February 2021 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: x86: Allow guests to see MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL even if" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 7131636e7ea5b50ca910f8953f6365ef2d1f741c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 11:45:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Allow guests to see MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL even if tsx=off Userspace that does not know about KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST will generally use the default value for MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. When this happens and the host has tsx=on, it is possible to end up with virtual machines that have HLE and RTM disabled, but TSX_CTRL available. If the fleet is then switched to tsx=off, kvm_get_arch_capabilities() will clear the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR bit and it will not be possible to use the tsx=off hosts as migration destinations, even though the guests do not have TSX enabled. To allow this migration, allow guests to write to their TSX_CTRL MSR, while keeping the host MSR unchanged for the entire life of the guests. This ensures that TSX remains disabled and also saves MSR reads and writes, and it's okay to do because with tsx=off we know that guests will not have the HLE and RTM features in their CPUID. (If userspace sets bogus CPUID data, we do not expect HLE and RTM to work in guests anyway). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: cbbaa2727aa3 ("KVM: x86: fix presentation of TSX feature in ARCH_CAPABILITIES") Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index cc60b1fc3ee7..eb69fef57485 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -6860,11 +6860,20 @@ static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) switch (index) { case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL: /* - * No need to pass TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR through, so - * let's avoid changing CPUID bits under the host - * kernel's feet. + * TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR is handled in the CPUID + * interception. Keep the host value unchanged to avoid + * changing CPUID bits under the host kernel's feet. + * + * hle=0, rtm=0, tsx_ctrl=1 can be found with some + * combinations of new kernel and old userspace. If + * those guests run on a tsx=off host, do allow guests + * to use TSX_CTRL, but do not change the value on the + * host so that TSX remains always disabled. */ - vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = ~(u64)TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR; + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) + vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = ~(u64)TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR; + else + vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = 0; break; default: vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = -1ull; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 76bce832cade..b05a1fe9dae9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1394,16 +1394,24 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void) if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) data |= ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO; - /* - * On TAA affected systems: - * - nothing to do if TSX is disabled on the host. - * - we emulate TSX_CTRL if present on the host. - * This lets the guest use VERW to clear CPU buffers. - */ - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) - data &= ~(ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO | ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR); - else if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) { + /* + * If RTM=0 because the kernel has disabled TSX, the host might + * have TAA_NO or TSX_CTRL. Clear TAA_NO (the guest sees RTM=0 + * and therefore knows that there cannot be TAA) but keep + * TSX_CTRL: some buggy userspaces leave it set on tsx=on hosts, + * and we want to allow migrating those guests to tsx=off hosts. + */ + data &= ~ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO; + } else if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) { data |= ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO; + } else { + /* + * Nothing to do here; we emulate TSX_CTRL if present on the + * host so the guest can choose between disabling TSX or + * using VERW to clear CPU buffers. + */ + } return data; }

