October 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

+ mm-refactor-map_deny_write_exec.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: mm: refactor map_deny_write_exec() has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is mm-refactor-map_deny_write_exec.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> Subject: mm: refactor map_deny_write_exec() Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2024 21:38:28 +0100 Refactor the map_deny_write_exec() to not unnecessarily require a VMA parameter but rather to accept VMA flags parameters, which allows us to use this function early in mmap_region() in a subsequent commit. While we're here, we refactor the function to be more readable and add some additional documentation. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e82d23cebaa87fe5b767fecf9e730e0059066e63.17297152… Fixes: deb0f6562884 ("mm/mmap: undo ->mmap() when arch_validate_flags() fails") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- include/linux/mman.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- mm/mmap.c | 2 +- mm/mprotect.c | 2 +- mm/vma.h | 2 +- 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/mman.h~mm-refactor-map_deny_write_exec +++ a/include/linux/mman.h @@ -188,16 +188,31 @@ static inline bool arch_memory_deny_writ * * d) mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC) * mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI) + * + * This is only applicable if the user has set the Memory-Deny-Write-Execute + * (MDWE) protection mask for the current process. + * + * @old specifies the VMA flags the VMA originally possessed, and @new the ones + * we propose to set. + * + * Return: false if proposed change is OK, true if not ok and should be denied. */ -static inline bool map_deny_write_exec(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags) +static inline bool map_deny_write_exec(unsigned long old, unsigned long new) { + /* If MDWE is disabled, we have nothing to deny. */ if (!test_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE, &current->mm->flags)) return false; - if ((vm_flags & VM_EXEC) && (vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) + /* If the new VMA is not executable, we have nothing to deny. */ + if (!(new & VM_EXEC)) + return false; + + /* Under MDWE we do not accept newly writably executable VMAs... */ + if (new & VM_WRITE) return true; - if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) && (vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) + /* ...nor previously non-executable VMAs becoming executable. */ + if (!(old & VM_EXEC)) return true; return false; --- a/mm/mmap.c~mm-refactor-map_deny_write_exec +++ a/mm/mmap.c @@ -1504,7 +1504,7 @@ unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *f vma_set_anonymous(vma); } - if (map_deny_write_exec(vma, vma->vm_flags)) { + if (map_deny_write_exec(vma->vm_flags, vma->vm_flags)) { error = -EACCES; goto close_and_free_vma; } --- a/mm/mprotect.c~mm-refactor-map_deny_write_exec +++ a/mm/mprotect.c @@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned lon break; } - if (map_deny_write_exec(vma, newflags)) { + if (map_deny_write_exec(vma->vm_flags, newflags)) { error = -EACCES; break; } --- a/mm/vma.h~mm-refactor-map_deny_write_exec +++ a/mm/vma.h @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ struct vma_munmap_struct { int vma_count; /* Number of vmas that will be removed */ bool unlock; /* Unlock after the munmap */ bool clear_ptes; /* If there are outstanding PTE to be cleared */ - /* 1 byte hole */ + /* 2 byte hole */ unsigned long nr_pages; /* Number of pages being removed */ unsigned long locked_vm; /* Number of locked pages */ unsigned long nr_accounted; /* Number of VM_ACCOUNT pages */ _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com are fork-do-not-invoke-uffd-on-fork-if-error-occurs.patch fork-only-invoke-khugepaged-ksm-hooks-if-no-error.patch mm-vma-add-expand-only-vma-merge-mode-and-optimise-do_brk_flags.patch tools-testing-add-expand-only-mode-vma-test.patch mm-avoid-unsafe-vma-hook-invocation-when-error-arises-on-mmap-hook.patch mm-unconditionally-close-vmas-on-error.patch mm-refactor-map_deny_write_exec.patch mm-resolve-faulty-mmap_region-error-path-behaviour.patch tools-testing-add-additional-vma_internalh-stubs.patch mm-isolate-mmap-internal-logic-to-mm-vmac.patch mm-refactor-__mmap_region.patch mm-defer-second-attempt-at-merge-on-mmap.patch selftests-mm-add-pkey_sighandler_xx-hugetlb_dio-to-gitignore.patch mm-refactor-mm_access-to-not-return-null.patch mm-refactor-mm_access-to-not-return-null-fix.patch mm-madvise-unrestrict-process_madvise-for-current-process.patch maple_tree-do-not-hash-pointers-on-dump-in-debug-mode.patch tools-testing-fix-phys_addr_t-size-on-64-bit-systems.patch

