March 2023 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm/display/dp_mst: Correct the kref of port." failed to apply to 6.2-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.2-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.2.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 9b2d019144a00627ed95cc1f664fc681b6fe1c7d # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '1678448074177203(a)kroah.com' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.2.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 9b2d019144a0 ("drm/display/dp_mst: Correct the kref of port.") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 9b2d019144a00627ed95cc1f664fc681b6fe1c7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wayne Lin <Wayne.Lin(a)amd.com> Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2022 14:50:43 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] drm/display/dp_mst: Correct the kref of port. [why & how] We still need to refer to port while removing payload at commit_tail. we should keep the kref till then to release. Bug: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/2171 Signed-off-by: Wayne Lin <Wayne.Lin(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> Fixes: 4d07b0bc4034 ("drm/display/dp_mst: Move all payload info into the atomic state") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.1 Acked-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Tested-by: Didier Raboud <odyx(a)debian.org> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c index 51a46689cda7..4ca37261584a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c @@ -3372,6 +3372,9 @@ void drm_dp_remove_payload(struct drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr *mgr, mgr->payload_count--; mgr->next_start_slot -= payload->time_slots; + + if (payload->delete) + drm_dp_mst_put_port_malloc(payload->port); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_dp_remove_payload); @@ -4327,7 +4330,6 @@ int drm_dp_atomic_release_time_slots(struct drm_atomic_state *state, drm_dbg_atomic(mgr->dev, "[MST PORT:%p] TU %d -> 0\n", port, payload->time_slots); if (!payload->delete) { - drm_dp_mst_put_port_malloc(port); payload->pbn = 0; payload->delete = true; topology_state->payload_mask &= ~BIT(payload->vcpi - 1);

2 years, 9 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down message handling after a packet" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.14.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 1241aedb6b5c7a5a8ad73e5eb3a41cfe18a3e00e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '16784480509180(a)kroah.com' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.14.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 1241aedb6b5c ("drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down message handling after a packet reception error") da68386d9edb ("drm: Rename dp/ to display/") 6c64ae228f08 ("Backmerge tag 'v5.17-rc6' into drm-next") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 1241aedb6b5c7a5a8ad73e5eb3a41cfe18a3e00e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com> Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 20:42:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down message handling after a packet reception error After an error during receiving a packet for a multi-packet DP MST sideband message, the state tracking which packets have been received already is not reset. This prevents the reception of subsequent down messages (due to the pending message not yet completed with an end-of-message-transfer packet). Fix the above by resetting the reception state after a packet error. Cc: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v3.17+ Signed-off-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20221214184258.2869417-2-imre… diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c index 90819fff2c9b..01350510244f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c @@ -3856,7 +3856,7 @@ static int drm_dp_mst_handle_down_rep(struct drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr *mgr) struct drm_dp_sideband_msg_rx *msg = &mgr->down_rep_recv; if (!drm_dp_get_one_sb_msg(mgr, false, &mstb)) - goto out; + goto out_clear_reply; /* Multi-packet message transmission, don't clear the reply */ if (!msg->have_eomt)

2 years, 9 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down message handling after a packet" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 1241aedb6b5c7a5a8ad73e5eb3a41cfe18a3e00e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '1678448049194199(a)kroah.com' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 1241aedb6b5c ("drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down message handling after a packet reception error") da68386d9edb ("drm: Rename dp/ to display/") 6c64ae228f08 ("Backmerge tag 'v5.17-rc6' into drm-next") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 1241aedb6b5c7a5a8ad73e5eb3a41cfe18a3e00e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com> Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 20:42:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down message handling after a packet reception error After an error during receiving a packet for a multi-packet DP MST sideband message, the state tracking which packets have been received already is not reset. This prevents the reception of subsequent down messages (due to the pending message not yet completed with an end-of-message-transfer packet). Fix the above by resetting the reception state after a packet error. Cc: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v3.17+ Signed-off-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20221214184258.2869417-2-imre… diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c index 90819fff2c9b..01350510244f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c @@ -3856,7 +3856,7 @@ static int drm_dp_mst_handle_down_rep(struct drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr *mgr) struct drm_dp_sideband_msg_rx *msg = &mgr->down_rep_recv; if (!drm_dp_get_one_sb_msg(mgr, false, &mstb)) - goto out; + goto out_clear_reply; /* Multi-packet message transmission, don't clear the reply */ if (!msg->have_eomt)