3 years, 11 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: x86: Allow guests to see MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL even if" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 7131636e7ea5b50ca910f8953f6365ef2d1f741c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 11:45:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Allow guests to see MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL even if tsx=off Userspace that does not know about KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST will generally use the default value for MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. When this happens and the host has tsx=on, it is possible to end up with virtual machines that have HLE and RTM disabled, but TSX_CTRL available. If the fleet is then switched to tsx=off, kvm_get_arch_capabilities() will clear the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR bit and it will not be possible to use the tsx=off hosts as migration destinations, even though the guests do not have TSX enabled. To allow this migration, allow guests to write to their TSX_CTRL MSR, while keeping the host MSR unchanged for the entire life of the guests. This ensures that TSX remains disabled and also saves MSR reads and writes, and it's okay to do because with tsx=off we know that guests will not have the HLE and RTM features in their CPUID. (If userspace sets bogus CPUID data, we do not expect HLE and RTM to work in guests anyway). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: cbbaa2727aa3 ("KVM: x86: fix presentation of TSX feature in ARCH_CAPABILITIES") Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index cc60b1fc3ee7..eb69fef57485 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -6860,11 +6860,20 @@ static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) switch (index) { case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL: /* - * No need to pass TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR through, so - * let's avoid changing CPUID bits under the host - * kernel's feet. + * TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR is handled in the CPUID + * interception. Keep the host value unchanged to avoid + * changing CPUID bits under the host kernel's feet. + * + * hle=0, rtm=0, tsx_ctrl=1 can be found with some + * combinations of new kernel and old userspace. If + * those guests run on a tsx=off host, do allow guests + * to use TSX_CTRL, but do not change the value on the + * host so that TSX remains always disabled. */ - vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = ~(u64)TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR; + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) + vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = ~(u64)TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR; + else + vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = 0; break; default: vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = -1ull; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 76bce832cade..b05a1fe9dae9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1394,16 +1394,24 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void) if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) data |= ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO; - /* - * On TAA affected systems: - * - nothing to do if TSX is disabled on the host. - * - we emulate TSX_CTRL if present on the host. - * This lets the guest use VERW to clear CPU buffers. - */ - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) - data &= ~(ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO | ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR); - else if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) { + /* + * If RTM=0 because the kernel has disabled TSX, the host might + * have TAA_NO or TSX_CTRL. Clear TAA_NO (the guest sees RTM=0 + * and therefore knows that there cannot be TAA) but keep + * TSX_CTRL: some buggy userspaces leave it set on tsx=on hosts, + * and we want to allow migrating those guests to tsx=off hosts. + */ + data &= ~ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO; + } else if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) { data |= ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO; + } else { + /* + * Nothing to do here; we emulate TSX_CTRL if present on the + * host so the guest can choose between disabling TSX or + * using VERW to clear CPU buffers. + */ + } return data; }

3 years, 11 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: x86: Allow guests to see MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL even if" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 7131636e7ea5b50ca910f8953f6365ef2d1f741c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 11:45:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Allow guests to see MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL even if tsx=off Userspace that does not know about KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST will generally use the default value for MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. When this happens and the host has tsx=on, it is possible to end up with virtual machines that have HLE and RTM disabled, but TSX_CTRL available. If the fleet is then switched to tsx=off, kvm_get_arch_capabilities() will clear the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR bit and it will not be possible to use the tsx=off hosts as migration destinations, even though the guests do not have TSX enabled. To allow this migration, allow guests to write to their TSX_CTRL MSR, while keeping the host MSR unchanged for the entire life of the guests. This ensures that TSX remains disabled and also saves MSR reads and writes, and it's okay to do because with tsx=off we know that guests will not have the HLE and RTM features in their CPUID. (If userspace sets bogus CPUID data, we do not expect HLE and RTM to work in guests anyway). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: cbbaa2727aa3 ("KVM: x86: fix presentation of TSX feature in ARCH_CAPABILITIES") Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index cc60b1fc3ee7..eb69fef57485 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -6860,11 +6860,20 @@ static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) switch (index) { case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL: /* - * No need to pass TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR through, so - * let's avoid changing CPUID bits under the host - * kernel's feet. + * TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR is handled in the CPUID + * interception. Keep the host value unchanged to avoid + * changing CPUID bits under the host kernel's feet. + * + * hle=0, rtm=0, tsx_ctrl=1 can be found with some + * combinations of new kernel and old userspace. If + * those guests run on a tsx=off host, do allow guests + * to use TSX_CTRL, but do not change the value on the + * host so that TSX remains always disabled. */ - vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = ~(u64)TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR; + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) + vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = ~(u64)TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR; + else + vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = 0; break; default: vmx->guest_uret_msrs[j].mask = -1ull; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 76bce832cade..b05a1fe9dae9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1394,16 +1394,24 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void) if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) data |= ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO; - /* - * On TAA affected systems: - * - nothing to do if TSX is disabled on the host. - * - we emulate TSX_CTRL if present on the host. - * This lets the guest use VERW to clear CPU buffers. - */ - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) - data &= ~(ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO | ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR); - else if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) { + /* + * If RTM=0 because the kernel has disabled TSX, the host might + * have TAA_NO or TSX_CTRL. Clear TAA_NO (the guest sees RTM=0 + * and therefore knows that there cannot be TAA) but keep + * TSX_CTRL: some buggy userspaces leave it set on tsx=on hosts, + * and we want to allow migrating those guests to tsx=off hosts. + */ + data &= ~ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO; + } else if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) { data |= ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO; + } else { + /* + * Nothing to do here; we emulate TSX_CTRL if present on the + * host so the guest can choose between disabling TSX or + * using VERW to clear CPU buffers. + */ + } return data; }

