The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 548ec0805c399c65ed66c6641be467f717833ab5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields(a)redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2021 15:08:00 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] nfsd: fix use-after-free due to delegation race
A delegation break could arrive as soon as we've called vfs_setlease. A
delegation break runs a callback which immediately (in
nfsd4_cb_recall_prepare) adds the delegation to del_recall_lru. If we
then exit nfs4_set_delegation without hashing the delegation, it will be
freed as soon as the callback is done with it, without ever being
removed from del_recall_lru.
Symptoms show up later as use-after-free or list corruption warnings,
usually in the laundromat thread.
I suspect aba2072f4523 "nfsd: grant read delegations to clients holding
writes" made this bug easier to hit, but I looked as far back as v3.0
and it looks to me it already had the same problem. So I'm not sure
where the bug was introduced; it may have been there from the beginning.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
index bfad94c70b84..1956d377d1a6 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
@@ -1207,6 +1207,11 @@ hash_delegation_locked(struct nfs4_delegation *dp, struct nfs4_file *fp)
return 0;
}
+static bool delegation_hashed(struct nfs4_delegation *dp)
+{
+ return !(list_empty(&dp->dl_perfile));
+}
+
static bool
unhash_delegation_locked(struct nfs4_delegation *dp)
{
@@ -1214,7 +1219,7 @@ unhash_delegation_locked(struct nfs4_delegation *dp)
lockdep_assert_held(&state_lock);
- if (list_empty(&dp->dl_perfile))
+ if (!delegation_hashed(dp))
return false;
dp->dl_stid.sc_type = NFS4_CLOSED_DELEG_STID;
@@ -4598,7 +4603,7 @@ static void nfsd4_cb_recall_prepare(struct nfsd4_callback *cb)
* queued for a lease break. Don't queue it again.
*/
spin_lock(&state_lock);
- if (dp->dl_time == 0) {
+ if (delegation_hashed(dp) && dp->dl_time == 0) {
dp->dl_time = ktime_get_boottime_seconds();
list_add_tail(&dp->dl_recall_lru, &nn->del_recall_lru);
}
The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 548ec0805c399c65ed66c6641be467f717833ab5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields(a)redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2021 15:08:00 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] nfsd: fix use-after-free due to delegation race
A delegation break could arrive as soon as we've called vfs_setlease. A
delegation break runs a callback which immediately (in
nfsd4_cb_recall_prepare) adds the delegation to del_recall_lru. If we
then exit nfs4_set_delegation without hashing the delegation, it will be
freed as soon as the callback is done with it, without ever being
removed from del_recall_lru.
Symptoms show up later as use-after-free or list corruption warnings,
usually in the laundromat thread.
I suspect aba2072f4523 "nfsd: grant read delegations to clients holding
writes" made this bug easier to hit, but I looked as far back as v3.0
and it looks to me it already had the same problem. So I'm not sure
where the bug was introduced; it may have been there from the beginning.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
index bfad94c70b84..1956d377d1a6 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
@@ -1207,6 +1207,11 @@ hash_delegation_locked(struct nfs4_delegation *dp, struct nfs4_file *fp)
return 0;
}
+static bool delegation_hashed(struct nfs4_delegation *dp)
+{
+ return !(list_empty(&dp->dl_perfile));
+}
+
static bool
unhash_delegation_locked(struct nfs4_delegation *dp)
{
@@ -1214,7 +1219,7 @@ unhash_delegation_locked(struct nfs4_delegation *dp)
lockdep_assert_held(&state_lock);
- if (list_empty(&dp->dl_perfile))
+ if (!delegation_hashed(dp))
return false;
dp->dl_stid.sc_type = NFS4_CLOSED_DELEG_STID;
@@ -4598,7 +4603,7 @@ static void nfsd4_cb_recall_prepare(struct nfsd4_callback *cb)
* queued for a lease break. Don't queue it again.
