A new installkernel application is now included in systemd-udev package
and it has been improved to allow simplifications.
For the new installkernel application, as Davide says:
<<The %post currently does a shuffling dance before calling installkernel.
This isn't actually necessary afaict, and the current implementation
ends up triggering downstream issues such as
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/29568
This commit simplifies the logic to remove the shuffling. For reference,
the original logic was added in commit 3c9c7a14b627("rpm-pkg: add %post
section to create initramfs and grub hooks").>>
But we need to keep the old behavior as well, because the old installkernel
application from grubby package, does not allow this simplification and
we need to be backward compatible to avoid issues with the different
packages. So the easiest solution is to check the package that provides
the installkernel application, and simplify (and fix for this
application at the same time), only if the package is systemd-udev.
cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Co-Developed-by: Davide Cavalca <dcavalca(a)meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <jtornosm(a)redhat.com>
---
V1 -> V2:
- Complete to be backward compatible with the previous installkernel
application.
scripts/package/kernel.spec | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/scripts/package/kernel.spec b/scripts/package/kernel.spec
index 3eee0143e0c5..d4276ddb6645 100644
--- a/scripts/package/kernel.spec
+++ b/scripts/package/kernel.spec
@@ -77,12 +77,16 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot}
%post
if [ -x /sbin/installkernel -a -r /boot/vmlinuz-%{KERNELRELEASE} -a -r /boot/System.map-%{KERNELRELEASE} ]; then
+if [ $(rpm -qf /sbin/installkernel --queryformat "%{n}") = systemd-udev ];then
+/sbin/installkernel %{KERNELRELEASE} /boot/vmlinuz-%{KERNELRELEASE} /boot/System.map-%{KERNELRELEASE}
+else
cp /boot/vmlinuz-%{KERNELRELEASE} /boot/.vmlinuz-%{KERNELRELEASE}-rpm
cp /boot/System.map-%{KERNELRELEASE} /boot/.System.map-%{KERNELRELEASE}-rpm
rm -f /boot/vmlinuz-%{KERNELRELEASE} /boot/System.map-%{KERNELRELEASE}
/sbin/installkernel %{KERNELRELEASE} /boot/.vmlinuz-%{KERNELRELEASE}-rpm /boot/.System.map-%{KERNELRELEASE}-rpm
rm -f /boot/.vmlinuz-%{KERNELRELEASE}-rpm /boot/.System.map-%{KERNELRELEASE}-rpm
fi
+fi
%preun
if [ -x /sbin/new-kernel-pkg ]; then
--
2.43.0
From: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli(a)igalia.com>
[ Upstream commit e585a37e5061f6d5060517aed1ca4ccb2e56a34c ]
By running a Van Gogh device (Steam Deck), the following message
was noticed in the kernel log:
pci 0000:04:00.3: PCI class overridden (0x0c03fe -> 0x0c03fe) so dwc3 driver can claim this instead of xhci
Effectively this means the quirk executed but changed nothing, since the
class of this device was already the proper one (likely adjusted by newer
firmware versions).
Check and perform the override only if necessary.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120160531.361552-1-gpiccoli@igalia.com
Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli(a)igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang(a)amd.com>
Cc: Vicki Pfau <vi(a)endrift.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/pci/quirks.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/quirks.c b/drivers/pci/quirks.c
index d55a3ffae4b8..057cd5bb89f9 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/quirks.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/quirks.c
@@ -702,10 +702,13 @@ static void quirk_amd_dwc_class(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
u32 class = pdev->class;
- /* Use "USB Device (not host controller)" class */
- pdev->class = PCI_CLASS_SERIAL_USB_DEVICE;
- pci_info(pdev, "PCI class overridden (%#08x -> %#08x) so dwc3 driver can claim this instead of xhci\n",
- class, pdev->class);
+ if (class != PCI_CLASS_SERIAL_USB_DEVICE) {
+ /* Use "USB Device (not host controller)" class */
+ pdev->class = PCI_CLASS_SERIAL_USB_DEVICE;
+ pci_info(pdev,
+ "PCI class overridden (%#08x -> %#08x) so dwc3 driver can claim this instead of xhci\n",
+ class, pdev->class);
+ }
}
DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_NL_USB,
quirk_amd_dwc_class);
--
2.43.0
The rule inside kvm enforces that the vcpu->mutex is taken *inside*
kvm->lock. The rule is violated by the pkvm_create_hyp_vm() which acquires
the kvm->lock while already holding the vcpu->mutex lock from
kvm_vcpu_ioctl(). Avoid the circular locking dependency altogether by
protecting the hyp vm handle with the config_lock, much like we already
do for other forms of VM-scoped data.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Ene <sebastianene(a)google.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton(a)linux.dev>
---
arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c
index 8350fb8fee0b..b7be96a53597 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c
@@ -101,6 +101,17 @@ void __init kvm_hyp_reserve(void)
hyp_mem_base);
}
+static void __pkvm_destroy_hyp_vm(struct kvm *host_kvm)
+{
+ if (host_kvm->arch.pkvm.handle) {
+ WARN_ON(kvm_call_hyp_nvhe(__pkvm_teardown_vm,
+ host_kvm->arch.pkvm.handle));
+ }
+
+ host_kvm->arch.pkvm.handle = 0;
+ free_hyp_memcache(&host_kvm->arch.pkvm.teardown_mc);
+}
+
/*
* Allocates and donates memory for hypervisor VM structs at EL2.
