_del_legacy_sysfs(chip); if (tpm_is_hwrng_enabled(chip)) hwrng_unregister(&chip->hwrng); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c index c3fbbf4d3db7..4bc07963e260 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c @@ -27,6 +27,13 @@ static ssize_t tpm_dev_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, struct tpm_header *header = (void *)buf; ssize_t ret, len; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { + tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->null_key); + chip->null_key = 0; + } +#endif + ret = tpm2_prepare_space(chip, space, buf, bufsiz); /* If the command is not implemented by the TPM, synthesize a * response with a TPM2_RC_COMMAND_CODE return for user-space. diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c index 5da134f12c9a..bfa47d48b0f2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c @@ -379,10 +379,15 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev) rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); if (!rc) { - if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->null_key); + chip->null_key = 0; +#endif tpm2_shutdown(chip, TPM2_SU_STATE); - else + } else { rc = tpm1_pm_suspend(chip, tpm_suspend_pcr); + } tpm_put_ops(chip); } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 1e856259219e..aba024cbe7c5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -364,6 +364,9 @@ void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle) struct tpm_buf buf; int rc; + if (!handle) + return; + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT); if (rc) { dev_warn(&chip->dev, "0x%08x was not flushed, out of memory\n", diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 1215c53f0ae7..9ffd3da35d21 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -920,11 +920,19 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) u32 tmp_null_key; int rc; + /* fast path */ + if (chip->null_key) { + *null_key = chip->null_key; + return 0; + } + rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset, &tmp_null_key); if (rc != -EINVAL) { - if (!rc) + if (!rc) { + chip->null_key = tmp_null_key; *null_key = tmp_null_key; + } goto err; } @@ -934,6 +942,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) /* Return the null key if the name has not been changed: */ if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0) { + chip->null_key = tmp_null_key; *null_key = tmp_null_key; return 0; } @@ -1006,7 +1015,6 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_SHA256); rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "start auth session"); - tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key); if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) rc = tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(auth, &buf); @@ -1338,7 +1346,10 @@ static int tpm2_create_null_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip) rc = tpm2_save_context(chip, null_key, chip->null_key_context, sizeof(chip->null_key_context), &offset); - tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key); + if (rc) + tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key); + else + chip->null_key = null_key; } return rc; diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 587b96b4418e..28a932aa0416 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -205,6 +205,8 @@ struct tpm_chip { #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC /* details for communication security via sessions */ + /* loaded null key */ + u32 null_key; /* saved context for NULL seed */ u8 null_key_context[TPM2_MAX_CONTEXT_SIZE]; /* name of NULL seed */ -- 2.47.0

11 months

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[PATCH v6 2/5] tpm: Implement tpm2_load_null() rollback

by Jarkko Sakkinen

tpm2_load_null() has weak and broken error handling: - The return value of tpm2_create_primary() is ignored. - Leaks TPM return codes from tpm2_load_context() to the caller. - If the key name comparison succeeds returns previous error instead of zero to the caller. Implement a proper error rollback. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: eb24c9788cd9 ("tpm: disable the TPM if NULL name changes") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- v6: - Address Stefan's remark: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/def4ec2d-584b-405f-9d5e-99267013c3c… v5: - Fix the TPM error code leak from tpm2_load_context(). v4: - No changes. v3: - Update log messages. Previously the log message incorrectly stated on load failure that integrity check had been failed, even tho the check is done *after* the load operation. v2: - Refined the commit message. - Reverted tpm2_create_primary() changes. They are not required if tmp_null_key is used as the parameter. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 253639767c1e..1215c53f0ae7 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -915,33 +915,36 @@ static int tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(struct tpm2_auth *auth, static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) { - int rc; unsigned int offset = 0; /* dummy offset for null seed context */ u8 name[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2]; + u32 tmp_null_key; + int rc; rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset, - null_key); - if (rc != -EINVAL) - return rc; + &tmp_null_key); + if (rc != -EINVAL) { + if (!rc) + *null_key = tmp_null_key; + goto err; + } - /* an integrity failure may mean the TPM has been reset */ - dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL key integrity failure!\n"); - /* check the null name against what we know */ - tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, NULL, name); - if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0) - /* name unchanged, assume transient integrity failure */ - return rc; - /* - * Fatal TPM failure: the NULL seed has actually changed, so - * the TPM must have been illegally reset. All in-kernel TPM - * operations will fail because the NULL primary can't be - * loaded to salt the sessions, but disable the TPM anyway so - * userspace programmes can't be compromised by it. - */ - dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL name has changed, disabling TPM due to interference\n"); + rc = tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, &tmp_null_key, name); + if (rc) + goto err; + + /* Return the null key if the name has not been changed: */ + if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0) { + *null_key = tmp_null_key; + return 0; + } + + /* Deduce from the name change TPM interference: */ + dev_err(&chip->dev, "the null key integrity check failedh\n"); + tpm2_flush_context(chip, tmp_null_key); chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_DISABLE; - return rc; +err: + return rc ? -ENODEV : 0; } /** -- 2.47.0