*/
spin_lock(&state_lock);
- if (dp->dl_time == 0) {
+ if (delegation_hashed(dp) && dp->dl_time == 0) {
dp->dl_time = ktime_get_boottime_seconds();
list_add_tail(&dp->dl_recall_lru, &nn->del_recall_lru);
}
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 057ae59f5a1d924511beb1b09f395bdb316cfd03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter(a)intel.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2021 18:22:57 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] perf intel-pt: Fix some PGE (packet generation enable/control
flow packets) usage
Packet generation enable (PGE) refers to whether control flow (COFI)
packets are being produced.
PGE may be false even when branch-tracing is enabled, due to being
out-of-context, or outside a filter address range. Fix some missing PGE
usage.
Fixes: 7c1b16ba0e26e6 ("perf intel-pt: Add support for decoding FUP/TIP only")
Fixes: 839598176b0554 ("perf intel-pt: Allow decoding with branch tracing disabled")
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter(a)intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa(a)redhat.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.15+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210162303.2288710-2-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c
index 5f83937bf8f3..6f6f163161a9 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c
@@ -2678,6 +2678,7 @@ static int intel_pt_hop_trace(struct intel_pt_decoder *decoder, bool *no_tip, in
return HOP_IGNORE;
case INTEL_PT_TIP_PGD:
+ decoder->pge = false;
if (!decoder->packet.count) {
intel_pt_set_nr(decoder);
return HOP_IGNORE;
@@ -2707,7 +2708,7 @@ static int intel_pt_hop_trace(struct intel_pt_decoder *decoder, bool *no_tip, in
intel_pt_set_ip(decoder);
if (intel_pt_fup_event(decoder))
return HOP_RETURN;
- if (!decoder->branch_enable)
+ if (!decoder->branch_enable || !decoder->pge)
*no_tip = true;
if (*no_tip) {
decoder->state.type = INTEL_PT_INSTRUCTION;
@@ -2897,7 +2898,7 @@ static bool intel_pt_psb_with_fup(struct intel_pt_decoder *decoder, int *err)
{
struct intel_pt_psb_info data = { .fup = false };
- if (!decoder->branch_enable || !decoder->pge)
+ if (!decoder->branch_enable)
return false;
intel_pt_pkt_lookahead(decoder, intel_pt_psb_lookahead_cb, &data);
@@ -2999,7 +3000,7 @@ static int intel_pt_walk_trace(struct intel_pt_decoder *decoder)
break;
}
intel_pt_set_last_ip(decoder);
- if (!decoder->branch_enable) {
+ if (!decoder->branch_enable || !decoder->pge) {
decoder->ip = decoder->last_ip;
if (intel_pt_fup_event(decoder))
return 0;
This patchset is a backport of DAMON fixes that merged in the mainline,
for v5.15.x stable series.
SeongJae Park (2):
timers: implement usleep_idle_range()
mm/damon/core: fix fake load reports due to uninterruptible sleeps
include/linux/delay.h | 14 +++++++++++++-
kernel/time/timer.c | 16 +++++++++-------
mm/damon/core.c | 14 +++++++++++---
3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--
2.17.1
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 3244867af8c065e51969f1bffe732d3ebfd9a7d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2021 22:09:19 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Ignore sparse banks size for an "all CPUs",
non-sparse IPI req
Do not bail early if there are no bits set in the sparse banks for a
non-sparse, a.k.a. "all CPUs", IPI request. Per the Hyper-V spec, it is
legal to have a variable length of '0', e.g. VP_SET's BankContents in
this case, if the request can be serviced without the extra info.
It is possible that for a given invocation of a hypercall that does
accept variable sized input headers that all the header input fits
entirely within the fixed size header. In such cases the variable sized
input header is zero-sized and the corresponding bits in the hypercall
input should be set to zero.
Bailing early results in KVM failing to send IPIs to all CPUs as expected
by the guest.
