June 2022 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] random: do not use jump labels before they are initialized" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 60e5b2886b92afa9e7af56bba7f5fa5f057e1e97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 17:28:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] random: do not use jump labels before they are initialized Stephen reported that a static key warning splat appears during early boot on systems that credit randomness from device trees that contain an "rng-seed" property, because because setup_machine_fdt() is called before jump_label_init() during setup_arch(): static_key_enable_cpuslocked(): static key '0xffffffe51c6fcfc0' used before call to jump_label_init() WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/jump_label.c:166 static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0xb0/0xb8 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0+ #224 44b43e377bfc84bc99bb5ab885ff694984ee09ff pstate: 600001c9 (nZCv dAIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0xb0/0xb8 lr : static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0xb0/0xb8 sp : ffffffe51c393cf0 x29: ffffffe51c393cf0 x28: 000000008185054c x27: 00000000f1042f10 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 00000000f10302b2 x24: 0000002513200000 x23: 0000002513200000 x22: ffffffe51c1c9000 x21: fffffffdfdc00000 x20: ffffffe51c2f0831 x19: ffffffe51c6fcfc0 x18: 00000000ffff1020 x17: 00000000e1e2ac90 x16: 00000000000000e0 x15: ffffffe51b710708 x14: 0000000000000066 x13: 0000000000000018 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 00000000ffffffff x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 61632065726f6665 x6 : 6220646573752027 x5 : ffffffe51c641d25 x4 : ffffffe51c13142c x3 : ffff0a00ffffff05 x2 : 40000000ffffe003 x1 : 00000000000001c0 x0 : 0000000000000065 Call trace: static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0xb0/0xb8 static_key_enable+0x2c/0x40 crng_set_ready+0x24/0x30 execute_in_process_context+0x80/0x90 _credit_init_bits+0x100/0x154 add_bootloader_randomness+0x64/0x78 early_init_dt_scan_chosen+0x140/0x184 early_init_dt_scan_nodes+0x28/0x4c early_init_dt_scan+0x40/0x44 setup_machine_fdt+0x7c/0x120 setup_arch+0x74/0x1d8 start_kernel+0x84/0x44c __primary_switched+0xc0/0xc8 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- random: crng init done Machine model: Google Lazor (rev1 - 2) with LTE A trivial fix went in to address this on arm64, 73e2d827a501 ("arm64: Initialize jump labels before setup_machine_fdt()"). I wrote patches as well for arm32 and risc-v. But still patches are needed on xtensa, powerpc, arc, and mips. So that's 7 platforms where things aren't quite right. This sort of points to larger issues that might need a larger solution. Instead, this commit just defers setting the static branch until later in the boot process. random_init() is called after jump_label_init() has been called, and so is always a safe place from which to adjust the static branch. Fixes: f5bda35fba61 ("random: use static branch for crng_ready()") Reported-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd(a)chromium.org> Reported-by: Phil Elwell <phil(a)raspberrypi.com> Tested-by: Phil Elwell <phil(a)raspberrypi.com> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com> Cc: Russell King <linux(a)armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 60d701a2516b..0b78b9c4acf5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -650,7 +650,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits) if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) { crng_reseed(); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */ - execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready); + if (static_key_initialized) + execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready); wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); pr_notice("crng init done\n"); @@ -798,6 +799,14 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line) _mix_pool_bytes(command_line, strlen(command_line)); add_latent_entropy(); + /* + * If we were initialized by the bootloader before jump labels are + * initialized, then we should enable the static branch here, where + * it's guaranteed that jump labels have been initialized. + */ + if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) && crng_init >= CRNG_READY) + crng_set_ready(NULL); + if (crng_ready()) crng_reseed(); else if (trust_cpu)