3 years, 11 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] io_uring: drop mm/files between task_work_submit" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From aec18a57edad562d620f7d19016de1fc0cc2208c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 19:22:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] io_uring: drop mm/files between task_work_submit Since SQPOLL task can be shared and so task_work entries can be a mix of them, we need to drop mm and files before trying to issue next request. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 5d3348d66f06..1f68105a41ed 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -2205,6 +2205,9 @@ static void __io_req_task_submit(struct io_kiocb *req) else __io_req_task_cancel(req, -EFAULT); mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); + + if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL) + io_sq_thread_drop_mm_files(); } static void io_req_task_submit(struct callback_head *cb)

3 years, 11 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm/amdkfd: fix null pointer panic while free buffer in kfd" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From b99a8c8f239d76820bbed33c1a42c381cc1f16db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Huang Rui <ray.huang(a)amd.com> Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2021 18:39:16 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] drm/amdkfd: fix null pointer panic while free buffer in kfd In drm_gem_object_free, it will call funcs of drm buffer obj. So kfd_alloc should use amdgpu_gem_object_create instead of amdgpu_bo_create to initialize the funcs as amdgpu_gem_object_funcs. [ 396.231390] amdgpu: Release VA 0x7f76b4ada000 - 0x7f76b4add000 [ 396.231394] amdgpu: remove VA 0x7f76b4ada000 - 0x7f76b4add000 in entry 0000000085c24a47 [ 396.231408] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 396.231445] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 396.231466] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 396.231484] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 396.231495] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 396.231509] CPU: 7 PID: 1352 Comm: clinfo Tainted: G OE 5.11.0-rc2-custom #1 [ 396.231537] Hardware name: AMD Celadon-RN/Celadon-RN, BIOS WCD0401N_Weekly_20_04_0 04/01/2020 [ 396.231563] RIP: 0010:drm_gem_object_free+0xc/0x22 [drm] [ 396.231606] Code: eb ec 48 89 c3 eb e7 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 8b bf 00 06 00 00 e8 72 0d 01 00 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 87 40 01 00 00 <48> 8b 00 48 85 c0 74 0b 55 48 89 e5 e8 54 37 7c db 5d c3 0f 0b c3 [ 396.231666] RSP: 0018:ffffb4704177fcf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 396.231686] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff993a0d0cc400 RCX: 0000000000003113 [ 396.231711] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: e9cda7a5d0791c6d RDI: ffff993a333a9058 [ 396.231736] RBP: ffffb4704177fdd0 R08: ffff993a03855858 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 396.231761] R10: ffff993a0d1f7158 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 396.231785] R13: ffff993a0d0cc428 R14: 0000000000003000 R15: ffffb4704177fde0 [ 396.231811] FS: 00007f76b5730740(0000) GS:ffff993b275c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 396.231840] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 396.231860] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000016d2e2000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 396.231885] Call Trace: [ 396.231897] ? amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_free_memory_of_gpu+0x24c/0x25f [amdgpu] [ 396.232056] ? __dynamic_dev_dbg+0xcd/0x100 [ 396.232076] kfd_ioctl_free_memory_of_gpu+0x91/0x102 [amdgpu] [ 396.232214] kfd_ioctl+0x211/0x35b [amdgpu] [ 396.232341] ? kfd_ioctl_get_queue_wave_state+0x52/0x52 [amdgpu] Fixes: 246cb7e49a70 ("drm/amdgpu: Introduce GEM object functions") Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling(a)amd.com> Tested-by: Changfeng <changzhu(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm.c index 2d991da2cead..d1ed4f8df2b7 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm.c @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include <linux/sched/task.h> #include "amdgpu_object.h" +#include "amdgpu_gem.h" #include "amdgpu_vm.h" #include "amdgpu_amdkfd.h" #include "amdgpu_dma_buf.h" @@ -1152,7 +1153,7 @@ int amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_alloc_memory_of_gpu( struct sg_table *sg = NULL; uint64_t user_addr = 0; struct amdgpu_bo *bo; - struct amdgpu_bo_param bp; + struct drm_gem_object *gobj; u32 domain, alloc_domain; u64 alloc_flags; int ret; @@ -1220,19 +1221,14 @@ int amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_alloc_memory_of_gpu( pr_debug("\tcreate BO VA 0x%llx size 0x%llx domain %s\n", va, size, domain_string(alloc_domain)); - memset(&bp, 0, sizeof(bp)); - bp.size = size; - bp.byte_align = 1; - bp.domain = alloc_domain; - bp.flags = alloc_flags; - bp.type = bo_type; - bp.resv = NULL; - ret = amdgpu_bo_create(adev, &bp, &bo); + ret = amdgpu_gem_object_create(adev, size, 1, alloc_domain, alloc_flags, + bo_type, NULL, &gobj); if (ret) { pr_debug("Failed to create BO on domain %s. ret %d\n", - domain_string(alloc_domain), ret); + domain_string(alloc_domain), ret); goto err_bo_create; } + bo = gem_to_amdgpu_bo(gobj); if (bo_type == ttm_bo_type_sg) { bo->tbo.sg = sg; bo->tbo.ttm->sg = sg;