Fixes: 214ff83d4473 ("KVM: x86: hyperv: implement PV IPI send hypercalls")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets(a)redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211207220926.718794-2-seanjc(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
index 5e19e6e4c2ce..8d8c1cc7cb53 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
@@ -1922,11 +1922,13 @@ static u64 kvm_hv_send_ipi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_hv_hcall *hc, bool
all_cpus = send_ipi_ex.vp_set.format == HV_GENERIC_SET_ALL;
+ if (all_cpus)
+ goto check_and_send_ipi;
+
if (!sparse_banks_len)
goto ret_success;
- if (!all_cpus &&
- kvm_read_guest(kvm,
+ if (kvm_read_guest(kvm,
hc->ingpa + offsetof(struct hv_send_ipi_ex,
vp_set.bank_contents),
sparse_banks,
@@ -1934,6 +1936,7 @@ static u64 kvm_hv_send_ipi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_hv_hcall *hc, bool
return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
}
+check_and_send_ipi:
if ((vector < HV_IPI_LOW_VECTOR) || (vector > HV_IPI_HIGH_VECTOR))
return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 3244867af8c065e51969f1bffe732d3ebfd9a7d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2021 22:09:19 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Ignore sparse banks size for an "all CPUs",
non-sparse IPI req
Do not bail early if there are no bits set in the sparse banks for a
non-sparse, a.k.a. "all CPUs", IPI request. Per the Hyper-V spec, it is
legal to have a variable length of '0', e.g. VP_SET's BankContents in
this case, if the request can be serviced without the extra info.
It is possible that for a given invocation of a hypercall that does
accept variable sized input headers that all the header input fits
entirely within the fixed size header. In such cases the variable sized
input header is zero-sized and the corresponding bits in the hypercall
input should be set to zero.
Bailing early results in KVM failing to send IPIs to all CPUs as expected
by the guest.
Fixes: 214ff83d4473 ("KVM: x86: hyperv: implement PV IPI send hypercalls")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets(a)redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211207220926.718794-2-seanjc(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
index 5e19e6e4c2ce..8d8c1cc7cb53 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
@@ -1922,11 +1922,13 @@ static u64 kvm_hv_send_ipi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_hv_hcall *hc, bool
all_cpus = send_ipi_ex.vp_set.format == HV_GENERIC_SET_ALL;
+ if (all_cpus)
+ goto check_and_send_ipi;
+
if (!sparse_banks_len)
goto ret_success;
- if (!all_cpus &&
- kvm_read_guest(kvm,
+ if (kvm_read_guest(kvm,
hc->ingpa + offsetof(struct hv_send_ipi_ex,
vp_set.bank_contents),
sparse_banks,
@@ -1934,6 +1936,7 @@ static u64 kvm_hv_send_ipi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_hv_hcall *hc, bool
return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
}
+check_and_send_ipi:
if ((vector < HV_IPI_LOW_VECTOR) || (vector > HV_IPI_HIGH_VECTOR))
return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
As Wenqing Liu reported in bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215235
- Overview
page fault in f2fs_setxattr() when mount and operate on corrupted image
- Reproduce
tested on kernel 5.16-rc3, 5.15.X under root
1. unzip tmp7.zip
2. ./single.sh f2fs 7
Sometimes need to run the script several times
- Kernel dump
loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072
F2FS-fs (loop0): Found nat_bits in checkpoint
F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 7548c2ee
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe47bc7123f48
RIP: 0010:kfree+0x66/0x320
Call Trace:
__f2fs_setxattr+0x2aa/0xc00 [f2fs]
f2fs_setxattr+0xfa/0x480 [f2fs]
__f2fs_set_acl+0x19b/0x330 [f2fs]
__vfs_removexattr+0x52/0x70
__vfs_removexattr_locked+0xb1/0x140
vfs_removexattr+0x56/0x100
removexattr+0x57/0x80
path_removexattr+0xa3/0xc0
__x64_sys_removexattr+0x17/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x37/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The root cause is in __f2fs_setxattr(), we missed to do sanity check on
last xattr entry, result in out-of-bound memory access during updating
inconsistent xattr data of target inode.
