April 2022 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH 1/2] cifs: prevent bad output lengths in smb2_ioctl_query_info()

by Paulo Alcantara

When calling smb2_ioctl_query_info() with smb_query_info::flags=PASSTHRU_FSCTL and smb_query_info::output_buffer_length=0, the following would return 0x10 buffer = memdup_user(arg + sizeof(struct smb_query_info), qi.output_buffer_length); if (IS_ERR(buffer)) { kfree(vars); return PTR_ERR(buffer); } rather than a valid pointer thus making IS_ERR() check fail. This would then cause a NULL ptr deference in @buffer when accessing it later in smb2_ioctl_query_ioctl(). While at it, prevent having a @buffer smaller than 8 bytes to correctly handle SMB2_SET_INFO FileEndOfFileInformation requests when smb_query_info::flags=PASSTHRU_SET_INFO. Here is a small C reproducer which triggers a NULL ptr in @buffer when passing an invalid smb_query_info::flags #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #define die(s) perror(s), exit(1) #define QUERY_INFO 0xc018cf07 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd; if (argc < 2) exit(1); fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY); if (fd == -1) die("open"); if (ioctl(fd, QUERY_INFO, (uint32_t[]) { 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0}) == -1) die("ioctl"); close(fd); return 0; } mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o ... gcc repro.c && ./a.out /mnt/f0 [ 114.138620] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 114.139310] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] [ 114.139775] CPU: 2 PID: 995 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8 #1 [ 114.140148] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [ 114.140818] RIP: 0010:smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x206/0x410 [cifs] [ 114.141221] Code: 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 c8 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 7b 28 4c 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 9c 01 00 00 49 8b 3f e8 58 02 fb ff 48 8b 14 24 [ 114.142348] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000b47b00 EFLAGS: 00010256 [ 114.142692] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888115503200 RCX: ffffffffa020580d [ 114.143119] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffffa043a380 [ 114.143544] RBP: ffff888115503278 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003 [ 114.143983] R10: fffffbfff4087470 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888115503288 [ 114.144424] R13: 00000000ffffffea R14: ffff888115503228 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 114.144852] FS: 00007f7aeabdf740(0000) GS:ffff888151600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 114.145338] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 114.145692] CR2: 00007f7aeacfdf5e CR3: 000000012000e000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 114.146131] Call Trace: [ 114.146291] <TASK> [ 114.146432] ? smb2_query_reparse_tag+0x890/0x890 [cifs] [ 114.146800] ? cifs_mapchar+0x460/0x460 [cifs] [ 114.147121] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 114.147412] ? cifs_strndup_to_utf16+0x15b/0x250 [cifs] [ 114.147775] ? dentry_path_raw+0xa6/0xf0 [ 114.148024] ? cifs_convert_path_to_utf16+0x198/0x220 [cifs] [ 114.148413] ? smb2_check_message+0x1080/0x1080 [cifs] [ 114.148766] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 114.149065] cifs_ioctl+0x1577/0x3320 [cifs] [ 114.149371] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0 [ 114.149631] ? cifs_readdir+0x2e60/0x2e60 [cifs] [ 114.149956] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 114.150250] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x80b/0xbe0 [ 114.150562] ? __up_read+0x192/0x710 [ 114.150791] ? __ia32_sys_rseq+0xf0/0xf0 [ 114.151025] ? __x64_sys_openat+0x11f/0x1d0 [ 114.151296] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 [ 114.151549] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 114.151768] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 114.152079] RIP: 0033:0x7f7aead043df [ 114.152306] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1f 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 [ 114.153431] RSP: 