August 2022 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] md-raid: destroy the bitmap after destroying the thread" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From e151db8ecfb019b7da31d076130a794574c89f6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> Date: Sun, 24 Jul 2022 14:26:12 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] md-raid: destroy the bitmap after destroying the thread When we ran the lvm test "shell/integrity-blocksize-3.sh" on a kernel with kasan, we got failure in write_page. The reason for the failure is that md_bitmap_destroy is called before destroying the thread and the thread may be waiting in the function write_page for the bio to complete. When the thread finishes waiting, it executes "if (test_bit(BITMAP_WRITE_ERROR, &bitmap->flags))", which triggers the kasan warning. Note that the commit 48df498daf62 that caused this bug claims that it is neede for md-cluster, you should check md-cluster and possibly find another bugfix for it. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in write_page+0x18d/0x680 [md_mod] Read of size 8 at addr ffff889162030c78 by task mdX_raid1/5539 CPU: 10 PID: 5539 Comm: mdX_raid1 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44 print_report.cold+0x45/0x57a ? __lock_text_start+0x18/0x18 ? write_page+0x18d/0x680 [md_mod] kasan_report+0xa8/0xe0 ? write_page+0x18d/0x680 [md_mod] kasan_check_range+0x13f/0x180 write_page+0x18d/0x680 [md_mod] ? super_sync+0x4d5/0x560 [dm_raid] ? md_bitmap_file_kick+0xa0/0xa0 [md_mod] ? rs_set_dev_and_array_sectors+0x2e0/0x2e0 [dm_raid] ? mutex_trylock+0x120/0x120 ? preempt_count_add+0x6b/0xc0 ? preempt_count_sub+0xf/0xc0 md_update_sb+0x707/0xe40 [md_mod] md_reap_sync_thread+0x1b2/0x4a0 [md_mod] md_check_recovery+0x533/0x960 [md_mod] raid1d+0xc8/0x2a20 [raid1] ? var_wake_function+0xe0/0xe0 ? psi_group_change+0x411/0x500 ? preempt_count_sub+0xf/0xc0 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x78/0xc0 ? __lock_text_start+0x18/0x18 ? raid1_end_read_request+0x2a0/0x2a0 [raid1] ? preempt_count_sub+0xf/0xc0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x19/0x40 ? del_timer_sync+0xa9/0x100 ? try_to_del_timer_sync+0xc0/0xc0 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x78/0xc0 ? __lock_text_start+0x18/0x18 ? __list_del_entry_valid+0x68/0xa0 ? finish_wait+0xa3/0x100 md_thread+0x161/0x260 [md_mod] ? unregister_md_personality+0xa0/0xa0 [md_mod] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x78/0xc0 ? prepare_to_wait_event+0x2c0/0x2c0 ? unregister_md_personality+0xa0/0xa0 [md_mod] kthread+0x148/0x180 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 5522: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x80/0xa0 md_bitmap_create+0xa8/0xe80 [md_mod] md_run+0x777/0x1300 [md_mod] raid_ctr+0x249c/0x4a30 [dm_raid] dm_table_add_target+0x2b0/0x620 [dm_mod] table_load+0x1c8/0x400 [dm_mod] ctl_ioctl+0x29e/0x560 [dm_mod] dm_compat_ctl_ioctl+0x7/0x20 [dm_mod] __do_compat_sys_ioctl+0xfa/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x90/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Freed by task 5680: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x40 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 __kasan_slab_free+0xf7/0x140 kfree+0x80/0x240 md_bitmap_free+0x1c3/0x280 [md_mod] __md_stop+0x21/0x120 [md_mod] md_stop+0x9/0x40 [md_mod] raid_dtr+0x1b/0x40 [dm_raid] dm_table_destroy+0x98/0x1e0 [dm_mod] __dm_destroy+0x199/0x360 [dm_mod] dev_remove+0x10c/0x160 [dm_mod] ctl_ioctl+0x29e/0x560 [dm_mod] dm_compat_ctl_ioctl+0x7/0x20 [dm_mod] __do_compat_sys_ioctl+0xfa/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x90/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 48df498daf62 ("md: move bitmap_destroy to the beginning of __md_stop") Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> diff --git a/drivers/md/md.c b/drivers/md/md.c index 6e82df21623d..35b895813c88 100644 --- a/drivers/md/md.c +++ b/drivers/md/md.c @@ -6238,11 +6238,11 @@ static void mddev_detach(struct mddev *mddev) static void __md_stop(struct mddev *mddev) { struct md_personality *pers = mddev->pers; - md_bitmap_destroy(mddev); mddev_detach(mddev); /* Ensure ->event_work is done */ if (mddev->event_work.func) flush_workqueue(md_misc_wq); + md_bitmap_destroy(mddev); spin_lock(&mddev->lock); mddev->pers = NULL; spin_unlock(&mddev->lock);

3 years, 4 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] fuse: fix deadlock between atomic O_TRUNC and page" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 2fdbb8dd01556e1501132b5ad3826e8f71e24a8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 15:48:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] fuse: fix deadlock between atomic O_TRUNC and page invalidation fuse_finish_open() will be called with FUSE_NOWRITE set in case of atomic O_TRUNC open(), so commit 76224355db75 ("fuse: truncate pagecache on atomic_o_trunc") replaced invalidate_inode_pages2() by truncate_pagecache() in such a case to avoid the A-A deadlock. However, we found another A-B-B-A deadlock related to the case above, which will cause the xfstests generic/464 testcase hung in our virtio-fs test environment. For example, consider two processes concurrently open one same file, one with O_TRUNC and another without O_TRUNC. The deadlock case is described below, if open(O_TRUNC) is already set_nowrite(acquired A), and is trying to lock a page (acquiring B), open() could have held the page lock (acquired B), and waiting on the page writeback (acquiring A). This would lead to deadlocks. open(O_TRUNC) ---------------------------------------------------------------- fuse_open_common inode_lock [C acquire] fuse_set_nowrite [A acquire] fuse_finish_open truncate_pagecache lock_page [B acquire] truncate_inode_page unlock_page [B release] fuse_release_nowrite [A release] inode_unlock [C release] ---------------------------------------------------------------- open() ---------------------------------------------------------------- fuse_open_common fuse_finish_open invalidate_inode_pages2 lock_page [B acquire] fuse_launder_page fuse_wait_on_page_writeback [A acquire & release] unlock_page [B release] ---------------------------------------------------------------- Besides this case, all calls of invalidate_inode_pages2() and invalidate_inode_pages2_range() in fuse code also can deadlock with open(O_TRUNC). Fix by moving the truncate_pagecache() call outside the nowrite protected region. The nowrite protection is only for delayed writeback (writeback_cache) case, where inode lock does not protect against truncation racing with writes on the server. Write syscalls racing with page cache truncation still get the inode lock protection. This patch also changes the order of filemap_invalidate_lock() vs. fuse_set_nowrite() in fuse_open_common(). This new order matches the order found in fuse_file_fallocate() and fuse_do_setattr(). Reported-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee(a)bytedance.com> Tested-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee(a)bytedance.com> Fixes: e4648309b85a ("fuse: truncate pending writes on O_TRUNC") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c index 74303d6e987b..a93d675a726a 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c @@ -537,6 +537,7 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, struct fuse_file *ff; void *security_ctx = NULL; u32 security_ctxlen; + bool trunc = flags & O_TRUNC; /* Userspace expects S_IFREG in create mode */ BUG_ON((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFREG); @@ -561,7 +562,7 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, inarg.mode = mode; inarg.umask = current_umask(); - if (fm->fc->handle_killpriv_v2 && (flags & O_TRUNC) && + if (fm->fc->handle_killpriv_v2 && trunc && !