May 2021 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] staging: rtl8723bs: avoid bogus gcc warning" failed to apply to 5.11-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.11-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 14b6cff54edaca5740068e9ed070152727ed7718 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 17:26:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] staging: rtl8723bs: avoid bogus gcc warning gcc gets confused by some of the type casts and produces an apparently senseless warning about an out-of-bound memcpy to an unrelated array in the same structure: drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c: In function 'rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption': cc1: error: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=] In file included from drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/drv_types.h:32, from drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c:10: drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/rtw_security.h:98:15: note: at offset [184, 4264] into destination object 'dot11AuthAlgrthm' of size 4 98 | u32 dot11AuthAlgrthm; /* 802.11 auth, could be open, shared, 8021x and authswitch */ | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ cc1: error: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=] drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/rtw_security.h:98:15: note: at offset [264, 4344] into destination object 'dot11AuthAlgrthm' of size 4 This is a known gcc bug, and the patch here is only a workaround, but the approach of using a temporary variable to hold a pointer to the key also improves readability in addition to avoiding the warning, so overall this should still help. Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=99673 Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422152648.2891996-1-arnd@kernel.org Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c index c1dac6eec59f..a6d731e959a2 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c @@ -527,6 +527,9 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa struct mlme_priv *pmlmepriv = &padapter->mlmepriv; struct security_priv *psecuritypriv = &(padapter->securitypriv); struct sta_priv *pstapriv = &padapter->stapriv; + char *grpkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; + char *txkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; + char *rxkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; param->u.crypt.err = 0; param->u.crypt.alg[IEEE_CRYPT_ALG_NAME_LEN - 1] = '\0'; @@ -609,7 +612,7 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa { if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "WEP") == 0) { - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _WEP40_; if (param->u.crypt.key_len == 13) @@ -622,12 +625,12 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _TKIP_; - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); /* DEBUG_ERR("set key length :param->u.crypt.key_len =%d\n", param->u.crypt.key_len); */ /* set mic key */ - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8); - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8); + memcpy(txkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8); + memcpy(rxkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8); psecuritypriv->busetkipkey = true; @@ -636,7 +639,7 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _AES_; - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); } else { @@ -713,7 +716,7 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa { if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "WEP") == 0) { - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _WEP40_; if (param->u.crypt.key_len == 13) @@ -725,12 +728,12 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _TKIP_; - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); /* DEBUG_ERR("set key length :param->u.crypt.key_len =%d\n", param->u.crypt.key_len); */ /* set mic key */ - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8); - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8); + memcpy(txkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8); + memcpy(rxkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8); psecuritypriv->busetkipkey = true; @@ -739,7 +742,7 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _AES_; - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); } else { diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c index e98e5388d5c7..5088c3731b6d 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c @@ -2963,6 +2963,9 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param, struct mlme_priv *pmlmepriv = &padapter->mlmepriv; struct security_priv *psecuritypriv = &(padapter->securitypriv); struct sta_priv *pstapriv = &padapter->stapriv; + char *txkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; + char *rxkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; + char *grpkey = psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; param->u.crypt.err = 0; param->u.crypt.alg[IEEE_CRYPT_ALG_NAME_LEN - 1] = '\0'; @@ -3064,7 +3067,7 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param, if (!psta && check_fwstate(pmlmepriv, WIFI_AP_STATE)) { /* group key */ if (param->u.crypt.set_tx == 1) { if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "WEP") == 0) { - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _WEP40_; if (param->u.crypt.key_len == 13) @@ -3073,11 +3076,11 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param, } else if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "TKIP") == 0) { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _TKIP_; - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); /* DEBUG_ERR("set key length :param->u.crypt.key_len =%d\n", param->u.crypt.key_len); */ /* set mic key */ - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8); + memcpy(txkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8); memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8); psecuritypriv->busetkipkey = true; @@ -3086,7 +3089,7 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param, else if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "CCMP") == 0) { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _AES_; - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); } else { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _NO_PRIVACY_; } @@ -3142,7 +3145,7 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param, } else { /* group key??? */ if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "WEP") == 0) { - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _WEP40_; if (param->u.crypt.key_len == 13) @@ -3150,19 +3153,19 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param, } else if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "TKIP") == 0) { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _TKIP_; - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); /* DEBUG_ERR("set key length :param->u.crypt.key_len =%d\n", param->u.crypt.key_len); */ /* set mic key */ - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8); - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8); + memcpy(txkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8); + memcpy(rxkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8); psecuritypriv->busetkipkey = true; } else if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "CCMP") == 0) { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _AES_; - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); } else { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _NO_PRIVACY_; }