002b:00007ffc2e0c1f80 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 114.153890] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7aead043df [ 114.154315] RDX: 00007ffc2e0c1ff0 RSI: 00000000c018cf07 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 114.154747] RBP: 00007ffc2e0c2010 R08: 00007f7aeae03db0 R09: 00007f7aeae24c4e [ 114.155192] R10: 00007f7aeabf7d40 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc2e0c2128 [ 114.155642] R13: 0000000000401176 R14: 0000000000403df8 R15: 00007f7aeae57000 [ 114.156071] </TASK> [ 114.156218] Modules linked in: cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 bpf_preload [ 114.156608] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 114.156898] RIP: 0010:smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x206/0x410 [cifs] [ 114.157792] Code: 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 c8 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 7b 28 4c 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 9c 01 00 00 49 8b 3f e8 58 02 fb ff 48 8b 14 24 [ 114.159293] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000b47b00 EFLAGS: 00010256 [ 114.159641] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888115503200 RCX: ffffffffa020580d [ 114.160093] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffffa043a380 [ 114.160699] RBP: ffff888115503278 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003 [ 114.161196] R10: fffffbfff4087470 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888115503288 [ 114.155642] R13: 0000000000401176 R14: 0000000000403df8 R15: 00007f7aeae57000 [ 114.156071] </TASK> [ 114.156218] Modules linked in: cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 bpf_preload [ 114.156608] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 114.156898] RIP: 0010:smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x206/0x410 [cifs] [ 114.157792] Code: 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 c8 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 7b 28 4c 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 9c 01 00 00 49 8b 3f e8 58 02 fb ff 48 8b 14 24 [ 114.159293] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000b47b00 EFLAGS: 00010256 [ 114.159641] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888115503200 RCX: ffffffffa020580d [ 114.160093] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffffa043a380 [ 114.160699] RBP: ffff888115503278 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003 [ 114.161196] R10: fffffbfff4087470 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888115503288 [ 114.161823] R13: 00000000ffffffea R14: ffff888115503228 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 114.162274] FS: 00007f7aeabdf740(0000) GS:ffff888151600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 114.162853] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 114.163218] CR2: 00007f7aeacfdf5e CR3: 000000012000e000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 114.163691] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 114.164087] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 114.164316] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc(a)cjr.nz> --- fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c index bf5d5b5ea829..600a5be3ccd0 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c @@ -1662,11 +1662,12 @@ smb2_ioctl_query_info(const unsigned int xid, if (smb3_encryption_required(tcon)) flags |= CIFS_TRANSFORM_REQ; - buffer = memdup_user(arg + sizeof(struct smb_query_info), - qi.output_buffer_length); - if (IS_ERR(buffer)) { - kfree(vars); - return PTR_ERR(buffer); + if (qi.output_buffer_length) { + buffer = memdup_user(arg + sizeof(struct smb_query_info), qi.output_buffer_length); + if (IS_ERR(buffer)) { + kfree(vars); + return PTR_ERR(buffer); + } } /* Open */ @@ -1729,10 +1730,13 @@ smb2_ioctl_query_info(const unsigned int xid, /* Can eventually relax perm check since server enforces too */ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; - else { + else if (qi.output_buffer_length < 8) + rc = -EINVAL; + else { rqst[1].rq_iov = &vars->si_iov[0]; rqst[1].rq_nvec = 1; + /* MS-FSCC 2.4.13 FileEndOfFileInformation */ size[0] = 8; data[0] = buffer; -- 2.35.1