(flags & O_EXCL) && !capable(CAP_FSETID)) { inarg.open_flags |= FUSE_OPEN_KILL_SUIDGID; } @@ -623,6 +624,10 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, } else { file->private_data = ff; fuse_finish_open(inode, file); + if (fm->fc->atomic_o_trunc && trunc) + truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); + else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) + invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); } return err; diff --git a/fs/fuse/file.c b/fs/fuse/file.c index 60885ff9157c..dfee142bca5c 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/file.c +++ b/fs/fuse/file.c @@ -210,13 +210,9 @@ void fuse_finish_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) fi->attr_version = atomic64_inc_return(&fc->attr_version); i_size_write(inode, 0); spin_unlock(&fi->lock); - truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); file_update_time(file); fuse_invalidate_attr_mask(inode, FUSE_STATX_MODSIZE); - } else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) { - invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); } - if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && fc->writeback_cache) fuse_link_write_file(file); } @@ -239,30 +235,38 @@ int fuse_open_common(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, bool isdir) if (err) return err; - if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) { + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) inode_lock(inode); - fuse_set_nowrite(inode); - } if (dax_truncate) { filemap_invalidate_lock(inode->i_mapping); err = fuse_dax_break_layouts(inode, 0, 0); if (err) - goto out; + goto out_inode_unlock; } + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) + fuse_set_nowrite(inode); + err = fuse_do_open(fm, get_node_id(inode), file, isdir); if (!err) fuse_finish_open(inode, file); -out: + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) + fuse_release_nowrite(inode); + if (!err) { + struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data; + + if (fc->atomic_o_trunc && (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)) + truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); + else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) + invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); + } if (dax_truncate) filemap_invalidate_unlock(inode->i_mapping); - - if (is_wb_truncate | dax_truncate) { - fuse_release_nowrite(inode); +out_inode_unlock: + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) inode_unlock(inode); - } return err; }

3 years, 4 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] fuse: fix deadlock between atomic O_TRUNC and page" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 2fdbb8dd01556e1501132b5ad3826e8f71e24a8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 15:48:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] fuse: fix deadlock between atomic O_TRUNC and page invalidation fuse_finish_open() will be called with FUSE_NOWRITE set in case of atomic O_TRUNC open(), so commit 76224355db75 ("fuse: truncate pagecache on atomic_o_trunc") replaced invalidate_inode_pages2() by truncate_pagecache() in such a case to avoid the A-A deadlock. However, we found another A-B-B-A deadlock related to the case above, which will cause the xfstests generic/464 testcase hung in our virtio-fs test environment. For example, consider two processes concurrently open one same file, one with O_TRUNC and another without O_TRUNC. The deadlock case is described below, if open(O_TRUNC) is already set_nowrite(acquired A), and is trying to lock a page (acquiring B), open() could have held the page lock (acquired B), and waiting on the page writeback (acquiring A). This would lead to deadlocks. open(O_TRUNC) ---------------------------------------------------------------- fuse_open_common inode_lock [C acquire] fuse_set_nowrite [A acquire] fuse_finish_open truncate_pagecache lock_page [B acquire] truncate_inode_page unlock_page [B release] fuse_release_nowrite [A release] inode_unlock [C release] ---------------------------------------------------------------- open() ---------------------------------------------------------------- fuse_open_common fuse_finish_open invalidate_inode_pages2 lock_page [B acquire] fuse_launder_page fuse_wait_on_page_writeback [A acquire & release] unlock_page [B release] ---------------------------------------------------------------- Besides this case, all calls of invalidate_inode_pages2() and invalidate_inode_pages2_range() in fuse code also can deadlock with open(O_TRUNC). Fix by moving the truncate_pagecache() call outside the nowrite protected region. The nowrite protection is only for delayed writeback (writeback_cache) case, where inode lock does not protect against truncation racing with writes on the server. Write syscalls racing with page cache truncation still get the inode lock protection. This patch also changes the order of filemap_invalidate_lock() vs. fuse_set_nowrite() in fuse_open_common(). This new order matches the order found in fuse_file_fallocate() and fuse_do_setattr(). Reported-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee(a)bytedance.com> Tested-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee(a)bytedance.com> Fixes: e4648309b85a ("fuse: truncate pending writes on O_TRUNC") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c index 74303d6e987b..a93d675a726a 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c @@ -537,6 +537,7 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, struct fuse_file *ff; void *security_ctx = NULL; u32 security_ctxlen; + bool trunc = flags & O_TRUNC; /* Userspace expects S_IFREG in create mode */ BUG_ON((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFREG); @@ -561,7 +562,7 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, inarg.mode = mode; inarg.umask = current_umask(); - if (fm->fc->handle_killpriv_v2 && (flags & O_TRUNC) && + if (fm->fc->handle_killpriv_v2 && trunc && !(flags & O_EXCL) && !capable(CAP_FSETID)) { inarg.open_flags |= FUSE_OPEN_KILL_SUIDGID; } @@ -623,6 +624,10 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, } else { file->private_data = ff; fuse_finish_open(inode, file); + if (fm->fc->atomic_o_trunc && trunc) + truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); + else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) + invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); } return err; diff --git a/fs/fuse/file.c b/fs/fuse/file.c index 60885ff9157c..dfee142bca5c 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/file.c +++ b/fs/fuse/file.c @@ -210,13 +210,9 @@ void fuse_finish_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) fi->attr_version = atomic64_inc_return(&fc->attr_version); i_size_write(inode, 0); spin_unlock(&fi->lock); - truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); file_update_time(file); fuse_invalidate_attr_mask(inode, FUSE_STATX_MODSIZE); - } else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) { - invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); } - if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && fc->writeback_cache) fuse_link_write_file(file); } @@ -239,30 +235,38 @@ int fuse_open_common(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, bool isdir) if (err) return err; - if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) { + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) inode_lock(inode); - fuse_set_nowrite(inode); - } if (dax_truncate) { filemap_invalidate_lock(inode->i_mapping); err = fuse_dax_break_layouts(inode, 0, 0); if (err) - goto out; + goto out_inode_unlock; } + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) + fuse_set_nowrite(inode); + err = fuse_do_open(fm, get_node_id(inode), file, isdir); if (!err) fuse_finish_open(inode, file); -out: + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) + fuse_release_nowrite(inode); + if (!err) { + struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data; + + if (fc->atomic_o_trunc && (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)) + truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); + else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) + invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); + } if (dax_truncate) filemap_invalidate_unlock(inode->i_mapping); - - if (is_wb_truncate | dax_truncate) { - fuse_release_nowrite(inode); +out_inode_unlock: + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) inode_unlock(inode); - } return err; }