*
@@ -181,7 +192,7 @@ static int __pkvm_create_hyp_vm(struct kvm *host_kvm)
return 0;
destroy_vm:
- pkvm_destroy_hyp_vm(host_kvm);
+ __pkvm_destroy_hyp_vm(host_kvm);
return ret;
free_vm:
free_pages_exact(hyp_vm, hyp_vm_sz);
@@ -194,23 +205,19 @@ int pkvm_create_hyp_vm(struct kvm *host_kvm)
{
int ret = 0;
- mutex_lock(&host_kvm->lock);
+ mutex_lock(&host_kvm->arch.config_lock);
if (!host_kvm->arch.pkvm.handle)
ret = __pkvm_create_hyp_vm(host_kvm);
- mutex_unlock(&host_kvm->lock);
+ mutex_unlock(&host_kvm->arch.config_lock);
return ret;
}
void pkvm_destroy_hyp_vm(struct kvm *host_kvm)
{
- if (host_kvm->arch.pkvm.handle) {
- WARN_ON(kvm_call_hyp_nvhe(__pkvm_teardown_vm,
- host_kvm->arch.pkvm.handle));
- }
-
- host_kvm->arch.pkvm.handle = 0;
- free_hyp_memcache(&host_kvm->arch.pkvm.teardown_mc);
+ mutex_lock(&host_kvm->arch.config_lock);
+ __pkvm_destroy_hyp_vm(host_kvm);
+ mutex_unlock(&host_kvm->arch.config_lock);
}
int pkvm_init_host_vm(struct kvm *host_kvm)
--
2.43.0.429.g432eaa2c6b-goog
From: Osama Muhammad <osmtendev(a)gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 9862ec7ac1cbc6eb5ee4a045b5d5b8edbb2f7e68 ]
Syzkaller reported the following issue:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2867:6
index 196694 is out of range for type 's8[1365]' (aka 'signed char[1365]')
CPU: 1 PID: 109 Comm: jfsCommit Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/04/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:217 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x11c/0x150 lib/ubsan.c:348
dbAdjTree+0x474/0x4f0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2867
dbJoin+0x210/0x2d0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2834
dbFreeBits+0x4eb/0xda0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2331
dbFreeDmap fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2080 [inline]
dbFree+0x343/0x650 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:402
txFreeMap+0x798/0xd50 fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2534
txUpdateMap+0x342/0x9e0
txLazyCommit fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2664 [inline]
jfs_lazycommit+0x47a/0xb70 fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2732
kthread+0x2d3/0x370 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x48/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304
</TASK>
================================================================================
Kernel panic - not syncing: UBSAN: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 1 PID: 109 Comm: jfsCommit Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/04/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
panic+0x30f/0x770 kernel/panic.c:340
check_panic_on_warn+0x82/0xa0 kernel/panic.c:236
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:223 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x13c/0x150 lib/ubsan.c:348
dbAdjTree+0x474/0x4f0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2867
dbJoin+0x210/0x2d0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2834
dbFreeBits+0x4eb/0xda0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2331
dbFreeDmap fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2080 [inline]
dbFree+0x343/0x650 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:402
txFreeMap+0x798/0xd50 fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2534
txUpdateMap+0x342/0x9e0
txLazyCommit fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2664 [inline]
jfs_lazycommit+0x47a/0xb70 fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2732
kthread+0x2d3/0x370 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x48/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304
</TASK>
Kernel Offset: disabled
Rebooting in 86400 seconds..
The issue is caused when the value of lp becomes greater than
CTLTREESIZE which is the max size of stree. Adding a simple check
solves this issue.
Dave:
As the function returns a void, good error handling
would require a more intrusive code reorganization, so I modified
Osama's patch at use WARN_ON_ONCE for lack of a cleaner option.
The patch is tested via syzbot.