2 months, 2 weeks

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+ mm-unconditionally-close-vmas-on-error.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: mm: unconditionally close VMAs on error has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is mm-unconditionally-close-vmas-on-error.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> Subject: mm: unconditionally close VMAs on error Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2024 21:38:27 +0100 Incorrect invokation of VMA callbacks when the VMA is no longer in a consistent state is bug prone and risky to perform. With regards to the important vm_ops->close() callback We have gone to great lengths to try to track whether or not we ought to close VMAs. Rather than doing so and risking making a mistake somewhere, instead unconditionally close and reset vma->vm_ops to an empty dummy operations set with a NULL .close operator. We introduce a new function to do so - vma_close() - and simplify existing vms logic which tracked whether we needed to close or not. This simplifies the logic, avoids incorrect double-calling of the .close() callback and allows us to update error paths to simply call vma_close() unconditionally - making VMA closure idempotent. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/72a81a6fb997508db644313a5fdf4d239f620da6.17297152… Fixes: deb0f6562884 ("mm/mmap: undo ->mmap() when arch_validate_flags() fails") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/internal.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ mm/mmap.c | 5 ++--- mm/nommu.c | 3 +-- mm/vma.c | 14 +++++--------- mm/vma.h | 4 +--- 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) --- a/mm/internal.h~mm-unconditionally-close-vmas-on-error +++ a/mm/internal.h @@ -135,6 +135,24 @@ static inline int mmap_file(struct file return err; } +/* + * If the VMA has a close hook then close it, and since closing it might leave + * it in an inconsistent state which makes the use of any hooks suspect, clear + * them down by installing dummy empty hooks. + */ +static inline void vma_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->close) { + vma->vm_ops->close(vma); + + /* + * The mapping is in an inconsistent state, and no further hooks + * may be invoked upon it. + */ + vma->vm_ops = &vma_dummy_vm_ops; + } +} + #ifdef CONFIG_MMU /* Flags for folio_pte_batch(). */ --- a/mm/mmap.c~mm-unconditionally-close-vmas-on-error +++ a/mm/mmap.c @@ -1572,8 +1572,7 @@ expanded: return addr; close_and_free_vma: - if (file && !vms.closed_vm_ops && vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->close) - vma->vm_ops->close(vma); + vma_close(vma); if (file || vma->vm_file) { unmap_and_free_vma: @@ -1933,7 +1932,7 @@ void exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm) do { if (vma->vm_flags & VM_ACCOUNT) nr_accounted += vma_pages(vma); - remove_vma(vma, /* unreachable = */ true, /* closed = */ false); + remove_vma(vma, /* unreachable = */ true); count++; cond_resched(); vma = vma_next(&vmi); --- a/mm/nommu.c~mm-unconditionally-close-vmas-on-error +++ a/mm/nommu.c @@ -589,8 +589,7 @@ static int delete_vma_from_mm(struct vm_ */ static void delete_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma) { - if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->close) - vma->vm_ops->close(vma); + vma_close(vma); if (vma->vm_file) fput(vma->vm_file); put_nommu_region(vma->vm_region); --- a/mm/vma.c~mm-unconditionally-close-vmas-on-error +++ a/mm/vma.c @@ -323,11 +323,10 @@ static bool can_vma_merge_right(struct