2 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] io_uring: ensure recv and recvmsg handle MSG_WAITALL" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 7ba89d2af17aa879dda30f5d5d3f152e587fc551 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2022 09:32:35 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] io_uring: ensure recv and recvmsg handle MSG_WAITALL correctly We currently don't attempt to get the full asked for length even if MSG_WAITALL is set, if we get a partial receive. If we do see a partial receive, then just note how many bytes we did and return -EAGAIN to get it retried. The iov is advanced appropriately for the vector based case, and we manually bump the buffer and remainder for the non-vector case. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Constantine Gavrilov <constantine.gavrilov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index f41d91ce1fd0..a70de170aea1 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -612,6 +612,7 @@ struct io_sr_msg { int msg_flags; int bgid; size_t len; + size_t done_io; }; struct io_open { @@ -5417,12 +5418,21 @@ static int io_recvmsg_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) if (req->ctx->compat) sr->msg_flags |= MSG_CMSG_COMPAT; #endif + sr->done_io = 0; return 0; } +static bool io_net_retry(struct socket *sock, int flags) +{ + if (!(flags & MSG_WAITALL)) + return false; + return sock->type == SOCK_STREAM || sock->type == SOCK_SEQPACKET; +} + static int io_recvmsg(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) { struct io_async_msghdr iomsg, *kmsg; + struct io_sr_msg *sr = &req->sr_msg; struct socket *sock; struct io_buffer *kbuf; unsigned flags; @@ -5465,6 +5475,10 @@ static int io_recvmsg(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) return io_setup_async_msg(req, kmsg); if (ret == -ERESTARTSYS) ret = -EINTR; + if (ret > 0 && io_net_retry(sock, flags)) { + sr->done_io += ret; + return io_setup_async_msg(req, kmsg); + } req_set_fail(req); } else if ((flags & MSG_WAITALL) && (kmsg->msg.msg_flags & (MSG_TRUNC | MSG_CTRUNC))) { req_set_fail(req); @@ -5474,6 +5488,10 @@ static int io_recvmsg(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) if (kmsg->free_iov) kfree(kmsg->free_iov); req->flags &= ~REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP; + if (ret >= 0) + ret += sr->done_io; + else if (sr->done_io) + ret = sr->done_io; __io_req_complete(req, issue_flags, ret, io_put_kbuf(req, issue_flags)); return 0; } @@ -5524,12 +5542,22 @@ static int io_recv(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) return -EAGAIN; if (ret == -ERESTARTSYS) ret = -EINTR; + if (ret > 0 && io_net_retry(sock, flags)) { + sr->len -= ret; + sr->buf += ret; + sr->done_io += ret; + return -EAGAIN; + } req_set_fail(req); } else if ((flags & MSG_WAITALL) && (msg.msg_flags & (MSG_TRUNC | MSG_CTRUNC))) { out_free: req_set_fail(req); } + if (ret >= 0) + ret += sr->done_io; + else if (sr->done_io) + ret = sr->done_io; __io_req_complete(req, issue_flags, ret, io_put_kbuf(req, issue_flags)); return 0; }