3 years, 6 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ext4: fix up test_dummy_encryption handling for new mount API" failed to apply to 5.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.18-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 85456054e10b0247920b00422d27365e689d9f4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Wed, 25 May 2022 21:04:12 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] ext4: fix up test_dummy_encryption handling for new mount API Since ext4 was converted to the new mount API, the test_dummy_encryption mount option isn't being handled entirely correctly, because the needed fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption() helper function combines parsing/checking/applying into one function. That doesn't work well with the new mount API, which split these into separate steps. This was sort of okay anyway, due to the parsing logic that was copied from fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption() into ext4_parse_param(), combined with an additional check in ext4_check_test_dummy_encryption(). However, these overlooked the case of changing the value of test_dummy_encryption on remount, which isn't allowed but ext4 wasn't detecting until ext4_apply_options() when it's too late to fail. Another bug is that if test_dummy_encryption was specified multiple times with an argument, memory was leaked. Fix this up properly by using the new helper functions that allow splitting up the parse/check/apply steps for test_dummy_encryption. Fixes: cebe85d570cf ("ext4: switch to the new mount api") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220526040412.173025-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 13d562d11235..845f2f8aee5f 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static struct inode *ext4_get_journal_inode(struct super_block *sb, static int ext4_validate_options(struct fs_context *fc); static int ext4_check_opt_consistency(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *sb); -static int ext4_apply_options(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *sb); +static void ext4_apply_options(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *sb); static int ext4_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param); static int ext4_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc); static int ext4_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc); @@ -1870,31 +1870,12 @@ ext4_sb_read_encoding(const struct ext4_super_block *es) } #endif -static int ext4_set_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, char *arg) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION - struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); - int err; - - err = fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption(sb, arg, - &sbi->s_dummy_enc_policy); - if (err) { - ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, - "Error while setting test dummy encryption [%d]", err); - return err; - } - ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Test dummy encryption mode enabled"); -#endif - return 0; -} - #define EXT4_SPEC_JQUOTA (1 << 0) #define EXT4_SPEC_JQFMT (1 << 1) #define EXT4_SPEC_DATAJ (1 << 2) #define EXT4_SPEC_SB_BLOCK (1 << 3) #define EXT4_SPEC_JOURNAL_DEV (1 << 4) #define EXT4_SPEC_JOURNAL_IOPRIO (1 << 5) -#define EXT4_SPEC_DUMMY_ENCRYPTION (1 << 6) #define EXT4_SPEC_s_want_extra_isize (1 << 7) #define EXT4_SPEC_s_max_batch_time (1 << 8) #define EXT4_SPEC_s_min_batch_time (1 << 9) @@ -1911,7 +1892,7 @@ static int ext4_set_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, char *arg) struct ext4_fs_context { char *s_qf_names[EXT4_MAXQUOTAS]; - char *test_dummy_enc_arg; + struct fscrypt_dummy_policy dummy_enc_policy; int s_jquota_fmt; /* Format of quota to use */ #ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_DEBUG int s_fc_debug_max_replay; @@ -1953,7 +1934,7 @@ static void ext4_fc_free(struct fs_context *fc) for (i = 0; i < EXT4_MAXQUOTAS; i++) kfree(ctx->s_qf_names[i]); - kfree(ctx->test_dummy_enc_arg); + fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(&ctx->dummy_enc_policy); kfree(ctx); } @@ -2029,6 +2010,29 @@ static int unnote_qf_name(struct fs_context *fc, int qtype) } #endif +static int ext4_parse_test_dummy_encryption(const struct fs_parameter *param, + struct ext4_fs_context *ctx) +{ + int err; + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION)) { + ext4_msg(NULL, KERN_WARNING, + "test_dummy_encryption option not supported"); + return -EINVAL; + } + err = fscrypt_parse_test_dummy_encryption(param, + &ctx->dummy_enc_policy); + if (err == -EINVAL) { + ext4_msg(NULL, KERN_WARNING, + "Value of option \"%s\" is unrecognized", param->key); + } else if (err == -EEXIST) { + ext4_msg(NULL, KERN_WARNING, + "Conflicting test_dummy_encryption options"); + return -EINVAL; + } + return err; +} + #define EXT4_SET_CTX(name) \ static inline void ctx_set_##name(struct ext4_fs_context *ctx, \ unsigned long flag) \ @@ -2291,29 +2295,7 @@ static int ext4_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param) ctx->spec |= EXT4_SPEC_JOURNAL_IOPRIO; return 0; case Opt_test_dummy_encryption: -#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION - if (param->type == fs_value_is_flag) { - ctx->spec |= EXT4_SPEC_DUMMY_ENCRYPTION; - ctx->test_dummy_enc_arg = NULL; - return 0; - } - if (*param->string && - !