3 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] staging: rtl8723bs: avoid bogus gcc warning" failed to apply to 5.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 14b6cff54edaca5740068e9ed070152727ed7718 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 17:26:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] staging: rtl8723bs: avoid bogus gcc warning gcc gets confused by some of the type casts and produces an apparently senseless warning about an out-of-bound memcpy to an unrelated array in the same structure: drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c: In function 'rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption': cc1: error: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=] In file included from drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/drv_types.h:32, from drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c:10: drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/rtw_security.h:98:15: note: at offset [184, 4264] into destination object 'dot11AuthAlgrthm' of size 4 98 | u32 dot11AuthAlgrthm; /* 802.11 auth, could be open, shared, 8021x and authswitch */ | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ cc1: error: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=] drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/rtw_security.h:98:15: note: at offset [264, 4344] into destination object 'dot11AuthAlgrthm' of size 4 This is a known gcc bug, and the patch here is only a workaround, but the approach of using a temporary variable to hold a pointer to the key also improves readability in addition to avoiding the warning, so overall this should still help. Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=99673 Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422152648.2891996-1-arnd@kernel.org Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c index c1dac6eec59f..a6d731e959a2 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c @@ -527,6 +527,9 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa struct mlme_priv *pmlmepriv = &padapter->mlmepriv; struct security_priv *psecuritypriv = &(padapter->securitypriv); struct sta_priv *pstapriv = &padapter->stapriv; + char *grpkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; + char *txkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; + char *rxkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; param->u.crypt.err = 0; param->u.crypt.alg[IEEE_CRYPT_ALG_NAME_LEN - 1] = '\0'; @@ -609,7 +612,7 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa { if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "WEP") == 0) { - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _WEP40_; if (param->u.crypt.key_len == 13) @@ -622,12 +625,12 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _TKIP_; - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); /* DEBUG_ERR("set key length :param->u.crypt.key_len =%d\n", param->u.crypt.key_len); */ /* set mic key */ - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8); - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8); + memcpy(txkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8); + memcpy(rxkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8); psecuritypriv->busetkipkey = true; @@ -636,7 +639,7 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _AES_; - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); } else { @@ -713,7 +716,7 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa { if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "WEP") == 0) { - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _WEP40_; if (param->u.crypt.key_len == 13) @@ -725,12 +728,12 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _TKIP_; - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); /* DEBUG_ERR("set key length :param->u.crypt.key_len =%d\n", param->u.crypt.key_len); */ /* set mic key */ - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8); - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8); + memcpy(txkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8); + memcpy(rxkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8); psecuritypriv->busetkipkey = true; @@ -739,7 +742,7 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _AES_; - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); } else { diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c index e98e5388d5c7..5088c3731b6d 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c @@ -2963,6 +2963,9 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param, struct mlme_priv *pmlmepriv = &padapter->mlmepriv; struct security_priv *psecuritypriv = &(padapter->securitypriv); struct sta_priv *pstapriv = &padapter->stapriv; + char *txkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; + char *rxkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; + char *grpkey = psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey; param->u.crypt.err = 0; param->u.crypt.alg[IEEE_CRYPT_ALG_NAME_LEN - 1] = '\0'; @@ -3064,7 +3067,7 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param, if (!psta && check_fwstate(pmlmepriv, WIFI_AP_STATE)) { /* group key */ if (param->u.crypt.set_tx == 1) { if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "WEP") == 0) { - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _WEP40_; if (param->u.crypt.key_len == 13) @@ -3073,11 +3076,11 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param, } else if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "TKIP") == 0) { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _TKIP_; - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); /* DEBUG_ERR("set key length :param->u.crypt.key_len =%d\n", param->u.crypt.key_len); */ /* set mic key */ - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8); + memcpy(txkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8); memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8); psecuritypriv->busetkipkey = true; @@ -3086,7 +3089,7 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param, else if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "CCMP") == 0) { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _AES_; - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); } else { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _NO_PRIVACY_; } @@ -3142,7 +3145,7 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param, } else { /* group key??? */ if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "WEP") == 0) { - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _WEP40_; if (param->u.crypt.key_len == 13) @@ -3150,19 +3153,19 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param, } else if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "TKIP") == 0) { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _TKIP_; - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); /* DEBUG_ERR("set key length :param->u.crypt.key_len =%d\n", param->u.crypt.key_len); */ /* set mic key */ - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8); - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8); + memcpy(txkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8); + memcpy(rxkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8); psecuritypriv->busetkipkey = true; } else if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "CCMP") == 0) { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _AES_; - memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); + memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len)); } else { psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _NO_PRIVACY_; }