2 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] io_uring: ensure recv and recvmsg handle MSG_WAITALL" failed to apply to 5.16-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.16-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 7ba89d2af17aa879dda30f5d5d3f152e587fc551 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2022 09:32:35 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] io_uring: ensure recv and recvmsg handle MSG_WAITALL correctly We currently don't attempt to get the full asked for length even if MSG_WAITALL is set, if we get a partial receive. If we do see a partial receive, then just note how many bytes we did and return -EAGAIN to get it retried. The iov is advanced appropriately for the vector based case, and we manually bump the buffer and remainder for the non-vector case. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Constantine Gavrilov <constantine.gavrilov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index f41d91ce1fd0..a70de170aea1 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -612,6 +612,7 @@ struct io_sr_msg { int msg_flags; int bgid; size_t len; + size_t done_io; }; struct io_open { @@ -5417,12 +5418,21 @@ static int io_recvmsg_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) if (req->ctx->compat) sr->msg_flags |= MSG_CMSG_COMPAT; #endif + sr->done_io = 0; return 0; } +static bool io_net_retry(struct socket *sock, int flags) +{ + if (!(flags & MSG_WAITALL)) + return false; + return sock->type == SOCK_STREAM || sock->type == SOCK_SEQPACKET; +} + static int io_recvmsg(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) { struct io_async_msghdr iomsg, *kmsg; + struct io_sr_msg *sr = &req->sr_msg; struct socket *sock; struct io_buffer *kbuf; unsigned flags; @@ -5465,6 +5475,10 @@ static int io_recvmsg(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) return io_setup_async_msg(req, kmsg); if (ret == -ERESTARTSYS) ret = -EINTR; + if (ret > 0 && io_net_retry(sock, flags)) { + sr->done_io += ret; + return io_setup_async_msg(req, kmsg); + } req_set_fail(req); } else if ((flags & MSG_WAITALL) && (kmsg->msg.msg_flags & (MSG_TRUNC | MSG_CTRUNC))) { req_set_fail(req); @@ -5474,6 +5488,10 @@ static int io_recvmsg(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) if (kmsg->free_iov) kfree(kmsg->free_iov); req->flags &= ~REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP; + if (ret >= 0) + ret += sr->done_io; + else if (sr->done_io) + ret = sr->done_io; __io_req_complete(req, issue_flags, ret, io_put_kbuf(req, issue_flags)); return 0; } @@ -5524,12 +5542,22 @@ static int io_recv(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) return -EAGAIN; if (ret == -ERESTARTSYS) ret = -EINTR; + if (ret > 0 && io_net_retry(sock, flags)) { + sr->len -= ret; + sr->buf += ret; + sr->done_io += ret; + return -EAGAIN; + } req_set_fail(req); } else if ((flags & MSG_WAITALL) && (msg.msg_flags & (MSG_TRUNC | MSG_CTRUNC))) { out_free: req_set_fail(req); } + if (ret >= 0) + ret += sr->done_io; + else if (sr->done_io) + ret = sr->done_io; __io_req_complete(req, issue_flags, ret, io_put_kbuf(req, issue_flags)); return 0; }