Reported-by: syzbot+39ba34a099ac2e9bd3cb(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=39ba34a099ac2e9bd3cb
Signed-off-by: Osama Muhammad <osmtendev(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c
index 2f452b5ee731..b7fc47907d96 100644
--- a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c
+++ b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c
@@ -2948,6 +2948,9 @@ static void dbAdjTree(dmtree_t * tp, int leafno, int newval)
/* is the current value the same as the old value ? if so,
* there is nothing to do.
*/
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(lp >= CTLTREESIZE))
+ return;
+
if (tp->dmt_stree[lp] == newval)
return;
--
2.43.0
From: Rui Zhang <zr.zhang(a)vivo.com>
[ Upstream commit 7993d3a9c34f609c02171e115fd12c10e2105ff4 ]
The use_count of a regulator should only be incremented when the
enable_count changes from 0 to 1. Similarly, the use_count should
only be decremented when the enable_count changes from 1 to 0.
In the previous implementation, use_count was sometimes decremented
to 0 when some consumer called unbalanced disable,
leading to unexpected disable even the regulator is enabled by
other consumers. With this change, the use_count accurately reflects
the number of users which the regulator is enabled.
This should make things more robust in the case where a consumer does
leak references.
Signed-off-by: Rui Zhang <zr.zhang(a)vivo.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231103074231.8031-1-zr.zhang@vivo.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/regulator/core.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/regulator/core.c b/drivers/regulator/core.c
index 51c4f604d3b2..54330eb0d03b 100644
--- a/drivers/regulator/core.c
+++ b/drivers/regulator/core.c
@@ -2768,7 +2768,8 @@ static int _regulator_enable(struct regulator *regulator)
/* Fallthrough on positive return values - already enabled */
}
- rdev->use_count++;
+ if (regulator->enable_count == 1)
+ rdev->use_count++;
return 0;
@@ -2846,37 +2847,40 @@ static int _regulator_disable(struct regulator *regulator)
lockdep_assert_held_once(&rdev->mutex.base);
- if (WARN(rdev->use_count <= 0,
+ if (WARN(regulator->enable_count == 0,
"unbalanced disables for %s\n", rdev_get_name(rdev)))
return -EIO;
- /* are we the last user and permitted to disable ? */
- if (rdev->use_count == 1 &&
- (rdev->constraints && !rdev->constraints->always_on)) {
-
- /* we are last user */
- if (regulator_ops_is_valid(rdev, REGULATOR_CHANGE_STATUS)) {
- ret = _notifier_call_chain(rdev,
- REGULATOR_EVENT_PRE_DISABLE,
- NULL);
- if (ret & NOTIFY_STOP_MASK)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- ret = _regulator_do_disable(rdev);
- if (ret < 0) {
- rdev_err(rdev, "failed to disable: %pe\n", ERR_PTR(ret));
- _notifier_call_chain(rdev,
- REGULATOR_EVENT_ABORT_DISABLE,
+ if (regulator->enable_count == 1) {
+ /* disabling last enable_count from this regulator */
+ /* are we the last user and permitted to disable ? */
+ if (rdev->use_count == 1 &&
+ (rdev->constraints && !rdev->constraints->always_on)) {
+
+ /* we are last user */
+ if (regulator_ops_is_valid(rdev, REGULATOR_CHANGE_STATUS)) {
+ ret = _notifier_call_chain(rdev,
+ REGULATOR_EVENT_PRE_DISABLE,
+ NULL);
+ if (ret & NOTIFY_STOP_MASK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = _regulator_do_disable(rdev);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ rdev_err(rdev, "failed to disable: %pe\n", ERR_PTR(ret));
+ _notifier_call_chain(rdev,
+ REGULATOR_EVENT_ABORT_DISABLE,
+ NULL);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ _notifier_call_chain(rdev, REGULATOR_EVENT_DISABLE,
NULL);
- return ret;
}
- _notifier_call_chain(rdev, REGULATOR_EVENT_DISABLE,
- NULL);
- }
- rdev->use_count = 0;
- } else if (rdev->use_count > 1) {
- rdev->use_count--;
+ rdev->use_count = 0;
+ } else if (rdev->use_count > 1) {
+ rdev->use_count--;
+ }
}
if (ret == 0)
--
2.43.0
From: Rui Zhang <zr.zhang(a)vivo.com>
[ Upstream commit 7993d3a9c34f609c02171e115fd12c10e2105ff4 ]
The use_count of a regulator should only be incremented when the
enable_count changes from 0 to 1. Similarly, the use_count should
only be decremented when the enable_count changes from 1 to 0.