3 years, 11 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm/amdgpu: fix the issue that retry constantly once the" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 89fa15ecdca7eb46a711476b961f70a74765bbe4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Huang Rui <ray.huang(a)amd.com> Date: Sat, 30 Jan 2021 17:14:30 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] drm/amdgpu: fix the issue that retry constantly once the buffer is oversize MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit We cannot modify initial_domain every time while the retry starts. That will cause the busy waiting that unable to switch to GTT while the vram is not enough. Fixes: f8aab60422c3 ("drm/amdgpu: Initialise drm_gem_object_funcs for imported BOs") Signed-off-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gem.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gem.c index d0a1fee1f5f6..174a73eb23f0 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gem.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gem.c @@ -269,8 +269,8 @@ int amdgpu_gem_create_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, resv = vm->root.base.bo->tbo.base.resv; } -retry: initial_domain = (u32)(0xffffffff & args->in.domains); +retry: r = amdgpu_gem_object_create(adev, size, args->in.alignment, initial_domain, flags, ttm_bo_type_device, resv, &gobj);

3 years, 11 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] Fix unsynchronized access to sev members through" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 19a23da53932bc8011220bd8c410cb76012de004 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Gonda <pgonda(a)google.com> Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 08:15:24 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] Fix unsynchronized access to sev members through svm_register_enc_region Grab kvm->lock before pinning memory when registering an encrypted region; sev_pin_memory() relies on kvm->lock being held to ensure correctness when checking and updating the number of pinned pages. Add a lockdep assertion to help prevent future regressions. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa(a)zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro(a)8bytes.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Cc: x86(a)kernel.org Cc: kvm(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1e80fdc09d12 ("KVM: SVM: Pin guest memory when SEV is active") Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda(a)google.com> V2 - Fix up patch description - Correct file paths svm.c -> sev.c - Add unlock of kvm->lock on sev_pin_memory error V1 - https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20210126185431.1824530-1-pgonda@google.com/ Message-Id: <20210127161524.2832400-1-pgonda(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index ac652bc476ae..48017fef1cd9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -342,6 +342,8 @@ static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr, unsigned long first, last; int ret; + lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->lock); + if (ulen == 0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); @@ -1119,12 +1121,20 @@ int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, if (!region) return -ENOMEM; + mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); region->pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, range->addr, range->size, &region->npages, 1); if (IS_ERR(region->pages)) { ret = PTR_ERR(region->pages); + mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); goto e_free; } + region->uaddr = range->addr; + region->size = range->size; + + list_add_tail(&region->list, &sev->regions_list); + mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); + /* * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1 * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are @@ -1133,13 +1143,6 @@ int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, */ sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages); - region->uaddr = range->addr; - region->size = range->size; - - mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); - list_add_tail(&region->list, &sev->regions_list); - mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); - return ret; e_free:

3 years, 11 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] Fix unsynchronized access to sev members through" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 19a23da53932bc8011220bd8c410cb76012de004 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Gonda <pgonda(a)google.com> Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 08:15:24 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] Fix unsynchronized access to sev members through svm_register_enc_region Grab kvm->lock before pinning memory when registering an encrypted region; sev_pin_memory() relies on kvm->lock being held to ensure correctness when checking and updating the number of pinned pages. Add a lockdep assertion to help prevent future regressions. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa(a)zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro(a)8bytes.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Cc: x86(a)kernel.org Cc: kvm(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1e80fdc09d12 ("KVM: SVM: Pin guest memory when SEV is active") Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda(a)google.com> V2 - Fix up patch description - Correct file paths svm.c -> sev.c - Add unlock of kvm->lock on sev_pin_memory error V1 - https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20210126185431.1824530-1-pgonda@google.com/ Message-Id: <20210127161524.2832400-1-pgonda(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index ac652bc476ae..48017fef1cd9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -342,6 +342,8 @@ static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr, unsigned long first, last; int ret; + lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->lock); + if (ulen == 0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); @@ -1119,12 +1121,20 @@ int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, if (!region) return -ENOMEM; + mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); region->pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, range->addr, range->size, &region->npages, 1); if (IS_ERR(region->pages)) { ret = PTR_ERR(region->pages); + mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); goto e_free; } + region->uaddr = range->addr; + region->size = range->size; + + list_add_tail(&region->list, &sev->regions_list); + mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); + /* * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1 * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are @@ -1133,13 +1143,6 @@ int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, */ sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages); - region->uaddr = range->addr; - region->size = range->size; - - mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); - list_add_tail(&region->list, &sev->regions_list); - mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); - return ret; e_free:

3 years, 11 months

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✅ PASS: Test report for kernel 5.10.14 (stable-queue)

