August 2022 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH] wifi: mac80211: Don't finalize CSA in IBSS mode if state is disconnected

by Siddh Raman Pant

When we are not connected to a channel, sending channel "switch" announcement doesn't make any sense. The BSS list is empty in that case. This causes the for loop in cfg80211_get_bss() to be bypassed, so the function returns NULL (check line 1424 of net/wireless/scan.c), causing the WARN_ON() in ieee80211_ibss_csa_beacon() to get triggered (check line 500 of net/mac80211/ibss.c), which was consequently reported on the syzkaller dashboard. Thus, check if we have an existing connection before generating the CSA beacon in ieee80211_ibss_finish_csa(). Fixes: cd7760e62c2a ("mac80211: add support for CSA in IBSS mode") Bug report: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=05603ef4ae8926761b678d2939a3b2ad28ab9c… Reported-by: syzbot+b6c9fe29aefe68e4ad34(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Siddh Raman Pant <code(a)siddh.me> --- The fixes commit is old, and syzkaller shows the problem exists for 4.19 and 4.14 as well, so CC'd stable list. net/mac80211/ibss.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/mac80211/ibss.c b/net/mac80211/ibss.c index d56890e3fabb..9b283bbc7bb4 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ibss.c +++ b/net/mac80211/ibss.c @@ -530,6 +530,10 @@ int ieee80211_ibss_finish_csa(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) sdata_assert_lock(sdata); + /* When not connected/joined, sending CSA doesn't make sense. */ + if (ifibss->state != IEEE80211_IBSS_MLME_JOINED) + return -ENOLINK; + /* update cfg80211 bss information with the new channel */ if (!is_zero_ether_addr(ifibss->bssid)) { cbss = cfg80211_get_bss(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, -- 2.35.1

2 years, 5 months

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Re

by Benita Henderson

I was actually expecting a response from you regarding that info

2 years, 5 months

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[PATCH] tpm: fix potential race condition in suspend/resume

by Sven van Ashbrook

Concurrent accesses to the tpm chip are prevented by allowing only a single thread at a time to obtain a tpm chip reference through tpm_try_get_ops(). However, the tpm's suspend function does not use this mechanism, so when the tpm api is called by a kthread which does not get frozen on suspend (such as the hw_random kthread) it's possible that the tpm is used when already in suspend, or in use while in the process of suspending. This is seen on certain ChromeOS platforms - low-probability warnings are generated during suspend. In this case, the tpm attempted to read data from a tpm chip on an already-suspended bus. i2c_designware i2c_designware.1: Transfer while suspended Fix: 1. prevent concurrent execution of tpm accesses and suspend/ resume, by letting suspend/resume grab the tpm_mutex. 2. before commencing a tpm access, check if the tpm chip is already suspended. Fail with -EAGAIN if so. Tested by running 6000 suspend/resume cycles back-to-back on a ChromeOS "brya" device. The intermittent warnings reliably disappear after applying this patch. No system issues were observed. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Fixes: e891db1a18bf ("tpm: turn on TPM on suspend for TPM 1.x") Signed-off-by: Sven van Ashbrook <svenva(a)chromium.org> --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ include/linux/tpm.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c index 1621ce818705..16ca490fd483 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c @@ -82,6 +82,11 @@ static ssize_t tpm_try_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, void *buf, size_t bufsiz) return -E2BIG; } + if (chip->is_suspended) { + dev_info(&chip->dev, "blocking transmit while suspended\n"); + return -EAGAIN; + } + rc = chip->ops->send(chip, buf, count); if (rc < 0) { if (rc != -EPIPE) @@ -394,6 +399,8 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev) if (!chip) return -ENODEV; + mutex_lock(&chip->tpm_mutex); + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_ALWAYS_POWERED) goto suspended; @@ -411,6 +418,11 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev) } suspended: + if (!rc) + chip->is_suspended = true; + + mutex_unlock(&chip->tpm_mutex); + return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pm_suspend); @@ -426,6 +438,10 @@ int tpm_pm_resume(struct device *dev) if (chip == NULL) return -ENODEV; + mutex_lock(&chip->tpm_mutex); + chip->is_suspended = false; + mutex_unlock(&chip->tpm_mutex); + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pm_resume); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index d7c67581929f..0fbc1a43ae80 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -131,6 +131,8 @@ struct tpm_chip { int dev_num; /* /dev/tpm# */ unsigned long is_open; /* only one allowed */ + bool is_suspended; + char hwrng_name[64]; struct hwrng hwrng; -- 2.37.1.559.g78731f0fdb-goog