2 years, 9 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down message handling after a packet" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 1241aedb6b5c7a5a8ad73e5eb3a41cfe18a3e00e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '16784480483547(a)kroah.com' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 1241aedb6b5c ("drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down message handling after a packet reception error") da68386d9edb ("drm: Rename dp/ to display/") 6c64ae228f08 ("Backmerge tag 'v5.17-rc6' into drm-next") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 1241aedb6b5c7a5a8ad73e5eb3a41cfe18a3e00e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com> Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 20:42:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down message handling after a packet reception error After an error during receiving a packet for a multi-packet DP MST sideband message, the state tracking which packets have been received already is not reset. This prevents the reception of subsequent down messages (due to the pending message not yet completed with an end-of-message-transfer packet). Fix the above by resetting the reception state after a packet error. Cc: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v3.17+ Signed-off-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20221214184258.2869417-2-imre… diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c index 90819fff2c9b..01350510244f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c @@ -3856,7 +3856,7 @@ static int drm_dp_mst_handle_down_rep(struct drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr *mgr) struct drm_dp_sideband_msg_rx *msg = &mgr->down_rep_recv; if (!drm_dp_get_one_sb_msg(mgr, false, &mstb)) - goto out; + goto out_clear_reply; /* Multi-packet message transmission, don't clear the reply */ if (!msg->have_eomt)

2 years, 9 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down/up message handling after sink" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.14.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 1d082618bbf3b6755b8cc68c0a8122af2842d593 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '167844801954200(a)kroah.com' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.14.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 1d082618bbf3 ("drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down/up message handling after sink disconnect") da68386d9edb ("drm: Rename dp/ to display/") 6c64ae228f08 ("Backmerge tag 'v5.17-rc6' into drm-next") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 1d082618bbf3b6755b8cc68c0a8122af2842d593 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com> Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 20:42:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down/up message handling after sink disconnect If the sink gets disconnected during receiving a multi-packet DP MST AUX down-reply/up-request sideband message, the state keeping track of which packets have been received already is not reset. This results in a failed sanity check for the subsequent message packet received after a sink is reconnected (due to the pending message not yet completed with an end-of-message-transfer packet), indicated by the "sideband msg set header failed" error. Fix the above by resetting the up/down message reception state after a disconnect event. Cc: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v3.17+ Signed-off-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20221214184258.2869417-1-imre… diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c index 51a46689cda7..90819fff2c9b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c @@ -3641,6 +3641,9 @@ int drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst(struct drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr *mgr, bool ms drm_dp_dpcd_writeb(mgr->aux, DP_MSTM_CTRL, 0); ret = 0; mgr->payload_id_table_cleared = false; + + memset(&mgr->down_rep_recv, 0, sizeof(mgr->down_rep_recv)); + memset(&mgr->up_req_recv, 0, sizeof(mgr->up_req_recv)); } out_unlock:

2 years, 9 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down/up message handling after sink" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 1d082618bbf3b6755b8cc68c0a8122af2842d593 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '16784480185239(a)kroah.com' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 1d082618bbf3 ("drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down/up message handling after sink disconnect") da68386d9edb ("drm: Rename dp/ to display/") 6c64ae228f08 ("Backmerge tag 'v5.17-rc6' into drm-next") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 1d082618bbf3b6755b8cc68c0a8122af2842d593 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com> Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 20:42:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down/up message handling after sink disconnect If the sink gets disconnected during receiving a multi-packet DP MST AUX down-reply/up-request sideband message, the state keeping track of which packets have been received already is not reset. This results in a failed sanity check for the subsequent message packet received after a sink is reconnected (due to the pending message not yet completed with an end-of-message-transfer packet), indicated by the "sideband msg set header failed" error. Fix the above by resetting the up/down message reception state after a disconnect event. Cc: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v3.17+ Signed-off-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20221214184258.2869417-1-imre… diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c index 51a46689cda7..90819fff2c9b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c @@ -3641,6 +3641,9 @@ int drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst(struct drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr *mgr, bool ms drm_dp_dpcd_writeb(mgr->aux, DP_MSTM_CTRL, 0); ret = 0; mgr->payload_id_table_cleared = false; + + memset(&mgr->down_rep_recv, 0, sizeof(mgr->down_rep_recv)); + memset(&mgr->up_req_recv, 0, sizeof(mgr->up_req_recv)); } out_unlock:

2 years, 9 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down/up message handling after sink" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 1d082618bbf3b6755b8cc68c0a8122af2842d593 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '1678448017136169(a)kroah.com' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 1d082618bbf3 ("drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down/up message handling after sink disconnect") da68386d9edb ("drm: Rename dp/ to display/") 6c64ae228f08 ("Backmerge tag 'v5.17-rc6' into drm-next") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 1d082618bbf3b6755b8cc68c0a8122af2842d593 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com> Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 20:42:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] drm/display/dp_mst: Fix down/up message handling after sink disconnect If the sink gets disconnected during receiving a multi-packet DP MST AUX down-reply/up-request sideband message, the state keeping track of which packets have been received already is not reset. This results in a failed sanity check for the subsequent message packet received after a sink is reconnected (due to the pending message not yet completed with an end-of-message-transfer packet), indicated by the "sideband msg set header failed" error. Fix the above by resetting the up/down message reception state after a disconnect event. Cc: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v3.17+ Signed-off-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20221214184258.2869417-1-imre… diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c index 51a46689cda7..90819fff2c9b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/display/drm_dp_mst_topology.c @@ -3641,6 +3641,9 @@ int drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst(struct drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr *mgr, bool ms drm_dp_dpcd_writeb(mgr->aux, DP_MSTM_CTRL, 0); ret = 0; mgr->payload_id_table_cleared = false; + + memset(&mgr->down_rep_recv, 0, sizeof(mgr->down_rep_recv)); + memset(&mgr->up_req_recv, 0, sizeof(mgr->up_req_recv)); } out_unlock:

2 years, 9 months

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[PATCH v2] crypto: testmgr - fix RNG performance in fuzz tests

