April 2021 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] net: phy: marvell: fix detection of PHY on Topaz switches" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 1fe976d308acb6374c899a4ee8025a0a016e453e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Pali=20Roh=C3=A1r?= <pali(a)kernel.org> Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 18:57:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] net: phy: marvell: fix detection of PHY on Topaz switches MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Since commit fee2d546414d ("net: phy: marvell: mv88e6390 temperature sensor reading"), Linux reports the temperature of Topaz hwmon as constant -75°C. This is because switches from the Topaz family (88E6141 / 88E6341) have the address of the temperature sensor register different from Peridot. This address is instead compatible with 88E1510 PHYs, as was used for Topaz before the above mentioned commit. Create a new mapping table between switch family and PHY ID for families which don't have a model number. And define PHY IDs for Topaz and Peridot families. Create a new PHY ID and a new PHY driver for Topaz's internal PHY. The only difference from Peridot's PHY driver is the HWMON probing method. Prior this change Topaz's internal PHY is detected by kernel as: PHY [...] driver [Marvell 88E6390] (irq=63) And afterwards as: PHY [...] driver [Marvell 88E6341 Family] (irq=63) Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali(a)kernel.org> BugLink: https://github.com/globalscaletechnologies/linux/issues/1 Fixes: fee2d546414d ("net: phy: marvell: mv88e6390 temperature sensor reading") Reviewed-by: Marek Behún <kabel(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew(a)lunn.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c index 903d619e08ed..e08bf9377140 100644 --- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c @@ -3026,10 +3026,17 @@ static int mv88e6xxx_setup(struct dsa_switch *ds) return err; } +/* prod_id for switch families which do not have a PHY model number */ +static const u16 family_prod_id_table[] = { + [MV88E6XXX_FAMILY_6341] = MV88E6XXX_PORT_SWITCH_ID_PROD_6341, + [MV88E6XXX_FAMILY_6390] = MV88E6XXX_PORT_SWITCH_ID_PROD_6390, +}; + static int mv88e6xxx_mdio_read(struct mii_bus *bus, int phy, int reg) { struct mv88e6xxx_mdio_bus *mdio_bus = bus->priv; struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip = mdio_bus->chip; + u16 prod_id; u16 val; int err; @@ -3040,23 +3047,12 @@ static int mv88e6xxx_mdio_read(struct mii_bus *bus, int phy, int reg) err = chip->info->ops->phy_read(chip, bus, phy, reg, &val); mv88e6xxx_reg_unlock(chip); - if (reg == MII_PHYSID2) { - /* Some internal PHYs don't have a model number. */ - if (chip->info->family != MV88E6XXX_FAMILY_6165) - /* Then there is the 6165 family. It gets is - * PHYs correct. But it can also have two - * SERDES interfaces in the PHY address - * space. And these don't have a model - * number. But they are not PHYs, so we don't - * want to give them something a PHY driver - * will recognise. - * - * Use the mv88e6390 family model number - * instead, for anything which really could be - * a PHY, - */ - if (!(val & 0x3f0)) - val |= MV88E6XXX_PORT_SWITCH_ID_PROD_6390 >> 4; + /* Some internal PHYs don't have a model number. */ + if (reg == MII_PHYSID2 && !(val & 0x3f0) && + chip->info->family < ARRAY_SIZE(family_prod_id_table)) { + prod_id = family_prod_id_table[chip->info->family]; + if (prod_id) + val |= prod_id >> 4; } return err ? err : val; diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/marvell.c b/drivers/net/phy/marvell.c index e26a5d663f8a..8018ddf7f316 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/marvell.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/marvell.c @@ -3021,9 +3021,34 @@ static struct phy_driver marvell_drivers[] = { .get_stats = marvell_get_stats, }, { - .phy_id = MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6390, + .phy_id = MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6341_FAMILY, .phy_id_mask = MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK, - .name = "Marvell 88E6390", + .name = "Marvell 88E6341 Family", + /* PHY_GBIT_FEATURES */ + .flags = PHY_POLL_CABLE_TEST, + .probe = m88e1510_probe, + .config_init = marvell_config_init, + .config_aneg = m88e6390_config_aneg, + .read_status = marvell_read_status, + .config_intr = marvell_config_intr, + .handle_interrupt = marvell_handle_interrupt, + .resume = genphy_resume, + .suspend = genphy_suspend, + .read_page = marvell_read_page, + .write_page = marvell_write_page, + .get_sset_count = marvell_get_sset_count, + .get_strings = marvell_get_strings, + .get_stats = marvell_get_stats, + .get_tunable = m88e1540_get_tunable, + .set_tunable = m88e1540_set_tunable, + .cable_test_start = marvell_vct7_cable_test_start, + .cable_test_tdr_start = marvell_vct5_cable_test_tdr_start, + .cable_test_get_status = marvell_vct7_cable_test_get_status, + }, + { + .phy_id = MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6390_FAMILY, + .phy_id_mask = MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK, + .name = "Marvell 88E6390 Family", /* PHY_GBIT_FEATURES */ .flags = PHY_POLL_CABLE_TEST, .probe = m88e6390_probe, @@ -3107,7 +3132,8 @@ static struct mdio_device_id __maybe_unused marvell_tbl[] = { { MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E1540, MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK }, { MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E1545, MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK }, { MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E3016, MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK }, - { MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6390, MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK }, + { MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6341_FAMILY, MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK }, + { MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6390_FAMILY, MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK }, { MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E1340S, MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK }, { MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E1548P, MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK }, { } diff --git a/include/linux/marvell_phy.h b/include/linux/marvell_phy.h index 52b1610eae68..c544b70dfbd2 100644 --- a/include/linux/marvell_phy.h +++ b/include/linux/marvell_phy.h @@ -28,11 +28,12 @@ /* Marvel 88E1111 in Finisar SFP module with modified PHY ID */ #define MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E1111_FINISAR 0x01ff0cc0 -/* The MV88e6390 Ethernet switch contains embedded PHYs. These PHYs do +/* These Ethernet switch families contain embedded PHYs, but they do * not have a model ID. So the switch driver traps reads to the ID2 * register and returns the switch family ID */ -#define MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6390 0x01410f90 +#define MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6341_FAMILY 0x01410f41 +#define MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6390_FAMILY 0x01410f90 #define MARVELL_PHY_FAMILY_ID(id) ((id) >> 4)