by CKI Project

Hello, We ran automated tests on a recent commit from this kernel tree: Kernel repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git Commit: e86cf3211995 - usb: host: xhci: mvebu: make USB 3.0 PHY optional for Armada 3720 The results of these automated tests are provided below. Overall result: PASSED Merge: OK Compile: OK Tests: OK All kernel binaries, config files, and logs are available for download here: https://arr-cki-prod-datawarehouse-public.s3.amazonaws.com/index.html?prefi… Please reply to this email if you have any questions about the tests that we ran or if you have any suggestions on how to make future tests more effective. ,-. ,-. ( C ) ( K ) Continuous `-',-.`-' Kernel ( I ) Integration `-' ______________________________________________________________________________ Compile testing --------------- We compiled the kernel for 4 architectures: aarch64: make options: make -j24 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg ppc64le: make options: make -j24 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg s390x: make options: make -j24 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg x86_64: make options: make -j24 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg Hardware testing ---------------- We booted each kernel and ran the following tests: aarch64: Host 1: ✅ Boot test ✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite ✅ storage: software RAID testing 🚧 ✅ xfstests - ext4 🚧 ✅ xfstests - xfs 🚧 ✅ xfstests - btrfs 🚧 ❌ IPMI driver test 🚧 ✅ IPMItool loop stress test 🚧 ✅ Storage blktests 🚧 ✅ Storage block - filesystem fio test 🚧 ✅ Storage block - queue scheduler test 🚧 ✅ Storage nvme - tcp 🚧 ✅ Storage: swraid mdadm raid_module test 🚧 ✅ stress: stress-ng Host 2: ✅ Boot test ✅ ACPI table test ✅ ACPI enabled test ✅ LTP ✅ Loopdev Sanity ✅ Memory: fork_mem ✅ Memory function: memfd_create ✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility) ✅ Networking bridge: sanity ✅ Networking socket: fuzz ✅ Networking: igmp conformance test ✅ Networking route: pmtu ✅ Networking route_func - local ✅ Networking route_func - forward ✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test ✅ Networking UDP: socket ✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test ✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic ✅ L2TP basic test ✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic ✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - transport ✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel ✅ Libkcapi AF_ALG test ✅ pciutils: update pci ids test ✅ ALSA PCM loopback test ✅ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test ✅ storage: SCSI VPD 🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon 🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites 🚧 ✅ Firmware test suite 🚧 ✅ jvm - jcstress tests 🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr 🚧 ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity 🚧 ✅ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test 🚧 ✅ audit: audit testsuite test 🚧 ✅ trace: ftrace/tracer ppc64le: Host 1: ✅ Boot test ✅ LTP ✅ Loopdev Sanity ✅ Memory: fork_mem ✅ Memory function: memfd_create ✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility) ✅ Networking bridge: sanity ✅ Networking socket: fuzz ✅ Networking route: pmtu ✅ Networking route_func - local ✅ Networking route_func - forward ✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test ✅ Networking UDP: socket ✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test ✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic ✅ L2TP basic test ✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic ✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel ✅ Libkcapi AF_ALG test ✅ pciutils: update pci ids test ✅ ALSA PCM loopback test ✅ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test 🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon 🚧 ❌ POSIX pjd-fstest suites 🚧 ✅ jvm - jcstress tests 🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr 🚧 ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity 🚧 ✅ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test 🚧 ✅ audit: audit testsuite test 🚧 ✅ trace: ftrace/tracer Host 2: ✅ Boot test ✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite ✅ storage: software RAID testing 🚧 ✅ xfstests - ext4 🚧 ✅ xfstests - xfs 🚧 ✅ xfstests - btrfs 🚧 ✅ IPMI driver test 🚧 ✅ IPMItool loop stress test 🚧 ✅ Storage blktests 🚧 ✅ Storage block - filesystem fio test 🚧 ✅ Storage block - queue scheduler test 🚧 ✅ Storage nvme - tcp 🚧 ✅ Storage: swraid mdadm raid_module test s390x: Host 1: ✅ Boot test ✅ LTP ✅ Loopdev Sanity ✅ Memory: fork_mem ✅ Memory function: memfd_create ✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility) ✅ Networking bridge: sanity ✅ Networking route: pmtu ✅ Networking route_func - local ✅ Networking route_func - forward ✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test ✅ Networking UDP: socket ✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test ✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic ✅ L2TP basic test ✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic ✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - transport ✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel ✅ Libkcapi AF_ALG test 🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon 🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites 🚧 ✅ jvm - jcstress tests 🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr 🚧 ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity 🚧 ✅ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test 🚧 ✅ audit: audit testsuite test 🚧 ✅ trace: ftrace/tracer Host 2: ✅ Boot test ✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite 🚧 ✅ Storage blktests 🚧 ✅ Storage nvme - tcp 🚧 ✅ Storage: swraid mdadm raid_module test 🚧 ✅ stress: stress-ng x86_64: Host 1: ✅ Boot test ✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite ✅ storage: software RAID testing 🚧 ❌ CPU: Frequency Driver Test 🚧 ✅ CPU: Idle Test 🚧 ✅ xfstests - ext4 🚧 ✅ xfstests - xfs 🚧 ✅ xfstests - btrfs 🚧 ✅ xfstests - nfsv4.2 🚧 ✅ xfstests - cifsv3.11 🚧 ❌ IPMI driver test 🚧 ✅ IPMItool loop stress test 🚧 ✅ Storage blktests 🚧 ✅ Storage block - filesystem fio test 🚧 ✅ Storage block - queue scheduler test 🚧 ✅ Storage nvme - tcp 🚧 ✅ Storage: swraid mdadm raid_module test 🚧 ✅ stress: stress-ng Host 2: ✅ Boot test ✅ ACPI table test ✅ LTP ✅ Loopdev Sanity ✅ Memory: fork_mem ✅ Memory function: memfd_create ✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility) ✅ Networking bridge: sanity ✅ Networking socket: fuzz ✅ Networking: igmp conformance test ✅ Networking route: pmtu ✅ Networking route_func - local ✅ Networking route_func - forward ✅ Networking TCP: keepalive test ✅ Networking UDP: socket ✅ Networking tunnel: geneve basic test ✅ Networking tunnel: gre basic ✅ L2TP basic test ✅ Networking tunnel: vxlan basic ✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - transport ✅ Networking ipsec: basic netns - tunnel ✅ Libkcapi AF_ALG test ✅ pciutils: sanity smoke test ✅ pciutils: update pci ids test ✅ ALSA PCM loopback test ✅ ALSA Control (mixer) Userspace Element test ✅ storage: SCSI VPD 🚧 ✅ CIFS Connectathon 🚧 ✅ POSIX pjd-fstest suites 🚧 ✅ Firmware test suite 🚧 ✅ jvm - jcstress tests 🚧 ✅ Memory function: kaslr 🚧 ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity 🚧 ✅ Networking firewall: basic netfilter test 🚧 ✅ audit: audit testsuite test 🚧 ✅ trace: ftrace/tracer Test sources: https://gitlab.com/cki-project/kernel-tests 💚 Pull requests are welcome for new tests or improvements to existing tests! Aborted tests ------------- Tests that didn't complete running successfully are marked with ⚡⚡⚡. If this was caused by an infrastructure issue, we try to mark that explicitly in the report. Waived tests ------------ If the test run included waived tests, they are marked with 🚧. Such tests are executed but their results are not taken into account. Tests are waived when their results are not reliable enough, e.g. when they're just introduced or are being fixed. Testing timeout --------------- We aim to provide a report within reasonable timeframe. Tests that haven't finished running yet are marked with ⏱.