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> The performance of the crypto fuzz tests has greatly regressed since v5.18. When booting a kernel on an arm64 dev board with all software crypto algorithms and CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS enabled, the fuzz tests now take about 200 seconds to run, or about 325 seconds with lockdep enabled, compared to about 5 seconds before. The root cause is that the random number generation has become much slower due to commit d4150779e60f ("random32: use real rng for non-deterministic randomness"). On my same arm64 dev board, at the time the fuzz tests are run, get_random_u8() is about 345x slower than prandom_u32_state(), or about 469x if lockdep is enabled. Lockdep makes a big difference, but much of the rest comes from the get_random_*() functions taking a *very* slow path when the CRNG is not yet initialized. Since the crypto self-tests run early during boot, even having a hardware RNG driver enabled (CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QCOM_RNG in my case) doesn't prevent this. x86 systems don't have this issue, but they still see a significant regression if lockdep is enabled. Converting the "Fully random bytes" case in generate_random_bytes() to use get_random_bytes() helps significantly, improving the test time to about 27 seconds. But that's still over 5x slower than before. This is all a bit silly, though, since the fuzz tests don't actually need cryptographically secure random numbers. So let's just make them use a non-cryptographically-secure RNG as they did before. The original prandom_u32() is gone now, so let's use prandom_u32_state() instead, with an explicitly managed state, like various other self-tests in the kernel source tree (rbtree_test.c, test_scanf.c, etc.) already do. This also has the benefit that no locking is required anymore, so performance should be even better than the original version that used prandom_u32(). Fixes: d4150779e60f ("random32: use real rng for non-deterministic randomness") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- v2: made init_rnd_state() use get_random_u64() crypto/testmgr.c | 266 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 169 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c index c91e93ece20b..b160eeb12c8e 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.c +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c @@ -860,12 +860,50 @@ static int prepare_keybuf(const u8 *key, unsigned int ksize, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS +/* + * The fuzz tests use prandom instead of the normal Linux RNG since they don't + * need cryptographically secure random numbers. This greatly improves the + * performance of these tests, especially if they are run before the Linux RNG + * has been initialized or if they are run on a lockdep-enabled kernel. + */ + +static inline void init_rnd_state(struct rnd_state *rng) +{ + prandom_seed_state(rng, get_random_u64()); +} + +static inline u8 prandom_u8(struct rnd_state *rng) +{ + return prandom_u32_state(rng); +} + +static inline u32 prandom_u32_below(struct rnd_state *rng, u32 ceil) +{ + /* + * This is slightly biased for non-power-of-2 values of 'ceil', but this + * isn't important here. + */ + return prandom_u32_state(rng) % ceil; +} + +static inline bool prandom_bool(struct rnd_state *rng) +{ + return prandom_u32_below(rng, 2); +} + +static inline u32 prandom_u32_inclusive(struct rnd_state *rng, + u32 floor, u32 ceil) +{ + return floor + prandom_u32_below(rng, ceil - floor + 1); +} + /* Generate a random length in range [0, max_len], but prefer smaller values */ -static unsigned int generate_random_length(unsigned int max_len) +static unsigned int generate_random_length(struct rnd_state *rng, + unsigned int max_len) { - unsigned int len = get_random_u32_below(max_len + 1); + unsigned int len = prandom_u32_below(rng, max_len + 1); - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: return len % 64; case 1: @@ -878,43 +916,44 @@ static unsigned int generate_random_length(unsigned int max_len) } /* Flip a random bit in the given nonempty data buffer */ -static void flip_random_bit(u8 *buf, size_t size) +static void flip_random_bit(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size) { size_t bitpos; - bitpos = get_random_u32_below(size * 8); + bitpos = prandom_u32_below(rng, size * 8); buf[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos % 8); } /* Flip a random byte in the given nonempty data buffer */ -static void flip_random_byte(u8 *buf, size_t size) +static void flip_random_byte(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size) { - buf[get_random_u32_below(size)] ^= 0xff; + buf[prandom_u32_below(rng, size)] ^= 0xff; } /* Sometimes make some random changes to the given nonempty data buffer */ -static void mutate_buffer(u8 *buf, size_t size) +static void mutate_buffer(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size) { size_t num_flips; size_t i; /* Sometimes flip some bits */ - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) { - num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << get_random_u32_below(8), size * 8); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) { + num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << prandom_u32_below(rng, 8), + size * 8); for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++) - flip_random_bit(buf, size); + flip_random_bit(rng, buf, size); } /* Sometimes flip some bytes */ - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) { - num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << get_random_u32_below(8), size); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) { + num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << prandom_u32_below(rng, 8), size); for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++) - flip_random_byte(buf, size); + flip_random_byte(rng, buf, size); } } /* Randomly generate 'count' bytes, but sometimes make them "interesting" */ -static void generate_random_bytes(u8 *buf, size_t count) +static void generate_random_bytes(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t count) { u8 b; u8 increment; @@ -923,11 +962,11 @@ static void generate_random_bytes(u8 *buf, size_t count) if (count == 0) return; - switch (get_random_u32_below(8)) { /* Choose a generation strategy */ + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 8)) { /* Choose a generation strategy */ case 0: case 1: /* All the same byte, plus optional mutations */ - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: b = 0x00; break; @@ -935,28 +974,28 @@ static void generate_random_bytes(u8 *buf, size_t count) b = 0xff; break; default: - b = get_random_u8(); + b = prandom_u8(rng); break; } memset(buf, b, count); - mutate_buffer(buf, count); + mutate_buffer(rng, buf, count); break; case 2: /* Ascending or descending bytes, plus optional mutations */ - increment = get_random_u8(); - b = get_random_u8(); + increment = prandom_u8(rng); + b = prandom_u8(rng); for (i = 0; i < count; i++, b += increment) buf[i] = b; - mutate_buffer(buf, count); + mutate_buffer(rng, buf, count); break; default: /* Fully random bytes */ - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) - buf[i] = get_random_u8(); + prandom_bytes_state(rng, buf, count); } } -static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs, +static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct test_sg_division *divs, size_t max_divs, char *p, char *end, bool gen_flushes, u32 req_flags) { @@ -967,24 +1006,26 @@ static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs, unsigned int this_len; const char *flushtype_str; - if (div == &divs[max_divs - 1] || get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) + if (div == &divs[max_divs - 1] || prandom_bool(rng)) this_len = remaining; else - this_len = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, remaining); + this_len = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, remaining); div->proportion_of_total = this_len; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - div->offset = get_random_u32_inclusive(PAGE_SIZE - 128, PAGE_SIZE - 1); - else if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) - div->offset = get_random_u32_below(32); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + div->offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, + PAGE_SIZE - 128, + PAGE_SIZE - 1); + else if (prandom_bool(rng)) + div->offset = prandom_u32_below(rng, 32); else - div->offset = get_random_u32_below(PAGE_SIZE); - if (get_random_u32_below(8) == 0) + div->offset = prandom_u32_below(rng, PAGE_SIZE); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 8) == 0) div->offset_relative_to_alignmask = true; div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_NONE; if (gen_flushes) { - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT; break; @@ -996,7 +1037,7 @@ static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs, if (div->flush_type != FLUSH_TYPE_NONE && !(req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) && - get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) + prandom_bool(rng)) div->nosimd = true; switch (div->flush_type) { @@ -1031,7 +1072,8 @@ static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs, } /* Generate a random testvec_config for fuzz testing */ -static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg, +static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct testvec_config *cfg, char *name, size_t max_namelen) { char *p = name; @@ -1043,7 +1085,7 @@ static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg, p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "random:"); - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: case 1: cfg->inplace_mode = OUT_OF_PLACE; @@ -1058,12 +1100,12 @@ static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg, break; } - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (prandom_bool(rng)) { cfg->req_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " may_sleep"); } - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: cfg->finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL; p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " use_final"); @@ -1078,36 +1120,37 @@ static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg, break; } - if (!(cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) && - get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (!(cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) && prandom_bool(rng)) { cfg->nosimd = true; p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " nosimd"); } p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " src_divs=["); - p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(cfg->src_divs, + p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(rng, cfg->src_divs, ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->src_divs), p, end, (cfg->finalization_type != FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST), cfg->req_flags); p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "]"); - if (cfg->inplace_mode == OUT_OF_PLACE && get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (cfg->inplace_mode == OUT_OF_PLACE && prandom_bool(rng)) { p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " dst_divs=["); - p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(cfg->dst_divs, + p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(rng, cfg->dst_divs, ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->dst_divs), p, end, false, cfg->req_flags); p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "]"); } - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { - cfg->iv_offset = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); + if (prandom_bool(rng)) { + cfg->iv_offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, + MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " iv_offset=%u", cfg->iv_offset); } - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { - cfg->key_offset = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); + if (prandom_bool(rng)) { + cfg->key_offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, + MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " key_offset=%u", cfg->key_offset); } @@ -1620,11 +1663,14 @@ static int test_hash_vec(const struct hash_testvec *vec, unsigned int vec_num, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS if (!noextratests) { + struct rnd_state rng; struct testvec_config cfg; char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) { - generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_hash_vec_cfg(vec, vec_name, &cfg, req, desc, tsgl, hashstate); @@ -1642,15 +1688,16 @@ static int test_hash_vec(const struct hash_testvec *vec, unsigned int vec_num, * Generate a hash test vector from the given implementation. * Assumes the buffers in 'vec' were already allocated. */ -static void generate_random_hash_testvec(struct shash_desc *desc, +static void generate_random_hash_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct shash_desc *desc, struct hash_testvec *vec, unsigned int maxkeysize, unsigned int maxdatasize, char *name, size_t max_namelen) { /* Data */ - vec->psize = generate_random_length(maxdatasize); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->plaintext, vec->psize); + vec->psize = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->plaintext, vec->psize); /* * Key: length in range [1, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize. @@ -1660,9 +1707,9 @@ static void