3 years, 8 months

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[PATCH] net: phy: marvell: fix detection of PHY on Topaz switches

by Pali Rohár

commit 1fe976d308acb6374c899a4ee8025a0a016e453e upstream. Since commit fee2d546414d ("net: phy: marvell: mv88e6390 temperature sensor reading"), Linux reports the temperature of Topaz hwmon as constant -75°C. This is because switches from the Topaz family (88E6141 / 88E6341) have the address of the temperature sensor register different from Peridot. This address is instead compatible with 88E1510 PHYs, as was used for Topaz before the above mentioned commit. Create a new mapping table between switch family and PHY ID for families which don't have a model number. And define PHY IDs for Topaz and Peridot families. Create a new PHY ID and a new PHY driver for Topaz's internal PHY. The only difference from Peridot's PHY driver is the HWMON probing method. Prior this change Topaz's internal PHY is detected by kernel as: PHY [...] driver [Marvell 88E6390] (irq=63) And afterwards as: PHY [...] driver [Marvell 88E6341 Family] (irq=63) Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali(a)kernel.org> BugLink: https://github.com/globalscaletechnologies/linux/issues/1 Fixes: fee2d546414d ("net: phy: marvell: mv88e6390 temperature sensor reading") Reviewed-by: Marek Behún <kabel(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew(a)lunn.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> [pali: Backported to 5.10 version] --- This patch is backported to 5.10 version. Tested on Turris Mox with Topaz switch. --- drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c | 30 +++++++++++++---------------- drivers/net/phy/marvell.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- include/linux/marvell_phy.h | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c index 87160e723dfc..70ec17f3c300 100644 --- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c @@ -2994,10 +2994,17 @@ static int mv88e6xxx_setup(struct dsa_switch *ds) return err; } +/* prod_id for switch families which do not have a PHY model number */ +static const u16 family_prod_id_table[] = { + [MV88E6XXX_FAMILY_6341] = MV88E6XXX_PORT_SWITCH_ID_PROD_6341, + [MV88E6XXX_FAMILY_6390] = MV88E6XXX_PORT_SWITCH_ID_PROD_6390, +}; + static int mv88e6xxx_mdio_read(struct mii_bus *bus, int phy, int reg) { struct mv88e6xxx_mdio_bus *mdio_bus = bus->priv; struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip = mdio_bus->chip; + u16 prod_id; u16 val; int err; @@ -3008,23 +3015,12 @@ static int mv88e6xxx_mdio_read(struct mii_bus *bus, int phy, int reg) err = chip->info->ops->phy_read(chip, bus, phy, reg, &val); mv88e6xxx_reg_unlock(chip); - if (reg == MII_PHYSID2) { - /* Some internal PHYs don't have a model number. */ - if (chip->info->family != MV88E6XXX_FAMILY_6165) - /* Then there is the 6165 family. It gets is - * PHYs correct. But it can also have two - * SERDES interfaces in the PHY address - * space. And these don't have a model - * number. But they are not PHYs, so we don't - * want to give them something a PHY driver - * will recognise. - * - * Use the mv88e6390 family model number - * instead, for anything which really could be - * a PHY, - */ - if (!(val & 0x3f0)) - val |= MV88E6XXX_PORT_SWITCH_ID_PROD_6390 >> 4; + /* Some internal PHYs don't have a model number. */ + if (reg == MII_PHYSID2 && !(val & 0x3f0) && + chip->info->family < ARRAY_SIZE(family_prod_id_table)) { + prod_id = family_prod_id_table[chip->info->family]; + if (prod_id) + val |= prod_id >> 4; } return err ? err : val; diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/marvell.c b/drivers/net/phy/marvell.c index 5dbdaf0f5f09..823a89354466 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/marvell.