(!strcmp(param->string, "v1") || - !strcmp(param->string, "v2"))) { - ext4_msg(NULL, KERN_WARNING, - "Value of option \"%s\" is unrecognized", - param->key); - return -EINVAL; - } - ctx->spec |= EXT4_SPEC_DUMMY_ENCRYPTION; - ctx->test_dummy_enc_arg = kmemdup_nul(param->string, param->size, - GFP_KERNEL); - return 0; -#else - ext4_msg(NULL, KERN_WARNING, - "test_dummy_encryption option not supported"); - return -EINVAL; -#endif + return ext4_parse_test_dummy_encryption(param, ctx); case Opt_dax: case Opt_dax_type: #ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX @@ -2504,7 +2486,8 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, if (s_ctx->spec & EXT4_SPEC_JOURNAL_IOPRIO) m_ctx->journal_ioprio = s_ctx->journal_ioprio; - ret = ext4_apply_options(fc, sb); + ext4_apply_options(fc, sb); + ret = 0; out_free: if (fc) { @@ -2673,11 +2656,11 @@ static int ext4_check_quota_consistency(struct fs_context *fc, static int ext4_check_test_dummy_encryption(const struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *sb) { -#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION const struct ext4_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private; const struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); + int err; - if (!(ctx->spec & EXT4_SPEC_DUMMY_ENCRYPTION)) + if (!fscrypt_is_dummy_policy_set(&ctx->dummy_enc_policy)) return 0; if (!ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb)) { @@ -2691,14 +2674,46 @@ static int ext4_check_test_dummy_encryption(const struct fs_context *fc, * needed to allow it to be set or changed during remount. We do allow * it to be specified during remount, but only if there is no change. */ - if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE && - !sbi->s_dummy_enc_policy.policy) { + if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE) { + if (fscrypt_dummy_policies_equal(&sbi->s_dummy_enc_policy, + &ctx->dummy_enc_policy)) + return 0; ext4_msg(NULL, KERN_WARNING, - "Can't set test_dummy_encryption on remount"); + "Can't set or change test_dummy_encryption on remount"); return -EINVAL; } -#endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ - return 0; + /* Also make sure s_mount_opts didn't contain a conflicting value. */ + if (fscrypt_is_dummy_policy_set(&sbi->s_dummy_enc_policy)) { + if (fscrypt_dummy_policies_equal(&sbi->s_dummy_enc_policy, + &ctx->dummy_enc_policy)) + return 0; + ext4_msg(NULL, KERN_WARNING, + "Conflicting test_dummy_encryption options"); + return -EINVAL; + } + /* + * fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key() technically changes the super_block, so + * technically it should be delayed until ext4_apply_options() like the + * other changes. But since we never get here for remounts (see above), + * and this is the last chance to report errors, we do it here. + */ + err = fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key(sb, &ctx->dummy_enc_policy); + if (err) + ext4_msg(NULL, KERN_WARNING, + "Error adding test dummy encryption key [%d]", err); + return err; +} + +static void ext4_apply_test_dummy_encryption(struct ext4_fs_context *ctx, + struct super_block *sb) +{ + if (!fscrypt_is_dummy_policy_set(&ctx->dummy_enc_policy) || + /* if already set, it was already verified to be the same */ + fscrypt_is_dummy_policy_set(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_dummy_enc_policy)) + return; + EXT4_SB(sb)->s_dummy_enc_policy = ctx->dummy_enc_policy; + memset(&ctx->dummy_enc_policy, 0, sizeof(ctx->dummy_enc_policy)); + ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Test dummy encryption mode enabled"); } static int ext4_check_opt_consistency(struct fs_context *fc, @@ -2785,11 +2800,10 @@ static int ext4_check_opt_consistency(struct fs_context *fc, return ext4_check_quota_consistency(fc, sb); } -static int ext4_apply_options(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *sb) +static void ext4_apply_options(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *sb) { struct ext4_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private; struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = fc->s_fs_info; - int ret = 0; sbi->s_mount_opt &= ~ctx->mask_s_mount_opt; sbi->s_mount_opt |= ctx->vals_s_mount_opt; @@ -2825,11 +2839,7 @@ static int ext4_apply_options(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *sb) #endif ext4_apply_quota_options(fc, sb); - - if (ctx->spec & EXT4_SPEC_DUMMY_ENCRYPTION) - ret = ext4_set_test_dummy_encryption(sb, ctx->test_dummy_enc_arg); - - return ret; + ext4_apply_test_dummy_encryption(ctx, sb); } @@ -4552,9 +4562,7 @@ static int __ext4_fill_super(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *sb) if (err < 0) goto failed_mount; - err = ext4_apply_options(fc, sb); - if (err < 0) - goto failed_mount; + ext4_apply_options(fc, sb); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNICODE) if (ext4_has_feature_casefold(sb) && !sb->s_encoding) {