2 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] io_uring: ensure recv and recvmsg handle MSG_WAITALL" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 7ba89d2af17aa879dda30f5d5d3f152e587fc551 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2022 09:32:35 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] io_uring: ensure recv and recvmsg handle MSG_WAITALL correctly We currently don't attempt to get the full asked for length even if MSG_WAITALL is set, if we get a partial receive. If we do see a partial receive, then just note how many bytes we did and return -EAGAIN to get it retried. The iov is advanced appropriately for the vector based case, and we manually bump the buffer and remainder for the non-vector case. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Constantine Gavrilov <constantine.gavrilov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index f41d91ce1fd0..a70de170aea1 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -612,6 +612,7 @@ struct io_sr_msg { int msg_flags; int bgid; size_t len; + size_t done_io; }; struct io_open { @@ -5417,12 +5418,21 @@ static int io_recvmsg_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) if (req->ctx->compat) sr->msg_flags |= MSG_CMSG_COMPAT; #endif + sr->done_io = 0; return 0; } +static bool io_net_retry(struct socket *sock, int flags) +{ + if (!(flags & MSG_WAITALL)) + return false; + return sock->type == SOCK_STREAM || sock->type == SOCK_SEQPACKET; +} + static int io_recvmsg(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) { struct io_async_msghdr iomsg, *kmsg; + struct io_sr_msg *sr = &req->sr_msg; struct socket *sock; struct io_buffer *kbuf; unsigned flags; @@ -5465,6 +5475,10 @@ static int io_recvmsg(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) return io_setup_async_msg(req, kmsg); if (ret == -ERESTARTSYS) ret = -EINTR; + if (ret > 0 && io_net_retry(sock, flags)) { + sr->done_io += ret; + return io_setup_async_msg(req, kmsg); + } req_set_fail(req); } else if ((flags & MSG_WAITALL) && (kmsg->msg.msg_flags & (MSG_TRUNC | MSG_CTRUNC))) { req_set_fail(req); @@ -5474,6 +5488,10 @@ static int io_recvmsg(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) if (kmsg->free_iov) kfree(kmsg->free_iov); req->flags &= ~REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP; + if (ret >= 0) + ret += sr->done_io; + else if (sr->done_io) + ret = sr->done_io; __io_req_complete(req, issue_flags, ret, io_put_kbuf(req, issue_flags)); return 0; } @@ -5524,12 +5542,22 @@ static int io_recv(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) return -EAGAIN; if (ret == -ERESTARTSYS) ret = -EINTR; + if (ret > 0 && io_net_retry(sock, flags)) { + sr->len -= ret; + sr->buf += ret; + sr->done_io += ret; + return -EAGAIN; + } req_set_fail(req); } else if ((flags & MSG_WAITALL) && (msg.msg_flags & (MSG_TRUNC | MSG_CTRUNC))) { out_free: req_set_fail(req); } + if (ret >= 0) + ret += sr->done_io; + else if (sr->done_io) + ret = sr->done_io; __io_req_complete(req, issue_flags, ret, io_put_kbuf(req, issue_flags)); return 0; }

2 years, 8 months

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0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] io_uring: ensure recv and recvmsg handle MSG_WAITALL" failed to apply to 5.17-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.17-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 7ba89d2af17aa879dda30f5d5d3f152e587fc551 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2022 09:32:35 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] io_uring: ensure recv and recvmsg handle MSG_WAITALL correctly We currently don't attempt to get the full asked for length even if MSG_WAITALL is set, if we get a partial receive. If we do see a partial receive, then just note how many bytes we did and return -EAGAIN to get it retried. The iov is advanced appropriately for the vector based case, and we manually bump the buffer and remainder for the non-vector case. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Constantine Gavrilov <constantine.gavrilov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index f41d91ce1fd0..a70de170aea1 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -612,6 +612,7 @@ struct io_sr_msg { int msg_flags; int bgid; size_t len; + size_t done_io; }; struct io_open { @@ -5417,12 +5418,21 @@ static int io_recvmsg_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) if (req->ctx->compat) sr->msg_flags |= MSG_CMSG_COMPAT; #endif + sr->done_io = 0; return 0; } +static bool io_net_retry(struct socket *sock, int flags) +{ + if (!(flags & MSG_WAITALL)) + return false; + return sock->type == SOCK_STREAM || sock->type == SOCK_SEQPACKET; +} + static int io_recvmsg(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) { struct io_async_msghdr iomsg, *kmsg; + struct io_sr_msg *sr = &req->sr_msg; struct socket *sock; struct io_buffer *kbuf; unsigned flags; @@ -5465,6 +5475,10 @@ static int io_recvmsg(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) return io_setup_async_msg(req, kmsg); if (ret == -ERESTARTSYS) ret = -EINTR; + if (ret > 0 && io_net_retry(sock, flags)) { + sr->done_io += ret; + return io_setup_async_msg(req, kmsg); + } req_set_fail(req); } else if ((flags & MSG_WAITALL) && (kmsg->msg.msg_flags & (MSG_TRUNC | MSG_CTRUNC))) { req_set_fail(req); @@ -5474,6 +5488,10 @@ static int io_recvmsg(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) if (kmsg->free_iov) kfree(kmsg->free_iov); req->flags &= ~REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP; + if (ret >= 0) + ret += sr->done_io; + else if (sr->done_io) + ret = sr->done_io; __io_req_complete(req, issue_flags, ret, io_put_kbuf(req, issue_flags)); return 0; } @@ -5524,12 +5542,22 @@ static int io_recv(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) return -EAGAIN; if (ret == -ERESTARTSYS) ret = -EINTR; + if (ret > 0 && io_net_retry(sock, flags)) { + sr->len -= ret; + sr->buf += ret; + sr->done_io += ret; + return -EAGAIN; + } req_set_fail(req); } else if ((flags & MSG_WAITALL) && (msg.msg_flags & (MSG_TRUNC | MSG_CTRUNC))) { out_free: req_set_fail(req); } + if (ret >= 0) + ret += sr->done_io; + else if (sr->done_io) + ret = sr->done_io; __io_req_complete(req, issue_flags, ret, io_put_kbuf(req, issue_flags)); return 0; }