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/marvell.c @@ -2913,9 +2913,35 @@ static struct phy_driver marvell_drivers[] = { .get_stats = marvell_get_stats, }, { - .phy_id = MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6390, + .phy_id = MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6341_FAMILY, .phy_id_mask = MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK, - .name = "Marvell 88E6390", + .name = "Marvell 88E6341 Family", + /* PHY_GBIT_FEATURES */ + .flags = PHY_POLL_CABLE_TEST, + .probe = m88e1510_probe, + .config_init = marvell_config_init, + .config_aneg = m88e6390_config_aneg, + .read_status = marvell_read_status, + .ack_interrupt = marvell_ack_interrupt, + .config_intr = marvell_config_intr, + .did_interrupt = m88e1121_did_interrupt, + .resume = genphy_resume, + .suspend = genphy_suspend, + .read_page = marvell_read_page, + .write_page = marvell_write_page, + .get_sset_count = marvell_get_sset_count, + .get_strings = marvell_get_strings, + .get_stats = marvell_get_stats, + .get_tunable = m88e1540_get_tunable, + .set_tunable = m88e1540_set_tunable, + .cable_test_start = marvell_vct7_cable_test_start, + .cable_test_tdr_start = marvell_vct5_cable_test_tdr_start, + .cable_test_get_status = marvell_vct7_cable_test_get_status, + }, + { + .phy_id = MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6390_FAMILY, + .phy_id_mask = MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK, + .name = "Marvell 88E6390 Family", /* PHY_GBIT_FEATURES */ .flags = PHY_POLL_CABLE_TEST, .probe = m88e6390_probe, @@ -3001,7 +3027,8 @@ static struct mdio_device_id __maybe_unused marvell_tbl[] = { { MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E1540, MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK }, { MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E1545, MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK }, { MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E3016, MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK }, - { MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6390, MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK }, + { MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6341_FAMILY, MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK }, + { MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6390_FAMILY, MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK }, { MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E1340S, MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK }, { MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E1548P, MARVELL_PHY_ID_MASK }, { } diff --git a/include/linux/marvell_phy.h b/include/linux/marvell_phy.h index ff7b7607c8cf..f5cf19d19776 100644 --- a/include/linux/marvell_phy.h +++ b/include/linux/marvell_phy.h @@ -25,11 +25,12 @@ #define MARVELL_PHY_ID_88X3310 0x002b09a0 #define MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E2110 0x002b09b0 -/* The MV88e6390 Ethernet switch contains embedded PHYs. These PHYs do +/* These Ethernet switch families contain embedded PHYs, but they do * not have a model ID. So the switch driver traps reads to the ID2 * register and returns the switch family ID */ -#define MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6390 0x01410f90 +#define MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6341_FAMILY 0x01410f41 +#define MARVELL_PHY_ID_88E6390_FAMILY 0x01410f90 #define MARVELL_PHY_FAMILY_ID(id) ((id) >> 4) -- 2.20.1