v /* * Close a vm structure and free it. */ -void remove_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool unreachable, bool closed) +void remove_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool unreachable) { might_sleep(); - if (!closed && vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->close) - vma->vm_ops->close(vma); + vma_close(vma); if (vma->vm_file) fput(vma->vm_file); mpol_put(vma_policy(vma)); @@ -1115,9 +1114,7 @@ void vms_clean_up_area(struct vma_munmap vms_clear_ptes(vms, mas_detach, true); mas_set(mas_detach, 0); mas_for_each(mas_detach, vma, ULONG_MAX) - if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->close) - vma->vm_ops->close(vma); - vms->closed_vm_ops = true; + vma_close(vma); } /* @@ -1160,7 +1157,7 @@ void vms_complete_munmap_vmas(struct vma /* Remove and clean up vmas */ mas_set(mas_detach, 0); mas_for_each(mas_detach, vma, ULONG_MAX) - remove_vma(vma, /* = */ false, vms->closed_vm_ops); + remove_vma(vma, /* unreachable = */ false); vm_unacct_memory(vms->nr_accounted); validate_mm(mm); @@ -1684,8 +1681,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct *copy_vma(struct v return new_vma; out_vma_link: - if (new_vma->vm_ops && new_vma->vm_ops->close) - new_vma->vm_ops->close(new_vma); + vma_close(new_vma); if (new_vma->vm_file) fput(new_vma->vm_file); --- a/mm/vma.h~mm-unconditionally-close-vmas-on-error +++ a/mm/vma.h @@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ struct vma_munmap_struct { int vma_count; /* Number of vmas that will be removed */ bool unlock; /* Unlock after the munmap */ bool clear_ptes; /* If there are outstanding PTE to be cleared */ - bool closed_vm_ops; /* call_mmap() was encountered, so vmas may be closed */ /* 1 byte hole */ unsigned long nr_pages; /* Number of pages being removed */ unsigned long locked_vm; /* Number of locked pages */ @@ -198,7 +197,6 @@ static inline void init_vma_munmap(struc vms->unmap_start = FIRST_USER_ADDRESS; vms->unmap_end = USER_PGTABLES_CEILING; vms->clear_ptes = false; - vms->closed_vm_ops = false; } #endif @@ -269,7 +267,7 @@ int do_vmi_munmap(struct vma_iterator *v unsigned long start, size_t len, struct list_head *uf, bool unlock); -void remove_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool unreachable, bool closed); +void remove_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool unreachable); void unmap_region(struct ma_state *mas, struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct *prev, struct vm_area_struct *next); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com are fork-do-not-invoke-uffd-on-fork-if-error-occurs.patch fork-only-invoke-khugepaged-ksm-hooks-if-no-error.patch mm-vma-add-expand-only-vma-merge-mode-and-optimise-do_brk_flags.patch tools-testing-add-expand-only-mode-vma-test.patch mm-avoid-unsafe-vma-hook-invocation-when-error-arises-on-mmap-hook.patch mm-unconditionally-close-vmas-on-error.patch mm-refactor-map_deny_write_exec.patch mm-resolve-faulty-mmap_region-error-path-behaviour.patch tools-testing-add-additional-vma_internalh-stubs.patch mm-isolate-mmap-internal-logic-to-mm-vmac.patch mm-refactor-__mmap_region.patch mm-defer-second-attempt-at-merge-on-mmap.patch selftests-mm-add-pkey_sighandler_xx-hugetlb_dio-to-gitignore.patch mm-refactor-mm_access-to-not-return-null.patch mm-refactor-mm_access-to-not-return-null-fix.patch mm-madvise-unrestrict-process_madvise-for-current-process.patch maple_tree-do-not-hash-pointers-on-dump-in-debug-mode.patch tools-testing-fix-phys_addr_t-size-on-64-bit-systems.patch

