The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From cb8d53d2c97369029cc638c9274ac7be0a316c75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2020 09:24:56 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] ext4: fix leaking sysfs kobject after failed mount
ext4_unregister_sysfs() only deletes the kobject. The reference to it
needs to be put separately, like ext4_put_super() does.
This addresses the syzbot report
"memory leak in kobject_set_name_vargs (3)"
(https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9f864abad79fae7c17e1).
Reported-by: syzbot+9f864abad79fae7c17e1(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 72ba74508b28 ("ext4: release sysfs kobject when failing to enable quotas on mount")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200922162456.93657-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu>
diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c
index ea425b49b345..41953b86ffe3 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -4872,6 +4872,7 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
failed_mount8:
ext4_unregister_sysfs(sb);
+ kobject_put(&sbi->s_kobj);
failed_mount7:
ext4_unregister_li_request(sb);
failed_mount6:
The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 8b92c4ff4423aa9900cf838d3294fcade4dbda35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matteo Croce <mcroce(a)microsoft.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2020 22:52:02 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Revert "kernel/reboot.c: convert simple_strtoul to kstrtoint"
Patch series "fix parsing of reboot= cmdline", v3.
The parsing of the reboot= cmdline has two major errors:
- a missing bound check can crash the system on reboot
- parsing of the cpu number only works if specified last
Fix both.
This patch (of 2):
This reverts commit 616feab753972b97.
kstrtoint() and simple_strtoul() have a subtle difference which makes
them non interchangeable: if a non digit character is found amid the
parsing, the former will return an error, while the latter will just
stop parsing, e.g. simple_strtoul("123xyx") = 123.
The kernel cmdline reboot= argument allows to specify the CPU used for
rebooting, with the syntax `s####` among the other flags, e.g.
"reboot=warm,s31,force", so if this flag is not the last given, it's
silently ignored as well as the subsequent ones.
Fixes: 616feab75397 ("kernel/reboot.c: convert simple_strtoul to kstrtoint")
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce(a)microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek(a)suse.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin(a)soleen.com>
Cc: Robin Holt <robinmholt(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf(a)skynet.be>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201103214025.116799-2-mcroce@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/kernel/reboot.c b/kernel/reboot.c
index e7b78d5ae1ab..8fbba433725e 100644
--- a/kernel/reboot.c
+++ b/kernel/reboot.c
@@ -551,22 +551,15 @@ static int __init reboot_setup(char *str)
break;
case 's':
- {
- int rc;
-
- if (isdigit(*(str+1))) {
- rc = kstrtoint(str+1, 0, &reboot_cpu);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
- } else if (str[1] == 'm' && str[2] == 'p' &&
- isdigit(*(str+3))) {
- rc = kstrtoint(str+3, 0, &reboot_cpu);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
- } else
+ if (isdigit(*(str+1)))
+ reboot_cpu = simple_strtoul(str+1, NULL, 0);
+ else if (str[1] == 'm' && str[2] == 'p' &&
+ isdigit(*(str+3)))
+ reboot_cpu = simple_strtoul(str+3, NULL, 0);
+ else
*mode = REBOOT_SOFT;
break;
- }
+
case 'g':
*mode = REBOOT_GPIO;
break;
Hi Greg, Sasha,
Please consider the attached backport of
f91072ed1b72 ("perf/core: Fix race in the perf_mmap_close() function")
for v4.14.y, v4.19.y and v5.4.y
This will not apply in v4.9.y and v4.4.y and I am sending separate backport
for that.
--
Regards
Sudip
Hi Greg, Sasha,
This was missing from v4.4.y, v4.9.y and v4.14.y. Please consider
the attached backported patch.
Missed adding stable in the previous mail.
--
Regards
Sudip
commit 1978b3a53a74e3230cd46932b149c6e62e832e9a upstream.
On AMD CPUs which have the feature X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON,
STIBP is set to on and
spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED
At the same time, IBPB can be set to conditional.
However, this leads to the case where it's impossible to turn on IBPB
for a process because in the PR_SPEC_DISABLE case in ib_prctl_set() the
spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED
condition leads to a return before the task flag is set. Similarly,
ib_prctl_get() will return PR_SPEC_DISABLE even though IBPB is set to
conditional.
More generally, the following cases are possible:
1. STIBP = conditional && IBPB = on for spectre_v2_user=seccomp,ibpb
2. STIBP = on && IBPB = conditional for AMD CPUs with
X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON
The first case functions correctly today, but only because
spectre_v2_user_ibpb isn't updated to reflect the IBPB mode.
At a high level, this change does one thing. If either STIBP or IBPB
is set to conditional, allow the prctl to change the task flag.
Also, reflect that capability when querying the state. This isn't
perfect since it doesn't take into account if only STIBP or IBPB is
unconditionally on. But it allows the conditional feature to work as
expected, without affecting the unconditional one.
[ bp: Massage commit message and comment; space out statements for
better readability. ]
Fixes: 21998a351512 ("x86/speculation: Avoid force-disabling IBPB based on STIBP and enhanced IBRS.")
Signed-off-by: Anand K Mistry <amistry(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201105163246.v2.1.Ifd7243cd3e2c2206a893ad0a5b9a…
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
Superfluous newline which was removed in upstream commit a5ce9f2bb665
---
The one conflict is a newline in a comment which was removed in upstream
commit a5ce9f2bb665, but was not merged into the stable trees.
This patch applies cleanly on the stable trees 5.4, 4.19, 4.14, 4.9, and
4.4, which are affected by this bug.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index acbf3dbb8bf2..bdc1ed7ff669 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1252,6 +1252,14 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
return 0;
}
+static bool is_spec_ib_user_controlled(void)
+{
+ return spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
+ spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP;
+}
+
static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
{
switch (ctrl) {
@@ -1259,17 +1267,26 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
return 0;
- /*
- * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
- * mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled
- * by a previous prctl call.
+ /*
+ * With strict mode for both IBPB and STIBP, the instruction
+ * code paths avoid checking this task flag and instead,
+ * unconditionally run the instruction. However, STIBP and IBPB
+ * are independent and either can be set to conditionally
+ * enabled regardless of the mode of the other.
+ *
+ * If either is set to conditional, allow the task flag to be
+ * updated, unless it was force-disabled by a previous prctl
+ * call. Currently, this is possible on an AMD CPU which has the
+ * feature X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON. In this case, if the
+ * kernel is booted with 'spectre_v2_user=seccomp', then
+ * spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP and
+ * spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED.
*/
- if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ||
+ if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled() ||
task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
return -EPERM;
+
task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
task_update_spec_tif(task);
break;
@@ -1282,10 +1299,10 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
return -EPERM;
- if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+
+ if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled())
return 0;
+
task_set_spec_ib_disable(task);
if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE)
task_set_spec_ib_force_disable(task);
@@ -1350,20 +1367,17 @@ static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
- else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
- return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
- else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
- spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
- spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP) {
+ else if (is_spec_ib_user_controlled()) {
if (task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
if (task_spec_ib_disable(task))
return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
- } else
+ } else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+ return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ else
return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
}
--
2.29.2.222.g5d2a92d10f8-goog