3 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask" failed to apply to 5.11-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.11-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 7fedb63a8307dda0ec3b8969a3b233a1dd7ea8e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2021 10:38:26 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask This work tightens the offset mask we use for unprivileged pointer arithmetic in order to mitigate a corner case reported by Piotr and Benedict where in the speculative domain it is possible to advance, for example, the map value pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of-bounds in order to leak kernel memory via side-channel to user space. Before this change, the computed ptr_limit for retrieve_ptr_limit() helper represents largest valid distance when moving pointer to the right or left which is then fed as aux->alu_limit to generate masking instructions against the offset register. After the change, the derived aux->alu_limit represents the largest potential value of the offset register which we mask against which is just a narrower subset of the former limit. For minimal complexity, we call sanitize_ptr_alu() from 2 observation points in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), that is, before and after the simulated alu operation. In the first step, we retieve the alu_state and alu_limit before the operation as well as we branch-off a verifier path and push it to the verification stack as we did before which checks the dst_reg under truncation, in other words, when the speculative domain would attempt to move the pointer out-of-bounds. In the second step, we retrieve the new alu_limit and calculate the absolute distance between both. Moreover, we commit the alu_state and final alu_limit via update_alu_sanitation_state() to the env's instruction aux data, and bail out from there if there is a mismatch due to coming from different verification paths with different states. Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter(a)rub.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Tested-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter(a)rub.de> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index e41b6326e3e6..0399ac092b36 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -5871,7 +5871,7 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0; bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) || (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg); - u32 off, max = 0, ptr_limit = 0; + u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0; if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) && (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0)) @@ -5880,26 +5880,18 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, switch (ptr_reg->type) { case PTR_TO_STACK: /* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the - * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. + * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar + * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is + * currently prohibited for unprivileged. */ max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left; - /* Indirect variable offset stack access is prohibited in - * unprivileged mode so it's not handled here. - */ - off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value; - if (mask_to_left) - ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off; - else - ptr_limit = -off - 1; + ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off); break; case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size; - if (mask_to_left) { - ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off; - } else { - off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off; - ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off - 1; - } + ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ? + ptr_reg->smin_value : + ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off; break; default: return REASON_TYPE; @@ -5954,10 +5946,12 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, - struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) + struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, + struct bpf_insn_aux_data *tmp_aux, + const bool commit_window) { + struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : tmp_aux; struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; - struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0; bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg; u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); @@ -5976,18 +5970,33 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (vstate->speculative) goto do_sim; - alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0; - alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ? - BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST; - err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, off_reg, &alu_limit, opcode); if (err < 0) return err; + if (commit_window) { + /* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on + * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation. + */ + alu_state = tmp_aux->alu_state; + alu_limit = abs(tmp_aux->alu_limit - alu_limit); + } else { + alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0; + alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ? + BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST; + } + err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit); if (err < 0) return err; do_sim: + /* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already + * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification + * stack. + */ + if (commit_window) + return 0; + /* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under * speculative execution from truncation as a result of * masking when off was not within expected range. If off @@ -6130,6 +6139,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value; u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; + struct bpf_insn_aux_data tmp_aux = {}; u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; int ret; @@ -6196,12 +6206,15 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, /* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */ __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); - switch (opcode) { - case BPF_ADD: - ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg); + if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { + ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, + &tmp_aux, false); if (ret < 0) return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); + } + switch (opcode) { + case BPF_ADD: /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow * the s32 'off' field */ @@ -6252,10 +6265,6 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } break; case BPF_SUB: - ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg); - if (ret < 0) - return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); - if (dst_reg == off_reg) { /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */ verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n", @@ -6338,6 +6347,12 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0) return -EACCES; + if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { + ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, + &tmp_aux, true); + if (ret < 0) + return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); + } return 0; }

