Currently, when loading a kernel image via the kexec_file_load() system
call, arm64 can only use the .builtin_trusted_keys keyring to verify
a signature whereas x86 can use three more keyrings i.e.
.secondary_trusted_keys, .machine and .platform keyrings. For example,
one resulting problem is kexec'ing a kernel image would be rejected
with the error "Lockdown: kexec: kexec of unsigned images is restricted;
see man kernel_lockdown.7".
This patch set enables arm64 to make use of the same keyrings as x86 to
verify the signature kexec'ed kernel image.
Fixes: 732b7b93d849 ("arm64: kexec_file: add kernel signature verification support")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 105e10e2cf1c: kexec_file: drop weak attribute from functions
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 34d5960af253: kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 83b7bb2d49ae: kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com>
Cc: kexec(a)lists.infradead.org
Cc: keyrings(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module(a)vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek(a)suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek(a)suse.de>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu(a)redhat.com>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 11 +----------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
index 9ec34690e255..5ed6a585f21f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/pe.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
-#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/image.h>
@@ -130,18 +129,10 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
return NULL;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
-{
- return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL,
- VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
-}
-#endif
-
const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops = {
.probe = image_probe,
.load = image_load,
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
- .verify_sig = image_verify_sig,
+ .verify_sig = kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig,
#endif
};
--
2.35.3
Before commit 105e10e2cf1c ("kexec_file: drop weak attribute from
functions"), there was already no arch-specific implementation
of arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig. With weak attribute dropped by that
commit, arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig is completely useless. So clean it
up.
Note this patch is dependent by later patches so it should backported to
the stable tree as well.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm(a)xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek(a)suse.de>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu(a)redhat.com>
---
include/linux/kexec.h | 5 -----
kernel/kexec_file.c | 33 +++++++++++++--------------------
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h
index 6958c6b471f4..6e7510f39368 100644
--- a/include/linux/kexec.h
+++ b/include/linux/kexec.h
@@ -212,11 +212,6 @@ static inline void *arch_kexec_kernel_image_load(struct kimage *image)
}
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-int arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
- unsigned long buf_len);
-#endif
-
extern int kexec_add_buffer(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
int kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index 0c27c81351ee..6dc1294c90fc 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -81,24 +81,6 @@ int kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(struct kimage *image)
return image->fops->cleanup(image->image_loader_data);
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-static int kexec_image_verify_sig_default(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
- unsigned long buf_len)
-{
- if (!image->fops || !image->fops->verify_sig) {
- pr_debug("kernel loader does not support signature verification.\n");
- return -EKEYREJECTED;
- }
-
- return image->fops->verify_sig(buf, buf_len);
-}
-
-int arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf, unsigned long buf_len)
-{
- return kexec_image_verify_sig_default(image, buf, buf_len);
-}
-#endif
-
/*
* Free up memory used by kernel, initrd, and command line. This is temporary
* memory allocation which is not needed any more after these buffers have
@@ -141,13 +123,24 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+static int kexec_image_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
+ unsigned long buf_len)
+{
+ if (!image->fops || !image->fops->verify_sig) {
+ pr_debug("kernel loader does not support signature verification.\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+
+ return image->fops->verify_sig(buf, buf_len);
+}
+
static int
kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image)
{
int ret;
- ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
- image->kernel_buf_len);
+ ret = kexec_image_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
+ image->kernel_buf_len);
if (ret) {
if (sig_enforce) {
--
2.35.3
When a nexthop is added, without a gw address, the default scope was set
to 'host'. Thus, when a source address is selected, 127.0.0.1 may be chosen
but rejected when the route is used.
When using a route without a nexthop id, the scope can be configured in the
route, thus the problem doesn't exist.
To explain more deeply: when a user creates a nexthop, it cannot specify
the scope. To create it, the function nh_create_ipv4() calls fib_check_nh()
with scope set to 0. fib_check_nh() calls fib_check_nh_nongw() wich was
setting scope to 'host'. Then, nh_create_ipv4() calls
fib_info_update_nhc_saddr() with scope set to 'host'. The src addr is
chosen before the route is inserted.
When a 'standard' route (ie without a reference to a nexthop) is added,
fib_create_info() calls fib_info_update_nhc_saddr() with the scope set by
the user. iproute2 set the scope to 'link' by default.
Here is a way to reproduce the problem:
ip netns add foo
ip -n foo link set lo up
ip netns add bar
ip -n bar link set lo up
sleep 1
ip -n foo link add name eth0 type dummy
ip -n foo link set eth0 up
ip -n foo address add 192.168.0.1/24 dev eth0
ip -n foo link add name veth0 type veth peer name veth1 netns bar
ip -n foo link set veth0 up
ip -n bar link set veth1 up
ip -n bar address add 192.168.1.1/32 dev veth1
ip -n bar route add default dev veth1
ip -n foo nexthop add id 1 dev veth0
ip -n foo route add 192.168.1.1 nhid 1
Try to get/use the route:
> $ ip -n foo route get 192.168.1.1
> RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument
> $ ip netns exec foo ping -c1 192.168.1.1
> ping: connect: Invalid argument
Try without nexthop group (iproute2 sets scope to 'link' by dflt):
ip -n foo route del 192.168.1.1
ip -n foo route add 192.168.1.1 dev veth0
Try to get/use the route:
> $ ip -n foo route get 192.168.1.1
> 192.168.1.1 dev veth0 src 192.168.0.1 uid 0
> cache
> $ ip netns exec foo ping -c1 192.168.1.1
> PING 192.168.1.1 (192.168.1.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
> 64 bytes from 192.168.1.1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.039 ms
>
> --- 192.168.1.1 ping statistics ---
> 1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms
> rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.039/0.039/0.039/0.000 ms
CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 597cfe4fc339 ("nexthop: Add support for IPv4 nexthops")
Reported-by: Edwin Brossette <edwin.brossette(a)6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel(a)6wind.com>
---
v2 -> v3:
- no change
v1 -> v2:
- remove useless arp off / fixed mac settings in the description
net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c b/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c
index a57ba23571c9..20177ecf5bdd 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c
@@ -1230,7 +1230,7 @@ static int fib_check_nh_nongw(struct net *net, struct fib_nh *nh,
nh->fib_nh_dev = in_dev->dev;
dev_hold_track(nh->fib_nh_dev, &nh->fib_nh_dev_tracker, GFP_ATOMIC);
- nh->fib_nh_scope = RT_SCOPE_HOST;
+ nh->fib_nh_scope = RT_SCOPE_LINK;
if (!netif_carrier_ok(nh->fib_nh_dev))
nh->fib_nh_flags |= RTNH_F_LINKDOWN;
err = 0;
--
2.33.0