In the previous implementation, use_count was sometimes decremented
to 0 when some consumer called unbalanced disable,
leading to unexpected disable even the regulator is enabled by
other consumers. With this change, the use_count accurately reflects
the number of users which the regulator is enabled.
This should make things more robust in the case where a consumer does
leak references.
Signed-off-by: Rui Zhang <zr.zhang(a)vivo.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231103074231.8031-1-zr.zhang@vivo.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
drivers/regulator/core.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/regulator/core.c b/drivers/regulator/core.c
index 3137e40fcd3e..a7b3e548ea5a 100644
--- a/drivers/regulator/core.c
+++ b/drivers/regulator/core.c
@@ -2918,7 +2918,8 @@ static int _regulator_enable(struct regulator *regulator)
/* Fallthrough on positive return values - already enabled */
}
- rdev->use_count++;
+ if (regulator->enable_count == 1)
+ rdev->use_count++;
return 0;
@@ -2993,37 +2994,40 @@ static int _regulator_disable(struct regulator *regulator)
lockdep_assert_held_once(&rdev->mutex.base);
- if (WARN(rdev->use_count <= 0,
+ if (WARN(regulator->enable_count == 0,
"unbalanced disables for %s\n", rdev_get_name(rdev)))
return -EIO;
- /* are we the last user and permitted to disable ? */
- if (rdev->use_count == 1 &&
- (rdev->constraints && !rdev->constraints->always_on)) {
-
- /* we are last user */
- if (regulator_ops_is_valid(rdev, REGULATOR_CHANGE_STATUS)) {
- ret = _notifier_call_chain(rdev,
- REGULATOR_EVENT_PRE_DISABLE,
- NULL);
- if (ret & NOTIFY_STOP_MASK)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- ret = _regulator_do_disable(rdev);
- if (ret < 0) {
- rdev_err(rdev, "failed to disable: %pe\n", ERR_PTR(ret));
- _notifier_call_chain(rdev,
- REGULATOR_EVENT_ABORT_DISABLE,
+ if (regulator->enable_count == 1) {
+ /* disabling last enable_count from this regulator */
+ /* are we the last user and permitted to disable ? */
+ if (rdev->use_count == 1 &&
+ (rdev->constraints && !rdev->constraints->always_on)) {
+
+ /* we are last user */
+ if (regulator_ops_is_valid(rdev, REGULATOR_CHANGE_STATUS)) {
+ ret = _notifier_call_chain(rdev,
+ REGULATOR_EVENT_PRE_DISABLE,
+ NULL);
+ if (ret & NOTIFY_STOP_MASK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = _regulator_do_disable(rdev);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ rdev_err(rdev, "failed to disable: %pe\n", ERR_PTR(ret));
+ _notifier_call_chain(rdev,
+ REGULATOR_EVENT_ABORT_DISABLE,
+ NULL);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ _notifier_call_chain(rdev, REGULATOR_EVENT_DISABLE,
NULL);
- return ret;
}
- _notifier_call_chain(rdev, REGULATOR_EVENT_DISABLE,
- NULL);
- }
- rdev->use_count = 0;
- } else if (rdev->use_count > 1) {
- rdev->use_count--;
+ rdev->use_count = 0;
+ } else if (rdev->use_count > 1) {
+ rdev->use_count--;
+ }
}
if (ret == 0)
--
2.43.0
From: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov(a)yandex.ru>
[ Upstream commit 1bfc466b13cf6652ba227c282c27a30ffede69a5 ]
When compiling with gcc version 14.0.0 20231220 (experimental)
and W=1, I've noticed the following warning:
kernel/watch_queue.c: In function 'watch_queue_set_size':
kernel/watch_queue.c:273:32: warning: 'kcalloc' sizes specified with 'sizeof'
in the earlier argument and not in the later argument [-Wcalloc-transposed-args]
273 | pages = kcalloc(sizeof(struct page *), nr_pages, GFP_KERNEL);
| ^~~~~~
Since 'n' and 'size' arguments of 'kcalloc()' are multiplied to
calculate the final size, their actual order doesn't affect the
result and so this is not a bug. But it's still worth to fix it.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov(a)yandex.ru>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231221090139.12579-1-dmantipov@yandex.ru
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
kernel/watch_queue.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/watch_queue.c b/kernel/watch_queue.c
index 73717917d816..5f15a921a8d0 100644
--- a/kernel/watch_queue.c
+++ b/kernel/watch_queue.c
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ long watch_queue_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned int nr_notes)
goto error;
ret = -ENOMEM;
- pages = kcalloc(sizeof(struct page *), nr_pages, GFP_KERNEL);
+ pages = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pages)
goto error;
--
2.43.0