2 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 01/16] remoteproc: coredump: Correct argument 2 type for memcpy_fromio

by Sasha Levin

From: Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com> [ Upstream commit 876e0b26ccd211ca92607d83c87cc1f097784c6d ] Address the sparse check warning: >> drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_coredump.c:169:53: sparse: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) sparse: expected void const volatile [noderef] __iomem *src sparse: got void *[assigned] ptr Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211110032101.517487-1-peng.fan@oss.nxp.com Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_coredump.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_coredump.c b/drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_coredump.c index c892f433a323e..4b093420d98aa 100644 --- a/drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_coredump.c +++ b/drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_coredump.c @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ static void rproc_copy_segment(struct rproc *rproc, void *dest, memset(dest, 0xff, size); } else { if (is_iomem) - memcpy_fromio(dest, ptr, size); + memcpy_fromio(dest, (void const __iomem *)ptr, size); else memcpy(dest, ptr, size); } -- 2.34.1

2 years, 8 months

2
16
0 0

[PATCH 3/3] drm/vmwgfx: Fix gem refcounting on prime exported surfaces

by Zack Rusin

From: Zack Rusin <zackr(a)vmware.com> vmwgfx exports two different kinds of gpu buffers to the userspace: surfaces and mob's. Surfaces are backed by mob's. Currently only surfaces are allowed with prime. Surfaces exported as prime weren't increasing the reference count on the backing mob's (gem objects), which meant that if the userspace destroyed the mob's, the exported surface was becoming invalid and its usage lead to crashes (due to usage after free). Surfaces need to increase the reference count on the backing mob's for the duration of the exported file descriptor for purposes of prime. Same has to happen when an already existing mob is passed to the surface, its reference count has to be increased. This fixes crashes with XA state tracker which is used for xrender acceleration on xf86-video-vmware. Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin <zackr(a)vmware.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v5.17+ Reviewed-by: Martin Krastev <krastevm(a)vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Maaz Mombasawala <mombasawalam(a)vmware.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/ttm_object.c | 7 ++++++- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.h | 2 ++ drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_gem.c | 6 ++---- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_prime.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c | 12 ++++++++++++ drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c | 1 + 6 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/ttm_object.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/ttm_object.c index 26a55fef1ab5..53e9f81f7e1b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/ttm_object.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/ttm_object.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */ /************************************************************************** * - * Copyright (c) 2009-2013 VMware, Inc., Palo Alto, CA., USA + * Copyright (c) 2009-2022 VMware, Inc., Palo Alto, CA., USA * All Rights Reserved. * * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include "ttm_object.h" #include "vmwgfx_drv.h" +#include "vmwgfx_resource_priv.h" MODULE_IMPORT_NS(DMA_BUF); @@ -617,6 +618,7 @@ int ttm_prime_handle_to_fd(struct ttm_object_file *tfile, struct ttm_base_object *base; struct dma_buf *dma_buf; struct ttm_prime_object *prime; + struct vmw_resource *res; int ret; base = ttm_base_object_lookup(tfile, handle); @@ -667,6 +669,9 @@ int ttm_prime_handle_to_fd(struct ttm_object_file *tfile, ret = dma_buf_fd(dma_buf, flags); if (ret >= 0) { + res = user_surface_converter->base_obj_to_res(&prime->base); + if (res) + vmw_resource_prime_ref(res); *prime_fd = ret; ret = 0; } else diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.h index eabe3e8e9cf9..bb11f0d0b9b1 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.h @@ -853,6 +853,8 @@ void vmw_resource_dirty_update(struct vmw_resource *res, pgoff_t start, pgoff_t end); int vmw_resources_clean(struct vmw_buffer_object *vbo, pgoff_t start, pgoff_t end, pgoff_t *num_prefault); +void vmw_resource_prime_ref(struct vmw_resource *res); +void vmw_resource_prime_unref(struct vmw_resource *res); /** * vmw_resource_mob_attached - Whether a resource currently has a mob attached diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_gem.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_gem.c index ce609e7d758f..f41dc638df23 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_gem.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_gem.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */ /* - * Copyright 2021 VMware, Inc. + * Copyright 2021-2022 VMware, Inc. * * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person * obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation @@ -46,9 +46,8 @@ vmw_buffer_object(struct ttm_buffer_object *bo) static void vmw_gem_object_free(struct drm_gem_object *gobj) { struct ttm_buffer_object *bo = drm_gem_ttm_of_gem(gobj); - if (bo) { + if (bo) ttm_bo_put(bo); - } } static int vmw_gem_object_open(struct drm_gem_object *obj, @@ -158,7 +157,6 @@ int vmw_gem_object_create_with_handle(struct vmw_private *dev_priv, return ret; } - int vmw_gem_object_create_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, struct drm_file *filp) { diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_prime.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_prime.c index 2d72a5ee7c0c..2896d212db54 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_prime.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_prime.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT /************************************************************************** * - * Copyright 2013 VMware, Inc., Palo Alto, CA., USA + * Copyright 2013-2022 VMware, Inc., Palo Alto, CA., USA * * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ */ #include "vmwgfx_drv.h" +#include "vmwgfx_resource_priv.h" #include "ttm_object.h" #include <linux/dma-buf.h> @@ -62,12 +63,21 @@ static void vmw_prime_unmap_dma_buf(struct dma_buf_attachment *attach, { } +static void vmw_prime_release(struct dma_buf *dma_buf) +{ + struct ttm_prime_object *prime = dma_buf->priv; + struct vmw_resource *res = + user_surface_converter->base_obj_to_res(&prime->base); + if (res) + vmw_resource_prime_unref(res); +} + const struct dma_buf_ops vmw_prime_dmabuf_ops = { .attach = vmw_prime_map_attach, .detach = vmw_prime_map_detach, .map_dma_buf = vmw_prime_map_dma_buf, .unmap_dma_buf = vmw_prime_unmap_dma_buf, - .release = NULL, + .release = vmw_prime_release, }; int vmw_prime_fd_to_handle(struct drm_device *dev, diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c index 6542f1498651..11de5d697351 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c @@ -1169,3 +1169,15 @@ int vmw_resources_clean(struct vmw_buffer_object *vbo, pgoff_t start, return 0; } + +void vmw_resource_prime_ref(struct vmw_resource *res) +{ + if (res->backup) + drm_gem_object_get(&res->backup->base.base); +} + +void vmw_resource_prime_unref(struct vmw_resource *res) +{ + if (res->backup) + drm_gem_object_put(&res->backup->base.base); +} diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c index 00e8e27e4884..04fdf613df83 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c @@ -1502,6 +1502,7 @@ vmw_gb_surface_define_internal(struct drm_device *dev, goto out_unlock; } else { backup_handle = req->base.buffer_handle; + drm_gem_object_get(&res->backup->base.base); } } } else if (req->base.drm_surface_flags & -- 2.32.0

