May 2021 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ath10k: add CCMP PN replay protection for fragmented frames" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From a1166b2653db2f3de7338b9fb8a0f6e924b904ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wen Gong <wgong(a)codeaurora.org> Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: add CCMP PN replay protection for fragmented frames for PCIe PN replay check for not fragmented frames is finished in the firmware, but this was not done for fragmented frames when ath10k is used with QCA6174/QCA6377 PCIe. mac80211 has the function ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() for PN replay check for fragmented frames, but this does not get checked with QCA6174 due to the ieee80211_has_protected() condition not matching the cleared Protected bit case. Validate the PN of received fragmented frames within ath10k when CCMP is used and drop the fragment if the PN is not correct (incremented by exactly one from the previous fragment). This applies only for QCA6174/QCA6377 PCIe. Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong(a)codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni(a)codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.9ba2664866a4.I756e47b67e210dba6996… Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h index 956157946106..dbc8aef82a65 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h @@ -845,6 +845,7 @@ enum htt_security_types { #define ATH10K_HTT_TXRX_PEER_SECURITY_MAX 2 #define ATH10K_TXRX_NUM_EXT_TIDS 19 +#define ATH10K_TXRX_NON_QOS_TID 16 enum htt_security_flags { #define HTT_SECURITY_TYPE_MASK 0x7F diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c index 1a08156d5011..f1e5bce8b14f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c @@ -1746,16 +1746,87 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload(struct sk_buff *msdu) msdu->ip_summed = ath10k_htt_rx_get_csum_state(msdu); } +static u64 ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 offset, + enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype) +{ + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; + u64 pn = 0; + u8 *ehdr; + + hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset); + ehdr = skb->data + offset + ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); + + if (enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2) { + pn = ehdr[0]; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[1] << 8; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[4] << 16; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[5] << 24; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[6] << 32; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[7] << 40; + } + return pn; +} + +static bool ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(struct ath10k *ar, + struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 peer_id, + u16 offset, + enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype) +{ + struct ath10k_peer *peer; + union htt_rx_pn_t *last_pn, new_pn = {0}; + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; + bool more_frags; + u8 tid, frag_number; + u32 seq; + + peer = ath10k_peer_find_by_id(ar, peer_id); + if (!peer) { + ath10k_dbg(ar, ATH10K_DBG_HTT, "invalid peer for frag pn check\n"); + return false; + } + + hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset); + if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) + tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr); + else + tid = ATH10K_TXRX_NON_QOS_TID; + + last_pn = &peer->frag_tids_last_pn[tid]; + new_pn.pn48 = ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(ar, skb, offset, enctype); + more_frags = ieee80211_has_morefrags(hdr->frame_control); + frag_number = le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl) & IEEE80211_SCTL_FRAG; + seq = (__le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl) & IEEE80211_SCTL_SEQ) >> 4; + + if (frag_number == 0) { + last_pn->pn48 = new_pn.pn48; + peer->frag_tids_seq[tid] = seq; + } else { + if (seq != peer->frag_tids_seq[tid]) + return false; + + if (new_pn.pn48 != last_pn->pn48 + 1) + return false; + + last_pn->pn48 = new_pn.pn48; + } + + return true; +} + static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff_head *amsdu, struct ieee80211_rx_status *status, bool fill_crypt_header, u8 *rx_hdr, - enum ath10k_pkt_rx_err *err) + enum ath10k_pkt_rx_err *err, + u16 peer_id, + bool frag) { struct sk_buff *first; struct sk_buff *last; - struct sk_buff *msdu; + struct sk_buff *msdu, *temp; struct htt_rx_desc *rxd; struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype; @@ -1768,6 +1839,7 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar, bool is_decrypted; bool is_mgmt; u32 attention; + bool frag_pn_check = true; if (skb_queue_empty(amsdu)) return; @@ -1866,6 +1938,24 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar, } skb_queue_walk(amsdu, msdu) { + if (frag && !fill_crypt_header && is_decrypted && + enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2) + frag_pn_check = ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(ar, + msdu, + peer_id, + 0, + enctype); + + if (!frag_pn_check) { + /* Discard the fragment with invalid PN */ + temp = msdu->prev; + __skb_unlink(msdu, amsdu); + dev_kfree_skb_any(msdu); + msdu = temp; + frag_pn_check = true; + continue; + } + ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload(msdu); ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap(ar, msdu, status, first_hdr, enctype, is_decrypted); @@ -2071,7 +2161,8 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_handle_amsdu(struct