3 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 7fedb63a8307dda0ec3b8969a3b233a1dd7ea8e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2021 10:38:26 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask This work tightens the offset mask we use for unprivileged pointer arithmetic in order to mitigate a corner case reported by Piotr and Benedict where in the speculative domain it is possible to advance, for example, the map value pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of-bounds in order to leak kernel memory via side-channel to user space. Before this change, the computed ptr_limit for retrieve_ptr_limit() helper represents largest valid distance when moving pointer to the right or left which is then fed as aux->alu_limit to generate masking instructions against the offset register. After the change, the derived aux->alu_limit represents the largest potential value of the offset register which we mask against which is just a narrower subset of the former limit. For minimal complexity, we call sanitize_ptr_alu() from 2 observation points in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), that is, before and after the simulated alu operation. In the first step, we retieve the alu_state and alu_limit before the operation as well as we branch-off a verifier path and push it to the verification stack as we did before which checks the dst_reg under truncation, in other words, when the speculative domain would attempt to move the pointer out-of-bounds. In the second step, we retrieve the new alu_limit and calculate the absolute distance between both. Moreover, we commit the alu_state and final alu_limit via update_alu_sanitation_state() to the env's instruction aux data, and bail out from there if there is a mismatch due to coming from different verification paths with different states. Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter(a)rub.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Tested-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter(a)rub.de> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index e41b6326e3e6..0399ac092b36 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -5871,7 +5871,7 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0; bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) || (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg); - u32 off, max = 0, ptr_limit = 0; + u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0; if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) && (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0)) @@ -5880,26 +5880,18 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, switch (ptr_reg->type) { case PTR_TO_STACK: /* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the - * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. + * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar + * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is + * currently prohibited for unprivileged. */ max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left; - /* Indirect variable offset stack access is prohibited in - * unprivileged mode so it's not handled here. - */ - off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value; - if (mask_to_left) - ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off; - else - ptr_limit = -off - 1; + ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off); break; case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size; - if (mask_to_left) { - ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off; - } else { - off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off; - ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off - 1; - } + ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ? + ptr_reg->smin_value : + ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off; break; default: return REASON_TYPE; @@ -5954,10 +5946,12 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, - struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) + struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, + struct bpf_insn_aux_data *tmp_aux, + const bool commit_window) { + struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : tmp_aux; struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; - struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0; bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg; u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); @@ -5976,18 +5970,33 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (vstate->speculative) goto do_sim; - alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0; - alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ? - BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST; - err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, off_reg, &alu_limit, opcode); if (err < 0) return err; + if (commit_window) { + /* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on + * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation. + */ + alu_state = tmp_aux->alu_state; + alu_limit = abs(tmp_aux->alu_limit - alu_limit); + } else { + alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0; + alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ? + BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST; + } + err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit); if (err < 0) return err; do_sim: + /* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already + * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification + * stack. + */ + if (commit_window) + return 0; + /* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under * speculative execution from truncation as a result of * masking when off was not within expected range. If off @@ -6130,6 +6139,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value; u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; + struct bpf_insn_aux_data tmp_aux = {}; u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; int ret; @@ -6196,12 +6206,15 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, /* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */ __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); - switch (opcode) { - case BPF_ADD: - ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg); + if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { + ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, + &tmp_aux, false); if (ret < 0) return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); + } + switch (opcode) { + case BPF_ADD: /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow * the s32 'off' field */ @@ -6252,10 +6265,6 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } break; case BPF_SUB: - ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg); - if (ret < 0) - return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); - if (dst_reg == off_reg) { /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */ verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n", @@ -6338,6 +6347,12 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0) return -EACCES; + if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { + ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, + &tmp_aux, true); + if (ret < 0) + return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); + } return 0; }