2 months, 2 weeks

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+ mm-avoid-unsafe-vma-hook-invocation-when-error-arises-on-mmap-hook.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: mm: avoid unsafe VMA hook invocation when error arises on mmap hook has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is mm-avoid-unsafe-vma-hook-invocation-when-error-arises-on-mmap-hook.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> Subject: mm: avoid unsafe VMA hook invocation when error arises on mmap hook Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2024 21:38:26 +0100 Patch series "fix error handling in mmap_region() and refactor", v2. The mmap_region() function is somewhat terrifying, with spaghetti-like control flow and numerous means by which issues can arise and incomplete state, memory leaks and other unpleasantness can occur. A large amount of the complexity arises from trying to handle errors late in the process of mapping a VMA, which forms the basis of recently observed issues with resource leaks and observable inconsistent state. This series goes to great lengths to simplify how mmap_region() works and to avoid unwinding errors late on in the process of setting up the VMA for the new mapping, and equally avoids such operations occurring while the VMA is in an inconsistent state. The first four patches are intended for backporting to correct the possibility of people encountering corrupted state while invoking mmap() which is otherwise at risk of happening. After this we go further, refactoring the code, placing it in mm/vma.c in order to make it eventually userland testable, and significantly simplifying the logic to avoid this issue arising in future. This patch (of 4): After an attempted mmap() fails, we are no longer in a situation where we can safely interact with VMA hooks. This is currently not enforced, meaning that we need complicated handling to ensure we do not incorrectly call these hooks. We can avoid the whole issue by treating the VMA as suspect the moment that the file->f_ops->mmap() function reports an error by replacing whatever VMA operations were installed with a dummy empty set of VMA operations. We do so through a new helper function internal to mm - mmap_file() - which is both more logically named than the existing call_mmap() function and correctly isolates handling of the vm_op reassignment to mm. All the existing invocations of call_mmap() outside of mm are ultimately nested within the call_mmap() from mm, which we now replace. It is therefore safe to leave call_mmap() in place as a convenience function (and to avoid churn). The invokers are: ovl_file_operations -> mmap -> ovl_mmap() -> backing_file_mmap() coda_file_operations -> mmap -> coda_file_mmap() shm_file_operations -> shm_mmap() shm_file_operations_huge -> shm_mmap() dma_buf_fops -> dma_buf_mmap_internal -> i915_dmabuf_ops -> i915_gem_dmabuf_mmap() None of these callers interact with vm_ops or mappings in a problematic way on error, quickly exiting out. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1729715266.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/69f3c04df1ece2b7d402a29451ec19290ff429a4.17297152… Fixes: deb0f6562884 ("mm/mmap: undo ->mmap() when arch_validate_flags() fails") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/internal.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ mm/mmap.c | 6 +++--- mm/nommu.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/mm/internal.h~mm-avoid-unsafe-vma-hook-invocation-when-error-arises-on-mmap-hook +++ a/mm/internal.h @@ -108,6 +108,33 @@ static inline void *folio_raw_mapping(co return (void *)(mapping & ~PAGE_MAPPING_FLAGS); } +/* + * This is a file-backed mapping, and is about to be memory mapped - invoke its + * mmap hook and safely handle error conditions. On error, VMA hooks will be + * mutated. + * + * @file: File which backs the mapping. + * @vma: VMA which we are mapping. + * + * Returns: 0 if success, error otherwise. + */ +static inline int mmap_file(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + int err = call_mmap(file, vma); + + if (likely(!err)) + return 0; + + /* + * OK, we tried to call the file hook for mmap(), but an error + * arose. The mapping is in an inconsistent state and we most not invoke + * any further hooks on it. + */ + vma->vm_ops = &vma_dummy_vm_ops; + + return err; +} + #ifdef CONFIG_MMU /* Flags for folio_pte_batch(). */ --- a/mm/mmap.c~mm-avoid-unsafe-vma-hook-invocation-when-error-arises-on-mmap-hook +++ a/mm/mmap.c @@ -1421,7 +1421,7 @@ unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *f /* * clear PTEs while the vma is still in the tree so that rmap * cannot race with the freeing later in the truncate scenario. - * This is also needed for call_mmap(), which is why vm_ops + * This is also needed for mmap_file(), which is why vm_ops * close function is called. */ vms_clean_up_area(&vms, &mas_detach); @@ -1446,7 +1446,7 @@ unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *f if (file) { vma->vm_file = get_file(file); - error = call_mmap(file, vma); + error = mmap_file(file, vma); if (error) goto unmap_and_free_vma; @@ -1469,7 +1469,7 @@ unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *f vma_iter_config(&vmi, addr, end); /* - * If vm_flags changed after call_mmap(), we should try merge + * If vm_flags changed after mmap_file(), we should try merge * vma again as we may succeed this time. */ if (unlikely(vm_flags != vma->vm_flags && vmg.prev)) { --- a/mm/nommu.c~mm-avoid-unsafe-vma-hook-invocation-when-error-arises-on-mmap-hook +++ a/mm/nommu.c @@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ static int do_mmap_shared_file(struct vm { int ret; - ret = call_mmap(vma->vm_file, vma); + ret = mmap_file(vma->vm_file, vma); if (ret == 0) { vma->vm_region->vm_top = vma->vm_region->vm_end; return 0; @@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ static int do_mmap_private(struct vm_are * happy. */ if (capabilities & NOMMU_MAP_DIRECT) { - ret = call_mmap(vma->vm_file, vma); + ret = mmap_file(vma->vm_file, vma); /* shouldn't return success if we're not sharing */ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_nommu_shared_mapping(vma->vm_flags))) ret = -ENOSYS; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com are fork-do-not-invoke-uffd-on-fork-if-error-occurs.patch fork-only-invoke-khugepaged-ksm-hooks-if-no-error.patch mm-vma-add-expand-only-vma-merge-mode-and-optimise-do_brk_flags.patch tools-testing-add-expand-only-mode-vma-test.patch mm-avoid-unsafe-vma-hook-invocation-when-error-arises-on-mmap-hook.patch mm-unconditionally-close-vmas-on-error.patch mm-refactor-map_deny_write_exec.patch mm-resolve-faulty-mmap_region-error-path-behaviour.patch tools-testing-add-additional-vma_internalh-stubs.patch mm-isolate-mmap-internal-logic-to-mm-vmac.patch mm-refactor-__mmap_region.patch mm-defer-second-attempt-at-merge-on-mmap.patch selftests-mm-add-pkey_sighandler_xx-hugetlb_dio-to-gitignore.patch mm-refactor-mm_access-to-not-return-null.patch mm-refactor-mm_access-to-not-return-null-fix.patch mm-madvise-unrestrict-process_madvise-for-current-process.patch maple_tree-do-not-hash-pointers-on-dump-in-debug-mode.patch tools-testing-fix-phys_addr_t-size-on-64-bit-systems.patch