3 years, 6 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] io_uring: fix not locked access to fixed buf table" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 05b538c1765f8d14a71ccf5f85258dcbeaf189f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2022 08:34:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] io_uring: fix not locked access to fixed buf table We can look inside the fixed buffer table only while holding ->uring_lock, however in some cases we don't do the right async prep for IORING_OP_{WRITE,READ}_FIXED ending up with NULL req->imu forcing making an io-wq worker to try to resolve the fixed buffer without proper locking. Move req->imu setup into early req init paths, i.e. io_prep_rw(), which is called unconditionally for rw requests and under uring_lock. Fixes: 634d00df5e1cf ("io_uring: add full-fledged dynamic buffers support") Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence(a)gmail.com> diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index be05f375a776..fd8a1ffe6a1a 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -3636,6 +3636,20 @@ static int io_prep_rw(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) int ret; kiocb->ki_pos = READ_ONCE(sqe->off); + /* used for fixed read/write too - just read unconditionally */ + req->buf_index = READ_ONCE(sqe->buf_index); + + if (req->opcode == IORING_OP_READ_FIXED || + req->opcode == IORING_OP_WRITE_FIXED) { + struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx; + u16 index; + + if (unlikely(req->buf_index >= ctx->nr_user_bufs)) + return -EFAULT; + index = array_index_nospec(req->buf_index, ctx->nr_user_bufs); + req->imu = ctx->user_bufs[index]; + io_req_set_rsrc_node(req, ctx, 0); + } ioprio = READ_ONCE(sqe->ioprio); if (ioprio) { @@ -3648,12 +3662,9 @@ static int io_prep_rw(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) kiocb->ki_ioprio = get_current_ioprio(); } - req->imu = NULL; req->rw.addr = READ_ONCE(sqe->addr); req->rw.len = READ_ONCE(sqe->len); req->rw.flags = READ_ONCE(sqe->rw_flags); - /* used for fixed read/write too - just read unconditionally */ - req->buf_index = READ_ONCE(sqe->buf_index); return 0; } @@ -3785,20 +3796,9 @@ static int __io_import_fixed(struct io_kiocb *req, int rw, struct iov_iter *iter static int io_import_fixed(struct io_kiocb *req, int rw, struct iov_iter *iter, unsigned int issue_flags) { - struct io_mapped_ubuf *imu = req->imu; - u16 index, buf_index = req->buf_index; - - if (likely(!imu)) { - struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx; - - if (unlikely(buf_index >= ctx->nr_user_bufs)) - return -EFAULT; - io_req_set_rsrc_node(req, ctx, issue_flags); - index = array_index_nospec(buf_index, ctx->nr_user_bufs); - imu = READ_ONCE(ctx->user_bufs[index]); - req->imu = imu; - } - return __io_import_fixed(req, rw, iter, imu); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!req->imu)) + return -EFAULT; + return __io_import_fixed(req, rw, iter, req->imu); } static int io_buffer_add_list(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,