2 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

[patch 15/16] mm/kmemleak: reset tag when compare object pointer

by Andrew Morton

From: Kuan-Ying Lee <Kuan-Ying.Lee(a)mediatek.com> Subject: mm/kmemleak: reset tag when compare object pointer When we use HW-tag based kasan and enable vmalloc support, we hit the following bug. It is due to comparison between tagged object and non-tagged pointer. We need to reset the kasan tag when we need to compare tagged object and non-tagged pointer. [ 7.690429][T400001] init: kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&]Scan area larger than object 0xffffffe77076f440 [ 7.691762][T400001] init: CPU: 4 PID: 1 Comm: init Tainted: G S W 5.15.25-android13-0-g5cacf919c2bc #1 [ 7.693218][T400001] init: Hardware name: MT6983(ENG) (DT) [ 7.693983][T400001] init: Call trace: [ 7.694508][T400001] init: dump_backtrace.cfi_jt+0x0/0x8 [ 7.695272][T400001] init: dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0x120 [ 7.695985][T400001] init: add_scan_area+0xc4/0x244 [ 7.696685][T400001] init: kmemleak_scan_area+0x40/0x9c [ 7.697428][T400001] init: layout_and_allocate+0x1e8/0x288 [ 7.698211][T400001] init: load_module+0x2c8/0xf00 [ 7.698895][T400001] init: __se_sys_finit_module+0x190/0x1d0 [ 7.699701][T400001] init: __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x20/0x30 [ 7.700517][T400001] init: invoke_syscall+0x60/0x170 [ 7.701225][T400001] init: el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x114 [ 7.701933][T400001] init: do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0 [ 7.702580][T400001] init: el0_svc+0x60/0xf8 [ 7.703196][T400001] init: el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xec [ 7.703964][T400001] init: el0t_64_sync+0x1b4/0x1b8 [ 7.704658][T400001] init: kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&]Object 0xf5ffffe77076b000 (size 32768): [ 7.705824][T400001] init: kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&] comm "init", pid 1, jiffies 4294894197 [ 7.707002][T400001] init: kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&] min_count = 0 [ 7.707886][T400001] init: kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&] count = 0 [ 7.708718][T400001] init: kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&] flags = 0x1 [ 7.709574][T400001] init: kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&] checksum = 0 [ 7.710440][T400001] init: kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&] backtrace: [ 7.711284][T400001] init: module_alloc+0x9c/0x120 [ 7.712015][T400001] init: move_module+0x34/0x19c [ 7.712735][T400001] init: layout_and_allocate+0x1c4/0x288 [ 7.713561][T400001] init: load_module+0x2c8/0xf00 [ 7.714291][T400001] init: __se_sys_finit_module+0x190/0x1d0 [ 7.715142][T400001] init: __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x20/0x30 [ 7.716004][T400001] init: invoke_syscall+0x60/0x170 [ 7.716758][T400001] init: el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x114 [ 7.717512][T400001] init: do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0 [ 7.718207][T400001] init: el0_svc+0x60/0xf8 [ 7.718869][T400001] init: el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xec [ 7.719683][T400001] init: el0t_64_sync+0x1b4/0x1b8 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220318034051.30687-1-Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ying Lee <Kuan-Ying.Lee(a)mediatek.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg(a)gmail.com> Cc: Chinwen Chang <chinwen.chang(a)mediatek.com> Cc: Nicholas Tang <nicholas.tang(a)mediatek.com> Cc: Yee Lee <yee.lee(a)mediatek.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/kmemleak.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/mm/kmemleak.c~mm-kmemleak-reset-tag-when-compare-object-pointer +++ a/mm/kmemleak.c @@ -796,6 +796,8 @@ static void add_scan_area(unsigned long unsigned long flags; struct kmemleak_object *object; struct kmemleak_scan_area *area = NULL; + unsigned long untagged_ptr; + unsigned long untagged_objp; object = find_and_get_object(ptr, 1); if (!object) { @@ -804,6 +806,9 @@ static void add_scan_area(unsigned long return; } + untagged_ptr = (unsigned long)kasan_reset_tag((void *)ptr); + untagged_objp = (unsigned long)kasan_reset_tag((void *)object->pointer); + if (scan_area_cache) area = kmem_cache_alloc(scan_area_cache, gfp_kmemleak_mask(gfp)); @@ -815,8 +820,8 @@ static void add_scan_area(unsigned long goto out_unlock; } if (size == SIZE_MAX) { - size = object->pointer + object->size - ptr; - } else if (ptr + size > object->pointer + object->size) { + size = untagged_objp + object->size - untagged_ptr; + } else if (untagged_ptr + size > untagged_objp + object->size) { kmemleak_warn("Scan area larger than object 0x%08lx\n", ptr); dump_object_info(object); kmem_cache_free(scan_area_cache, area); _

2 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

[patch 11/16] mm,hwpoison: unmap poisoned page before invalidation

by Andrew Morton

From: Rik van Riel <riel(a)surriel.com> Subject: mm,hwpoison: unmap poisoned page before invalidation In some cases it appears the invalidation of a hwpoisoned page fails because the page is still mapped in another process. This can cause a program to be continuously restarted and die when it page faults on the page that was not invalidated. Avoid that problem by unmapping the hwpoisoned page when we find it. Another issue is that sometimes we end up oopsing in finish_fault, if the code tries to do something with the now-NULL vmf->page. I did not hit this error when submitting the previous patch because there are several opportunities for alloc_set_pte to bail out before accessing vmf->page, and that apparently happened on those systems, and most of the time on other systems, too. However, across several million systems that error does occur a handful of times a day. It can be avoided by returning VM_FAULT_NOPAGE which will cause do_read_fault to return before calling finish_fault. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220325161428.5068d97e@imladris.surriel.com Fixes: e53ac7374e64 ("mm: invalidate hwpoison page cache page in fault path") Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel(a)surriel.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> Tested-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi(a)nec.com> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.de> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman(a)suse.de> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/memory.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/mm/memory.c~mmhwpoison-unmap-poisoned-page-before-invalidation +++ a/mm/memory.c @@ -3918,14 +3918,18 @@ static vm_fault_t __do_fault(struct vm_f return ret; if (unlikely(PageHWPoison(vmf->page))) { + struct page *page = vmf->page; vm_fault_t poisonret = VM_FAULT_HWPOISON; if (ret & VM_FAULT_LOCKED) { + if (page_mapped(page)) + unmap_mapping_pages(page_mapping(page), + page->index, 1, false); /* Retry if a clean page was removed from the cache. */ - if (invalidate_inode_page(vmf->page)) - poisonret = 0; - unlock_page(vmf->page); + if (invalidate_inode_page(page)) + poisonret = VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; + unlock_page(page); } - put_page(vmf->page); + put_page(page); vmf->page = NULL; return poisonret; } _