2 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH 0/2] soc: qcom: pmic_glink: Resolve failures to bring up pmic_glink

by Bjorn Andersson

With the transition of pd-mapper into the kernel, the timing was altered such that on some targets the initial rpmsg_send() requests from pmic_glink clients would be attempted before the firmware had announced intents, and the firmware reject intent requests. Fix this Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson(a)oss.qualcomm.com> --- Bjorn Andersson (2): rpmsg: glink: Handle rejected intent request better soc: qcom: pmic_glink: Handle GLINK intent allocation rejections drivers/rpmsg/qcom_glink_native.c | 10 +++++++--- drivers/soc/qcom/pmic_glink.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 42f7652d3eb527d03665b09edac47f85fb600924 change-id: 20241022-pmic-glink-ecancelled-d899a9ca0358 Best regards, -- Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson(a)oss.qualcomm.com>

2 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH v7 5/5] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open

by Jarkko Sakkinen

Instead of flushing and reloading the auth session for every single transaction, keep the session open unless /dev/tpm0 is used. In practice this means applying TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION to the session attributes. Flush the session always when /dev/tpm0 is written. Reported-by: Pengyu Ma <mapengyu(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219229 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 7ca110f2679b ("tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*()") Tested-by: Pengyu Ma <mapengyu(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- v5: - No changes. v4: - Changed as bug. v3: - Refined the commit message. - Removed the conditional for applying TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION only when /dev/tpm0 is open. It is not required as the auth session is flushed, not saved. v2: - A new patch. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 1 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 1 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 1 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 0ea00e32f575..7a6bb30d1f32 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -680,6 +680,7 @@ void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip) rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); if (!rc) { if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->null_key); chip->null_key = 0; } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c index 4eaa8e05c291..a3ed7a99a394 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ static ssize_t tpm_dev_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->null_key); chip->null_key = 0; } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c index bfa47d48b0f2..2363018fa8fb 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c @@ -381,6 +381,7 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev) if (!rc) { if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->null_key); chip->null_key = 0; #endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 6e52785de9fd..a7079c7ec6d1 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -333,6 +333,9 @@ void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, } #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + /* The first write to /dev/tpm{rm0} will flush the session. */ + attributes |= TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION; + /* * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros * before computing the HMAC -- 2.47.0

2 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH v1 1/2] mseal: Two fixes for madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) when sealed