3 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] iio: tsl2583: Fix division by a zero lux_val" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From af0e1871d79cfbb91f732d2c6fa7558e45c31038 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Colin Ian King <colin.king(a)canonical.com> Date: Fri, 7 May 2021 19:30:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] iio: tsl2583: Fix division by a zero lux_val The lux_val returned from tsl2583_get_lux can potentially be zero, so check for this to avoid a division by zero and an overflowed gain_trim_val. Fixes clang scan-build warning: drivers/iio/light/tsl2583.c:345:40: warning: Either the condition 'lux_val<0' is redundant or there is division by zero at line 345. [zerodivcond] Fixes: ac4f6eee8fe8 ("staging: iio: TAOS tsl258x: Device driver") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king(a)canonical.com> Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron(a)huawei.com> diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/tsl2583.c b/drivers/iio/light/tsl2583.c index 0f787bfc88fc..c9d8f07a6fcd 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/tsl2583.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/tsl2583.c @@ -341,6 +341,14 @@ static int tsl2583_als_calibrate(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) return lux_val; } + /* Avoid division by zero of lux_value later on */ + if (lux_val == 0) { + dev_err(&chip->client->dev, + "%s: lux_val of 0 will produce out of range trim_value\n", + __func__); + return -ENODATA; + } + gain_trim_val = (unsigned int)(((chip->als_settings.als_cal_target) * chip->als_settings.als_gain_trim) / lux_val); if ((gain_trim_val < 250) || (gain_trim_val > 4000)) {

3 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] iio: tsl2583: Fix division by a zero lux_val" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From af0e1871d79cfbb91f732d2c6fa7558e45c31038 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Colin Ian King <colin.king(a)canonical.com> Date: Fri, 7 May 2021 19:30:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] iio: tsl2583: Fix division by a zero lux_val The lux_val returned from tsl2583_get_lux can potentially be zero, so check for this to avoid a division by zero and an overflowed gain_trim_val. Fixes clang scan-build warning: drivers/iio/light/tsl2583.c:345:40: warning: Either the condition 'lux_val<0' is redundant or there is division by zero at line 345. [zerodivcond] Fixes: ac4f6eee8fe8 ("staging: iio: TAOS tsl258x: Device driver") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king(a)canonical.com> Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron(a)huawei.com> diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/tsl2583.c b/drivers/iio/light/tsl2583.c index 0f787bfc88fc..c9d8f07a6fcd 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/tsl2583.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/tsl2583.c @@ -341,6 +341,14 @@ static int tsl2583_als_calibrate(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) return lux_val; } + /* Avoid division by zero of lux_value later on */ + if (lux_val == 0) { + dev_err(&chip->client->dev, + "%s: lux_val of 0 will produce out of range trim_value\n", + __func__); + return -ENODATA; + } + gain_trim_val = (unsigned int)(((chip->als_settings.als_cal_target) * chip->als_settings.als_gain_trim) / lux_val); if ((gain_trim_val < 250) || (gain_trim_val > 4000)) {