3 years, 4 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] fuse: fix deadlock between atomic O_TRUNC and page" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 2fdbb8dd01556e1501132b5ad3826e8f71e24a8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 15:48:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] fuse: fix deadlock between atomic O_TRUNC and page invalidation fuse_finish_open() will be called with FUSE_NOWRITE set in case of atomic O_TRUNC open(), so commit 76224355db75 ("fuse: truncate pagecache on atomic_o_trunc") replaced invalidate_inode_pages2() by truncate_pagecache() in such a case to avoid the A-A deadlock. However, we found another A-B-B-A deadlock related to the case above, which will cause the xfstests generic/464 testcase hung in our virtio-fs test environment. For example, consider two processes concurrently open one same file, one with O_TRUNC and another without O_TRUNC. The deadlock case is described below, if open(O_TRUNC) is already set_nowrite(acquired A), and is trying to lock a page (acquiring B), open() could have held the page lock (acquired B), and waiting on the page writeback (acquiring A). This would lead to deadlocks. open(O_TRUNC) ---------------------------------------------------------------- fuse_open_common inode_lock [C acquire] fuse_set_nowrite [A acquire] fuse_finish_open truncate_pagecache lock_page [B acquire] truncate_inode_page unlock_page [B release] fuse_release_nowrite [A release] inode_unlock [C release] ---------------------------------------------------------------- open() ---------------------------------------------------------------- fuse_open_common fuse_finish_open invalidate_inode_pages2 lock_page [B acquire] fuse_launder_page fuse_wait_on_page_writeback [A acquire & release] unlock_page [B release] ---------------------------------------------------------------- Besides this case, all calls of invalidate_inode_pages2() and invalidate_inode_pages2_range() in fuse code also can deadlock with open(O_TRUNC). Fix by moving the truncate_pagecache() call outside the nowrite protected region. The nowrite protection is only for delayed writeback (writeback_cache) case, where inode lock does not protect against truncation racing with writes on the server. Write syscalls racing with page cache truncation still get the inode lock protection. This patch also changes the order of filemap_invalidate_lock() vs. fuse_set_nowrite() in fuse_open_common(). This new order matches the order found in fuse_file_fallocate() and fuse_do_setattr(). Reported-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee(a)bytedance.com> Tested-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee(a)bytedance.com> Fixes: e4648309b85a ("fuse: truncate pending writes on O_TRUNC") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c index 74303d6e987b..a93d675a726a 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c @@ -537,6 +537,7 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, struct fuse_file *ff; void *security_ctx = NULL; u32 security_ctxlen; + bool trunc = flags & O_TRUNC; /* Userspace expects S_IFREG in create mode */ BUG_ON((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFREG); @@ -561,7 +562,7 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, inarg.mode = mode; inarg.umask = current_umask(); - if (fm->fc->handle_killpriv_v2 && (flags & O_TRUNC) && + if (fm->fc->handle_killpriv_v2 && trunc && !(flags & O_EXCL) && !capable(CAP_FSETID)) { inarg.open_flags |= FUSE_OPEN_KILL_SUIDGID; } @@ -623,6 +624,10 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, } else { file->private_data = ff; fuse_finish_open(inode, file); + if (fm->fc->atomic_o_trunc && trunc) + truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); + else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) + invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); } return err; diff --git a/fs/fuse/file.c b/fs/fuse/file.c index 60885ff9157c..dfee142bca5c 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/file.c +++ b/fs/fuse/file.c @@ -210,13 +210,9 @@ void fuse_finish_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) fi->attr_version = atomic64_inc_return(&fc->attr_version); i_size_write(inode, 0); spin_unlock(&fi->lock); - truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); file_update_time(file); fuse_invalidate_attr_mask(inode, FUSE_STATX_MODSIZE); - } else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) { - invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); } - if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && fc->writeback_cache) fuse_link_write_file(file); } @@ -239,30 +235,38 @@ int fuse_open_common(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, bool isdir) if (err) return err; - if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) { + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) inode_lock(inode); - fuse_set_nowrite(inode); - } if (dax_truncate) { filemap_invalidate_lock(inode->i_mapping); err = fuse_dax_break_layouts(inode, 0, 0); if (err) - goto out; + goto out_inode_unlock; } + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) + fuse_set_nowrite(inode); + err = fuse_do_open(fm, get_node_id(inode), file, isdir); if (!err) fuse_finish_open(inode, file); -out: + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) + fuse_release_nowrite(inode); + if (!err) { + struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data; + + if (fc->atomic_o_trunc && (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)) + truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); + else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) + invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); + } if (dax_truncate) filemap_invalidate_unlock(inode->i_mapping); - - if (is_wb_truncate | dax_truncate) { - fuse_release_nowrite(inode); +out_inode_unlock: + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) inode_unlock(inode); - } return err; }

3 years, 4 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] fuse: fix deadlock between atomic O_TRUNC and page" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 2fdbb8dd01556e1501132b5ad3826e8f71e24a8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 15:48:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] fuse: fix deadlock between atomic O_TRUNC and page invalidation fuse_finish_open() will be called with FUSE_NOWRITE set in case of atomic O_TRUNC open(), so commit 76224355db75 ("fuse: truncate pagecache on atomic_o_trunc") replaced invalidate_inode_pages2() by truncate_pagecache() in such a case to avoid the A-A deadlock. However, we found another A-B-B-A deadlock related to the case above, which will cause the xfstests generic/464 testcase hung in our virtio-fs test environment. For example, consider two processes concurrently open one same file, one with O_TRUNC and another without O_TRUNC. The deadlock case is described below, if open(O_TRUNC) is already set_nowrite(acquired A), and is trying to lock a page (acquiring B), open() could have held the page lock (acquired B), and waiting on the page writeback (acquiring A). This would lead to deadlocks. open(O_TRUNC) ---------------------------------------------------------------- fuse_open_common inode_lock [C acquire] fuse_set_nowrite [A acquire] fuse_finish_open truncate_pagecache lock_page [B acquire] truncate_inode_page unlock_page [B release] fuse_release_nowrite [A release] inode_unlock [C release] ---------------------------------------------------------------- open() ---------------------------------------------------------------- fuse_open_common fuse_finish_open invalidate_inode_pages2 lock_page [B acquire] fuse_launder_page fuse_wait_on_page_writeback [A acquire & release] unlock_page [B release] ---------------------------------------------------------------- Besides this case, all calls of invalidate_inode_pages2() and invalidate_inode_pages2_range() in fuse code also can deadlock with open(O_TRUNC). Fix by moving the truncate_pagecache() call outside the nowrite protected region. The nowrite protection is only for delayed writeback (writeback_cache) case, where inode lock does not protect against truncation racing with writes on the server. Write syscalls racing with page cache truncation still get the inode lock protection. This patch also changes the order of filemap_invalidate_lock() vs. fuse_set_nowrite() in fuse_open_common(). This new order matches the order found in fuse_file_fallocate() and fuse_do_setattr(). Reported-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee(a)bytedance.com> Tested-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee(a)bytedance.com> Fixes: e4648309b85a ("fuse: truncate pending writes on O_TRUNC") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c index 74303d6e987b..a93d675a726a 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c @@ -537,6 +537,7 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, struct fuse_file *ff; void *security_ctx = NULL; u32 security_ctxlen; + bool trunc = flags & O_TRUNC; /* Userspace expects S_IFREG in create mode */ BUG_ON((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFREG); @@ -561,7 +562,7 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, inarg.mode = mode; inarg.umask = current_umask(); - if (fm->fc->handle_killpriv_v2 && (flags & O_TRUNC) && + if (fm->fc->handle_killpriv_v2 && trunc && !