3 years, 6 months

1
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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] io_uring: fix not locked access to fixed buf table" failed to apply to 5.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.18-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 05b538c1765f8d14a71ccf5f85258dcbeaf189f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2022 08:34:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] io_uring: fix not locked access to fixed buf table We can look inside the fixed buffer table only while holding ->uring_lock, however in some cases we don't do the right async prep for IORING_OP_{WRITE,READ}_FIXED ending up with NULL req->imu forcing making an io-wq worker to try to resolve the fixed buffer without proper locking. Move req->imu setup into early req init paths, i.e. io_prep_rw(), which is called unconditionally for rw requests and under uring_lock. Fixes: 634d00df5e1cf ("io_uring: add full-fledged dynamic buffers support") Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence(a)gmail.com> diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index be05f375a776..fd8a1ffe6a1a 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -3636,6 +3636,20 @@ static int io_prep_rw(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) int ret; kiocb->ki_pos = READ_ONCE(sqe->off); + /* used for fixed read/write too - just read unconditionally */ + req->buf_index = READ_ONCE(sqe->buf_index); + + if (req->opcode == IORING_OP_READ_FIXED || + req->opcode == IORING_OP_WRITE_FIXED) { + struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx; + u16 index; + + if (unlikely(req->buf_index >= ctx->nr_user_bufs)) + return -EFAULT; + index = array_index_nospec(req->buf_index, ctx->nr_user_bufs); + req->imu = ctx->user_bufs[index]; + io_req_set_rsrc_node(req, ctx, 0); + } ioprio = READ_ONCE(sqe->ioprio); if (ioprio) { @@ -3648,12 +3662,9 @@ static int io_prep_rw(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) kiocb->ki_ioprio = get_current_ioprio(); } - req->imu = NULL; req->rw.addr = READ_ONCE(sqe->addr); req->rw.len = READ_ONCE(sqe->len); req->rw.flags = READ_ONCE(sqe->rw_flags); - /* used for fixed read/write too - just read unconditionally */ - req->buf_index = READ_ONCE(sqe->buf_index); return 0; } @@ -3785,20 +3796,9 @@ static int __io_import_fixed(struct io_kiocb *req, int rw, struct iov_iter *iter static int io_import_fixed(struct io_kiocb *req, int rw, struct iov_iter *iter, unsigned int issue_flags) { - struct io_mapped_ubuf *imu = req->imu; - u16 index, buf_index = req->buf_index; - - if (likely(!imu)) { - struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx; - - if (unlikely(buf_index >= ctx->nr_user_bufs)) - return -EFAULT; - io_req_set_rsrc_node(req, ctx, issue_flags); - index = array_index_nospec(buf_index, ctx->nr_user_bufs); - imu = READ_ONCE(ctx->user_bufs[index]); - req->imu = imu; - } - return __io_import_fixed(req, rw, iter, imu); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!req->imu)) + return -EFAULT; + return __io_import_fixed(req, rw, iter, req->imu); } static int io_buffer_add_list(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,