3 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] xhci: Do not use GFP_KERNEL in (potentially) atomic context" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From dda32c00c9a0fa103b5d54ef72c477b7aa993679 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> Date: Wed, 12 May 2021 11:08:14 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] xhci: Do not use GFP_KERNEL in (potentially) atomic context 'xhci_urb_enqueue()' is passed a 'mem_flags' argument, because "URBs may be submitted in interrupt context" (see comment related to 'usb_submit_urb()' in 'drivers/usb/core/urb.c') So this flag should be used in all the calling chain. Up to now, 'xhci_check_maxpacket()' which is only called from 'xhci_urb_enqueue()', uses GFP_KERNEL. Be safe and pass the mem_flags to this function as well. Fixes: ddba5cd0aeff ("xhci: Use command structures when queuing commands on the command ring") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210512080816.866037-4-mathias.nyman@linux.intel… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c index ca9385d22f68..27283654ca08 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c @@ -1514,7 +1514,7 @@ static int xhci_configure_endpoint(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, * we need to issue an evaluate context command and wait on it. */ static int xhci_check_maxpacket(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, unsigned int slot_id, - unsigned int ep_index, struct urb *urb) + unsigned int ep_index, struct urb *urb, gfp_t mem_flags) { struct xhci_container_ctx *out_ctx; struct xhci_input_control_ctx *ctrl_ctx; @@ -1545,7 +1545,7 @@ static int xhci_check_maxpacket(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, unsigned int slot_id, * changes max packet sizes. */ - command = xhci_alloc_command(xhci, true, GFP_KERNEL); + command = xhci_alloc_command(xhci, true, mem_flags); if (!command) return -ENOMEM; @@ -1639,7 +1639,7 @@ static int xhci_urb_enqueue(struct usb_hcd *hcd, struct urb *urb, gfp_t mem_flag */ if (urb->dev->speed == USB_SPEED_FULL) { ret = xhci_check_maxpacket(xhci, slot_id, - ep_index, urb); + ep_index, urb, mem_flags); if (ret < 0) { xhci_urb_free_priv(urb_priv); urb->hcpriv = NULL;

3 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] xhci: Do not use GFP_KERNEL in (potentially) atomic context" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From dda32c00c9a0fa103b5d54ef72c477b7aa993679 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> Date: Wed, 12 May 2021 11:08:14 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] xhci: Do not use GFP_KERNEL in (potentially) atomic context 'xhci_urb_enqueue()' is passed a 'mem_flags' argument, because "URBs may be submitted in interrupt context" (see comment related to 'usb_submit_urb()' in 'drivers/usb/core/urb.c') So this flag should be used in all the calling chain. Up to now, 'xhci_check_maxpacket()' which is only called from 'xhci_urb_enqueue()', uses GFP_KERNEL. Be safe and pass the mem_flags to this function as well. Fixes: ddba5cd0aeff ("xhci: Use command structures when queuing commands on the command ring") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210512080816.866037-4-mathias.nyman@linux.intel… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c index ca9385d22f68..27283654ca08 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c @@ -1514,7 +1514,7 @@ static int xhci_configure_endpoint(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, * we need to issue an evaluate context command and wait on it. */ static int xhci_check_maxpacket(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, unsigned int slot_id, - unsigned int ep_index, struct urb *urb) + unsigned int ep_index, struct urb *urb, gfp_t mem_flags) { struct xhci_container_ctx *out_ctx; struct xhci_input_control_ctx *ctrl_ctx; @@ -1545,7 +1545,7 @@ static int xhci_check_maxpacket(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, unsigned int slot_id, * changes max packet sizes. */ - command = xhci_alloc_command(xhci, true, GFP_KERNEL); + command = xhci_alloc_command(xhci, true, mem_flags); if (!command) return -ENOMEM; @@ -1639,7 +1639,7 @@ static int xhci_urb_enqueue(struct usb_hcd *hcd, struct urb *urb, gfp_t mem_flag */ if (urb->dev->speed == USB_SPEED_FULL) { ret = xhci_check_maxpacket(xhci, slot_id, - ep_index, urb); + ep_index, urb, mem_flags); if (ret < 0) { xhci_urb_free_priv(urb_priv); urb->hcpriv = NULL;