11 months

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[PATCH 0/6] arm64: probes: fixes and cleanup

by Mark Rutland

These patches address some issues I spotted while looking at kprobes and uprobes. Patch 1 is the most pressing, as a uprobes user can trigger a kernel BUG(). Patches 2 and 3 fix latent endianness bugs which only manifest on big-endian kernels, and patchs 4-6 clean things up so that it's harder to get this wrong again in future. Mark. Mark Rutland (6): arm64: probes: Remove broken LDR (literal) uprobe support arm64: probes: Fix simulate_ldr*_literal() arm64: probes: Fix uprobes for big-endian kernels arm64: probes: Move kprobes-specific fields arm64: probes: Cleanup kprobes endianness conversions arm64: probes: Remove probe_opcode_t arch/arm64/include/asm/probes.h | 11 +++---- arch/arm64/include/asm/uprobes.h | 8 ++--- arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c | 22 ++++++++----- arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c | 39 ++++++++++++------------ arch/arm64/kernel/probes/simulate-insn.c | 18 +++++------ arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c | 8 ++--- 7 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) -- 2.30.2

11 months

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[PATCH] comedi: Flush partial mappings in error case

by Jann Horn

If some remap_pfn_range() calls succeeded before one failed, we still have buffer pages mapped into the userspace page tables when we drop the buffer reference with comedi_buf_map_put(bm). The userspace mappings are only cleaned up later in the mmap error path. Fix it by explicitly flushing all mappings in our VMA on the comedi_mmap() error path. See commit 79a61cc3fc04 ("mm: avoid leaving partial pfn mappings around in error case"). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: ed9eccbe8970 ("Staging: add comedi core") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> --- Note: compile-tested only; I don't actually have comedi hardware, and I don't know anything about comedi. --- drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c b/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c index 1b481731df96..0e573df8646f 100644 --- a/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c +++ b/drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c @@ -2414,6 +2414,15 @@ static int comedi_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) vma->vm_private_data = bm; vma->vm_ops->open(vma); + } else { + /* + * Leaving behind a partial mapping of a buffer we're about to + * drop is unsafe, see remap_pfn_range_notrack(). + * We need to zap the range here ourselves instead of relying + * on the automatic zapping in remap_pfn_range() because we call + * remap_pfn_range() in a loop. + */ + zap_page_range_single(vma, vma->vm_start, size, NULL); } done: --- base-commit: 6485cf5ea253d40d507cd71253c9568c5470cd27 change-id: 20241014-comedi-tlb-400246505961 -- Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>

11 months

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[PATCH 1/4] efi/libstub: Free correct pointer on failure

by Ard Biesheuvel

From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> cmdline_ptr is an out parameter, which is not allocated by the function itself, and likely points into the caller's stack. cmdline refers to the pool allocation that should be freed when cleaning up after a failure, so pass this instead to free_pool(). Fixes: 42c8ea3dca09 ("efi: libstub: Factor out EFI stub entrypoint ...") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c index f09e277ba210..fc71dcab43e0 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_handle_cmdline(efi_loaded_image_t *image, char **cmdline_ptr) return EFI_SUCCESS; fail_free_cmdline: - efi_bs_call(free_pool, cmdline_ptr); + efi_bs_call(free_pool, cmdline); return status; } -- 2.47.0.rc1.288.g06298d1525-goog

11 months

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[PATCH net v2 0/2] mptcp: prevent MPC handshake on port-based signal endpoints

by Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)

MPTCP connection requests toward a listening socket created by the in-kernel PM for a port based signal endpoint will never be accepted, they need to be explicitly rejected. - Patch 1: Explicitly reject such requests. A fix for >= v5.12. - Patch 2: Cover this case in the MPTCP selftests to avoid regressions. Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - This new version fixes the root cause for the issue Cong Wang sent a patch for a few weeks ago, see the v1, and the explanations below. The new version is very different from the v1, from a different author. Thanks to Cong Wang for the first analysis, and to Paolo for having spot the root cause, and sent a fix for it. - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240908180620.822579-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com - Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a5289a0d-2557-40b8-9575-6f1a0bbf06e4@redhat.com --- Paolo Abeni (2): mptcp: prevent MPC handshake on port-based signal endpoints selftests: mptcp: join: test for prohibited MPC to port-based endp net/mptcp/mib.c | 1 + net/mptcp/mib.h | 1 + net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c | 1 + net/mptcp/protocol.h | 1 + net/mptcp/subflow.c | 11 +++ tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh | 117 +++++++++++++++++------- 6 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 174714f0e505070a16be6fbede30d32b81df789f change-id: 20241014-net-mptcp-mpc-port-endp-4f88bd428ec7 Best regards, -- Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org>

11 months

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