3 years, 6 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm/i915: Individualize fences before adding to dma_resv obj" failed to apply to 5.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.18-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 842d9346b2fdda4d2fb8ccb5b87faef1ac01ab51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nirmoy Das <nirmoy.das(a)intel.com> Date: Wed, 25 May 2022 11:59:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] drm/i915: Individualize fences before adding to dma_resv obj _i915_vma_move_to_active() can receive > 1 fences for multiple batch buffers submission. Because dma_resv_add_fence() can only accept one fence at a time, change _i915_vma_move_to_active() to be aware of multiple fences so that it can add individual fences to the dma resv object. v6: fix multi-line comment. v5: remove double fence reservation for batch VMAs. v4: Reserve fences for composite_fence on multi-batch contexts and also reserve fence slots to composite_fence for each VMAs. v3: dma_resv_reserve_fences is not cumulative so pass num_fences. v2: make sure to reserve enough fence slots before adding. Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/5614 Fixes: 544460c33821 ("drm/i915: Multi-BB execbuf") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v5.16+ Signed-off-by: Nirmoy Das <nirmoy.das(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andrzej Hajda <andrzej.hajda(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld(a)intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220525095955.15371-1-nirmoy… (cherry picked from commit 420a07b841d03f6a436d8c06571c69aa5c783897) Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula(a)intel.com> diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c index c326bd2b444f..30fe847c6664 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c @@ -999,7 +999,8 @@ static int eb_validate_vmas(struct i915_execbuffer *eb) } } - err = dma_resv_reserve_fences(vma->obj->base.resv, 1); + /* Reserve enough slots to accommodate composite fences */ + err = dma_resv_reserve_fences(vma->obj->base.resv, eb->num_batches); if (err) return err; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_vma.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_vma.c index 4f6db539571a..0bffb70b3c5f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_vma.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_vma.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ */ #include <linux/sched/mm.h> +#include <linux/dma-fence-array.h> #include <drm/drm_gem.h> #include "display/intel_frontbuffer.h" @@ -1823,6 +1824,21 @@ int _i915_vma_move_to_active(struct i915_vma *vma, if (unlikely(err)) return err; + /* + * Reserve fences slot early to prevent an allocation after preparing + * the workload and associating fences with dma_resv. + */ + if (fence && !(flags & __EXEC_OBJECT_NO_RESERVE)) { + struct dma_fence *curr; + int idx; + + dma_fence_array_for_each(curr, idx, fence) + ; + err = dma_resv_reserve_fences(vma->obj->base.resv, idx); + if (unlikely(err)) + return err; + } + if (flags & EXEC_OBJECT_WRITE) { struct intel_frontbuffer *front; @@ -1832,31 +1848,23 @@ int _i915_vma_move_to_active(struct i915_vma *vma, i915_active_add_request(&front->write, rq); intel_frontbuffer_put(front); } + } - if (!(flags & __EXEC_OBJECT_NO_RESERVE)) { - err = dma_resv_reserve_fences(vma->obj->base.resv, 1); - if (unlikely(err)) - return err; - } + if (fence) { + struct dma_fence *curr; + enum dma_resv_usage usage; + int idx; - if (fence) { - dma_resv_add_fence(vma->obj->base.resv, fence, - DMA_RESV_USAGE_WRITE); + obj->read_domains = 0; + if (flags & EXEC_OBJECT_WRITE) { + usage = DMA_RESV_USAGE_WRITE; obj->write_domain = I915_GEM_DOMAIN_RENDER; - obj->read_domains = 0; - } - } else { - if (!(flags & __EXEC_OBJECT_NO_RESERVE)) { - err = dma_resv_reserve_fences(vma->obj->base.resv, 1); - if (unlikely(err)) - return err; + } else { + usage = DMA_RESV_USAGE_READ; } - if (fence) { - dma_resv_add_fence(vma->obj->base.resv, fence, - DMA_RESV_USAGE_READ); - obj->write_domain = 0; - } + dma_fence_array_for_each(curr, idx, fence) + dma_resv_add_fence(vma->obj->base.resv, curr, usage); } if (flags & EXEC_OBJECT_NEEDS_FENCE && vma->fence)