3 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] xhci: Do not use GFP_KERNEL in (potentially) atomic context" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From dda32c00c9a0fa103b5d54ef72c477b7aa993679 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> Date: Wed, 12 May 2021 11:08:14 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] xhci: Do not use GFP_KERNEL in (potentially) atomic context 'xhci_urb_enqueue()' is passed a 'mem_flags' argument, because "URBs may be submitted in interrupt context" (see comment related to 'usb_submit_urb()' in 'drivers/usb/core/urb.c') So this flag should be used in all the calling chain. Up to now, 'xhci_check_maxpacket()' which is only called from 'xhci_urb_enqueue()', uses GFP_KERNEL. Be safe and pass the mem_flags to this function as well. Fixes: ddba5cd0aeff ("xhci: Use command structures when queuing commands on the command ring") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210512080816.866037-4-mathias.nyman@linux.intel… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c index ca9385d22f68..27283654ca08 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c @@ -1514,7 +1514,7 @@ static int xhci_configure_endpoint(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, * we need to issue an evaluate context command and wait on it. */ static int xhci_check_maxpacket(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, unsigned int slot_id, - unsigned int ep_index, struct urb *urb) + unsigned int ep_index, struct urb *urb, gfp_t mem_flags) { struct xhci_container_ctx *out_ctx; struct xhci_input_control_ctx *ctrl_ctx; @@ -1545,7 +1545,7 @@ static int xhci_check_maxpacket(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, unsigned int slot_id, * changes max packet sizes. */ - command = xhci_alloc_command(xhci, true, GFP_KERNEL); + command = xhci_alloc_command(xhci, true, mem_flags); if (!command) return -ENOMEM; @@ -1639,7 +1639,7 @@ static int xhci_urb_enqueue(struct usb_hcd *hcd, struct urb *urb, gfp_t mem_flag */ if (urb->dev->speed == USB_SPEED_FULL) { ret = xhci_check_maxpacket(xhci, slot_id, - ep_index, urb); + ep_index, urb, mem_flags); if (ret < 0) { xhci_urb_free_priv(urb_priv); urb->hcpriv = NULL;

3 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] usb: dwc3: gadget: Enable suspend events" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From d1d90dd27254c44d087ad3f8b5b3e4fff0571f45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jack Pham <jackp(a)codeaurora.org> Date: Wed, 28 Apr 2021 02:01:10 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] usb: dwc3: gadget: Enable suspend events commit 72704f876f50 ("dwc3: gadget: Implement the suspend entry event handler") introduced (nearly 5 years ago!) an interrupt handler for U3/L1-L2 suspend events. The problem is that these events aren't currently enabled in the DEVTEN register so the handler is never even invoked. Fix this simply by enabling the corresponding bit in dwc3_gadget_enable_irq() using the same revision check as found in the handler. Fixes: 72704f876f50 ("dwc3: gadget: Implement the suspend entry event handler") Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jack Pham <jackp(a)codeaurora.org> Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210428090111.3370-1-jackp@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c index dd80e5ca8c78..cab3a9184068 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c @@ -2323,6 +2323,10 @@ static void dwc3_gadget_enable_irq(struct dwc3 *dwc) if (DWC3_VER_IS_PRIOR(DWC3, 250A)) reg |= DWC3_DEVTEN_ULSTCNGEN; + /* On 2.30a and above this bit enables U3/L2-L1 Suspend Events */ + if (!DWC3_VER_IS_PRIOR(DWC3, 230A)) + reg |= DWC3_DEVTEN_EOPFEN; + dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_DEVTEN, reg); }