ath10k_htt *htt) ath10k_htt_rx_h_unchain(ar, &amsdu, &drop_cnt, &unchain_cnt); ath10k_htt_rx_h_filter(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, &drop_cnt_filter); - ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, true, first_hdr, &err); + ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, true, first_hdr, &err, 0, + false); msdus_to_queue = skb_queue_len(&amsdu); ath10k_htt_rx_h_enqueue(ar, &amsdu, rx_status); @@ -3027,7 +3118,7 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_in_ord_ind(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff *skb) ath10k_htt_rx_h_ppdu(ar, &amsdu, status, vdev_id); ath10k_htt_rx_h_filter(ar, &amsdu, status, NULL); ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, status, false, NULL, - NULL); + NULL, peer_id, frag); ath10k_htt_rx_h_enqueue(ar, &amsdu, status); break; case -EAGAIN:

3 years, 7 months

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0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ath10k: add CCMP PN replay protection for fragmented frames" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From a1166b2653db2f3de7338b9fb8a0f6e924b904ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wen Gong <wgong(a)codeaurora.org> Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: add CCMP PN replay protection for fragmented frames for PCIe PN replay check for not fragmented frames is finished in the firmware, but this was not done for fragmented frames when ath10k is used with QCA6174/QCA6377 PCIe. mac80211 has the function ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() for PN replay check for fragmented frames, but this does not get checked with QCA6174 due to the ieee80211_has_protected() condition not matching the cleared Protected bit case. Validate the PN of received fragmented frames within ath10k when CCMP is used and drop the fragment if the PN is not correct (incremented by exactly one from the previous fragment). This applies only for QCA6174/QCA6377 PCIe. Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong(a)codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni(a)codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.9ba2664866a4.I756e47b67e210dba6996… Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h index 956157946106..dbc8aef82a65 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h @@ -845,6 +845,7 @@ enum htt_security_types { #define ATH10K_HTT_TXRX_PEER_SECURITY_MAX 2 #define ATH10K_TXRX_NUM_EXT_TIDS 19 +#define ATH10K_TXRX_NON_QOS_TID 16 enum htt_security_flags { #define HTT_SECURITY_TYPE_MASK 0x7F diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c index 1a08156d5011..f1e5bce8b14f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c @@ -1746,16 +1746,87 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload(struct sk_buff *msdu) msdu->ip_summed = ath10k_htt_rx_get_csum_state(msdu); } +static u64 ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 offset, + enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype) +{ + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; + u64 pn = 0; + u8 *ehdr; + + hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset); + ehdr = skb->data + offset + ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); + + if (enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2) { + pn = ehdr[0]; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[1] << 8; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[4] << 16; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[5] << 24; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[6] << 32; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[7] << 40; + } + return pn; +} + +static bool ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(struct ath10k *ar, + struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 peer_id, + u16 offset, + enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype) +{ + struct ath10k_peer *peer; + union htt_rx_pn_t *last_pn, new_pn = {0}; + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; + bool more_frags; + u8 tid, frag_number; + u32 seq; + + peer = ath10k_peer_find_by_id(ar, peer_id); + if (!peer) { + ath10k_dbg(ar, ATH10K_DBG_HTT, "invalid peer for frag pn check\n"); + return false; + } + + hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset); + if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) + tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr); + else + tid = ATH10K_TXRX_NON_QOS_TID; + + last_pn = &peer->frag_tids_last_pn[tid]; + new_pn.pn48 = ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(ar, skb, offset, enctype); + more_frags = ieee80211_has_morefrags(hdr->frame_control); + frag_number = le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl) & IEEE80211_SCTL_FRAG; + seq = (__le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl) & IEEE80211_SCTL_SEQ) >> 4; + + if (frag_number == 0) { + last_pn->pn48 = new_pn.pn48; + peer->frag_tids_seq[tid] = seq; + } else { + if (seq != peer->frag_tids_seq[tid]) + return false; + + if (new_pn.pn48 != last_pn->pn48 + 1) + return false; + + last_pn->pn48 = new_pn.pn48; + } + + return true; +} + static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff_head *amsdu, struct ieee80211_rx_status *status, bool fill_crypt_header, u8 *rx_hdr, - enum ath10k_pkt_rx_err *err) + enum ath10k_pkt_rx_err *err, + u16 peer_id, + bool frag) { struct sk_buff *first; struct sk_buff *last; - struct sk_buff *msdu; + struct sk_buff *msdu, *temp; struct htt_rx_desc *rxd; struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype; @@ -1768,6 +1839,7 