2 years, 5 months

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.9 1/8] tty: serial: Fix refcount leak bug in ucc_uart.c

by Sasha Levin

From: Liang He <windhl(a)126.com> [ Upstream commit d24d7bb2cd947676f9b71fb944d045e09b8b282f ] In soc_info(), of_find_node_by_type() will return a node pointer with refcount incremented. We should use of_node_put() when it is not used anymore. Acked-by: Timur Tabi <timur(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liang He <windhl(a)126.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220618060850.4058525-1-windhl@126.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/tty/serial/ucc_uart.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/ucc_uart.c b/drivers/tty/serial/ucc_uart.c index 481eb2989a1e..ed1658b61e54 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/ucc_uart.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/ucc_uart.c @@ -1143,6 +1143,8 @@ static unsigned int soc_info(unsigned int *rev_h, unsigned int *rev_l) /* No compatible property, so try the name. */ soc_string = np->name; + of_node_put(np); + /* Extract the SOC number from the "PowerPC," string */ if ((sscanf(soc_string, "PowerPC,%u", &soc) != 1) || !soc) return 0; -- 2.35.1

2 years, 5 months

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 1/9] tty: serial: Fix refcount leak bug in ucc_uart.c

by Sasha Levin

From: Liang He <windhl(a)126.com> [ Upstream commit d24d7bb2cd947676f9b71fb944d045e09b8b282f ] In soc_info(), of_find_node_by_type() will return a node pointer with refcount incremented. We should use of_node_put() when it is not used anymore. Acked-by: Timur Tabi <timur(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liang He <windhl(a)126.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220618060850.4058525-1-windhl@126.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/tty/serial/ucc_uart.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/ucc_uart.c b/drivers/tty/serial/ucc_uart.c index 55b702775786..40b8e414f48f 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/ucc_uart.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/ucc_uart.c @@ -1143,6 +1143,8 @@ static unsigned int soc_info(unsigned int *rev_h, unsigned int *rev_l) /* No compatible property, so try the name. */ soc_string = np->name; + of_node_put(np); + /* Extract the SOC number from the "PowerPC," string */ if ((sscanf(soc_string, "PowerPC,%u", &soc) != 1) || !soc) return 0; -- 2.35.1

2 years, 5 months

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 01/14] lib/list_debug.c: Detect uninitialized lists

