April 2022 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - only allow with rsa" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 9b30430ea356f237945e52f8a3a42158877bd5a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:02 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - only allow with rsa The pkcs1pad template can be instantiated with an arbitrary akcipher algorithm, which doesn't make sense; it is specifically an RSA padding scheme. Make it check that the underlying algorithm really is RSA. Fixes: 3d5b1ecdea6f ("crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithm") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.5+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 8ac3e73e8ea6..1b3545781425 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -621,6 +621,11 @@ static int pkcs1pad_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) rsa_alg = crypto_spawn_akcipher_alg(&ctx->spawn); + if (strcmp(rsa_alg->base.cra_name, "rsa") != 0) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_free_inst; + } + err = -ENAMETOOLONG; hash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]); if (IS_ERR(hash_name)) {

2 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - only allow with rsa" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 9b30430ea356f237945e52f8a3a42158877bd5a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:02 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - only allow with rsa The pkcs1pad template can be instantiated with an arbitrary akcipher algorithm, which doesn't make sense; it is specifically an RSA padding scheme. Make it check that the underlying algorithm really is RSA. Fixes: 3d5b1ecdea6f ("crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithm") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.5+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 8ac3e73e8ea6..1b3545781425 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -621,6 +621,11 @@ static int pkcs1pad_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) rsa_alg = crypto_spawn_akcipher_alg(&ctx->spawn); + if (strcmp(rsa_alg->base.cra_name, "rsa") != 0) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_free_inst; + } + err = -ENAMETOOLONG; hash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]); if (IS_ERR(hash_name)) {

2 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - only allow with rsa" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 9b30430ea356f237945e52f8a3a42158877bd5a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:02 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - only allow with rsa The pkcs1pad template can be instantiated with an arbitrary akcipher algorithm, which doesn't make sense; it is specifically an RSA padding scheme. Make it check that the underlying algorithm really is RSA. Fixes: 3d5b1ecdea6f ("crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithm") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.5+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 8ac3e73e8ea6..1b3545781425 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -621,6 +621,11 @@ static int pkcs1pad_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) rsa_alg = crypto_spawn_akcipher_alg(&ctx->spawn); + if (strcmp(rsa_alg->base.cra_name, "rsa") != 0) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_free_inst; + } + err = -ENAMETOOLONG; hash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]); if (IS_ERR(hash_name)) {

2 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix buffer overread in" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From a24611ea356c7f3f0ec926da11b9482ac1f414fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:05 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix buffer overread in pkcs1pad_verify_complete() Before checking whether the expected digest_info is present, we need to check that there are enough bytes remaining. Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 6b556ddeb3a0..9d804831c8b3 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -476,6 +476,8 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err) pos++; if (digest_info) { + if (digest_info->size > dst_len - pos) + goto done; if (crypto_memneq(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data, digest_info->size)) goto done;

2 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix buffer overread in" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From a24611ea356c7f3f0ec926da11b9482ac1f414fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:05 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix buffer overread in pkcs1pad_verify_complete() Before checking whether the expected digest_info is present, we need to check that there are enough bytes remaining. Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 6b556ddeb3a0..9d804831c8b3 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -476,6 +476,8 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err) pos++; if (digest_info) { + if (digest_info->size > dst_len - pos) + goto done; if (crypto_memneq(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data, digest_info->size)) goto done;

2 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix buffer overread in" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From a24611ea356c7f3f0ec926da11b9482ac1f414fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:05 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix buffer overread in pkcs1pad_verify_complete() Before checking whether the expected digest_info is present, we need to check that there are enough bytes remaining. Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 6b556ddeb3a0..9d804831c8b3 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -476,6 +476,8 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err) pos++; if (digest_info) { + if (digest_info->size > dst_len - pos) + goto done; if (crypto_memneq(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data, digest_info->size)) goto done;