(flags & O_EXCL) && !capable(CAP_FSETID)) { inarg.open_flags |= FUSE_OPEN_KILL_SUIDGID; } @@ -623,6 +624,10 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, } else { file->private_data = ff; fuse_finish_open(inode, file); + if (fm->fc->atomic_o_trunc && trunc) + truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); + else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) + invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); } return err; diff --git a/fs/fuse/file.c b/fs/fuse/file.c index 60885ff9157c..dfee142bca5c 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/file.c +++ b/fs/fuse/file.c @@ -210,13 +210,9 @@ void fuse_finish_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) fi->attr_version = atomic64_inc_return(&fc->attr_version); i_size_write(inode, 0); spin_unlock(&fi->lock); - truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); file_update_time(file); fuse_invalidate_attr_mask(inode, FUSE_STATX_MODSIZE); - } else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) { - invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); } - if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && fc->writeback_cache) fuse_link_write_file(file); } @@ -239,30 +235,38 @@ int fuse_open_common(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, bool isdir) if (err) return err; - if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) { + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) inode_lock(inode); - fuse_set_nowrite(inode); - } if (dax_truncate) { filemap_invalidate_lock(inode->i_mapping); err = fuse_dax_break_layouts(inode, 0, 0); if (err) - goto out; + goto out_inode_unlock; } + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) + fuse_set_nowrite(inode); + err = fuse_do_open(fm, get_node_id(inode), file, isdir); if (!err) fuse_finish_open(inode, file); -out: + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) + fuse_release_nowrite(inode); + if (!err) { + struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data; + + if (fc->atomic_o_trunc && (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)) + truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); + else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) + invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); + } if (dax_truncate) filemap_invalidate_unlock(inode->i_mapping); - - if (is_wb_truncate | dax_truncate) { - fuse_release_nowrite(inode); +out_inode_unlock: + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) inode_unlock(inode); - } return err; }

3 years, 4 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] fuse: fix deadlock between atomic O_TRUNC and page" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 2fdbb8dd01556e1501132b5ad3826e8f71e24a8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 15:48:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] fuse: fix deadlock between atomic O_TRUNC and page invalidation fuse_finish_open() will be called with FUSE_NOWRITE set in case of atomic O_TRUNC open(), so commit 76224355db75 ("fuse: truncate pagecache on atomic_o_trunc") replaced invalidate_inode_pages2() by truncate_pagecache() in such a case to avoid the A-A deadlock. However, we found another A-B-B-A deadlock related to the case above, which will cause the xfstests generic/464 testcase hung in our virtio-fs test environment. For example, consider two processes concurrently open one same file, one with O_TRUNC and another without O_TRUNC. The deadlock case is described below, if open(O_TRUNC) is already set_nowrite(acquired A), and is trying to lock a page (acquiring B), open() could have held the page lock (acquired B), and waiting on the page writeback (acquiring A). This would lead to deadlocks. open(O_TRUNC) ---------------------------------------------------------------- fuse_open_common inode_lock [C acquire] fuse_set_nowrite [A acquire] fuse_finish_open truncate_pagecache lock_page [B acquire] truncate_inode_page unlock_page [B release] fuse_release_nowrite [A release] inode_unlock [C release] ---------------------------------------------------------------- open() ---------------------------------------------------------------- fuse_open_common fuse_finish_open invalidate_inode_pages2 lock_page [B acquire] fuse_launder_page fuse_wait_on_page_writeback [A acquire & release] unlock_page [B release] ---------------------------------------------------------------- Besides this case, all calls of invalidate_inode_pages2() and invalidate_inode_pages2_range() in fuse code also can deadlock with open(O_TRUNC). Fix by moving the truncate_pagecache() call outside the nowrite protected region. The nowrite protection is only for delayed writeback (writeback_cache) case, where inode lock does not protect against truncation racing with writes on the server. Write syscalls racing with page cache truncation still get the inode lock protection. This patch also changes the order of filemap_invalidate_lock() vs. fuse_set_nowrite() in fuse_open_common(). This new order matches the order found in fuse_file_fallocate() and fuse_do_setattr(). Reported-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee(a)bytedance.com> Tested-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee(a)bytedance.com> Fixes: e4648309b85a ("fuse: truncate pending writes on O_TRUNC") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c index 74303d6e987b..a93d675a726a 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c @@ -537,6 +537,7 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, struct fuse_file *ff; void *security_ctx = NULL; u32 security_ctxlen; + bool trunc = flags & O_TRUNC; /* Userspace expects S_IFREG in create mode */ BUG_ON((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFREG); @@ -561,7 +562,7 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, inarg.mode = mode; inarg.umask = current_umask(); - if (fm->fc->handle_killpriv_v2 && (flags & O_TRUNC) && + if (fm->fc->handle_killpriv_v2 && trunc && !(flags & O_EXCL) && !capable(CAP_FSETID)) { inarg.open_flags |= FUSE_OPEN_KILL_SUIDGID; } @@ -623,6 +624,10 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, } else { file->private_data = ff; fuse_finish_open(inode, file); + if (fm->fc->atomic_o_trunc && trunc) + truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); + else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) + invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); } return err; diff --git a/fs/fuse/file.c b/fs/fuse/file.c index 60885ff9157c..dfee142bca5c 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/file.c +++ b/fs/fuse/file.c @@ -210,13 +210,9 @@ void fuse_finish_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) fi->attr_version = atomic64_inc_return(&fc->attr_version); i_size_write(inode, 0); spin_unlock(&fi->lock); - truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); file_update_time(file); fuse_invalidate_attr_mask(inode, FUSE_STATX_MODSIZE); - } else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) { - invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); } - if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && fc->writeback_cache) fuse_link_write_file(file); } @@ -239,30 +235,38 @@ int fuse_open_common(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, bool isdir) if (err) return err; - if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) { + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) inode_lock(inode); - fuse_set_nowrite(inode); - } if (dax_truncate) { filemap_invalidate_lock(inode->i_mapping); err = fuse_dax_break_layouts(inode, 0, 0); if (err) - goto out; + goto out_inode_unlock; } + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) + fuse_set_nowrite(inode); + err = fuse_do_open(fm, get_node_id(inode), file, isdir); if (!err) fuse_finish_open(inode, file); -out: + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) + fuse_release_nowrite(inode); + if (!err) { + struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data; + + if (fc->atomic_o_trunc && (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)) + truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); + else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) + invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); + } if (dax_truncate) filemap_invalidate_unlock(inode->i_mapping); - - if (is_wb_truncate | dax_truncate) { - fuse_release_nowrite(inode); +out_inode_unlock: + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) inode_unlock(inode); - } return err; }