3 years, 8 months

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[PATCH 1/3] spi: stm32-qspi: fix pm_runtime usage_count counter

by patrice.chotard＠foss.st.com

From: Christophe Kerello <christophe.kerello(a)foss.st.com> pm_runtime usage_count counter is not well managed. pm_runtime_put_autosuspend callback drops the usage_counter but this one has never been increased. Add pm_runtime_get_sync callback to bump up the usage counter. It is also needed to use pm_runtime_force_suspend and pm_runtime_force_resume APIs to handle properly the clock. Fixes: 9d282c17b023 ("spi: stm32-qspi: Add pm_runtime support") Signed-off-by: Christophe Kerello <christophe.kerello(a)foss.st.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- drivers/spi/spi-stm32-qspi.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-stm32-qspi.c b/drivers/spi/spi-stm32-qspi.c index 947e6b9dc9f4..2786470a5201 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-stm32-qspi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-stm32-qspi.c @@ -727,21 +727,31 @@ static int __maybe_unused stm32_qspi_suspend(struct device *dev) { pinctrl_pm_select_sleep_state(dev); - return 0; + return pm_runtime_force_suspend(dev); } static int __maybe_unused stm32_qspi_resume(struct device *dev) { struct stm32_qspi *qspi = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + int ret; + + ret = pm_runtime_force_resume(dev); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; pinctrl_pm_select_default_state(dev); - clk_prepare_enable(qspi->clk); + + ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(dev); + if (ret < 0) { + pm_runtime_put_noidle(dev); + return ret; + } writel_relaxed(qspi->cr_reg, qspi->io_base + QSPI_CR); writel_relaxed(qspi->dcr_reg, qspi->io_base + QSPI_DCR); - pm_runtime_mark_last_busy(qspi->dev); - pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(qspi->dev); + pm_runtime_mark_last_busy(dev); + pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(dev); return 0; } -- 2.17.1

3 years, 8 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] bpf: Refactor and streamline bounds check into helper" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 073815b756c51ba9d8384d924c5d1c03ca3d1ae4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2021 15:05:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] bpf: Refactor and streamline bounds check into helper Move the bounds check in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() into a small helper named sanitize_check_bounds() in order to simplify the former a bit. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index f378d4ae405f..db77e2c670b9 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -6075,6 +6075,37 @@ static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic( return 0; } +static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + const struct bpf_insn *insn, + const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) +{ + u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; + + /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds + * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. + */ + if (env->bypass_spec_v1) + return 0; + + switch (dst_reg->type) { + case PTR_TO_STACK: + if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg, + dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value)) + return -EACCES; + break; + case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: + if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) { + verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " + "prohibited for !root\n", dst); + return -EACCES; + } + break; + default: + break; + } + + return 0; +} /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. @@ -6300,22 +6331,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); - /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds - * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. - */ - if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { - if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && - check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) { - verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " - "prohibited for !root\n", dst); - return -EACCES; - } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK && - check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic( - env, dst, dst_reg, dst_reg->off + - dst_reg->var_off.value)) { - return -EACCES; - } - } + if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0) + return -EACCES; return 0; }

