April 2022 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] media: omap3isp: Use struct_group() for memcpy() region" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From d4568fc8525897e683983806f813be1ae9eedaed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 18:29:52 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] media: omap3isp: Use struct_group() for memcpy() region In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid intentionally writing across neighboring fields. Wrap the target region in struct_group(). This additionally fixes a theoretical misalignment of the copy (since the size of "buf" changes between 64-bit and 32-bit, but this is likely never built for 64-bit). FWIW, I think this code is totally broken on 64-bit (which appears to not be a "real" build configuration): it would either always fail (with an uninitialized data->buf_size) or would cause corruption in userspace due to the copy_to_user() in the call path against an uninitialized data->buf value: omap3isp_stat_request_statistics_time32(...) struct omap3isp_stat_data data64; ... omap3isp_stat_request_statistics(stat, &data64); int omap3isp_stat_request_statistics(struct ispstat *stat, struct omap3isp_stat_data *data) ... buf = isp_stat_buf_get(stat, data); static struct ispstat_buffer *isp_stat_buf_get(struct ispstat *stat, struct omap3isp_stat_data *data) ... if (buf->buf_size > data->buf_size) { ... return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } ... rval = copy_to_user(data->buf, buf->virt_addr, buf->buf_size); Regardless, additionally initialize data64 to be zero-filled to avoid undefined behavior. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211215220505.GB21862@embeddedor Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Fixes: 378e3f81cb56 ("media: omap3isp: support 64-bit version of omap3isp_stat_data") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart(a)ideasonboard.com> Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/omap3isp/ispstat.c b/drivers/media/platform/omap3isp/ispstat.c index 5b9b57f4d9bf..68cf68dbcace 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/omap3isp/ispstat.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/omap3isp/ispstat.c @@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ int omap3isp_stat_request_statistics(struct ispstat *stat, int omap3isp_stat_request_statistics_time32(struct ispstat *stat, struct omap3isp_stat_data_time32 *data) { - struct omap3isp_stat_data data64; + struct omap3isp_stat_data data64 = { }; int ret; ret = omap3isp_stat_request_statistics(stat, &data64); @@ -521,7 +521,8 @@ int omap3isp_stat_request_statistics_time32(struct ispstat *stat, data->ts.tv_sec = data64.ts.tv_sec; data->ts.tv_usec = data64.ts.tv_usec; - memcpy(&data->buf, &data64.buf, sizeof(*data) - sizeof(data->ts)); + data->buf = (uintptr_t)data64.buf; + memcpy(&data->frame, &data64.frame, sizeof(data->frame)); return 0; } diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/omap3isp.h b/include/uapi/linux/omap3isp.h index 87b55755f4ff..d9db7ad43890 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/omap3isp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/omap3isp.h @@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ struct omap3isp_h3a_aewb_config { * struct omap3isp_stat_data - Statistic data sent to or received from user * @ts: Timestamp of returned framestats. * @buf: Pointer to pass to user. + * @buf_size: Size of buffer. * @frame_number: Frame number of requested stats. * @cur_frame: Current frame number being processed. * @config_counter: Number of the configuration associated with the data. @@ -176,10 +177,12 @@ struct omap3isp_stat_data { struct timeval ts; #endif void __user *buf; - __u32 buf_size; - __u16 frame_number; - __u16 cur_frame; - __u16 config_counter; + __struct_group(/* no tag */, frame, /* no attrs */, + __u32 buf_size; + __u16 frame_number; + __u16 cur_frame; + __u16 config_counter; + ); }; #ifdef __KERNEL__ @@ -189,10 +192,12 @@ struct omap3isp_stat_data_time32 { __s32 tv_usec; } ts; __u32 buf; - __u32 buf_size; - __u16 frame_number; - __u16 cur_frame; - __u16 config_counter; + __struct_group(/* no tag */, frame, /* no attrs */, + __u32 buf_size; + __u16 frame_number; + __u16 cur_frame; + __u16 config_counter; + ); }; #endif

3 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - only allow with rsa" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 9b30430ea356f237945e52f8a3a42158877bd5a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:02 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - only allow with rsa The pkcs1pad template can be instantiated with an arbitrary akcipher algorithm, which doesn't make sense; it is specifically an RSA padding scheme. Make it check that the underlying algorithm really is RSA. Fixes: 3d5b1ecdea6f ("crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithm") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.5+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 8ac3e73e8ea6..1b3545781425 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -621,6 +621,11 @@ static int pkcs1pad_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) rsa_alg = crypto_spawn_akcipher_alg(&ctx->spawn); + if (strcmp(rsa_alg->base.cra_name, "rsa") != 0) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_free_inst; + } + err = -ENAMETOOLONG; hash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]); if (IS_ERR(hash_name)) {

3 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - only allow with rsa" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 9b30430ea356f237945e52f8a3a42158877bd5a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:02 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - only allow with rsa The pkcs1pad template can be instantiated with an arbitrary akcipher algorithm, which doesn't make sense; it is specifically an RSA padding scheme. Make it check that the underlying algorithm really is RSA. Fixes: 3d5b1ecdea6f ("crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithm") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.5+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 8ac3e73e8ea6..1b3545781425 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -621,6 +621,11 @@ static int pkcs1pad_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) rsa_alg = crypto_spawn_akcipher_alg(&ctx->spawn); + if (strcmp(rsa_alg->base.cra_name, "rsa") != 0) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_free_inst; + } + err = -ENAMETOOLONG; hash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]); if (IS_ERR(hash_name)) {