2 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

[patch 02/16] ocfs2: fix crash when mount with quota enabled

by Andrew Morton

From: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi(a)linux.alibaba.com> Subject: ocfs2: fix crash when mount with quota enabled There is a reported crash when mounting ocfs2 with quota enabled. RIP: 0010:ocfs2_qinfo_lock_res_init+0x44/0x50 [ocfs2] Call Trace: <TASK> ocfs2_local_read_info+0xb9/0x6f0 [ocfs2] ? ocfs2_local_check_quota_file+0x197/0x390 [ocfs2] dquot_load_quota_sb+0x216/0x470 ? preempt_count_add+0x68/0xa0 dquot_load_quota_inode+0x85/0x100 ocfs2_enable_quotas+0xa0/0x1c0 [ocfs2] ocfs2_fill_super.cold+0xc8/0x1bf [ocfs2] mount_bdev+0x185/0x1b0 ? ocfs2_initialize_super.isra.0+0xf40/0xf40 [ocfs2] legacy_get_tree+0x27/0x40 vfs_get_tree+0x25/0xb0 path_mount+0x465/0xac0 __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae </TASK> It is caused by when initializing dqi_gqlock, the corresponding dqi_type and dqi_sb are not properly initialized. This issue is introduced by commit 6c85c2c72819, which wants to avoid accessing uninitialized variables in error cases. So make global quota info properly initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220323023644.40084-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com Link: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1007141 Fixes: 6c85c2c72819 ("ocfs2: quota_local: fix possible uninitialized-variable access in ocfs2_local_read_info()") Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi(a)linux.alibaba.com> Reported-by: Dayvison <sathlerds(a)gmail.com> Tested-by: Valentin Vidic <vvidic(a)valentin-vidic.from.hr> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/ocfs2/quota_global.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- fs/ocfs2/quota_local.c | 2 -- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) --- a/fs/ocfs2/quota_global.c~ocfs2-fix-crash-when-mount-with-quota-enabled +++ a/fs/ocfs2/quota_global.c @@ -337,7 +337,6 @@ void ocfs2_unlock_global_qf(struct ocfs2 /* Read information header from global quota file */ int ocfs2_global_read_info(struct super_block *sb, int type) { - struct inode *gqinode = NULL; unsigned int ino[OCFS2_MAXQUOTAS] = { USER_QUOTA_SYSTEM_INODE, GROUP_QUOTA_SYSTEM_INODE }; struct ocfs2_global_disk_dqinfo dinfo; @@ -346,29 +345,31 @@ int ocfs2_global_read_info(struct super_ u64 pcount; int status; + oinfo->dqi_gi.dqi_sb = sb; + oinfo->dqi_gi.dqi_type = type; + ocfs2_qinfo_lock_res_init(&oinfo->dqi_gqlock, oinfo); + oinfo->dqi_gi.dqi_entry_size = sizeof(struct ocfs2_global_disk_dqblk); + oinfo->dqi_gi.dqi_ops = &ocfs2_global_ops; + oinfo->dqi_gqi_bh = NULL; + oinfo->dqi_gqi_count = 0; + /* Read global header */ - gqinode = ocfs2_get_system_file_inode(OCFS2_SB(sb), ino[type], + oinfo->dqi_gqinode = ocfs2_get_system_file_inode(OCFS2_SB(sb), ino[type], OCFS2_INVALID_SLOT); - if (!gqinode) { + if (!oinfo->dqi_gqinode) { mlog(ML_ERROR, "failed to get global quota inode (type=%d)\n", type); status = -EINVAL; goto out_err; } - oinfo->dqi_gi.dqi_sb = sb; - oinfo->dqi_gi.dqi_type = type; - oinfo->dqi_gi.dqi_entry_size = sizeof(struct ocfs2_global_disk_dqblk); - oinfo->dqi_gi.dqi_ops = &ocfs2_global_ops; - oinfo->dqi_gqi_bh = NULL; - oinfo->dqi_gqi_count = 0; - oinfo->dqi_gqinode = gqinode; + status = ocfs2_lock_global_qf(oinfo, 0); if (status < 0) { mlog_errno(status); goto out_err; } - status = ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks(gqinode, 0, &oinfo->dqi_giblk, + status = ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks(oinfo->dqi_gqinode, 0, &oinfo->dqi_giblk, &pcount, NULL); if (status < 0) goto out_unlock; --- a/fs/ocfs2/quota_local.c~ocfs2-fix-crash-when-mount-with-quota-enabled +++ a/fs/ocfs2/quota_local.c @@ -702,8 +702,6 @@ static int ocfs2_local_read_info(struct info->dqi_priv = oinfo; oinfo->dqi_type = type; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&oinfo->dqi_chunk); - oinfo->dqi_gqinode = NULL; - ocfs2_qinfo_lock_res_init(&oinfo->dqi_gqlock, oinfo); oinfo->dqi_rec = NULL; oinfo->dqi_lqi_bh = NULL; oinfo->dqi_libh = NULL; _

2 years, 8 months

1
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