3 years, 8 months

1
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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] bpf: Refactor and streamline bounds check into helper" failed to apply to 5.11-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.11-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 073815b756c51ba9d8384d924c5d1c03ca3d1ae4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2021 15:05:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] bpf: Refactor and streamline bounds check into helper Move the bounds check in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() into a small helper named sanitize_check_bounds() in order to simplify the former a bit. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index f378d4ae405f..db77e2c670b9 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -6075,6 +6075,37 @@ static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic( return 0; } +static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + const struct bpf_insn *insn, + const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) +{ + u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; + + /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds + * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. + */ + if (env->bypass_spec_v1) + return 0; + + switch (dst_reg->type) { + case PTR_TO_STACK: + if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg, + dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value)) + return -EACCES; + break; + case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: + if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) { + verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " + "prohibited for !root\n", dst); + return -EACCES; + } + break; + default: + break; + } + + return 0; +} /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. @@ -6300,22 +6331,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); - /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds - * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. - */ - if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { - if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && - check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) { - verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " - "prohibited for !root\n", dst); - return -EACCES; - } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK && - check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic( - env, dst, dst_reg, dst_reg->off + - dst_reg->var_off.value)) { - return -EACCES; - } - } + if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0) + return -EACCES; return 0; }

3 years, 8 months

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[tip: x86/build] x86/build: Disable HIGHMEM64G selection for M486SX

by tip-bot2 for Maciej W. Rozycki

The following commit has been merged into the x86/build branch of tip: Commit-ID: 0ef3439cd80ba7770723edb0470d15815914bb62 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/0ef3439cd80ba7770723edb0470d15815914bb62 Author: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)orcam.me.uk> AuthorDate: Wed, 14 Apr 2021 12:38:28 +02:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> CommitterDate: Mon, 19 Apr 2021 14:02:12 +02:00 x86/build: Disable HIGHMEM64G selection for M486SX Fix a regression caused by making the 486SX separately selectable in Kconfig, for which the HIGHMEM64G setting has not been updated and therefore has become exposed as a user-selectable option for the M486SX configuration setting unlike with original M486 and all the other settings that choose non-PAE-enabled processors: High Memory Support > 1. off (NOHIGHMEM) 2. 4GB (HIGHMEM4G) 3. 64GB (HIGHMEM64G) choice[1-3?]: With the fix in place the setting is now correctly removed: High Memory Support > 1. off (NOHIGHMEM) 2. 4GB (HIGHMEM4G) choice[1-2?]: [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: 87d6021b8143 ("x86/math-emu: Limit MATH_EMULATION to 486SX compatibles") Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro(a)orcam.me.uk> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.5+ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.2104141221340.44318@angie.orcam.m… --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 2792879..268b7d5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1406,7 +1406,7 @@ config HIGHMEM4G config HIGHMEM64G bool "64GB" - depends on !M486 && !M586 && !M586TSC && !M586MMX && !MGEODE_LX && !MGEODEGX1 && !MCYRIXIII && !MELAN && !MWINCHIPC6 && !WINCHIP3D && !MK6 + depends on !M486SX && !M486 && !M586 && !M586TSC && !M586MMX && !MGEODE_LX && !MGEODEGX1 && !MCYRIXIII && !MELAN && !MWINCHIPC6 && !WINCHIP3D && !MK6 select X86_PAE help Select this if you have a 32-bit processor and more than 4