generate_random_hash_testvec(struct shash_desc *desc, vec->ksize = 0; if (maxkeysize) { vec->ksize = maxkeysize; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - vec->ksize = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, maxkeysize); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->ksize); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + vec->ksize = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, maxkeysize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->ksize); vec->setkey_error = crypto_shash_setkey(desc->tfm, vec->key, vec->ksize); @@ -1696,6 +1743,7 @@ static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN; const char *algname = crypto_hash_alg_common(tfm)->base.cra_name; const char *driver = crypto_ahash_driver_name(tfm); + struct rnd_state rng; char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; struct crypto_shash *generic_tfm = NULL; struct shash_desc *generic_desc = NULL; @@ -1709,6 +1757,8 @@ static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, if (noextratests) return 0; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */ err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver); if (err) @@ -1777,10 +1827,11 @@ static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, } for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) { - generate_random_hash_testvec(generic_desc, &vec, + generate_random_hash_testvec(&rng, generic_desc, &vec, maxkeysize, maxdatasize, vec_name, sizeof(vec_name)); - generate_random_testvec_config(cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, cfg, cfgname, + sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_hash_vec_cfg(&vec, vec_name, cfg, req, desc, tsgl, hashstate); @@ -2182,11 +2233,14 @@ static int test_aead_vec(int enc, const struct aead_testvec *vec, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS if (!noextratests) { + struct rnd_state rng; struct testvec_config cfg; char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) { - generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_aead_vec_cfg(enc, vec, vec_name, &cfg, req, tsgls); @@ -2202,6 +2256,7 @@ static int test_aead_vec(int enc, const struct aead_testvec *vec, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS struct aead_extra_tests_ctx { + struct rnd_state rng; struct aead_request *req; struct crypto_aead *tfm; const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc; @@ -2220,24 +2275,26 @@ struct aead_extra_tests_ctx { * here means the full ciphertext including the authentication tag. The * authentication tag (and hence also the ciphertext) is assumed to be nonempty. */ -static void mutate_aead_message(struct aead_testvec *vec, bool aad_iv, +static void mutate_aead_message(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct aead_testvec *vec, bool aad_iv, unsigned int ivsize) { const unsigned int aad_tail_size = aad_iv ? ivsize : 0; const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen; - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0 && vec->alen > aad_tail_size) { + if (prandom_bool(rng) && vec->alen > aad_tail_size) { /* Mutate the AAD */ - flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen - aad_tail_size); - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) + flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->assoc, + vec->alen - aad_tail_size); + if (prandom_bool(rng)) return; } - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (prandom_bool(rng)) { /* Mutate auth tag (assuming it's at the end of ciphertext) */ - flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->ctext + vec->plen, authsize); + flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext + vec->plen, authsize); } else { /* Mutate any part of the ciphertext */ - flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); + flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); } } @@ -2248,7 +2305,8 @@ static void mutate_aead_message(struct aead_testvec *vec, bool aad_iv, */ #define MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE 8 -static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, +static void generate_aead_message(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct aead_request *req, const struct aead_test_suite *suite, struct aead_testvec *vec, bool prefer_inauthentic) @@ -2257,17 +2315,18 @@ static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen; const bool inauthentic = (authsize >= MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE) && - (prefer_inauthentic || get_random_u32_below(4) == 0); + (prefer_inauthentic || + prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0); /* Generate the AAD. */ - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen); if (suite->aad_iv && vec->alen >= ivsize) /* Avoid implementation-defined behavior. */ memcpy((u8 *)vec->assoc + vec->alen - ivsize, vec->iv, ivsize); - if (inauthentic && get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (inauthentic && prandom_bool(rng)) { /* Generate a random ciphertext. */ - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); } else { int i = 0; struct scatterlist src[2], dst; @@ -2279,7 +2338,7 @@ static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, if (vec->alen) sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->assoc, vec->alen); if (vec->plen) { - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->plen); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->plen); sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->ptext, vec->plen); } sg_init_one(&dst, vec->ctext, vec->alen + vec->clen); @@ -2299,7 +2358,7 @@ static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, * Mutate the authentic (ciphertext, AAD) pair to get an * inauthentic one. */ - mutate_aead_message(vec, suite->aad_iv, ivsize); + mutate_aead_message(rng, vec, suite->aad_iv, ivsize); } vec->novrfy = 1; if (suite->einval_allowed) @@ -2313,7 +2372,8 @@ static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, * If 'prefer_inauthentic' is true, then this function will generate inauthentic * test vectors (i.e. vectors with 'vec->novrfy=1') more often. */ -static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req, +static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct aead_request *req, struct aead_testvec *vec, const struct aead_test_suite *suite, unsigned int maxkeysize, @@ -2329,18 +2389,18 @@ static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req, /* Key: length in [0, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize */ vec->klen = maxkeysize; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - vec->klen = get_random_u32_below(maxkeysize + 1); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + vec->klen = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxkeysize + 1); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); vec->setkey_error = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen); /* IV */ - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); /* Tag length: in [0, maxauthsize], but usually choose maxauthsize */ authsize = maxauthsize; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - authsize = get_random_u32_below(maxauthsize + 1); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + authsize = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxauthsize + 1); if (prefer_inauthentic && authsize < MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE) authsize = MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE; if (WARN_ON(authsize > maxdatasize)) @@ -2349,11 +2409,11 @@ static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req, vec->setauthsize_error = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, authsize); /* AAD, plaintext, and ciphertext lengths */ - total_len = generate_random_length(maxdatasize); - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) + total_len = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) vec->alen = 0; else - vec->alen = generate_random_length(total_len); + vec->alen = generate_random_length(rng, total_len); vec->plen = total_len - vec->alen; vec->clen = vec->plen + authsize; @@ -2364,7 +2424,7 @@ static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req, vec->novrfy = 0; vec->crypt_error = 0; if (vec->setkey_error == 0 && vec->setauthsize_error == 0) - generate_aead_message(req, suite, vec, prefer_inauthentic); + generate_aead_message(rng, req, suite, vec, prefer_inauthentic); snprintf(name, max_namelen, "\"random: alen=%u plen=%u authsize=%u klen=%u novrfy=%d\"", vec->alen, vec->plen, authsize, vec->klen, vec->novrfy); @@ -2376,7 +2436,7 @@ static void try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec( int i; for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { - generate_random_aead_testvec(ctx->req, &ctx->vec, + generate_random_aead_testvec(&ctx->rng, ctx->req, &ctx->vec, &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead, ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize, ctx->vec_name, @@ -2407,7 +2467,8 @@ static int test_aead_inauthentic_inputs(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx) */ try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec(ctx); if (ctx->vec.novrfy) { - generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->cfg, ctx->cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->rng, &ctx->cfg, + ctx->cfgname, sizeof(ctx->cfgname)); err = test_aead_vec_cfg(DECRYPT, &ctx->vec, ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg, @@ -2497,12 +2558,13 @@ static int test_aead_vs_generic_impl(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx) * the other implementation against them. */ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) { - generate_random_aead_testvec(generic_req, &ctx->vec, + generate_random_aead_testvec(&ctx->rng, generic_req, &ctx->vec, &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead, ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize, ctx->vec_name, sizeof(ctx->vec_name), false); - generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->cfg, ctx->cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->rng, &ctx->cfg, + ctx->cfgname, sizeof(ctx->cfgname)); if (!ctx->vec.novrfy) { err = test_aead_vec_cfg(ENCRYPT, &ctx->vec, @@ -2541,6 +2603,7 @@ static int test_aead_extra(const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc, ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ctx) return -ENOMEM; + init_rnd_state(&ctx->rng); ctx->req = req; ctx->tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); ctx->test_desc = test_desc; @@ -2930,11 +2993,14 @@ static int test_skcipher_vec(int enc, const struct cipher_testvec *vec, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS if (!noextratests) { + struct rnd_state rng; struct testvec_config cfg; char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) { - generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(enc, vec, vec_name, &cfg, req, tsgls); @@ -2952,7 +3018,8 @@ static int test_skcipher_vec(int enc, const struct cipher_testvec *vec, * Generate a symmetric cipher test vector from the given implementation. * Assumes the buffers in 'vec' were already allocated. */ -static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct skcipher_request *req, +static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct skcipher_request *req, struct cipher_testvec *vec, unsigned int maxdatasize, char *name, size_t max_namelen) @@ -2966,17 +3033,17 @@ static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct skcipher_request *req, /* Key: length in [0, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize */ vec->klen = maxkeysize; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - vec->klen = get_random_u32_below(maxkeysize + 1); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + vec->klen = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxkeysize + 1); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); vec->setkey_error = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen); /* IV */ - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); /* Plaintext */ - vec->len = generate_random_length(maxdatasize); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->len); + vec->len = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->len); /* If the key couldn't be set, no need to continue to encrypt. */ if (vec->setkey_error) @@ -3018,6 +3085,7 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN; const char *algname = crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->base.cra_name; const char *driver = crypto_skcipher_driver_name(tfm); + struct rnd_state rng; char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; struct crypto_skcipher *generic_tfm = NULL; struct skcipher_request *generic_req = NULL; @@ -3035,6 +3103,8 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, if (strncmp(algname, "kw(", 3) == 0) return 0; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */ err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver); if (err) @@ -3119,9 +3189,11 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, } for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) { - generate_random_cipher_testvec(generic_req, &vec, maxdatasize, + generate_random_cipher_testvec(&rng, generic_req, &vec, + maxdatasize, vec_name, sizeof(vec_name)); - generate_random_testvec_config(cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, cfg, cfgname, + sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(ENCRYPT, &vec, vec_name, cfg, req, tsgls); base-commit: 2fcd07b7ccd5fd10b2120d298363e4e6c53ccf9c -- 2.39.2