3 years, 6 months

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stable-rc/queue/5.17 baseline: 192 runs, 2 regressions (v5.17.15-80-gacb56a38ebc02)

by kernelci.org bot

stable-rc/queue/5.17 baseline: 192 runs, 2 regressions (v5.17.15-80-gacb56a38ebc02) Regressions Summary ------------------- platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions ------------------+------+---------------+----------+-----------------+------------ jetson-tk1 | arm | lab-baylibre | gcc-10 | tegra_defconfig | 1 tegra124-nyan-big | arm | lab-collabora | gcc-10 | tegra_defconfig | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/job/stable-rc/branch/queue%2F5.17/kernel/v5.17.15… Test: baseline Tree: stable-rc Branch: queue/5.17 Describe: v5.17.15-80-gacb56a38ebc02 URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git SHA: acb56a38ebc02441b21767a680c4ef09853866ee Test Regressions ---------------- platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions ------------------+------+---------------+----------+-----------------+------------ jetson-tk1 | arm | lab-baylibre | gcc-10 | tegra_defconfig | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/62b031c34db49c48f9a39bd9 Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: tegra_defconfig Compiler: gcc-10 (arm-linux-gnueabihf-gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable-rc/queue-5.17/v5.17.15-80-gacb56a38ebc… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable-rc/queue-5.17/v5.17.15-80-gacb56a38ebc… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2022… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/62b031c34db49c48f9a39bda failing since 9 days (last pass: v5.17.13-907-ga980fa631e355, first fail: v5.17.13-928-gfe5fcee7b41f8) platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions ------------------+------+---------------+----------+-----------------+------------ tegra124-nyan-big | arm | lab-collabora | gcc-10 | tegra_defconfig | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/62b037c33181b37bd3a39c04 Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: tegra_defconfig Compiler: gcc-10 (arm-linux-gnueabihf-gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable-rc/queue-5.17/v5.17.15-80-gacb56a38ebc… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable-rc/queue-5.17/v5.17.15-80-gacb56a38ebc… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2022… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/62b037c33181b37bd3a39c05 failing since 12 days (last pass: v5.17.13-759-gf64e250b75652, first fail: v5.17.13-771-g1bf589e90ab9c)

3 years, 6 months

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backport of d51f86cfd8e3 ("powerpc/mm: Switch obsolete dssall to .long")

by Sudip Mukherjee

Hi Greg, The stable branches 4.19-stable and 5.4-stable will also need d51f86cfd8e3 ("powerpc/mm: Switch obsolete dssall to .long") for powerpc allmodconfig failure. The backport for both is in the attached mbox. -- Regards Sudip

3 years, 6 months

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stable-rc/queue/5.18 baseline: 52 runs, 1 regressions (v5.18.5-99-gcf0cf9cc98a11)

by kernelci.org bot

stable-rc/queue/5.18 baseline: 52 runs, 1 regressions (v5.18.5-99-gcf0cf9cc98a11) Regressions Summary ------------------- platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions ------------------+------+---------------+----------+-----------------+------------ tegra124-nyan-big | arm | lab-collabora | gcc-10 | tegra_defconfig | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/job/stable-rc/branch/queue%2F5.18/kernel/v5.18.5-… Test: baseline Tree: stable-rc Branch: queue/5.18 Describe: v5.18.5-99-gcf0cf9cc98a11 URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git SHA: cf0cf9cc98a11e9ed5dae76061004ca902f106ef Test Regressions ---------------- platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions ------------------+------+---------------+----------+-----------------+------------ tegra124-nyan-big | arm | lab-collabora | gcc-10 | tegra_defconfig | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/62b028990fab107f72a39be0 Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: tegra_defconfig Compiler: gcc-10 (arm-linux-gnueabihf-gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable-rc/queue-5.18/v5.18.5-99-gcf0cf9cc98a1… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable-rc/queue-5.18/v5.18.5-99-gcf0cf9cc98a1… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2022… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/62b028990fab107f72a39be1 new failure (last pass: v5.18.5-51-g1c79ce42b8e0f)