After the fix, it can detect such xattr inconsistency as below:
F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (7) has invalid last xattr entry, entry_size: 60676
F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (8) has corrupted xattr
F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (8) has corrupted xattr
F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (8) has invalid last xattr entry, entry_size: 47736
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Wenqing Liu <wenqingliu0120(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org>
---
v3:
- fix compile warning:
warning: format ‘%u’ expects argument of type ‘unsigned int’, but argument 4 has type ‘long unsigned int’ [-Wformat=]
fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
index e348f33bcb2b..797ac505a075 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
@@ -684,8 +684,17 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
}
last = here;
- while (!IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(last))
+ while (!IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(last)) {
+ if ((void *)(last) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
+ (void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(last) > last_base_addr) {
+ f2fs_err(F2FS_I_SB(inode), "inode (%lu) has invalid last xattr entry, entry_size: %zu",
+ inode->i_ino, ENTRY_SIZE(last));
+ set_sbi_flag(F2FS_I_SB(inode), SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto exit;
+ }
last = XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(last);
+ }
newsize = XATTR_ALIGN(sizeof(struct f2fs_xattr_entry) + len + size);
--
2.32.0
As Wenqing Liu reported in bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215235
- Overview
page fault in f2fs_setxattr() when mount and operate on corrupted image
- Reproduce
tested on kernel 5.16-rc3, 5.15.X under root
1. unzip tmp7.zip
2. ./single.sh f2fs 7
Sometimes need to run the script several times
- Kernel dump
loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072
F2FS-fs (loop0): Found nat_bits in checkpoint
F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 7548c2ee
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe47bc7123f48
RIP: 0010:kfree+0x66/0x320
Call Trace:
__f2fs_setxattr+0x2aa/0xc00 [f2fs]
f2fs_setxattr+0xfa/0x480 [f2fs]
__f2fs_set_acl+0x19b/0x330 [f2fs]
__vfs_removexattr+0x52/0x70
__vfs_removexattr_locked+0xb1/0x140
vfs_removexattr+0x56/0x100
removexattr+0x57/0x80
path_removexattr+0xa3/0xc0
__x64_sys_removexattr+0x17/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x37/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The root cause is in __f2fs_setxattr(), we missed to do sanity check on
last xattr entry, result in out-of-bound memory access during updating
inconsistent xattr data of target inode.
After the fix, it can detect such xattr inconsistency as below:
F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (7) has invalid last xattr entry, entry_size: 60676
F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (8) has corrupted xattr
F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (8) has corrupted xattr
F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (8) has invalid last xattr entry, entry_size: 47736
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Wenqing Liu <wenqingliu0120(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org>
---
v2:
- fix compile warning:
format specifies type 'unsigned long' but the argument has type 'unsigned int' [-Wformat]
fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
index e348f33bcb2b..796a55c14d69 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
@@ -684,8 +684,17 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
}
last = here;
- while (!IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(last))
+ while (!IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(last)) {
+ if ((void *)(last) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
+ (void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(last) > last_base_addr) {
+ f2fs_err(F2FS_I_SB(inode), "inode (%lu) has invalid last xattr entry, entry_size: %u",
+ inode->i_ino, ENTRY_SIZE(last));
+ set_sbi_flag(F2FS_I_SB(inode), SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto exit;
+ }
last = XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(last);
+ }
newsize = XATTR_ALIGN(sizeof(struct f2fs_xattr_entry) + len + size);
--
2.32.0
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From f58ac1adc76b5beda43c64ef359056077df4d93a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brian Silverman <brian.silverman(a)bluerivertech.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2021 14:26:28 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] can: m_can: Disable and ignore ELO interrupt
With the design of this driver, this condition is often triggered.
However, the counter that this interrupt indicates an overflow is never
read either, so overflowing is harmless.