by Sasha Levin

From: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> [ Upstream commit 0cc011c576aaa4de505046f7a6c90933d7c749a9 ] In some circumstances, attempts are made to add entries to or to remove entries from an uninitialized list. A prime example is amdgpu_bo_vm_destroy(): It is indirectly called from ttm_bo_init_reserved() if that function fails, and tries to remove an entry from a list. However, that list is only initialized in amdgpu_bo_create_vm() after the call to ttm_bo_init_reserved() returned success. This results in crashes such as BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 1479 Comm: chrome Not tainted 5.10.110-15768-g29a72e65dae5 Hardware name: Google Grunt/Grunt, BIOS Google_Grunt.11031.149.0 07/15/2020 RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x26/0x7d ... Call Trace: amdgpu_bo_vm_destroy+0x48/0x8b ttm_bo_init_reserved+0x1d7/0x1e0 amdgpu_bo_create+0x212/0x476 ? amdgpu_bo_user_destroy+0x23/0x23 ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x60/0x271 amdgpu_bo_create_vm+0x40/0x7d amdgpu_vm_pt_create+0xe8/0x24b ... Check if the list's prev and next pointers are NULL to catch such problems. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220531222951.92073-1-linux@roeck-us.net Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- lib/list_debug.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/list_debug.c b/lib/list_debug.c index 5d5424b51b74..413daa72a3d8 100644 --- a/lib/list_debug.c +++ b/lib/list_debug.c @@ -20,7 +20,11 @@ bool __list_add_valid(struct list_head *new, struct list_head *prev, struct list_head *next) { - if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next->prev != prev, + if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev == NULL, + "list_add corruption. prev is NULL.\n") || + CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == NULL, + "list_add corruption. next is NULL.\n") || + CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next->prev != prev, "list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (%px), but was %px. (next=%px).\n", prev, next->prev, next) || CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev->next != next, @@ -42,7 +46,11 @@ bool __list_del_entry_valid(struct list_head *entry) prev = entry->prev; next = entry->next; - if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == LIST_POISON1, + if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == NULL, + "list_del corruption, %px->next is NULL\n", entry) || + CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev == NULL, + "list_del corruption, %px->prev is NULL\n", entry) || + CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == LIST_POISON1, "list_del corruption, %px->next is LIST_POISON1 (%px)\n", entry, LIST_POISON1) || CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev == LIST_POISON2, -- 2.35.1

2 years, 5 months

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 01/16] lib/list_debug.c: Detect uninitialized lists

by Sasha Levin

From: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> [ Upstream commit 0cc011c576aaa4de505046f7a6c90933d7c749a9 ] In some circumstances, attempts are made to add entries to or to remove entries from an uninitialized list. A prime example is amdgpu_bo_vm_destroy(): It is indirectly called from ttm_bo_init_reserved() if that function fails, and tries to remove an entry from a list. However, that list is only initialized in amdgpu_bo_create_vm() after the call to ttm_bo_init_reserved() returned success. This results in crashes such as BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 1479 Comm: chrome Not tainted 5.10.110-15768-g29a72e65dae5 Hardware name: Google Grunt/Grunt, BIOS Google_Grunt.11031.149.0 07/15/2020 RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x26/0x7d ... Call Trace: amdgpu_bo_vm_destroy+0x48/0x8b ttm_bo_init_reserved+0x1d7/0x1e0 amdgpu_bo_create+0x212/0x476 ? amdgpu_bo_user_destroy+0x23/0x23 ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x60/0x271 amdgpu_bo_create_vm+0x40/0x7d amdgpu_vm_pt_create+0xe8/0x24b ... Check if the list's prev and next pointers are NULL to catch such problems. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220531222951.92073-1-linux@roeck-us.net Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- lib/list_debug.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/list_debug.c b/lib/list_debug.c index 5d5424b51b74..413daa72a3d8 100644 --- a/lib/list_debug.c +++ b/lib/list_debug.c @@ -20,7 +20,11 @@ bool __list_add_valid(struct list_head *new, struct list_head *prev, struct list_head *next) { - if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next->prev != prev, + if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev == NULL, + "list_add corruption. prev is NULL.\n") || + CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == NULL, + "list_add corruption. next is NULL.\n") || + CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next->prev != prev, "list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (%px), but was %px. (next=%px).\n", prev, next->prev, next) || CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev->next != next, @@ -42,7 +46,11 @@ bool __list_del_entry_valid(struct list_head *entry) prev = entry->prev; next = entry->next; - if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == LIST_POISON1, + if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == NULL, + "list_del corruption, %px->next is NULL\n", entry) || + CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev == NULL, + "list_del corruption, %px->prev is NULL\n", entry) || + CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == LIST_POISON1, "list_del corruption, %px->next is LIST_POISON1 (%px)\n", entry, LIST_POISON1) || CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev == LIST_POISON2, -- 2.35.1