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar, bool is_decrypted; bool is_mgmt; u32 attention; + bool frag_pn_check = true; if (skb_queue_empty(amsdu)) return; @@ -1866,6 +1938,24 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar, } skb_queue_walk(amsdu, msdu) { + if (frag && !fill_crypt_header && is_decrypted && + enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2) + frag_pn_check = ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(ar, + msdu, + peer_id, + 0, + enctype); + + if (!frag_pn_check) { + /* Discard the fragment with invalid PN */ + temp = msdu->prev; + __skb_unlink(msdu, amsdu); + dev_kfree_skb_any(msdu); + msdu = temp; + frag_pn_check = true; + continue; + } + ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload(msdu); ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap(ar, msdu, status, first_hdr, enctype, is_decrypted); @@ -2071,7 +2161,8 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_handle_amsdu(struct ath10k_htt *htt) ath10k_htt_rx_h_unchain(ar, &amsdu, &drop_cnt, &unchain_cnt); ath10k_htt_rx_h_filter(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, &drop_cnt_filter); - ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, true, first_hdr, &err); + ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, true, first_hdr, &err, 0, + false); msdus_to_queue = skb_queue_len(&amsdu); ath10k_htt_rx_h_enqueue(ar, &amsdu, rx_status); @@ -3027,7 +3118,7 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_in_ord_ind(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff *skb) ath10k_htt_rx_h_ppdu(ar, &amsdu, status, vdev_id); ath10k_htt_rx_h_filter(ar, &amsdu, status, NULL); ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, status, false, NULL, - NULL); + NULL, peer_id, frag); ath10k_htt_rx_h_enqueue(ar, &amsdu, status); break; case -EAGAIN:

3 years, 7 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ath10k: add CCMP PN replay protection for fragmented frames" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From a1166b2653db2f3de7338b9fb8a0f6e924b904ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wen Gong <wgong(a)codeaurora.org> Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: add CCMP PN replay protection for fragmented frames for PCIe PN replay check for not fragmented frames is finished in the firmware, but this was not done for fragmented frames when ath10k is used with QCA6174/QCA6377 PCIe. mac80211 has the function ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() for PN replay check for fragmented frames, but this does not get checked with QCA6174 due to the ieee80211_has_protected() condition not matching the cleared Protected bit case. Validate the PN of received fragmented frames within ath10k when CCMP is used and drop the fragment if the PN is not correct (incremented by exactly one from the previous fragment). This applies only for QCA6174/QCA6377 PCIe. Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong(a)codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni(a)codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.9ba2664866a4.I756e47b67e210dba6996… Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h index 956157946106..dbc8aef82a65 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h @@ -845,6 +845,7 @@ enum htt_security_types { #define ATH10K_HTT_TXRX_PEER_SECURITY_MAX 2 #define ATH10K_TXRX_NUM_EXT_TIDS 19 +#define ATH10K_TXRX_NON_QOS_TID 16 enum htt_security_flags { #define HTT_SECURITY_TYPE_MASK 0x7F diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c index 1a08156d5011..f1e5bce8b14f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c @@ -1746,16 +1746,87 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload(struct sk_buff *msdu) msdu->ip_summed = ath10k_htt_rx_get_csum_state(msdu); } +static u64 ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 offset, + enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype) +{ + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; + u64 pn = 0; + u8 *ehdr; + + hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset); + ehdr = skb->data + offset + ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); + + if (enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2) { + pn = ehdr[0]; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[1] << 8; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[4] << 16; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[5] << 24; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[6] << 32; + pn |= (u64)ehdr[7] << 40; + } + return pn; +} + +static bool ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(struct ath10k *ar, + struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 peer_id, + u16 offset, + enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype) +{ + struct ath10k_peer *peer; + union htt_rx_pn_t *last_pn, new_pn = {0}; + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; + bool more_frags; + u8 tid, frag_number; + u32 seq; + + peer = ath10k_peer_find_by_id(ar, peer_id); + if (!peer) { + ath10k_dbg(ar, ATH10K_DBG_HTT, "invalid peer for frag pn check\n"); + return false; + } + + hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset); + if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) + tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr); + else + tid = ATH10K_TXRX_NON_QOS_TID; + + last_pn = &peer->frag_tids_last_pn[tid]; + new_pn.pn48 = ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(ar, skb, offset, enctype); + more_frags = ieee80211_has_morefrags(hdr->frame_control); + frag_number = le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl) & IEEE80211_SCTL_FRAG; + seq = (__le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl) & IEEE80211_SCTL_SEQ) >> 4; + + if (frag_number == 0) { + last_pn->pn48 = new_pn.pn48; + peer->frag_tids_seq[tid] = seq; + } else { + if (seq != peer->frag_tids_seq[tid]) + return false; + + if (new_pn.pn48 != last_pn->pn48 + 1) + return false; + + last_pn->pn48 = new_pn.pn48; + } + + return true; +} + static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff_head *amsdu, struct ieee80211_rx_status *status, bool fill_crypt_header, u8 *rx_hdr, - enum ath10k_pkt_rx_err *err) + enum ath10k_pkt_rx_err *err, + u16 peer_id, + bool frag) { struct sk_buff *first; struct sk_buff *last; - struct sk_buff *msdu; + struct sk_buff *msdu, *temp; struct htt_rx_desc *rxd; struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype; @@ -1768,6 +1839,7 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar, bool is_decrypted; bool is_mgmt; u32 attention; + bool frag_pn_check = true; if (skb_queue_empty(amsdu)) return; @@ -1866,6 +1938,24 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar, } skb_queue_walk(amsdu, msdu) { + if (frag && !fill_crypt_header && is_decrypted && + enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2) + frag_pn_check = ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(ar, + msdu, + peer_id, + 0, + enctype); + + if (!frag_pn_check) { + /* Discard the fragment with invalid PN */ + temp = msdu->prev; + __skb_unlink(msdu, amsdu); + dev_kfree_skb_any(msdu); + msdu = temp; + frag_pn_check = true; + continue; + } + ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload(msdu); ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap(ar, msdu, status, first_hdr, enctype, is_decrypted); @@ -2071,7 +2161,8 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_handle_amsdu(struct ath10k_htt *htt) ath10k_htt_rx_h_unchain(ar, &amsdu, &drop_cnt, &unchain_cnt); ath10k_htt_rx_h_filter(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, &drop_cnt_filter); - ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, true, first_hdr, &err); + ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, true, first_hdr, &err, 0, + false); msdus_to_queue = skb_queue_len(&amsdu); ath10k_htt_rx_h_enqueue(ar, &amsdu, rx_status); @@ -3027,7 +3118,7 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_in_ord_ind(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff *skb) ath10k_htt_rx_h_ppdu(ar, &amsdu, status, vdev_id); ath10k_htt_rx_h_filter(ar, &amsdu, status, NULL); ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, status, false, NULL, - NULL); + NULL, peer_id, frag); ath10k_htt_rx_h_enqueue(ar, &amsdu, status); break; case -EAGAIN:

3 years, 7 months

1
0
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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mac80211: extend protection against mixed key and fragment" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 3edc6b0d6c061a70d8ca3c3c72eb1f58ce29bfb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wen Gong <wgong(a)codeaurora.org> Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: extend protection against mixed key and fragment cache attacks For some chips/drivers, e.g., QCA6174 with ath10k, the decryption is done by the hardware, and the Protected bit in the Frame Control field is cleared in the lower level driver before the frame is passed to mac80211. In such cases, the condition for ieee80211_has_protected() is not met in ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() of mac80211 and the new security validation steps are not executed. Extend mac80211 to cover the case where the Protected bit has been cleared, but the frame is indicated as having been decrypted by the hardware. This extends protection against mixed key and fragment cache attack for additional drivers/chips. This fixes CVE-2020-24586 and CVE-2020-24587 for such cases. Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong(a)codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni(a)codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.037aa5ca0390.I7bb888e2965a0db02a67… Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 22a925899a9e..1bb43edd47b6 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2229,6 +2229,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) unsigned int frag, seq; struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry; struct sk_buff *skb; + struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb); hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; fc = hdr->frame_control; @@ -2287,7 +2288,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue])); BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN != IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); - } else if (rx->key && ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) { + } else if (rx->key && + (ieee80211_has_protected(fc) || + (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))) { entry->is_protected = true; entry->key_color = rx->key->color; } @@ -2332,13 +2335,19 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); } else if (entry->is_protected && - (!rx->key || !ieee80211_has_protected(fc) || + (!rx->key || + (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc) && + !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) || rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) { /* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even * if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a * lost cause anyway. */ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + } else if (entry->is_protected && rx->key && + entry->key_color != rx->key->color && + (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc));

