commit 3f489c2067c5824528212b0fc18b28d51332d906 upstream.
The mmap read lock is used during the shrinker's callback, which means
that using alloc->vma pointer isn't safe as it can race with munmap().
As of commit dd2283f2605e ("mm: mmap: zap pages with read mmap_sem in
munmap") the mmap lock is downgraded after the vma has been isolated.
I was able to reproduce this issue by manually adding some delays and
triggering page reclaiming through the shrinker's debug sysfs. The
following KASAN report confirms the UAF:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in zap_page_range_single+0x470/0x4b8
Read of size 8 at addr ffff356ed50e50f0 by task bash/478
CPU: 1 PID: 478 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.6.0-rc5-00055-g1c8b86a3799f-dirty #70
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
zap_page_range_single+0x470/0x4b8
binder_alloc_free_page+0x608/0xadc
__list_lru_walk_one+0x130/0x3b0
list_lru_walk_node+0xc4/0x22c
binder_shrink_scan+0x108/0x1dc
shrinker_debugfs_scan_write+0x2b4/0x500
full_proxy_write+0xd4/0x140
vfs_write+0x1ac/0x758
ksys_write+0xf0/0x1dc
__arm64_sys_write+0x6c/0x9c
Allocated by task 492:
kmem_cache_alloc+0x130/0x368
vm_area_alloc+0x2c/0x190
mmap_region+0x258/0x18bc
do_mmap+0x694/0xa60
vm_mmap_pgoff+0x170/0x29c
ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x290/0x3a0
__arm64_sys_mmap+0xcc/0x144
Freed by task 491:
kmem_cache_free+0x17c/0x3c8
vm_area_free_rcu_cb+0x74/0x98
rcu_core+0xa38/0x26d4
rcu_core_si+0x10/0x1c
__do_softirq+0x2fc/0xd24
Last potentially related work creation:
__call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x6c/0xba0
call_rcu+0x10/0x1c
vm_area_free+0x18/0x24
remove_vma+0xe4/0x118
do_vmi_align_munmap.isra.0+0x718/0xb5c
do_vmi_munmap+0xdc/0x1fc
__vm_munmap+0x10c/0x278
__arm64_sys_munmap+0x58/0x7c
Fix this issue by performing instead a vma_lookup() which will fail to
find the vma that was isolated before the mmap lock downgrade. Note that
this option has better performance than upgrading to a mmap write lock
which would increase contention. Plus, mmap_write_trylock() has been
recently removed anyway.
Fixes: dd2283f2605e ("mm: mmap: zap pages with read mmap_sem in munmap")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan(a)kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231201172212.1813387-3-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
[cmllamas: use find_vma() instead of vma_lookup() as commit ce6d42f2e4a2
is missing in v5.10. This only works because we check the vma against
our cached alloc->vma pointer.]
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com>
(cherry picked from commit aaa8cde67eba56b3ebe8c2c155e896f9ccaa8bb7)
---
drivers/android/binder_alloc.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
index b6bf9caaf1d1..61406bfa454b 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
@@ -1002,7 +1002,9 @@ enum lru_status binder_alloc_free_page(struct list_head *item,
goto err_mmget;
if (!mmap_read_trylock(mm))
goto err_mmap_read_lock_failed;
- vma = binder_alloc_get_vma(alloc);
+ vma = find_vma(mm, page_addr);
+ if (vma && vma != binder_alloc_get_vma(alloc))
+ goto err_invalid_vma;
list_lru_isolate(lru, item);
spin_unlock(lock);
@@ -1028,6 +1030,8 @@ enum lru_status binder_alloc_free_page(struct list_head *item,
mutex_unlock(&alloc->mutex);
return LRU_REMOVED_RETRY;
+err_invalid_vma:
+ mmap_read_unlock(mm);
err_mmap_read_lock_failed:
mmput_async(mm);
err_mmget:
--
2.43.0.429.g432eaa2c6b-goog
On Fri, Dec 01, 2023 at 05:21:33PM +0000, Carlos Llamas wrote:
> Move the padding of 0-sized buffers to an earlier stage to account for
> this round up during the alloc->free_async_space check.
>
> Fixes: 74310e06be4d ("android: binder: Move buffer out of area shared with user space")
> Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com>
> ---
Sorry, I forgot to Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org.
--
Carlos Llamas
On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 10:12 PM David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>
>
> Fix the size check added to dns_resolver_preparse() for the V1 server-list
> header so that it doesn't give EINVAL if the size supplied is the same as
> the size of the header struct (which should be valid).
>
> This can be tested with:
>
> echo -n -e '\0\0\01\xff\0\0' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @p
>
> which will give "add_key: Invalid argument" without this fix.
>
> Fixes: 1997b3cb4217 ("keys, dns: Fix missing size check of V1 server-list header")
[ CC stable(a)vger.kernel.org ]
Your (follow-up) patch is now upstream.
https://git.kernel.org/linus/acc657692aed438e9931438f8c923b2b107aebf9
This misses CC: Stable Tag as suggested by Linus.