by jeffxu＠chromium.org

From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu(a)chromium.org> Two fixes for madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) when sealed. For PROT_NONE mappings, the previous blocking of madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) is unnecessary. As PROT_NONE already prohibits memory access, madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) should be allowed to proceed in order to free the page. For file-backed, private, read-only memory mappings, we previously did not block the madvise(MADV_DONTNEED). This was based on the assumption that the memory's content, being file-backed, could be retrieved from the file if accessed again. However, this assumption failed to consider scenarios where a mapping is initially created as read-write, modified, and subsequently changed to read-only. The newly introduced VM_WASWRITE flag addresses this oversight. Reported-by: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato(a)gmail.com> Link:https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABi2SkW2XzuZ2-TunWOVzTEX1qc29LhjfNQ3hD4Ny… Fixes: 8be7258aad44 ("mseal: add mseal syscall") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 6.11.y: 4d1b3416659b: mm: move can_modify_vma to mm/vma.h Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 6.11.y: 4a2dd02b0916: mm/mprotect: replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 6.11.y: 23c57d1fa2b9: mseal: replace can_modify_mm_madv with a vma variant Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 6.11.y Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu(a)chromium.org> --- include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++ mm/mprotect.c | 3 +++ mm/mseal.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 4c32003c8404..b402eca2565a 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -430,6 +430,8 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp); #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT /* VM is sealed, in vm_flags */ #define VM_SEALED _BITUL(63) +/* VM was writable */ +#define VM_WASWRITE _BITUL(62) #endif /* Bits set in the VMA until the stack is in its final location */ diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c index 0c5d6d06107d..6397135ca526 100644 --- a/mm/mprotect.c +++ b/mm/mprotect.c @@ -821,6 +821,9 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len, break; } + if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) && !(newflags & VM_WRITE)) + newflags |= VM_WASWRITE; + error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot); if (error) break; diff --git a/mm/mseal.c b/mm/mseal.c index ece977bd21e1..28f28487be17 100644 --- a/mm/mseal.c +++ b/mm/mseal.c @@ -36,12 +36,8 @@ static bool is_madv_discard(int behavior) return false; } -static bool is_ro_anon(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +static bool anon_is_ro(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { - /* check anonymous mapping. */ - if (vma->vm_file || vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) - return false; - /* * check for non-writable: * PROT=RO or PKRU is not writeable. @@ -53,6 +49,22 @@ static bool is_ro_anon(struct vm_area_struct *vma) return false; } +static bool vma_is_prot_none(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_ACCESS_FLAGS) == VM_NONE) + return true; + + return false; +} + +static bool vma_was_writable_turn_readonly(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) && vma->vm_flags & VM_WASWRITE) + return true; + + return false; +} + /* * Check if a vma is allowed to be modified by madvise. */ @@ -61,7 +73,25 @@ bool can_modify_vma_madv(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int behavior) if (!is_madv_discard(behavior)) return true; - if (unlikely(!can_modify_vma(vma) && is_ro_anon(vma))) + /* not sealed */ + if (likely(can_modify_vma(vma))) + return true; + + /* PROT_NONE mapping */ + if (vma_is_prot_none(vma)) + return true; + + /* file-backed private mapping */ + if (vma->vm_file) { + /* read-only but was writeable */ + if (vma_was_writable_turn_readonly(vma)) + return false; + + return true; + } + + /* anonymous mapping is read-only */ + if (anon_is_ro(vma)) return false; /* Allow by default. */ -- 2.47.0.rc1.288.g06298d1525-goog

2 months, 2 weeks

7
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[PATCH stable 5.4] mtd: rawnand: protect access to rawnand devices while in suspend

