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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024100139-mousiness-agreeable-1242@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()") 592b5fad1677 ("mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()") 183654ce26a5 ("mmap: change do_mas_munmap and do_mas_aligned_munmap() to use vma iterator") 0378c0a0e9e4 ("mm/mmap: remove preallocation from do_mas_align_munmap()") 92fed82047d7 ("mm/mmap: convert brk to use vma iterator") baabcfc93d3b ("mm/mmap: fix typo in comment") c5d5546ea065 ("maple_tree: remove the parameter entry of mas_preallocate") 675eaca1f441 ("mm/mmap: properly unaccount memory on mas_preallocate() failure") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 17:41:04 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX, bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via AIO and can be found in [1]. The PoC: $ cat > test.c int main(void) { size_t pagesz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); int mfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, "test", 0); const char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4 * pagesz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, mfd, 0); unsigned int old = syscall(SYS_personality, 0xffffffff); syscall(SYS_personality, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | old); syscall(SYS_remap_file_pages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0); syscall(SYS_personality, old); // show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); unsigned char buf2[1024]; while (1) { int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024); if (ret <= 0) break; write(1, buf2, ret); } close(fd); } $ gcc test.c -o test $ ./test | grep rwx 7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted) Link: https://project-zero.issues.chromium.org/issues/42452389 [1] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com> [PM: subject line tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index d0dfc85b209b..18fddcce03b8 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -3198,8 +3198,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size, flags |= MAP_LOCKED; file = get_file(vma->vm_file); + ret = security_mmap_file(vma->vm_file, prot, flags); + if (ret) + goto out_fput; ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size, prot, flags, 0, pgoff, &populate, NULL); +out_fput: fput(file); out: mmap_write_unlock(mm);

2 months, 3 weeks

[PATCH 1/2] drm/xe/ct: prevent UAF in send_recv()

by Matthew Auld

Ensure we serialize with completion side to prevent UAF with fence going out of scope on the stack, since we have no clue if it will fire after the timeout before we can erase from the xa. Also we have some dependent loads and stores for which we need the correct ordering, and we lack the needed barriers. Fix this by grabbing the ct->lock after the wait, which is also held by the completion side. Fixes: dd08ebf6c352 ("drm/xe: Introduce a new DRM driver for Intel GPUs") Signed-off-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld(a)intel.com> Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost(a)intel.com> Cc: Badal Nilawar <badal.nilawar(a)intel.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.8+ --- drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_ct.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_ct.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_ct.c index 4b95f75b1546..232eb69bd8e4 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_ct.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_ct.c @@ -903,16 +903,26 @@ static int guc_ct_send_recv(struct xe_guc_ct *ct, const u32 *action, u32 len, } ret = wait_event_timeout(ct->g2h_fence_wq, g2h_fence.done, HZ); + + /* + * Ensure we serialize with completion side to prevent UAF with fence going out of scope on + * the stack, since we have no clue if it will fire after the timeout before we can erase + * from the xa. Also we have some dependent loads and stores below for which we need the + * correct ordering, and we lack the needed barriers. + */ + mutex_lock(&ct->lock); if (!ret) { xe_gt_err(gt, "Timed out wait for G2H, fence %u, action %04x", g2h_fence.seqno, action[0]); xa_erase_irq(&ct->fence_lookup, g2h_fence.seqno); + mutex_unlock(&ct->lock); return -ETIME; } if (g2h_fence.retry) { xe_gt_dbg(gt, "H2G action %#x retrying: reason %#x\n", action[0], g2h_fence.reason); + mutex_unlock(&ct->lock); goto retry; } if (g2h_fence.fail) { @@ -921,7 +931,12 @@ static int guc_ct_send_recv(struct xe_guc_ct *ct, const u32 *action, u32 len, ret = -EIO; } - return ret > 0 ? response_buffer ? g2h_fence.response_len : g2h_fence.response_data : ret; + if (ret > 0) + ret = response_buffer ? g2h_fence.response_len : g2h_fence.response_data; + + mutex_unlock(&ct->lock); + + return ret; } /** -- 2.46.2

2 months, 3 weeks

[PATCH net 03/10] ice: Fix improper handling of refcount in ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count()

by Tony Nguyen

From: Gui-Dong Han <hanguidong02(a)outlook.com> This patch addresses an issue with improper reference count handling in the ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count() function. First, the function calls ice_get_vf_by_id(), which increments the reference count of the vf pointer. If the subsequent call to ice_get_vf_vsi() fails, the function currently returns an error without decrementing the reference count of the vf pointer, leading to a reference count leak. The correct behavior, as implemented in this patch, is to decrement the reference count using ice_put_vf(vf) before returning an error when vsi is NULL. Second, the function calls ice_sriov_get_irqs(), which sets vf->first_vector_idx. If this call returns a negative value, indicating an error, the function returns an error without decrementing the reference count of the vf pointer, resulting in another reference count leak. The patch addresses this by adding a call to ice_put_vf(vf) before returning an error when vf->first_vector_idx < 0. This bug was identified by an experimental static analysis tool developed by our team. The tool specializes in analyzing reference count operations and identifying potential mismanagement of reference counts. In this case, the tool flagged the missing decrement operation as a potential issue, leading to this patch. Fixes: 4035c72dc1ba ("ice: reconfig host after changing MSI-X on VF") Fixes: 4d38cb44bd32 ("ice: manage VFs MSI-X using resource tracking") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gui-Dong Han <hanguidong02(a)outlook.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen(a)intel.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c index e34fe2516ccc..c2d6b2a144e9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c @@ -1096,8 +1096,10 @@ int ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count(struct pci_dev *vf_dev, int msix_vec_count) return -ENOENT; vsi = ice_get_vf_vsi(vf); - if (!vsi) + if (!vsi) { + ice_put_vf(vf); return -ENOENT; + } prev_msix = vf->num_msix; prev_queues = vf->num_vf_qs; @@ -1142,8 +1144,10 @@ int ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count(struct pci_dev *vf_dev, int msix_vec_count) vf->num_msix = prev_msix; vf->num_vf_qs = prev_queues; vf->first_vector_idx = ice_sriov_get_irqs(pf, vf->num_msix); - if (vf->first_vector_idx < 0) + if (vf->first_vector_idx < 0) { + ice_put_vf(vf); return -EINVAL; + } if (needs_rebuild) { ice_vf_reconfig_vsi(vf); -- 2.42.0

2 months, 3 weeks

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Linux-stable-mirror October 2024