2 years, 9 months

3
2
0 0

[PATCH] crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs - fix crash with CFI enabled

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> aesbs_ecb_encrypt(), aesbs_ecb_decrypt(), aesbs_xts_encrypt(), and aesbs_xts_decrypt() are called via indirect function calls. Therefore they need to use SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START instead of SYM_FUNC_START to cause their type hashes to be emitted when the kernel is built with CONFIG_CFI_CLANG=y. Otherwise, the code crashes with a CFI failure if the compiler doesn't happen to optimize out the indirect calls. Fixes: c50d32859e70 ("arm64: Add types to indirect called assembly functions") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-core.S | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-core.S b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-core.S index 7278a37c2d5c..baf450717b24 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-core.S +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-core.S @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ */ #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/cfi_types.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> .text @@ -620,12 +621,12 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(aesbs_decrypt8) .endm .align 4 -SYM_FUNC_START(aesbs_ecb_encrypt) +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aesbs_ecb_encrypt) __ecb_crypt aesbs_encrypt8, v0, v1, v4, v6, v3, v7, v2, v5 SYM_FUNC_END(aesbs_ecb_encrypt) .align 4 -SYM_FUNC_START(aesbs_ecb_decrypt) +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aesbs_ecb_decrypt) __ecb_crypt aesbs_decrypt8, v0, v1, v6, v4, v2, v7, v3, v5 SYM_FUNC_END(aesbs_ecb_decrypt) @@ -799,11 +800,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__xts_crypt8) ret .endm -SYM_FUNC_START(aesbs_xts_encrypt) +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aesbs_xts_encrypt) __xts_crypt aesbs_encrypt8, v0, v1, v4, v6, v3, v7, v2, v5 SYM_FUNC_END(aesbs_xts_encrypt) -SYM_FUNC_START(aesbs_xts_decrypt) +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aesbs_xts_decrypt) __xts_crypt aesbs_decrypt8, v0, v1, v6, v4, v2, v7, v3, v5 SYM_FUNC_END(aesbs_xts_decrypt) base-commit: f3a2439f20d918930cc4ae8f76fe1c1afd26958f -- 2.39.2

2 years, 9 months

3
2
0 0

[PATCH] drm/i915: Preserve crtc_state->inherited during state clearing

by Ville Syrjala

From: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com> intel_crtc_prepare_cleared_state() is unintentionally losing the "inherited" flag. This will happen if intel_initial_commit() is forced to go through the full modeset calculations for whatever reason. Afterwards the first real commit from userspace will not get forced to the full modeset path, and thus eg. audio state may not get recomputed properly. So if the monitor was already enabled during boot audio will not work until userspace itself does an explicit full modeset. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Lee Shawn C <shawn.c.lee(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c index a1fbdf32bd21..ed95c0acfaae 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c @@ -5078,6 +5078,7 @@ intel_crtc_prepare_cleared_state(struct intel_atomic_state *state, * only fields that are know to not cause problems are preserved. */ saved_state->uapi = crtc_state->uapi; + saved_state->inherited = crtc_state->inherited; saved_state->scaler_state = crtc_state->scaler_state; saved_state->shared_dpll = crtc_state->shared_dpll; saved_state->dpll_hw_state = crtc_state->dpll_hw_state; -- 2.39.2

2 years, 9 months

2
1
0 0

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