2 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - restore signature length check" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From d3481accd974541e6a5d6a1fb588924a3519c36e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:04 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - restore signature length check RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures are required to be the same length as the RSA key size. RFC8017 specifically requires the verifier to check this (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8017#section-8.2.2). Commit a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") changed the kernel to allow longer signatures, but didn't explain this part of the change; it seems to be unrelated to the rest of the commit. Revert this change, since it doesn't appear to be correct. We can be pretty sure that no one is relying on overly-long signatures (which would have to be front-padded with zeroes) being supported, given that they would have been broken since commit c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms"). Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk(a)linaro.org> Suggested-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt(a)altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 7b223adebabf..6b556ddeb3a0 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req) if (WARN_ON(req->dst) || WARN_ON(!req->dst_len) || - !ctx->key_size || req->src_len < ctx->key_size) + !ctx->key_size || req->src_len != ctx->key_size) return -EINVAL; req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + req->dst_len, GFP_KERNEL);

2 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - restore signature length check" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From d3481accd974541e6a5d6a1fb588924a3519c36e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:04 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - restore signature length check RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures are required to be the same length as the RSA key size. RFC8017 specifically requires the verifier to check this (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8017#section-8.2.2). Commit a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") changed the kernel to allow longer signatures, but didn't explain this part of the change; it seems to be unrelated to the rest of the commit. Revert this change, since it doesn't appear to be correct. We can be pretty sure that no one is relying on overly-long signatures (which would have to be front-padded with zeroes) being supported, given that they would have been broken since commit c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms"). Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk(a)linaro.org> Suggested-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt(a)altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 7b223adebabf..6b556ddeb3a0 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req) if (WARN_ON(req->dst) || WARN_ON(!req->dst_len) || - !ctx->key_size || req->src_len < ctx->key_size) + !ctx->key_size || req->src_len != ctx->key_size) return -EINVAL; req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + req->dst_len, GFP_KERNEL);

2 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - restore signature length check" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From d3481accd974541e6a5d6a1fb588924a3519c36e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:04 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - restore signature length check RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures are required to be the same length as the RSA key size. RFC8017 specifically requires the verifier to check this (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8017#section-8.2.2). Commit a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") changed the kernel to allow longer signatures, but didn't explain this part of the change; it seems to be unrelated to the rest of the commit. Revert this change, since it doesn't appear to be correct. We can be pretty sure that no one is relying on overly-long signatures (which would have to be front-padded with zeroes) being supported, given that they would have been broken since commit c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms"). Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk(a)linaro.org> Suggested-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt(a)altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 7b223adebabf..6b556ddeb3a0 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req) if (WARN_ON(req->dst) || WARN_ON(!req->dst_len) || - !ctx->key_size || req->src_len < ctx->key_size) + !ctx->key_size || req->src_len != ctx->key_size) return -EINVAL; req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + req->dst_len, GFP_KERNEL);