3 years, 8 months

1
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[PATCH stable 5.10.x] arm64: mte: Ensure TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT is set atomically

by Catalin Marinas

commit 2decad92f4731fac9755a083fcfefa66edb7d67d upstream. The entry from EL0 code checks the TFSRE0_EL1 register for any asynchronous tag check faults in user space and sets the TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT flag. This is not done atomically, potentially racing with another CPU calling set_tsk_thread_flag(). Replace the non-atomic ORR+STR with an STSET instruction. While STSET requires ARMv8.1 and an assembler that understands LSE atomics, the MTE feature is part of ARMv8.5 and already requires an updated assembler. Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com> Fixes: 637ec831ea4f ("arm64: mte: Handle synchronous and asynchronous tag check faults") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 5.10.x Reported-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210409173710.18582-1-catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 6 +++++- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 10 ++++++---- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index c1be64228327..5e5cf3af6351 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -1390,10 +1390,13 @@ config ARM64_PAN The feature is detected at runtime, and will remain as a 'nop' instruction if the cpu does not implement the feature. +config AS_HAS_LSE_ATOMICS + def_bool $(as-instr,.arch_extension lse) + config ARM64_LSE_ATOMICS bool default ARM64_USE_LSE_ATOMICS - depends on $(as-instr,.arch_extension lse) + depends on AS_HAS_LSE_ATOMICS config ARM64_USE_LSE_ATOMICS bool "Atomic instructions" @@ -1667,6 +1670,7 @@ config ARM64_MTE bool "Memory Tagging Extension support" default y depends on ARM64_AS_HAS_MTE && ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI + depends on AS_HAS_LSE_ATOMICS select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS help Memory Tagging (part of the ARMv8.5 Extensions) provides diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index d72c818b019c..2da82c139e1c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -148,16 +148,18 @@ alternative_cb_end .endm /* Check for MTE asynchronous tag check faults */ - .macro check_mte_async_tcf, flgs, tmp + .macro check_mte_async_tcf, tmp, ti_flags #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE + .arch_extension lse alternative_if_not ARM64_MTE b 1f alternative_else_nop_endif mrs_s \tmp, SYS_TFSRE0_EL1 tbz \tmp, #SYS_TFSR_EL1_TF0_SHIFT, 1f /* Asynchronous TCF occurred for TTBR0 access, set the TI flag */ - orr \flgs, \flgs, #_TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT - str \flgs, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS] + mov \tmp, #_TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT + add \ti_flags, tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS + stset \tmp, [\ti_flags] msr_s SYS_TFSRE0_EL1, xzr 1: #endif @@ -207,7 +209,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif disable_step_tsk x19, x20 /* Check for asynchronous tag check faults in user space */ - check_mte_async_tcf x19, x22 + check_mte_async_tcf x22, x23 apply_ssbd 1, x22, x23 ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, x20, x22, x23

3 years, 8 months

2
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[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 01/46] net: ieee802154: fix nl802154 del llsec key

by Sasha Levin

From: Alexander Aring <aahringo(a)redhat.com> [ Upstream commit 37feaaf5ceb2245e474369312bb7b922ce7bce69 ] This patch fixes a nullpointer dereference if NL802154_ATTR_SEC_KEY is not set by the user. If this is the case nl802154 will return -EINVAL. Reported-by: syzbot+ac5c11d2959a8b3c4806(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210221174321.14210-1-aahringo@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan(a)datenfreihafen.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- net/ieee802154/nl802154.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ieee802154/nl802154.c b/net/ieee802154/nl802154.c index 7c5a1aa5adb4..2f0a138bd5eb 100644 --- a/net/ieee802154/nl802154.c +++ b/net/ieee802154/nl802154.c @@ -1592,7 +1592,8 @@ static int nl802154_del_llsec_key(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) struct nlattr *attrs[NL802154_KEY_ATTR_MAX + 1]; struct ieee802154_llsec_key_id id; - if (nla_parse_nested_deprecated(attrs, NL802154_KEY_ATTR_MAX, info->attrs[NL802154_ATTR_SEC_KEY], nl802154_key_policy, info->extack)) + if (!info->attrs[NL802154_ATTR_SEC_KEY] || + nla_parse_nested_deprecated(attrs, NL802154_KEY_ATTR_MAX, info->attrs[NL802154_ATTR_SEC_KEY], nl802154_key_policy, info->extack)) return -EINVAL; if (ieee802154_llsec_parse_key_id(attrs[NL802154_KEY_ATTR_ID], &id) < 0) -- 2.30.2

3 years, 8 months

2
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