2 years, 5 months

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 01/19] lib/list_debug.c: Detect uninitialized lists

by Sasha Levin

From: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> [ Upstream commit 0cc011c576aaa4de505046f7a6c90933d7c749a9 ] In some circumstances, attempts are made to add entries to or to remove entries from an uninitialized list. A prime example is amdgpu_bo_vm_destroy(): It is indirectly called from ttm_bo_init_reserved() if that function fails, and tries to remove an entry from a list. However, that list is only initialized in amdgpu_bo_create_vm() after the call to ttm_bo_init_reserved() returned success. This results in crashes such as BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 1479 Comm: chrome Not tainted 5.10.110-15768-g29a72e65dae5 Hardware name: Google Grunt/Grunt, BIOS Google_Grunt.11031.149.0 07/15/2020 RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x26/0x7d ... Call Trace: amdgpu_bo_vm_destroy+0x48/0x8b ttm_bo_init_reserved+0x1d7/0x1e0 amdgpu_bo_create+0x212/0x476 ? amdgpu_bo_user_destroy+0x23/0x23 ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x60/0x271 amdgpu_bo_create_vm+0x40/0x7d amdgpu_vm_pt_create+0xe8/0x24b ... Check if the list's prev and next pointers are NULL to catch such problems. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220531222951.92073-1-linux@roeck-us.net Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- lib/list_debug.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/list_debug.c b/lib/list_debug.c index 5d5424b51b74..413daa72a3d8 100644 --- a/lib/list_debug.c +++ b/lib/list_debug.c @@ -20,7 +20,11 @@ bool __list_add_valid(struct list_head *new, struct list_head *prev, struct list_head *next) { - if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next->prev != prev, + if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev == NULL, + "list_add corruption. prev is NULL.\n") || + CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == NULL, + "list_add corruption. next is NULL.\n") || + CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next->prev != prev, "list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (%px), but was %px. (next=%px).\n", prev, next->prev, next) || CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev->next != next, @@ -42,7 +46,11 @@ bool __list_del_entry_valid(struct list_head *entry) prev = entry->prev; next = entry->next; - if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == LIST_POISON1, + if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == NULL, + "list_del corruption, %px->next is NULL\n", entry) || + CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev == NULL, + "list_del corruption, %px->prev is NULL\n", entry) || + CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == LIST_POISON1, "list_del corruption, %px->next is LIST_POISON1 (%px)\n", entry, LIST_POISON1) || CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev == LIST_POISON2, -- 2.35.1

2 years, 5 months

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.18 01/39] lib/list_debug.c: Detect uninitialized lists

by Sasha Levin

From: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> [ Upstream commit 0cc011c576aaa4de505046f7a6c90933d7c749a9 ] In some circumstances, attempts are made to add entries to or to remove entries from an uninitialized list. A prime example is amdgpu_bo_vm_destroy(): It is indirectly called from ttm_bo_init_reserved() if that function fails, and tries to remove an entry from a list. However, that list is only initialized in amdgpu_bo_create_vm() after the call to ttm_bo_init_reserved() returned success. This results in crashes such as BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 1479 Comm: chrome Not tainted 5.10.110-15768-g29a72e65dae5 Hardware name: Google Grunt/Grunt, BIOS Google_Grunt.11031.149.0 07/15/2020 RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x26/0x7d ... Call Trace: amdgpu_bo_vm_destroy+0x48/0x8b ttm_bo_init_reserved+0x1d7/0x1e0 amdgpu_bo_create+0x212/0x476 ? amdgpu_bo_user_destroy+0x23/0x23 ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x60/0x271 amdgpu_bo_create_vm+0x40/0x7d amdgpu_vm_pt_create+0xe8/0x24b ... Check if the list's prev and next pointers are NULL to catch such problems. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220531222951.92073-1-linux@roeck-us.net Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- lib/list_debug.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/list_debug.c b/lib/list_debug.c index 9daa3fb9d1cd..d98d43f80958 100644 --- a/lib/list_debug.c +++ b/lib/list_debug.c @@ -20,7 +20,11 @@ bool __list_add_valid(struct list_head *new, struct list_head *prev, struct list_head *next) { - if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next->prev != prev, + if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev == NULL, + "list_add corruption. prev is NULL.\n") || + CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == NULL, + "list_add corruption. next is NULL.\n") || + CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next->prev != prev, "list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (%px), but was %px. (next=%px).\n", prev, next->prev, next) || CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev->next != next, @@ -42,7 +46,11 @@ bool __list_del_entry_valid(struct list_head *entry) prev = entry->prev; next = entry->next; - if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == LIST_POISON1, + if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == NULL, + "list_del corruption, %px->next is NULL\n", entry) || + CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev == NULL, + "list_del corruption, %px->prev is NULL\n", entry) || + CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == LIST_POISON1, "list_del corruption, %px->next is LIST_POISON1 (%px)\n", entry, LIST_POISON1) || CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev == LIST_POISON2, -- 2.35.1