Looks like linux-6.1.y and linux-6.6.y needs it, too.
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=…https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=…
BG,
-Sedat-
> Reported-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu(a)intel.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZZ4fyY4r3rqgZL+4@xpf.sh.intel.com/
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com>
> cc: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis(a)qq.com>
> cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
> cc: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org>
> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org>
> Cc: Jeffrey E Altman <jaltman(a)auristor.com>
> Cc: Wang Lei <wang840925(a)gmail.com>
> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)redhat.com>
> Cc: Steve French <sfrench(a)us.ibm.com>
> Cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne(a)auristor.com>
> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem(a)davemloft.net>
> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com>
> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>
> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com>
> ---
> net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
> index f18ca02aa95a..c42ddd85ff1f 100644
> --- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
> +++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
> @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ dns_resolver_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> const struct dns_server_list_v1_header *v1;
>
> /* It may be a server list. */
> - if (datalen <= sizeof(*v1))
> + if (datalen < sizeof(*v1))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> v1 = (const struct dns_server_list_v1_header *)data;
>
>
On reception of a completion interrupt the SMT memory area is accessed to
retrieve the message header at first and then, if the message sequence
number identifies a transaction which is still pending, the related
payload is fetched too.
When an SCMI command times out the channel ownership remains with the
platform until eventually a late reply is received and, as a consequence,
any further transmission attempt remains pending, waiting for the channel
to be relinquished by the platform.
Once that late reply is received the channel ownership is given back
to the agent and any pending request is then allowed to proceed and
overwrite the SMT area of the just delivered late reply; then the wait for
the reply to the new request starts.
It has been observed that the spurious IRQ related to the late reply can
be wrongly associated with the freshly enqueued request: when that happens
the SCMI stack in-flight lookup procedure is fooled by the fact that the
message header now present in the SMT area is related to the new pending
transaction, even though the real reply has still to arrive.
This race-condition on the A2P channel can be detected by looking at the
channel status bits: a genuine reply from the platform will have set the
channel free bit before triggering the completion IRQ.
Add a consistency check to validate such condition in the A2P ISR.
Reported-by: Xinglong Yang <xinglong.yang(a)cixtech.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/PUZPR06MB54981E6FA00D82BFDBB864FBF08DA@PUZPR06M…
Fixes: 5c8a47a5a91d ("firmware: arm_scmi: Make scmi core independent of the transport type")
CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.15+
Signed-off-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi(a)arm.com>
---
drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/common.h | 1 +
drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/mailbox.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/shmem.c | 6 ++++++
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/common.h b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/common.h
index 3b7c68a11fd0..0956c2443840 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/common.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/common.h
@@ -329,6 +329,7 @@ void shmem_fetch_notification(struct scmi_shared_mem __iomem *shmem,
void shmem_clear_channel(struct scmi_shared_mem __iomem *shmem);
bool shmem_poll_done(struct scmi_shared_mem __iomem *shmem,
struct scmi_xfer *xfer);
+bool shmem_channel_free(struct scmi_shared_mem __iomem *shmem);
/* declarations for message passing transports */
struct scmi_msg_payld;
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/mailbox.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/mailbox.c
index 19246ed1f01f..b8d470417e8f 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/mailbox.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/mailbox.c
@@ -45,6 +45,20 @@ static void rx_callback(struct mbox_client *cl, void *m)
{
struct scmi_mailbox *smbox = client_to_scmi_mailbox(cl);
+ /*
+ * An A2P IRQ is NOT valid when received while the platform still has
+ * the ownership of the channel, because the platform at first releases
+ * the SMT channel and then sends the completion interrupt.
+ *
+ * This addresses a possible race condition in which a spurious IRQ from
+ * a previous timed-out reply which arrived late could be wrongly
+ * associated with the next pending transaction.
+ */
+ if (cl->knows_txdone && !shmem_channel_free(smbox->shmem)) {
+ dev_warn(smbox->cinfo->dev, "Ignoring spurious A2P IRQ !\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
scmi_rx_callback(smbox->cinfo, shmem_read_header(smbox->shmem), NULL);
}
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/shmem.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/shmem.c
index 87b4f4d35f06..517d52fb3bcb 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/shmem.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/shmem.c
@@ -122,3 +122,9 @@ bool shmem_poll_done(struct scmi_shared_mem __iomem *shmem,
(SCMI_SHMEM_CHAN_STAT_CHANNEL_ERROR |
SCMI_SHMEM_CHAN_STAT_CHANNEL_FREE);
}
+
+bool shmem_channel_free(struct scmi_shared_mem __iomem *shmem)
+{
+ return (ioread32(&shmem->channel_status) &
+ SCMI_SHMEM_CHAN_STAT_CHANNEL_FREE);
+}
--
2.34.1