by Florian Fainelli

From: Sean Nyekjaer <sean(a)geanix.com> commit 8cba323437a49a45756d661f500b324fc2d486fe upstream. Prevent rawnand access while in a suspended state. Commit 013e6292aaf5 ("mtd: rawnand: Simplify the locking") allows the rawnand layer to return errors rather than waiting in a blocking wait. Tested on a iMX6ULL. Fixes: 013e6292aaf5 ("mtd: rawnand: Simplify the locking") Signed-off-by: Sean Nyekjaer <sean(a)geanix.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon(a)collabora.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal(a)bootlin.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20220208085213.1838273-1-sean@geanix.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> [florian: Adjust rawnand.h members documentation and position] Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli(a)broadcom.com> --- drivers/mtd/nand/raw/nand_base.c | 44 +++++++++++++++----------------- include/linux/mtd/rawnand.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/nand_base.c b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/nand_base.c index db66c1be6e5f..29e3a5b04778 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/nand_base.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/raw/nand_base.c @@ -359,16 +359,19 @@ static int nand_isbad_bbm(struct nand_chip *chip, loff_t ofs) * * Return: -EBUSY if the chip has been suspended, 0 otherwise */ -static int nand_get_device(struct nand_chip *chip) +static void nand_get_device(struct nand_chip *chip) { - mutex_lock(&chip->lock); - if (chip->suspended) { + /* Wait until the device is resumed. */ + while (1) { + mutex_lock(&chip->lock); + if (!chip->suspended) { + mutex_lock(&chip->controller->lock); + return; + } mutex_unlock(&chip->lock); - return -EBUSY; - } - mutex_lock(&chip->controller->lock); - return 0; + wait_event(chip->resume_wq, !chip->suspended); + } } /** @@ -593,9 +596,7 @@ static int nand_block_markbad_lowlevel(struct nand_chip *chip, loff_t ofs) nand_erase_nand(chip, &einfo, 0); /* Write bad block marker to OOB */ - ret = nand_get_device(chip); - if (ret) - return ret; + nand_get_device(chip); ret = nand_markbad_bbm(chip, ofs); nand_release_device(chip); @@ -3576,9 +3577,7 @@ static int nand_read_oob(struct mtd_info *mtd, loff_t from, ops->mode != MTD_OPS_RAW) return -ENOTSUPP; - ret = nand_get_device(chip); - if (ret) - return ret; + nand_get_device(chip); if (!ops->datbuf) ret = nand_do_read_oob(chip, from, ops); @@ -4122,13 +4121,11 @@ static int nand_write_oob(struct mtd_info *mtd, loff_t to, struct mtd_oob_ops *ops) { struct nand_chip *chip = mtd_to_nand(mtd); - int ret; + int ret = 0; ops->retlen = 0; - ret = nand_get_device(chip); - if (ret) - return ret; + nand_get_device(chip); switch (ops->mode) { case MTD_OPS_PLACE_OOB: @@ -4184,9 +4181,7 @@ int nand_erase_nand(struct nand_chip *chip, struct erase_info *instr, return -EINVAL; /* Grab the lock and see if the device is available */ - ret = nand_get_device(chip); - if (ret) - return ret; + nand_get_device(chip); /* Shift to get first page */ page = (int)(instr->addr >> chip->page_shift); @@ -4273,7 +4268,7 @@ static void nand_sync(struct mtd_info *mtd) pr_debug("%s: called\n", __func__); /* Grab the lock and see if the device is available */ - WARN_ON(nand_get_device(chip)); + nand_get_device(chip); /* Release it and go back */ nand_release_device(chip); } @@ -4290,9 +4285,7 @@ static int nand_block_isbad(struct mtd_info *mtd, loff_t offs) int ret; /* Select the NAND device */ - ret = nand_get_device(chip); - if (ret) - return ret; + nand_get_device(chip); nand_select_target(chip, chipnr); @@ -4354,6 +4347,8 @@ static void nand_resume(struct mtd_info *mtd) pr_err("%s called for a chip which is not in suspended state\n", __func__); mutex_unlock(&chip->lock); + + wake_up_all(&chip->resume_wq); } /** @@ -5014,6 +5009,7 @@ static int nand_scan_ident(struct nand_chip *chip, unsigned int maxchips, chip->cur_cs = -1; mutex_init(&chip->lock); + init_waitqueue_head(&chip->resume_wq); /* Enforce the right timings for reset/detection */ onfi_fill_data_interface(chip, NAND_SDR_IFACE, 0); diff --git a/include/linux/mtd/rawnand.h b/include/linux/mtd/rawnand.h index 4ab9bccfcde0..9db457532870 100644 --- a/include/linux/mtd/rawnand.h +++ b/include/linux/mtd/rawnand.h @@ -1064,6 +1064,7 @@ struct nand_legacy { * @lock: lock protecting the suspended field. Also used to * serialize accesses to the NAND device. * @suspended: set to 1 when the device is suspended, 0 when it's not. + * @resume_wq: wait queue to sleep if rawnand is in suspended state. * @bbt: [INTERN] bad block table pointer * @bbt_td: [REPLACEABLE] bad block table descriptor for flash * lookup. @@ -1117,6 +1118,7 @@ struct nand_chip { struct mutex lock; unsigned int suspended : 1; + wait_queue_head_t resume_wq; uint8_t *oob_poi; struct nand_controller *controller; -- 2.43.0