2 years, 5 months

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.9 1/7] irqchip/tegra: Fix overflow implicit truncation warnings

by Sasha Levin

From: Sai Prakash Ranjan <quic_saipraka(a)quicinc.com> [ Upstream commit 443685992bda9bb4f8b17fc02c9f6c60e62b1461 ] Fix -Woverflow warnings for tegra irqchip driver which is a result of moving arm64 custom MMIO accessor macros to asm-generic function implementations giving a bonus type-checking now and uncovering these overflow warnings. drivers/irqchip/irq-tegra.c: In function ‘tegra_ictlr_suspend’: drivers/irqchip/irq-tegra.c:151:18: warning: large integer implicitly truncated to unsigned type [-Woverflow] writel_relaxed(~0ul, ictlr + ICTLR_COP_IER_CLR); ^ Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sai Prakash Ranjan <quic_saipraka(a)quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/irqchip/irq-tegra.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-tegra.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-tegra.c index 3973a14bb15b..02ffefd5011a 100644 --- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-tegra.c +++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-tegra.c @@ -157,10 +157,10 @@ static int tegra_ictlr_suspend(void) lic->cop_iep[i] = readl_relaxed(ictlr + ICTLR_COP_IEP_CLASS); /* Disable COP interrupts */ - writel_relaxed(~0ul, ictlr + ICTLR_COP_IER_CLR); + writel_relaxed(GENMASK(31, 0), ictlr + ICTLR_COP_IER_CLR); /* Disable CPU interrupts */ - writel_relaxed(~0ul, ictlr + ICTLR_CPU_IER_CLR); + writel_relaxed(GENMASK(31, 0), ictlr + ICTLR_CPU_IER_CLR); /* Enable the wakeup sources of ictlr */ writel_relaxed(lic->ictlr_wake_mask[i], ictlr + ICTLR_CPU_IER_SET); @@ -181,12 +181,12 @@ static void tegra_ictlr_resume(void) writel_relaxed(lic->cpu_iep[i], ictlr + ICTLR_CPU_IEP_CLASS); - writel_relaxed(~0ul, ictlr + ICTLR_CPU_IER_CLR); + writel_relaxed(GENMASK(31, 0), ictlr + ICTLR_CPU_IER_CLR); writel_relaxed(lic->cpu_ier[i], ictlr + ICTLR_CPU_IER_SET); writel_relaxed(lic->cop_iep[i], ictlr + ICTLR_COP_IEP_CLASS); - writel_relaxed(~0ul, ictlr + ICTLR_COP_IER_CLR); + writel_relaxed(GENMASK(31, 0), ictlr + ICTLR_COP_IER_CLR); writel_relaxed(lic->cop_ier[i], ictlr + ICTLR_COP_IER_SET); } @@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ static int __init tegra_ictlr_init(struct device_node *node, lic->base[i] = base; /* Disable all interrupts */ - writel_relaxed(~0UL, base + ICTLR_CPU_IER_CLR); + writel_relaxed(GENMASK(31, 0), base + ICTLR_CPU_IER_CLR); /* All interrupts target IRQ */ writel_relaxed(0, base + ICTLR_CPU_IEP_CLASS); -- 2.35.1

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Linux-stable-mirror August 2022