3 years, 7 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mac80211: extend protection against mixed key and fragment" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 3edc6b0d6c061a70d8ca3c3c72eb1f58ce29bfb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wen Gong <wgong(a)codeaurora.org> Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: extend protection against mixed key and fragment cache attacks For some chips/drivers, e.g., QCA6174 with ath10k, the decryption is done by the hardware, and the Protected bit in the Frame Control field is cleared in the lower level driver before the frame is passed to mac80211. In such cases, the condition for ieee80211_has_protected() is not met in ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() of mac80211 and the new security validation steps are not executed. Extend mac80211 to cover the case where the Protected bit has been cleared, but the frame is indicated as having been decrypted by the hardware. This extends protection against mixed key and fragment cache attack for additional drivers/chips. This fixes CVE-2020-24586 and CVE-2020-24587 for such cases. Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong(a)codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni(a)codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.037aa5ca0390.I7bb888e2965a0db02a67… Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 22a925899a9e..1bb43edd47b6 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2229,6 +2229,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) unsigned int frag, seq; struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry; struct sk_buff *skb; + struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb); hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; fc = hdr->frame_control; @@ -2287,7 +2288,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue])); BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN != IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); - } else if (rx->key && ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) { + } else if (rx->key && + (ieee80211_has_protected(fc) || + (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))) { entry->is_protected = true; entry->key_color = rx->key->color; } @@ -2332,13 +2335,19 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); } else if (entry->is_protected && - (!rx->key || !ieee80211_has_protected(fc) || + (!rx->key || + (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc) && + !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) || rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) { /* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even * if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a * lost cause anyway. */ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + } else if (entry->is_protected && rx->key && + entry->key_color != rx->key->color && + (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc));

3 years, 7 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mac80211: extend protection against mixed key and fragment" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 3edc6b0d6c061a70d8ca3c3c72eb1f58ce29bfb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wen Gong <wgong(a)codeaurora.org> Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: extend protection against mixed key and fragment cache attacks For some chips/drivers, e.g., QCA6174 with ath10k, the decryption is done by the hardware, and the Protected bit in the Frame Control field is cleared in the lower level driver before the frame is passed to mac80211. In such cases, the condition for ieee80211_has_protected() is not met in ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() of mac80211 and the new security validation steps are not executed. Extend mac80211 to cover the case where the Protected bit has been cleared, but the frame is indicated as having been decrypted by the hardware. This extends protection against mixed key and fragment cache attack for additional drivers/chips. This fixes CVE-2020-24586 and CVE-2020-24587 for such cases. Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong(a)codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni(a)codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.037aa5ca0390.I7bb888e2965a0db02a67… Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 22a925899a9e..1bb43edd47b6 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2229,6 +2229,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) unsigned int frag, seq; struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry; struct sk_buff *skb; + struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb); hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; fc = hdr->frame_control; @@ -2287,7 +2288,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue])); BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN != IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); - } else if (rx->key && ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) { + } else if (rx->key && + (ieee80211_has_protected(fc) || + (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))) { entry->is_protected = true; entry->key_color = rx->key->color; } @@ -2332,13 +2335,19 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); } else if (entry->is_protected && - (!rx->key || !ieee80211_has_protected(fc) || + (!rx->key || + (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc) && + !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) || rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) { /* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even * if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a * lost cause anyway. */ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + } else if (entry->is_protected && rx->key && + entry->key_color != rx->key->color && + (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc));