3 years, 6 months

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backport of patches to fix riscv build failure in 4.19-stable and 5.4-stable

by Sudip Mukherjee

Hi Greg, The build of riscv allmodconfig fails in 4.19-stable and 5.4-stable. 4.19-stable will need: 30aca1bacb39 ("RISC-V: fix barrier() use in <vdso/processor.h>") and 5.4-stable needs: 30aca1bacb39 ("RISC-V: fix barrier() use in <vdso/processor.h>") fc585d4a5cf6 ("riscv: Less inefficient gcc tishift helpers (and export their symbols)") Backport of all are in the attached mbox. -- Regards Sudip

3 years, 6 months

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[PATCH 5.10 1/2] commit 1d71eb53e451 ("Revert "PCI: Make pci_enable_ptm() private"")

by Meng Tang

From: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes(a)intel.com> Make pci_enable_ptm() accessible from the drivers. Exposing this to the driver enables the driver to use the 'ptm_enabled' field of 'pci_dev' to check if PTM is enabled or not. This reverts commit ac6c26da29c1 ("PCI: Make pci_enable_ptm() private"). In the 5.10 kernel version, even to the latest confirmed version, the following error will still be reported when I225-V network card is used. kernel: [ 1.031581] igc: probe of 0000:01:00.0 failed with error -2 kernel: [ 1.066574] igc: probe of 0000:02:00.0 failed with error -2 kernel: [ 1.096152] igc: probe of 0000:03:00.0 failed with error -2 kernel: [ 1.127251] igc: probe of 0000:04:00.0 failed with error -2 Even though I confirmed that 7c496de538eebd8212dc2a3c9a468386b2640d4 and 47bca7de6a4fb8dcb564c7ca4d885c91ed19e03 have been merged into the kernel 5.10, the bug is still occurred, and the "commit 1b5d73fb8624 ("igc: Enable PCIe PTM")" can fixes it. And this patch is the pre-patch of 1b5d73fb862414106cf270a1a7300ce8ae77de83. Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes(a)intel.com> Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Meng Tang <tangmeng(a)uniontech.com> --- drivers/pci/pci.h | 3 --- include/linux/pci.h | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.h b/drivers/pci/pci.h index a96dc6f53076..4084764bf0b1 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci.h +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.h @@ -585,11 +585,8 @@ static inline void pcie_ecrc_get_policy(char *str) { } #ifdef CONFIG_PCIE_PTM void pci_ptm_init(struct pci_dev *dev); -int pci_enable_ptm(struct pci_dev *dev, u8 *granularity); #else static inline void pci_ptm_init(struct pci_dev *dev) { } -static inline int pci_enable_ptm(struct pci_dev *dev, u8 *granularity) -{ return -EINVAL; } #endif struct pci_dev_reset_methods { diff --git a/include/linux/pci.h b/include/linux/pci.h index bc5a1150f072..692ce678c5f1 100644 --- a/include/linux/pci.h +++ b/include/linux/pci.h @@ -1599,6 +1599,13 @@ static inline bool pci_aer_available(void) { return false; } bool pci_ats_disabled(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_PCIE_PTM +int pci_enable_ptm(struct pci_dev *dev, u8 *granularity); +#else +static inline int pci_enable_ptm(struct pci_dev *dev, u8 *granularity) +{ return -EINVAL; } +#endif + void pci_cfg_access_lock(struct pci_dev *dev); bool pci_cfg_access_trylock(struct pci_dev *dev); void pci_cfg_access_unlock(struct pci_dev *dev); -- 2.20.1

3 years, 6 months

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