3 years, 4 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] fuse: fix deadlock between atomic O_TRUNC and page" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 2fdbb8dd01556e1501132b5ad3826e8f71e24a8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi(a)redhat.com> Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 15:48:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] fuse: fix deadlock between atomic O_TRUNC and page invalidation fuse_finish_open() will be called with FUSE_NOWRITE set in case of atomic O_TRUNC open(), so commit 76224355db75 ("fuse: truncate pagecache on atomic_o_trunc") replaced invalidate_inode_pages2() by truncate_pagecache() in such a case to avoid the A-A deadlock. However, we found another A-B-B-A deadlock related to the case above, which will cause the xfstests generic/464 testcase hung in our virtio-fs test environment. For example, consider two processes concurrently open one same file, one with O_TRUNC and another without O_TRUNC. The deadlock case is described below, if open(O_TRUNC) is already set_nowrite(acquired A), and is trying to lock a page (acquiring B), open() could have held the page lock (acquired B), and waiting on the page writeback (acquiring A). This would lead to deadlocks. open(O_TRUNC) ---------------------------------------------------------------- fuse_open_common inode_lock [C acquire] fuse_set_nowrite [A acquire] fuse_finish_open truncate_pagecache lock_page [B acquire] truncate_inode_page unlock_page [B release] fuse_release_nowrite [A release] inode_unlock [C release] ---------------------------------------------------------------- open() ---------------------------------------------------------------- fuse_open_common fuse_finish_open invalidate_inode_pages2 lock_page [B acquire] fuse_launder_page fuse_wait_on_page_writeback [A acquire & release] unlock_page [B release] ---------------------------------------------------------------- Besides this case, all calls of invalidate_inode_pages2() and invalidate_inode_pages2_range() in fuse code also can deadlock with open(O_TRUNC). Fix by moving the truncate_pagecache() call outside the nowrite protected region. The nowrite protection is only for delayed writeback (writeback_cache) case, where inode lock does not protect against truncation racing with writes on the server. Write syscalls racing with page cache truncation still get the inode lock protection. This patch also changes the order of filemap_invalidate_lock() vs. fuse_set_nowrite() in fuse_open_common(). This new order matches the order found in fuse_file_fallocate() and fuse_do_setattr(). Reported-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee(a)bytedance.com> Tested-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee(a)bytedance.com> Fixes: e4648309b85a ("fuse: truncate pending writes on O_TRUNC") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c index 74303d6e987b..a93d675a726a 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c @@ -537,6 +537,7 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, struct fuse_file *ff; void *security_ctx = NULL; u32 security_ctxlen; + bool trunc = flags & O_TRUNC; /* Userspace expects S_IFREG in create mode */ BUG_ON((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFREG); @@ -561,7 +562,7 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, inarg.mode = mode; inarg.umask = current_umask(); - if (fm->fc->handle_killpriv_v2 && (flags & O_TRUNC) && + if (fm->fc->handle_killpriv_v2 && trunc && !(flags & O_EXCL) && !capable(CAP_FSETID)) { inarg.open_flags |= FUSE_OPEN_KILL_SUIDGID; } @@ -623,6 +624,10 @@ static int fuse_create_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, } else { file->private_data = ff; fuse_finish_open(inode, file); + if (fm->fc->atomic_o_trunc && trunc) + truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); + else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) + invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); } return err; diff --git a/fs/fuse/file.c b/fs/fuse/file.c index 60885ff9157c..dfee142bca5c 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/file.c +++ b/fs/fuse/file.c @@ -210,13 +210,9 @@ void fuse_finish_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) fi->attr_version = atomic64_inc_return(&fc->attr_version); i_size_write(inode, 0); spin_unlock(&fi->lock); - truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); file_update_time(file); fuse_invalidate_attr_mask(inode, FUSE_STATX_MODSIZE); - } else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) { - invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); } - if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && fc->writeback_cache) fuse_link_write_file(file); } @@ -239,30 +235,38 @@ int fuse_open_common(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, bool isdir) if (err) return err; - if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) { + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) inode_lock(inode); - fuse_set_nowrite(inode); - } if (dax_truncate) { filemap_invalidate_lock(inode->i_mapping); err = fuse_dax_break_layouts(inode, 0, 0); if (err) - goto out; + goto out_inode_unlock; } + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) + fuse_set_nowrite(inode); + err = fuse_do_open(fm, get_node_id(inode), file, isdir); if (!err) fuse_finish_open(inode, file); -out: + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) + fuse_release_nowrite(inode); + if (!err) { + struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data; + + if (fc->atomic_o_trunc && (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)) + truncate_pagecache(inode, 0); + else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE)) + invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); + } if (dax_truncate) filemap_invalidate_unlock(inode->i_mapping); - - if (is_wb_truncate | dax_truncate) { - fuse_release_nowrite(inode); +out_inode_unlock: + if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) inode_unlock(inode); - } return err; }

3 years, 4 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: fix heap-based overflow in set_ntacl_dacl()" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 8f0541186e9ad1b62accc9519cc2b7a7240272a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2022 07:28:51 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] ksmbd: fix heap-based overflow in set_ntacl_dacl() The testcase use SMB2_SET_INFO_HE command to set a malformed file attribute under the label `security.NTACL`. SMB2_QUERY_INFO_HE command in testcase trigger the following overflow. [ 4712.003781] ================================================================== [ 4712.003790] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in build_sec_desc+0x842/0x1dd0 [ksmbd] [ 4712.003807] Write of size 1060 at addr ffff88801e34c068 by task kworker/0:0/4190 [ 4712.003813] CPU: 0 PID: 4190 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc5 #1 [ 4712.003850] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ksmbd] [ 4712.003867] Call Trace: [ 4712.003870] <TASK> [ 4712.003873] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x5f [ 4712.003935] print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5cf [ 4712.003972] ? ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr+0x16d/0x500 [ksmbd] [ 4712.003984] ? cmp_map_id+0x200/0x200 [ 4712.003988] ? build_sec_desc+0x842/0x1dd0 [ksmbd] [ 4712.004000] kasan_report+0xaa/0x120 [ 4712.004045] ? build_sec_desc+0x842/0x1dd0 [ksmbd] [ 4712.004056] kasan_check_range+0x100/0x1e0 [ 4712.004060] memcpy+0x3c/0x60 [ 4712.004064] build_sec_desc+0x842/0x1dd0 [ksmbd] [ 4712.004076] ? parse_sec_desc+0x580/0x580 [ksmbd] [ 4712.004088] ? ksmbd_acls_fattr+0x281/0x410 [ksmbd] [ 4712.004099] smb2_query_info+0xa8f/0x6110 [ksmbd] [ 4712.004111] ? psi_group_change+0x856/0xd70 [ 4712.004148] ? update_load_avg+0x1c3/0x1af0 [ 4712.004152] ? asym_cpu_capacity_scan+0x5d0/0x5d0 [ 4712.004157] ? xas_load+0x23/0x300 [ 4712.004162] ? smb2_query_dir+0x1530/0x1530 [ksmbd] [ 4712.004173] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0xe0/0xe0 [ 4712.004179] handle_ksmbd_work+0x30e/0x1020 [ksmbd] [ 4712.004192] process_one_work+0x778/0x11c0 [ 4712.004227] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8e/0xe0 [ 4712.004231] worker_thread+0x544/0x1180 [ 4712.004234] ? __cpuidle_text_end+0x4/0x4 [ 4712.004239] kthread+0x282/0x320 [ 4712.004243] ? process_one_work+0x11c0/0x11c0 [ 4712.004246] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x30/0x30 [ 4712.004282] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 This patch add the buffer validation for security descriptor that is stored by malformed SMB2_SET_INFO_HE command. and allocate large response buffer about SMB2_O_INFO_SECURITY file info class. Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: zdi-disclosures(a)trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-17771 Reviewed-by: Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c index 5943cb17a9b0..9751cc92c111 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c @@ -535,9 +535,10 @@ int smb2_allocate_rsp_buf(struct ksmbd_work *work) struct smb2_query_info_req *req; req = smb2_get_msg(work->request_buf); - if (req->InfoType == SMB2_O_INFO_FILE && - (req->FileInfoClass == FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION || - req->FileInfoClass == FILE_ALL_INFORMATION)) + if ((req->InfoType == SMB2_O_INFO_FILE && + (req->FileInfoClass == FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION || + req->FileInfoClass == FILE_ALL_INFORMATION)) || + req->InfoType == SMB2_O_INFO_SECURITY) sz = large_sz; } @@ -2988,7 +2989,7 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) goto err_out; rc = build_sec_desc(user_ns, - pntsd, NULL, + pntsd, NULL, 0, OWNER_SECINFO | GROUP_SECINFO | DACL_SECINFO, @@ -3833,6 +3834,15 @@ static int verify_info_level(int info_level) return 0; } +static int smb2_resp_buf_len(struct ksmbd_work *work, unsigned short hdr2_len) +{ + int free_len; + + free_len = (int)(work->response_sz - + (get_rfc1002_len(work->response_buf) + 4)) - hdr2_len; + return free_len; +} + static int smb2_calc_max_out_buf_len(struct ksmbd_work *work, unsigned short hdr2_len, unsigned int out_buf_len) @@ -3842,9 +3852,7 @@ static int smb2_calc_max_out_buf_len(struct ksmbd_work *work, if (out_buf_len > work->conn->vals->max_trans_size) return -EINVAL; - free_len = (int)(work->response_sz - - (get_rfc1002_len(work->response_buf) + 4)) - - hdr2_len; + free_len = smb2_resp_buf_len(work, hdr2_len); if (free_len < 0) return -EINVAL; @@ -5107,10 +5115,10 @@ static int smb2_get_info_sec(struct ksmbd_work *work, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd = (struct smb_ntsd *)rsp->Buffer, *ppntsd = NULL; struct smb_fattr fattr = {{0}}; struct inode *inode; - __u32 secdesclen; + __u32 secdesclen = 0; unsigned int id = KSMBD_NO_FID, pid = KSMBD_NO_FID; int addition_info = le32_to_cpu(req->AdditionalInformation); - int rc; + int rc = 0, ppntsd_size = 0; if (addition_info & ~(OWNER_SECINFO | GROUP_SECINFO | DACL_SECINFO | PROTECTED_DACL_SECINFO | @@ -5156,11 +5164,14 @@ static int smb2_get_info_sec(struct ksmbd_work *work, if (test_share_config_flag(work->tcon->share_conf, KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_ACL_XATTR)) - ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr(work->conn, user_ns, - fp->filp->f_path.dentry, &ppntsd); - - rc = build_sec_desc(user_ns, pntsd, ppntsd, addition_info, - &secdesclen, &fattr); + ppntsd_size = ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr(work->conn, user_ns, + fp->filp->f_path.dentry, + &ppntsd); + + /* Check if sd buffer size exceeds response buffer size */ + if (smb2_resp_buf_len(work, 8) > ppntsd_size) + rc = build_sec_desc(user_ns, pntsd, ppntsd, ppntsd_size, + addition_info, &secdesclen, &fattr); posix_acl_release(fattr.cf_acls); posix_acl_release(fattr.cf_dacls); kfree(ppntsd); diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c b/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c index 38f23bf981ac..3781bca2c8fc 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c @@ -690,6 +690,7 @@ static void set_posix_acl_entries_dacl(struct user_namespace *user_ns, static void set_ntacl_dacl(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct smb_acl *pndacl, struct smb_acl *nt_dacl, + unsigned int aces_size, const struct smb_sid *pownersid, const struct smb_sid *pgrpsid, struct smb_fattr *fattr) @@ -703,9 +704,19 @@ static void set_ntacl_dacl(struct user_namespace *user_ns, if (nt_num_aces) { ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)nt_dacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl)); for (i = 0; i < nt_num_aces; i++) { - memcpy((char *)pndace + size, ntace, le16_to_cpu(ntace->size)); - size += le16_to_cpu(ntace->size); - ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)ntace + le16_to_cpu(ntace->size)); + unsigned short nt_ace_size; + + if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size) + break; + + nt_ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ntace->size); + if (nt_ace_size > aces_size) + break; + + memcpy((char *)pndace + size, ntace, nt_ace_size); + size += nt_ace_size; + aces_size -= nt_ace_size; + ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)ntace + nt_ace_size); num_aces++; } } @@ -878,7 +889,7 @@ int parse_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, /* Convert permission bits from mode to equivalent CIFS ACL */ int build_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, struct smb_ntsd *ppntsd, - int addition_info, __u32 *secdesclen, + int ppntsd_size, int addition_info, __u32 *secdesclen, struct smb_fattr *fattr) { int rc = 0; @@ -938,15 +949,25 @@ int build_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns, if (!ppntsd) { set_mode_dacl(user_ns, dacl_ptr, fattr); - } else if (!ppntsd->dacloffset) { - goto out; } else { struct smb_acl *ppdacl_ptr; + unsigned int dacl_offset = le32_to_cpu(ppntsd->dacloffset); + int ppdacl_size, ntacl_size = ppntsd_size - dacl_offset; + + if (!dacl_offset || + (dacl_offset + sizeof(struct smb_acl) > ppntsd_size)) + goto out; + + ppdacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)ppntsd + dacl_offset); + ppdacl_size = le16_to_cpu(ppdacl_ptr->size); + if (ppdacl_size > ntacl_size || + ppdacl_size < sizeof(struct smb_acl)) + goto out; - ppdacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)ppntsd + - le32_to_cpu(ppntsd->dacloffset)); set_ntacl_dacl(user_ns, dacl_ptr, ppdacl_ptr, - nowner_sid_ptr, ngroup_sid_ptr, fattr); + ntacl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl), + nowner_sid_ptr, ngroup_sid_ptr, + fattr); } pntsd->dacloffset = cpu_to_le32(offset); offset += le16_to_cpu(dacl_ptr->size); @@ -980,24 +1001,31 @@ int smb_inherit_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct smb_sid owner_sid, group_sid; struct dentry *parent = path->dentry->d_parent; struct user_namespace *user_ns = mnt_user_ns(path->mnt); - int inherited_flags = 0, flags = 0, i, ace_cnt = 0, nt_size = 0; - int rc = 0, num_aces, dacloffset, pntsd_type, acl_len; + int inherited_flags = 0, flags = 0, i, ace_cnt = 0, nt_size = 0, pdacl_size; + int rc = 0, num_aces, dacloffset, pntsd_type, pntsd_size, acl_len, aces_size; char *aces_base; bool is_dir = S_ISDIR(d_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode); - acl_len = ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr(conn, user_ns, - parent, &parent_pntsd); - if (acl_len <= 0) + pntsd_size = ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr(conn, user_ns, + parent, &parent_pntsd); + if (pntsd_size <= 0) return -ENOENT; dacloffset = le32_to_cpu(parent_pntsd->dacloffset); - if (!dacloffset) { + if (!dacloffset || (dacloffset + sizeof(struct smb_acl) > pntsd_size)) { rc = -EINVAL; goto free_parent_pntsd; } parent_pdacl = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)parent_pntsd + dacloffset); + acl_len = pntsd_size - dacloffset; num_aces = le32_to_cpu(parent_pdacl->num_aces); pntsd_type = le16_to_cpu(parent_pntsd->type); + pdacl_size = le16_to_cpu(parent_pdacl->size); + + if (pdacl_size > acl_len || pdacl_size < sizeof(struct smb_acl)) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto free_parent_pntsd; + } aces_base = kmalloc(sizeof(struct smb_ace) * num_aces * 2, GFP_KERNEL); if (!aces_base) { @@ -1008,11 +1036,23 @@ int smb_inherit_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, aces = (struct smb_ace *)aces_base; parent_aces = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)parent_pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl)); + aces_size = acl_len - sizeof(struct smb_acl); if (pntsd_type & DACL_AUTO_INHERITED) inherited_flags = INHERITED_ACE; for (i = 0; i < num_aces; i++) { + int pace_size; + + if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size) + break; + + pace_size = le16_to_cpu(parent_aces->size); + if (pace_size > aces_size) + break; + + aces_size -= pace_size; + flags = parent_aces->flags; if (!smb_inherit_flags(flags, is_dir)) goto pass; @@ -1057,8 +1097,7 @@ int smb_inherit_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, aces = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)aces + le16_to_cpu(aces->size)); ace_cnt++; pass: - parent_aces = - (struct smb_ace *)((char *)parent_aces + le16_to_cpu(parent_aces->size)); + parent_aces = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)parent_aces + pace_size); } if (nt_size > 0) { @@ -1153,7 +1192,7 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct path *path, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd = NULL; struct smb_acl *pdacl; struct posix_acl *posix_acls; - int rc = 0, acl_size; + int rc = 0, pntsd_size, acl_size, aces_size, pdacl_size, dacl_offset; struct smb_sid sid; int granted = le32_to_cpu(*pdaccess & ~FILE_MAXIMAL_ACCESS_LE); struct smb_ace *ace; @@ -1162,37 +1201,33 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct path *path, struct smb_ace *others_ace = NULL; struct posix_acl_entry *pa_entry; unsigned int sid_type = SIDOWNER; - char *end_of_acl; + unsigned short ace_size; ksmbd_debug(SMB, "check permission using windows acl\n"); - acl_size = ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr(conn, user_ns, - path->dentry, &pntsd); - if (acl_size <= 0 || !pntsd || !pntsd->dacloffset) { - kfree(pntsd); - return 0; - } + pntsd_size = ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr(conn, user_ns, + path->dentry, &pntsd); + if (pntsd_size <= 0 || !pntsd) + goto err_out; + + dacl_offset = le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset); + if (!dacl_offset || + (dacl_offset + sizeof(struct smb_acl) > pntsd_size)) + goto err_out; pdacl = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset)); - end_of_acl = ((char *)pntsd) + acl_size; - if (end_of_acl <= (char *)pdacl) { - kfree(pntsd); - return 0; - } + acl_size = pntsd_size - dacl_offset; + pdacl_size = le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size); - if (end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size) || - le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size) < sizeof(struct smb_acl)) { - kfree(pntsd); - return 0; - } + if (pdacl_size > acl_size || pdacl_size < sizeof(struct smb_acl)) + goto err_out; if (!pdacl->num_aces) { - if (!(le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size) - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) && + if (!(pdacl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) && *pdaccess & ~(FILE_READ_CONTROL_LE | FILE_WRITE_DAC_LE)) { rc = -EACCES; goto err_out; } - kfree(pntsd); - return 0; + goto err_out; } if (*pdaccess & FILE_MAXIMAL_ACCESS_LE) { @@ -1200,11 +1235,16 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct path *path, DELETE; ace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl)); + aces_size = acl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl); for (i = 0; i < le32_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces); i++) { + if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size) + break; + ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size); + if (ace_size > aces_size) + break; + aces_size -= ace_size; granted |= le32_to_cpu(ace->access_req); ace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)ace + le16_to_cpu(ace->size)); - if (end_of_acl < (char *)ace) - goto err_out; } if (!pdacl->num_aces) @@ -1216,7 +1256,15 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct path *path, id_to_sid(uid, sid_type, &sid); ace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl)); + aces_size = acl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl); for (i = 0; i < le32_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces); i++) { + if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size) + break; + ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size); + if (ace_size > aces_size) + break; + aces_size -= ace_size; + if (!compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid) || !compare_sids(&sid_unix_NFS_mode, &ace->sid)) { found = 1; @@ -1226,8 +1274,6 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct path *path, others_ace = ace; ace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)ace + le16_to_cpu(ace->size)); - if (end_of_acl < (char *)ace) - goto err_out; } if (*pdaccess & FILE_MAXIMAL_ACCESS_LE && found) { diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.h b/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.h index 811af3309429..fcb2c83f2992 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.h +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.h @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ struct posix_acl_state { int parse_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, int acl_len, struct smb_fattr *fattr); int build_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, - struct smb_ntsd *ppntsd, int addition_info, + struct smb_ntsd *ppntsd, int ppntsd_size, int addition_info, __u32 *secdesclen, struct smb_fattr *fattr); int init_acl_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt); void free_acl_state(struct posix_acl_state *state); diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/vfs.c b/fs/ksmbd/vfs.c index c23793469645..ea139078b4b7 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/vfs.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/vfs.c @@ -1539,6 +1539,11 @@ int ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, } *pntsd = acl.sd_buf; + if (acl.sd_size < sizeof(struct smb_ntsd)) { + pr_err("sd size is invalid\n"); + goto out_free; + } + (*pntsd)->osidoffset = cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu((*pntsd)->osidoffset) - NDR_NTSD_OFFSETOF); (*pntsd)->gsidoffset = cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu((*pntsd)->gsidoffset) -

3 years, 4 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: prevent out of bound read for SMB2_WRITE" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From ac60778b87e45576d7bfdbd6f53df902654e6f09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2022 23:41:51 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] ksmbd: prevent out of bound read for SMB2_WRITE OOB read memory can be written to a file, if DataOffset is 0 and Length is too large in SMB2_WRITE request of compound request. To prevent this, when checking the length of the data area of SMB2_WRITE in smb2_get_data_area_len(), let the minimum of DataOffset be the size of SMB2 header + the size of SMB2_WRITE header. This bug can lead an oops looking something like: [ 798.008715] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0xd3d/0x14b0 [ 798.008724] Read of size 252 at addr ffff88800f863e90 by task kworker/0:2/2859 ... [ 798.008754] Call Trace: [ 798.008756] <TASK> [ 798.008759] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x5f [ 798.008764] print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5cf [ 798.008768] ? __filemap_get_folio+0x285/0x6d0 [ 798.008774] ? copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0xd3d/0x14b0 [ 798.008777] kasan_report+0xaa/0x120 [ 798.008781] ? copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0xd3d/0x14b0 [ 798.008784] kasan_check_range+0x100/0x1e0 [ 798.008788] memcpy+0x24/0x60 [ 798.008792] copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0xd3d/0x14b0 [ 798.008795] ? pagecache_get_page+0x53/0x160 [ 798.008799] ? iov_iter_get_pages_alloc+0x1590/0x1590 [ 798.008803] ? ext4_write_begin+0xfc0/0xfc0 [ 798.008807] ? current_time+0x72/0x210 [ 798.008811] generic_perform_write+0x2c8/0x530 [ 798.008816] ? filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x180/0x180 [ 798.008820] ? down_write+0xb4/0x120 [ 798.008824] ? down_write_killable+0x130/0x130 [ 798.008829] ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x137/0x2c0 [ 798.008833] ext4_file_write_iter+0x40b/0x1490 [ 798.008837] ? __fsnotify_parent+0x275/0xb20 [ 798.008842] ? __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags+0x2c0/0x2c0 [ 798.008846] ? ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x2c0/0x2c0 [ 798.008851] __kernel_write+0x3a1/0xa70 [ 798.008855] ? __x64_sys_preadv2+0x160/0x160 [ 798.008860] ? security_file_permission+0x4a/0xa0 [ 798.008865] kernel_write+0xbb/0x360 [ 798.008869] ksmbd_vfs_write+0x27e/0xb90 [ksmbd] [ 798.008881] ? ksmbd_vfs_read+0x830/0x830 [ksmbd] [ 798.008892] ? _raw_read_unlock+0x2a/0x50 [ 798.008896] smb2_write+0xb45/0x14e0 [ksmbd] [ 798.008909] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 798.008912] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0xd0/0xe0 [ 798.008916] ? smb2_read+0x15e0/0x15e0 [ksmbd] [ 798.008927] ? memcpy+0x4e/0x60 [ 798.008931] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x19/0x30 [ 798.008934] ? ksmbd_smb2_check_message+0x16af/0x2350 [ksmbd] [ 798.008946] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0xe0/0xe0 [ 798.008950] handle_ksmbd_work+0x30e/0x1020 [ksmbd] [ 798.008962] process_one_work+0x778/0x11c0 [ 798.008966] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8e/0xe0 [ 798.008970] worker_thread+0x544/0x1180 [ 798.008973] ? __cpuidle_text_end+0x4/0x4 [ 798.008977] kthread+0x282/0x320 [ 798.008982] ? process_one_work+0x11c0/0x11c0 [ 798.008985] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x30/0x30 [ 798.008989] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 798.008995] </TASK> Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: zdi-disclosures(a)trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-17817 Signed-off-by: Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c index f8f456377a51..aa1e663d9deb 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c @@ -136,8 +136,11 @@ static int smb2_get_data_area_len(unsigned int *off, unsigned int *len, *len = le16_to_cpu(((struct smb2_read_req *)hdr)->ReadChannelInfoLength); break; case SMB2_WRITE: - if (((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->DataOffset) { - *off = le16_to_cpu(((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->DataOffset); + if (((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->DataOffset || + ((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->Length) { + *off = max_t(unsigned int, + le16_to_cpu(((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->DataOffset), + offsetof(struct smb2_write_req, Buffer)); *len = le32_to_cpu(((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->Length); break; } diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c index 43bc027a50f2..5943cb17a9b0 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c @@ -6514,14 +6514,12 @@ int smb2_write(struct ksmbd_work *work) writethrough = true; if (is_rdma_channel == false) { - if ((u64)le16_to_cpu(req->DataOffset) + length > - get_rfc1002_len(work->request_buf)) { - pr_err("invalid write data offset %u, smb_len %u\n", - le16_to_cpu(req->DataOffset), - get_rfc1002_len(work->request_buf)); + if (le16_to_cpu(req->DataOffset) < + offsetof(struct smb2_write_req, Buffer)) { err = -EINVAL; goto out; } + data_buf = (char *)(((char *)&req->hdr.ProtocolId) + le16_to_cpu(req->DataOffset));

3 years, 4 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: prevent out of bound read for SMB2_WRITE" failed to apply to 5.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.18-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From ac60778b87e45576d7bfdbd6f53df902654e6f09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2022 23:41:51 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] ksmbd: prevent out of bound read for SMB2_WRITE OOB read memory can be written to a file, if DataOffset is 0 and Length is too large in SMB2_WRITE request of compound request. To prevent this, when checking the length of the data area of SMB2_WRITE in smb2_get_data_area_len(), let the minimum of DataOffset be the size of SMB2 header + the size of SMB2_WRITE header. This bug can lead an oops looking something like: [ 798.008715] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0xd3d/0x14b0 [ 798.008724] Read of size 252 at addr ffff88800f863e90 by task kworker/0:2/2859 ... [ 798.008754] Call Trace: [ 798.008756] <TASK> [ 798.008759] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x5f [ 798.008764] print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5cf [ 798.008768] ? __filemap_get_folio+0x285/0x6d0 [ 798.008774] ? copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0xd3d/0x14b0 [ 798.008777] kasan_report+0xaa/0x120 [ 798.008781] ? copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0xd3d/0x14b0 [ 798.008784] kasan_check_range+0x100/0x1e0 [ 798.008788] memcpy+0x24/0x60 [ 798.008792] copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0xd3d/0x14b0 [ 798.008795] ? pagecache_get_page+0x53/0x160 [ 798.008799] ? iov_iter_get_pages_alloc+0x1590/0x1590 [ 798.008803] ? ext4_write_begin+0xfc0/0xfc0 [ 798.008807] ? current_time+0x72/0x210 [ 798.008811] generic_perform_write+0x2c8/0x530 [ 798.008816] ? filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x180/0x180 [ 798.008820] ? down_write+0xb4/0x120 [ 798.008824] ? down_write_killable+0x130/0x130 [ 798.008829] ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x137/0x2c0 [ 798.008833] ext4_file_write_iter+0x40b/0x1490 [ 798.008837] ? __fsnotify_parent+0x275/0xb20 [ 798.008842] ? __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags+0x2c0/0x2c0 [ 798.008846] ? ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x2c0/0x2c0 [ 798.008851] __kernel_write+0x3a1/0xa70 [ 798.008855] ? __x64_sys_preadv2+0x160/0x160 [ 798.008860] ? security_file_permission+0x4a/0xa0 [ 798.008865] kernel_write+0xbb/0x360 [ 798.008869] ksmbd_vfs_write+0x27e/0xb90 [ksmbd] [ 798.008881] ? ksmbd_vfs_read+0x830/0x830 [ksmbd] [ 798.008892] ? _raw_read_unlock+0x2a/0x50 [ 798.008896] smb2_write+0xb45/0x14e0 [ksmbd] [ 798.008909] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 798.008912] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0xd0/0xe0 [ 798.008916] ? smb2_read+0x15e0/0x15e0 [ksmbd] [ 798.008927] ? memcpy+0x4e/0x60 [ 798.008931] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x19/0x30 [ 798.008934] ? ksmbd_smb2_check_message+0x16af/0x2350 [ksmbd] [ 798.008946] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0xe0/0xe0 [ 798.008950] handle_ksmbd_work+0x30e/0x1020 [ksmbd] [ 798.008962] process_one_work+0x778/0x11c0 [ 798.008966] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8e/0xe0 [ 798.008970] worker_thread+0x544/0x1180 [ 798.008973] ? __cpuidle_text_end+0x4/0x4 [ 798.008977] kthread+0x282/0x320 [ 798.008982] ? process_one_work+0x11c0/0x11c0 [ 798.008985] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x30/0x30 [ 798.008989] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 798.008995] </TASK> Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: zdi-disclosures(a)trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-17817 Signed-off-by: Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c index f8f456377a51..aa1e663d9deb 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c @@ -136,8 +136,11 @@ static int smb2_get_data_area_len(unsigned int *off, unsigned int *len, *len = le16_to_cpu(((struct smb2_read_req *)hdr)->ReadChannelInfoLength); break; case SMB2_WRITE: - if (((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->DataOffset) { - *off = le16_to_cpu(((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->DataOffset); + if (((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->DataOffset || + ((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->Length) { + *off = max_t(unsigned int, + le16_to_cpu(((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->DataOffset), + offsetof(struct smb2_write_req, Buffer)); *len = le32_to_cpu(((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->Length); break; } diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c index 43bc027a50f2..5943cb17a9b0 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c @@ -6514,14 +6514,12 @@ int smb2_write(struct ksmbd_work *work) writethrough = true; if (is_rdma_channel == false) { - if ((u64)le16_to_cpu(req->DataOffset) + length > - get_rfc1002_len(work->request_buf)) { - pr_err("invalid write data offset %u, smb_len %u\n", - le16_to_cpu(req->DataOffset), - get_rfc1002_len(work->request_buf)); + if (le16_to_cpu(req->DataOffset) < + offsetof(struct smb2_write_req, Buffer)) { err = -EINVAL; goto out; } + data_buf = (char *)(((char *)&req->hdr.ProtocolId) + le16_to_cpu(req->DataOffset));

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