3 years, 7 months

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0
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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mac80211: do not accept/forward invalid EAPOL frames" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From a8c4d76a8dd4fb9666fc8919a703d85fb8f44ed8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: do not accept/forward invalid EAPOL frames EAPOL frames are used for authentication and key management between the AP and each individual STA associated in the BSS. Those frames are not supposed to be sent by one associated STA to another associated STA (either unicast for broadcast/multicast). Similarly, in 802.11 they're supposed to be sent to the authenticator (AP) address. Since it is possible for unexpected EAPOL frames to result in misbehavior in supplicant implementations, it is better for the AP to not allow such cases to be forwarded to other clients either directly, or indirectly if the AP interface is part of a bridge. Accept EAPOL (control port) frames only if they're transmitted to the own address, or, due to interoperability concerns, to the PAE group address. Disable forwarding of EAPOL (or well, the configured control port protocol) frames back to wireless medium in all cases. Previously, these frames were accepted from fully authenticated and authorized stations and also from unauthenticated stations for one of the cases. Additionally, to avoid forwarding by the bridge, rewrite the PAE group address case to the local MAC address. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Co-developed-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni(a)codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni(a)codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.cb327ed0cabe.Ib7dcffa2a31f0913d660… Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 4454ec47283f..22a925899a9e 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2531,13 +2531,13 @@ static bool ieee80211_frame_allowed(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, __le16 fc) struct ethhdr *ehdr = (struct ethhdr *) rx->skb->data; /* - * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless - * of whether the frame was encrypted or not. + * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless of + * whether the frame was encrypted or not, and always disallow + * all other destination addresses for them. */ - if (ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol && - (ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) || - ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr))) - return true; + if (unlikely(ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol)) + return ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) || + ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr); if (ieee80211_802_1x_port_control(rx) || ieee80211_drop_unencrypted(rx, fc)) @@ -2562,8 +2562,28 @@ static void ieee80211_deliver_skb_to_local_stack(struct sk_buff *skb, cfg80211_rx_control_port(dev, skb, noencrypt); dev_kfree_skb(skb); } else { + struct ethhdr *ehdr = (void *)skb_mac_header(skb); + memset(skb->cb, 0, sizeof(skb->cb)); + /* + * 802.1X over 802.11 requires that the authenticator address + * be used for EAPOL frames. However, 802.1X allows the use of + * the PAE group address instead. If the interface is part of + * a bridge and we pass the frame with the PAE group address, + * then the bridge will forward it to the network (even if the + * client was not associated yet), which isn't supposed to + * happen. + * To avoid that, rewrite the destination address to our own + * address, so that the authenticator (e.g. hostapd) will see + * the frame, but bridge won't forward it anywhere else. Note + * that due to earlier filtering, the only other address can + * be the PAE group address. + */ + if (unlikely(skb->protocol == sdata->control_port_protocol && + !ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr))) + ether_addr_copy(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr); + /* deliver to local stack */ if (rx->list) list_add_tail(&skb->list, rx->list); @@ -2603,6 +2623,7 @@ ieee80211_deliver_skb(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if ((sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP || sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) && !(sdata->flags & IEEE80211_SDATA_DONT_BRIDGE_PACKETS) && + ehdr->h_proto != rx->sdata->control_port_protocol && (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN || !sdata->u.vlan.sta)) { if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ehdr->h_dest) && ieee80211_vif_get_num_mcast_if(sdata) != 0) {