On my system, when a CAN bus starts flapping up and down, this locks up
the whole system with lots of interrupts and printks.
Specifically, this interrupt indicates the CEL field of ECR has
overflowed. All reads of ECR mask out CEL.
Fixes: e0d1f4816f2a ("can: m_can: add Bosch M_CAN controller support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211129222628.7490-1-brian.silverman@blueriver…
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brian Silverman <brian.silverman(a)bluerivertech.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de>
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c b/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c
index 2470c47b2e31..91be87c4f4d3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c
@@ -204,16 +204,16 @@ enum m_can_reg {
/* Interrupts for version 3.0.x */
#define IR_ERR_LEC_30X (IR_STE | IR_FOE | IR_ACKE | IR_BE | IR_CRCE)
-#define IR_ERR_BUS_30X (IR_ERR_LEC_30X | IR_WDI | IR_ELO | IR_BEU | \
- IR_BEC | IR_TOO | IR_MRAF | IR_TSW | IR_TEFL | \
- IR_RF1L | IR_RF0L)
+#define IR_ERR_BUS_30X (IR_ERR_LEC_30X | IR_WDI | IR_BEU | IR_BEC | \
+ IR_TOO | IR_MRAF | IR_TSW | IR_TEFL | IR_RF1L | \
+ IR_RF0L)
#define IR_ERR_ALL_30X (IR_ERR_STATE | IR_ERR_BUS_30X)
/* Interrupts for version >= 3.1.x */
#define IR_ERR_LEC_31X (IR_PED | IR_PEA)
-#define IR_ERR_BUS_31X (IR_ERR_LEC_31X | IR_WDI | IR_ELO | IR_BEU | \
- IR_BEC | IR_TOO | IR_MRAF | IR_TSW | IR_TEFL | \
- IR_RF1L | IR_RF0L)
+#define IR_ERR_BUS_31X (IR_ERR_LEC_31X | IR_WDI | IR_BEU | IR_BEC | \
+ IR_TOO | IR_MRAF | IR_TSW | IR_TEFL | IR_RF1L | \
+ IR_RF0L)
#define IR_ERR_ALL_31X (IR_ERR_STATE | IR_ERR_BUS_31X)
/* Interrupt Line Select (ILS) */
@@ -810,8 +810,6 @@ static void m_can_handle_other_err(struct net_device *dev, u32 irqstatus)
{
if (irqstatus & IR_WDI)
netdev_err(dev, "Message RAM Watchdog event due to missing READY\n");
- if (irqstatus & IR_ELO)
- netdev_err(dev, "Error Logging Overflow\n");
if (irqstatus & IR_BEU)
netdev_err(dev, "Bit Error Uncorrected\n");
if (irqstatus & IR_BEC)
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 94cddf1e9227a171b27292509d59691819c458db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent(a)wanadoo.fr>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 20:16:54 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] can: pch_can: pch_can_rx_normal: fix use after free
After calling netif_receive_skb(skb), dereferencing skb is unsafe.
Especially, the can_frame cf which aliases skb memory is dereferenced
just after the call netif_receive_skb(skb).
Reordering the lines solves the issue.
Fixes: b21d18b51b31 ("can: Topcliff: Add PCH_CAN driver.")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211123111654.621610-1-mailhol.vincent@wanadoo…
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent(a)wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de>
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/pch_can.c b/drivers/net/can/pch_can.c
index 92a54a5fd4c5..964c8a09226a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/pch_can.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/pch_can.c
@@ -692,11 +692,11 @@ static int pch_can_rx_normal(struct net_device *ndev, u32 obj_num, int quota)
cf->data[i + 1] = data_reg >> 8;
}
- netif_receive_skb(skb);
rcv_pkts++;
stats->rx_packets++;
quota--;
stats->rx_bytes += cf->len;
+ netif_receive_skb(skb);
pch_fifo_thresh(priv, obj_num);
obj_num++;