2 years, 8 months

1
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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 8126b1c73108bc691f5643df19071a59a69d0bc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2022 19:59:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code pstore_dump() is *always* invoked in atomic context (nowadays in an RCU read-side critical section, before that under a spinlock). It doesn't make sense to try to use semaphores here. This is mostly a revert of commit ea84b580b955 ("pstore: Convert buf_lock to semaphore"), except that two parts aren't restored back exactly as they were: - keep the lock initialization in pstore_register - in efi_pstore_write(), always set the "block" flag to false - omit "is_locked", that was unnecessary since commit 959217c84c27 ("pstore: Actually give up during locking failure") - fix the bailout message The actual problem that the buggy commit was trying to address may have been that the use of preemptible() in efi_pstore_write() was wrong - it only looks at preempt_count() and the state of IRQs, but __rcu_read_lock() doesn't touch either of those under CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU. (Sidenote: CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU means that the scheduler can preempt tasks in RCU read-side critical sections, but you're not allowed to actively block/reschedule.) Lockdep probably never caught the problem because it's very rare that you actually hit the contended case, so lockdep always just sees the down_trylock(), not the down_interruptible(), and so it can't tell that there's a problem. Fixes: ea84b580b955 ("pstore: Convert buf_lock to semaphore") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220314185953.2068993-1-jannh@google.com diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c index 0ef086e43090..7e771c56c13c 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c @@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static int efi_pstore_write(struct pstore_record *record) efi_name[i] = name[i]; ret = efivar_entry_set_safe(efi_name, vendor, PSTORE_EFI_ATTRIBUTES, - preemptible(), record->size, record->psi->buf); + false, record->size, record->psi->buf); if (record->reason == KMSG_DUMP_OOPS && try_module_get(THIS_MODULE)) if (!schedule_work(&efivar_work)) diff --git a/fs/pstore/platform.c b/fs/pstore/platform.c index f243cb5e6a4f..e26162f102ff 100644 --- a/fs/pstore/platform.c +++ b/fs/pstore/platform.c @@ -143,21 +143,22 @@ static void pstore_timer_kick(void) mod_timer(&pstore_timer, jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(pstore_update_ms)); } -/* - * Should pstore_dump() wait for a concurrent pstore_dump()? If - * not, the current pstore_dump() will report a failure to dump - * and return. - */ -static bool pstore_cannot_wait(enum kmsg_dump_reason reason) +static bool pstore_cannot_block_path(enum kmsg_dump_reason reason) { - /* In NMI path, pstore shouldn't block regardless of reason. */ + /* + * In case of NMI path, pstore shouldn't be blocked + * regardless of reason. + */ if (in_nmi()) return true; switch (reason) { /* In panic case, other cpus are stopped by smp_send_stop(). */ case KMSG_DUMP_PANIC: - /* Emergency restart shouldn't be blocked. */ + /* + * Emergency restart shouldn't be blocked by spinning on + * pstore_info::buf_lock. + */ case KMSG_DUMP_EMERG: return true; default: @@ -389,21 +390,19 @@ static void pstore_dump(struct kmsg_dumper *dumper, unsigned long total = 0; const char *why; unsigned int part = 1; + unsigned long flags = 0; int ret; why = kmsg_dump_reason_str(reason); - if (down_trylock(&psinfo->buf_lock)) { - /* Failed to acquire lock: give up if we cannot wait. */ - if (pstore_cannot_wait(reason)) { - pr_err("dump skipped in %s path: may corrupt error record\n", - in_nmi() ? "NMI" : why); - return; - } - if (down_interruptible(&psinfo->buf_lock)) { - pr_err("could not grab semaphore?!\n"); + if (pstore_cannot_block_path(reason)) { + if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&psinfo->buf_lock, flags)) { + pr_err("dump skipped in %s path because of concurrent dump\n", + in_nmi() ? "NMI" : why); return; } + } else { + spin_lock_irqsave(&psinfo->buf_lock, flags); } kmsg_dump_rewind(&iter); @@ -467,8 +466,7 @@ static void pstore_dump(struct kmsg_dumper *dumper, total += record.size; part++; } - - up(&psinfo->buf_lock); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psinfo->buf_lock, flags); } static struct kmsg_dumper pstore_dumper = { @@ -594,7 +592,7 @@ int pstore_register(struct pstore_info *psi) psi->write_user = pstore_write_user_compat; psinfo = psi; mutex_init(&psinfo->read_mutex); - sema_init(&psinfo->buf_lock, 1); + spin_lock_init(&psinfo->buf_lock); if (psi->flags & PSTORE_FLAGS_DMESG) allocate_buf_for_compression(); diff --git a/include/linux/pstore.h b/include/linux/pstore.h index eb93a54cff31..e97a8188f0fd 100644 --- a/include/linux/pstore.h +++ b/include/linux/pstore.h @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/kmsg_dump.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> -#include <linux/semaphore.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/time.h> #include <linux/types.h> @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ struct pstore_record { * @owner: module which is responsible for this backend driver * @name: name of the backend driver * - * @buf_lock: semaphore to serialize access to @buf + * @buf_lock: spinlock to serialize access to @buf * @buf: preallocated crash dump buffer * @bufsize: size of @buf available for crash dump bytes (must match * smallest number of bytes available for writing to a @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ struct pstore_info { struct module *owner; const char *name; - struct semaphore buf_lock; + spinlock_t buf_lock; char *buf; size_t bufsize;

2 years, 8 months

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