3 years, 7 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mac80211: do not accept/forward invalid EAPOL frames" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From a8c4d76a8dd4fb9666fc8919a703d85fb8f44ed8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: do not accept/forward invalid EAPOL frames EAPOL frames are used for authentication and key management between the AP and each individual STA associated in the BSS. Those frames are not supposed to be sent by one associated STA to another associated STA (either unicast for broadcast/multicast). Similarly, in 802.11 they're supposed to be sent to the authenticator (AP) address. Since it is possible for unexpected EAPOL frames to result in misbehavior in supplicant implementations, it is better for the AP to not allow such cases to be forwarded to other clients either directly, or indirectly if the AP interface is part of a bridge. Accept EAPOL (control port) frames only if they're transmitted to the own address, or, due to interoperability concerns, to the PAE group address. Disable forwarding of EAPOL (or well, the configured control port protocol) frames back to wireless medium in all cases. Previously, these frames were accepted from fully authenticated and authorized stations and also from unauthenticated stations for one of the cases. Additionally, to avoid forwarding by the bridge, rewrite the PAE group address case to the local MAC address. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Co-developed-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni(a)codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni(a)codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.cb327ed0cabe.Ib7dcffa2a31f0913d660… Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 4454ec47283f..22a925899a9e 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2531,13 +2531,13 @@ static bool ieee80211_frame_allowed(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, __le16 fc) struct ethhdr *ehdr = (struct ethhdr *) rx->skb->data; /* - * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless - * of whether the frame was encrypted or not. + * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless of + * whether the frame was encrypted or not, and always disallow + * all other destination addresses for them. */ - if (ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol && - (ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) || - ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr))) - return true; + if (unlikely(ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol)) + return ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) || + ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr); if (ieee80211_802_1x_port_control(rx) || ieee80211_drop_unencrypted(rx, fc)) @@ -2562,8 +2562,28 @@ static void ieee80211_deliver_skb_to_local_stack(struct sk_buff *skb, cfg80211_rx_control_port(dev, skb, noencrypt); dev_kfree_skb(skb); } else { + struct ethhdr *ehdr = (void *)skb_mac_header(skb); + memset(skb->cb, 0, sizeof(skb->cb)); + /* + * 802.1X over 802.11 requires that the authenticator address + * be used for EAPOL frames. However, 802.1X allows the use of + * the PAE group address instead. If the interface is part of + * a bridge and we pass the frame with the PAE group address, + * then the bridge will forward it to the network (even if the + * client was not associated yet), which isn't supposed to + * happen. + * To avoid that, rewrite the destination address to our own + * address, so that the authenticator (e.g. hostapd) will see + * the frame, but bridge won't forward it anywhere else. Note + * that due to earlier filtering, the only other address can + * be the PAE group address. + */ + if (unlikely(skb->protocol == sdata->control_port_protocol && + !ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr))) + ether_addr_copy(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr); + /* deliver to local stack */ if (rx->list) list_add_tail(&skb->list, rx->list); @@ -2603,6 +2623,7 @@ ieee80211_deliver_skb(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if ((sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP || sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) && !(sdata->flags & IEEE80211_SDATA_DONT_BRIDGE_PACKETS) && + ehdr->h_proto != rx->sdata->control_port_protocol && (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN || !sdata->u.vlan.sta)) { if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ehdr->h_dest) && ieee80211_vif_get_num_mcast_if(sdata) != 0) {

3 years, 7 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mac80211: do not accept/forward invalid EAPOL frames" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From a8c4d76a8dd4fb9666fc8919a703d85fb8f44ed8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: do not accept/forward invalid EAPOL frames EAPOL frames are used for authentication and key management between the AP and each individual STA associated in the BSS. Those frames are not supposed to be sent by one associated STA to another associated STA (either unicast for broadcast/multicast). Similarly, in 802.11 they're supposed to be sent to the authenticator (AP) address. Since it is possible for unexpected EAPOL frames to result in misbehavior in supplicant implementations, it is better for the AP to not allow such cases to be forwarded to other clients either directly, or indirectly if the AP interface is part of a bridge. Accept EAPOL (control port) frames only if they're transmitted to the own address, or, due to interoperability concerns, to the PAE group address. Disable forwarding of EAPOL (or well, the configured control port protocol) frames back to wireless medium in all cases. Previously, these frames were accepted from fully authenticated and authorized stations and also from unauthenticated stations for one of the cases. Additionally, to avoid forwarding by the bridge, rewrite the PAE group address case to the local MAC address. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Co-developed-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni(a)codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni(a)codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.cb327ed0cabe.Ib7dcffa2a31f0913d660… Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 4454ec47283f..22a925899a9e 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2531,13 +2531,13 @@ static bool ieee80211_frame_allowed(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, __le16 fc) struct ethhdr *ehdr = (struct ethhdr *) rx->skb->data; /* - * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless - * of whether the frame was encrypted or not. + * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless of + * whether the frame was encrypted or not, and always disallow + * all other destination addresses for them. */ - if (ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol && - (ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) || - ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr))) - return true; + if (unlikely(ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol)) + return ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) || + ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr); if (ieee80211_802_1x_port_control(rx) || ieee80211_drop_unencrypted(rx, fc)) @@ -2562,8 +2562,28 @@ static void ieee80211_deliver_skb_to_local_stack(struct sk_buff *skb, cfg80211_rx_control_port(dev, skb, noencrypt); dev_kfree_skb(skb); } else { + struct ethhdr *ehdr = (void *)skb_mac_header(skb); + memset(skb->cb, 0, sizeof(skb->cb)); + /* + * 802.1X over 802.11 requires that the authenticator address + * be used for EAPOL frames. However, 802.1X allows the use of + * the PAE group address instead. If the interface is part of + * a bridge and we pass the frame with the PAE group address, + * then the bridge will forward it to the network (even if the + * client was not associated yet), which isn't supposed to + * happen. + * To avoid that, rewrite the destination address to our own + * address, so that the authenticator (e.g. hostapd) will see + * the frame, but bridge won't forward it anywhere else. Note + * that due to earlier filtering, the only other address can + * be the PAE group address. + */ + if (unlikely(skb->protocol == sdata->control_port_protocol && + !ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr))) + ether_addr_copy(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr); + /* deliver to local stack */ if (rx->list) list_add_tail(&skb->list, rx->list); @@ -2603,6 +2623,7 @@ ieee80211_deliver_skb(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if ((sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP || sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) && !(sdata->flags & IEEE80211_SDATA_DONT_BRIDGE_PACKETS) && + ehdr->h_proto != rx->sdata->control_port_protocol && (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN || !sdata->u.vlan.sta)) { if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ehdr->h_dest) && ieee80211_vif_get_num_mcast_if(sdata) != 0) {

3 years, 7 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mac80211: prevent attacks on TKIP/WEP as well" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 7e44a0b597f04e67eee8cdcbe7ee706c6f5de38b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:49 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: prevent attacks on TKIP/WEP as well Similar to the issues fixed in previous patches, TKIP and WEP should be protected even if for TKIP we have the Michael MIC protecting it, and WEP is broken anyway. However, this also somewhat protects potential other algorithms that drivers might implement. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.430e8c202313.Ia37e4e5b6b3eaab1a5ae… Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index b619c47e1d12..4454ec47283f 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2274,6 +2274,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) * next fragment has a sequential PN value. */ entry->check_sequential_pn = true; + entry->is_protected = true; entry->key_color = rx->key->color; memcpy(entry->last_pn, rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], @@ -2286,6 +2287,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue])); BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN != IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); + } else if (rx->key && ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) { + entry->is_protected = true; + entry->key_color = rx->key->color; } return RX_QUEUED; } @@ -2327,6 +2331,14 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if (memcmp(pn, rpn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); + } else if (entry->is_protected && + (!rx->key || !ieee80211_has_protected(fc) || + rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) { + /* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even + * if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a + * lost cause anyway. + */ + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc)); diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h index 5c56d29a619e..0333072ebd98 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h +++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h @@ -455,7 +455,8 @@ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry { u16 extra_len; u16 last_frag; u8 rx_queue; - bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */ + u8 check_sequential_pn:1, /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */ + is_protected:1; u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */ unsigned int key_color; };

3 years, 7 months

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Linux-stable-mirror May 2021