2 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH v7 2/5] tpm: Implement tpm2_load_null() rollback

by Jarkko Sakkinen

tpm2_load_null() has weak and broken error handling: - The return value of tpm2_create_primary() is ignored. - Leaks TPM return codes from tpm2_load_context() to the caller. - If the key name comparison succeeds returns previous error instead of zero to the caller. Implement a proper error rollback. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: eb24c9788cd9 ("tpm: disable the TPM if NULL name changes") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> -- v6: - Address Stefan's remark: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/def4ec2d-584b-405f-9d5e-99267013c3c… v5: - Fix the TPM error code leak from tpm2_load_context(). v4: - No changes. v3: - Update log messages. Previously the log message incorrectly stated on load failure that integrity check had been failed, even tho the check is done *after* the load operation. v2: - Refined the commit message. - Reverted tpm2_create_primary() changes. They are not required if tmp_null_key is used as the parameter. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 1e12e0b2492e..bdac11964b55 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -915,33 +915,36 @@ static int tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(struct tpm2_auth *auth, static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) { - int rc; unsigned int offset = 0; /* dummy offset for null seed context */ u8 name[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2]; + u32 tmp_null_key; + int rc; rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset, - null_key); - if (rc != -EINVAL) - return rc; + &tmp_null_key); + if (rc != -EINVAL) { + if (!rc) + *null_key = tmp_null_key; + goto err; + } - /* an integrity failure may mean the TPM has been reset */ - dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL key integrity failure!\n"); - /* check the null name against what we know */ - tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, NULL, name); - if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0) - /* name unchanged, assume transient integrity failure */ - return rc; - /* - * Fatal TPM failure: the NULL seed has actually changed, so - * the TPM must have been illegally reset. All in-kernel TPM - * operations will fail because the NULL primary can't be - * loaded to salt the sessions, but disable the TPM anyway so - * userspace programmes can't be compromised by it. - */ - dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL name has changed, disabling TPM due to interference\n"); + rc = tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, &tmp_null_key, name); + if (rc) + goto err; + + /* Return the null key if the name has not been changed: */ + if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0) { + *null_key = tmp_null_key; + return 0; + } + + /* Deduce from the name change TPM interference: */ + dev_err(&chip->dev, "the null key integrity check failedh\n"); + tpm2_flush_context(chip, tmp_null_key); chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_DISABLE; - return rc; +err: + return rc ? -ENODEV : 0; } /** -- 2.47.0

2 months, 2 weeks

2
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[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 1/7] usbnet: ipheth: race between ipheth_close and error handling

by Sasha Levin

From: Oliver Neukum <oneukum(a)suse.com> [ Upstream commit e5876b088ba03a62124266fa20d00e65533c7269 ] ipheth_sndbulk_callback() can submit carrier_work as a part of its error handling. That means that the driver must make sure that the work is cancelled after it has made sure that no more URB can terminate with an error condition. Hence the order of actions in ipheth_close() needs to be inverted. Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Foster Snowhill <forst(a)pen.gy> Tested-by: Georgi Valkov <gvalkov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/net/usb/ipheth.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/ipheth.c b/drivers/net/usb/ipheth.c index 73ad78f47763c..7814856636907 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/ipheth.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/ipheth.c @@ -353,8 +353,8 @@ static int ipheth_close(struct net_device *net) { struct ipheth_device *dev = netdev_priv(net); - cancel_delayed_work_sync(&dev->carrier_work); netif_stop_queue(net); + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&dev->carrier_work); return 0; } -- 2.43.0

2 months, 2 weeks

2
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[PATCH 6.1.y 5.15.y 5.10.y 5.4.y 4.19.y] vt: prevent kernel-infoleak in con_font_get()

by Jeongjun Park

commit f956052e00de211b5c9ebaa1958366c23f82ee9e upstream. font.data may not initialize all memory spaces depending on the implementation of vc->vc_sw->con_font_get. This may cause info-leak, so to prevent this, it is safest to modify it to initialize the allocated memory space to 0, and it generally does not affect the overall performance of the system. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+955da2d57931604ee691(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241010174619.59662-1-aha310510@gmail.com --- drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c index 5f1183b0b89d..800979e8d5b6 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c @@ -4398,7 +4398,7 @@ static int con_font_get(struct vc_data *vc, struct console_font_op *op) int c; if (op->data) { - font.data = kmalloc(max_font_size, GFP_KERNEL); + font.data = kzalloc(max_font_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!font.data) return -ENOMEM; } else --

2 months, 2 weeks

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