3 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] usb: typec: ucsi: Put fwnode in any case during ->probe()" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From b9a0866a5bdf6a4643a52872ada6be6184c6f4f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed, 5 May 2021 01:23:37 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] usb: typec: ucsi: Put fwnode in any case during ->probe() device_for_each_child_node() bumps a reference counting of a returned variable. We have to balance it whenever we return to the caller. Fixes: c1b0bc2dabfa ("usb: typec: Add support for UCSI interface") Cc: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210504222337.3151726-1-andy.shevchenko@gmail.com Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c index 282c3c825c13..0e1cec346e0f 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c @@ -999,6 +999,7 @@ static const struct typec_operations ucsi_ops = { .pr_set = ucsi_pr_swap }; +/* Caller must call fwnode_handle_put() after use */ static struct fwnode_handle *ucsi_find_fwnode(struct ucsi_connector *con) { struct fwnode_handle *fwnode; @@ -1033,7 +1034,7 @@ static int ucsi_register_port(struct ucsi *ucsi, int index) command |= UCSI_CONNECTOR_NUMBER(con->num); ret = ucsi_send_command(ucsi, command, &con->cap, sizeof(con->cap)); if (ret < 0) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; if (con->cap.op_mode & UCSI_CONCAP_OPMODE_DRP) cap->data = TYPEC_PORT_DRD; @@ -1151,6 +1152,8 @@ static int ucsi_register_port(struct ucsi *ucsi, int index) trace_ucsi_register_port(con->num, &con->status); out: + fwnode_handle_put(cap->fwnode); +out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&con->lock); return ret; }

3 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] usb: typec: ucsi: Put fwnode in any case during ->probe()" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From b9a0866a5bdf6a4643a52872ada6be6184c6f4f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed, 5 May 2021 01:23:37 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] usb: typec: ucsi: Put fwnode in any case during ->probe() device_for_each_child_node() bumps a reference counting of a returned variable. We have to balance it whenever we return to the caller. Fixes: c1b0bc2dabfa ("usb: typec: Add support for UCSI interface") Cc: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210504222337.3151726-1-andy.shevchenko@gmail.com Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c index 282c3c825c13..0e1cec346e0f 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c @@ -999,6 +999,7 @@ static const struct typec_operations ucsi_ops = { .pr_set = ucsi_pr_swap }; +/* Caller must call fwnode_handle_put() after use */ static struct fwnode_handle *ucsi_find_fwnode(struct ucsi_connector *con) { struct fwnode_handle *fwnode; @@ -1033,7 +1034,7 @@ static int ucsi_register_port(struct ucsi *ucsi, int index) command |= UCSI_CONNECTOR_NUMBER(con->num); ret = ucsi_send_command(ucsi, command, &con->cap, sizeof(con->cap)); if (ret < 0) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; if (con->cap.op_mode & UCSI_CONCAP_OPMODE_DRP) cap->data = TYPEC_PORT_DRD; @@ -1151,6 +1152,8 @@ static int ucsi_register_port(struct ucsi *ucsi, int index) trace_ucsi_register_port(con->num, &con->status); out: + fwnode_handle_put(cap->fwnode); +out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&con->lock); return ret; }

3 years, 8 months

1
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