3 years, 11 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] libnvdimm/dimm: Avoid race between probe and" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 7018c897c2f243d4b5f1b94bc6b4831a7eab80fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2021 16:20:40 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] libnvdimm/dimm: Avoid race between probe and available_slots_show() Richard reports that the following test: (while true; do cat /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmem*/available_slots 2>&1 > /dev/null done) & while true; do for i in $(seq 0 4); do echo nmem$i > /sys/bus/nd/drivers/nvdimm/bind done for i in $(seq 0 4); do echo nmem$i > /sys/bus/nd/drivers/nvdimm/unbind done done ...fails with a crash signature like: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI RIP: 0010:nd_label_nfree+0x134/0x1a0 [libnvdimm] [..] Call Trace: available_slots_show+0x4e/0x120 [libnvdimm] dev_attr_show+0x42/0x80 ? memset+0x20/0x40 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x218/0x410 The root cause is that available_slots_show() consults driver-data, but fails to synchronize against device-unbind setting up a TOCTOU race to access uninitialized memory. Validate driver-data under the device-lock. Fixes: 4d88a97aa9e8 ("libnvdimm, nvdimm: dimm driver and base libnvdimm device-driver infrastructure") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma(a)intel.com> Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang(a)intel.com> Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny(a)intel.com> Cc: Coly Li <colyli(a)suse.com> Reported-by: Richard Palethorpe <rpalethorpe(a)suse.com> Acked-by: Richard Palethorpe <rpalethorpe(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c b/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c index b59032e0859b..9d208570d059 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c @@ -335,16 +335,16 @@ static ssize_t state_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(state); -static ssize_t available_slots_show(struct device *dev, - struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +static ssize_t __available_slots_show(struct nvdimm_drvdata *ndd, char *buf) { - struct nvdimm_drvdata *ndd = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct device *dev; ssize_t rc; u32 nfree; if (!ndd) return -ENXIO; + dev = ndd->dev; nvdimm_bus_lock(dev); nfree = nd_label_nfree(ndd); if (nfree - 1 > nfree) { @@ -356,6 +356,18 @@ static ssize_t available_slots_show(struct device *dev, nvdimm_bus_unlock(dev); return rc; } + +static ssize_t available_slots_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + ssize_t rc; + + nd_device_lock(dev); + rc = __available_slots_show(dev_get_drvdata(dev), buf); + nd_device_unlock(dev); + + return rc; +} static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(available_slots); __weak ssize_t security_show(struct device *dev,

3 years, 11 months

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Linux-stable-mirror February 2021