3 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - only allow with rsa" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 9b30430ea356f237945e52f8a3a42158877bd5a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:02 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - only allow with rsa The pkcs1pad template can be instantiated with an arbitrary akcipher algorithm, which doesn't make sense; it is specifically an RSA padding scheme. Make it check that the underlying algorithm really is RSA. Fixes: 3d5b1ecdea6f ("crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithm") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.5+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 8ac3e73e8ea6..1b3545781425 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -621,6 +621,11 @@ static int pkcs1pad_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) rsa_alg = crypto_spawn_akcipher_alg(&ctx->spawn); + if (strcmp(rsa_alg->base.cra_name, "rsa") != 0) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_free_inst; + } + err = -ENAMETOOLONG; hash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]); if (IS_ERR(hash_name)) {

3 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix buffer overread in" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From a24611ea356c7f3f0ec926da11b9482ac1f414fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:05 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix buffer overread in pkcs1pad_verify_complete() Before checking whether the expected digest_info is present, we need to check that there are enough bytes remaining. Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 6b556ddeb3a0..9d804831c8b3 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -476,6 +476,8 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err) pos++; if (digest_info) { + if (digest_info->size > dst_len - pos) + goto done; if (crypto_memneq(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data, digest_info->size)) goto done;

3 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix buffer overread in" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From a24611ea356c7f3f0ec926da11b9482ac1f414fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:05 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix buffer overread in pkcs1pad_verify_complete() Before checking whether the expected digest_info is present, we need to check that there are enough bytes remaining. Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 6b556ddeb3a0..9d804831c8b3 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -476,6 +476,8 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err) pos++; if (digest_info) { + if (digest_info->size > dst_len - pos) + goto done; if (crypto_memneq(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data, digest_info->size)) goto done;

3 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix buffer overread in" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From a24611ea356c7f3f0ec926da11b9482ac1f414fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:05 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix buffer overread in pkcs1pad_verify_complete() Before checking whether the expected digest_info is present, we need to check that there are enough bytes remaining. Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 6b556ddeb3a0..9d804831c8b3 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -476,6 +476,8 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err) pos++; if (digest_info) { + if (digest_info->size > dst_len - pos) + goto done; if (crypto_memneq(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data, digest_info->size)) goto done;

3 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - restore signature length check" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From d3481accd974541e6a5d6a1fb588924a3519c36e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:04 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - restore signature length check RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures are required to be the same length as the RSA key size. RFC8017 specifically requires the verifier to check this (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8017#section-8.2.2). Commit a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") changed the kernel to allow longer signatures, but didn't explain this part of the change; it seems to be unrelated to the rest of the commit. Revert this change, since it doesn't appear to be correct. We can be pretty sure that no one is relying on overly-long signatures (which would have to be front-padded with zeroes) being supported, given that they would have been broken since commit c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms"). Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk(a)linaro.org> Suggested-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt(a)altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 7b223adebabf..6b556ddeb3a0 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req) if (WARN_ON(req->dst) || WARN_ON(!req->dst_len) || - !ctx->key_size || req->src_len < ctx->key_size) + !ctx->key_size || req->src_len != ctx->key_size) return -EINVAL; req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + req->dst_len, GFP_KERNEL);

3 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - restore signature length check" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From d3481accd974541e6a5d6a1fb588924a3519c36e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:04 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - restore signature length check RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures are required to be the same length as the RSA key size. RFC8017 specifically requires the verifier to check this (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8017#section-8.2.2). Commit a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") changed the kernel to allow longer signatures, but didn't explain this part of the change; it seems to be unrelated to the rest of the commit. Revert this change, since it doesn't appear to be correct. We can be pretty sure that no one is relying on overly-long signatures (which would have to be front-padded with zeroes) being supported, given that they would have been broken since commit c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms"). Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk(a)linaro.org> Suggested-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt(a)altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 7b223adebabf..6b556ddeb3a0 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req) if (WARN_ON(req->dst) || WARN_ON(!req->dst_len) || - !ctx->key_size || req->src_len < ctx->key_size) + !ctx->key_size || req->src_len != ctx->key_size) return -EINVAL; req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + req->dst_len, GFP_KERNEL);

3 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - restore signature length check" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From d3481accd974541e6a5d6a1fb588924a3519c36e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 16:13:04 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - restore signature length check RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures are required to be the same length as the RSA key size. RFC8017 specifically requires the verifier to check this (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8017#section-8.2.2). Commit a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") changed the kernel to allow longer signatures, but didn't explain this part of the change; it seems to be unrelated to the rest of the commit. Revert this change, since it doesn't appear to be correct. We can be pretty sure that no one is relying on overly-long signatures (which would have to be front-padded with zeroes) being supported, given that they would have been broken since commit c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms"). Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk(a)linaro.org> Suggested-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt(a)altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 7b223adebabf..6b556ddeb3a0 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req) if (WARN_ON(req->dst) || WARN_ON(!req->dst_len) || - !ctx->key_size || req->src_len < ctx->key_size) + !ctx->key_size || req->src_len != ctx->key_size) return -EINVAL; req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + req->dst_len, GFP_KERNEL);

3 years, 8 months

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Linux-stable-mirror April 2022