This ThinkCentre machine has a new realtek codec alc222, it is not
in the support list, we add it in the realtek.c then this machine
can apply FIXUPs for the realtek codec.
And this machine has two front mics which can't be handled
by PA so far, it uses the pin 0x18 and 0x19 as the front mics, as
a result the existing FIXUP ALC294_FIXUP_LENOVO_MIC_LOCATION doesn't
work on this machine. Fortunately another FIXUP
ALC283_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC also can change the location for one of the
two mics on this machine.
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang(a)canonical.com>
---
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
index 3b9583aa63c1..74697c1dd1d5 100644
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
@@ -7151,6 +7151,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = {
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x312a, "ThinkCentre Station", ALC294_FIXUP_LENOVO_MIC_LOCATION),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x312f, "ThinkCentre Station", ALC294_FIXUP_LENOVO_MIC_LOCATION),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x313c, "ThinkCentre Station", ALC294_FIXUP_LENOVO_MIC_LOCATION),
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3151, "ThinkCentre Station", ALC283_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3902, "Lenovo E50-80", ALC269_FIXUP_DMIC_THINKPAD_ACPI),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3977, "IdeaPad S210", ALC283_FIXUP_INT_MIC),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3978, "Lenovo B50-70", ALC269_FIXUP_DMIC_THINKPAD_ACPI),
@@ -9038,6 +9039,7 @@ static int patch_alc680(struct hda_codec *codec)
static const struct hda_device_id snd_hda_id_realtek[] = {
HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0215, "ALC215", patch_alc269),
HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0221, "ALC221", patch_alc269),
+ HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0222, "ALC222", patch_alc269),
HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0225, "ALC225", patch_alc269),
HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0231, "ALC231", patch_alc269),
HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0233, "ALC233", patch_alc269),
--
2.17.1
S-35390A RTC chip allows to set the lower two digit of the Western calendar year (00 to 99) and links together with the auto calendar from the year 2000 to the year 2099. If we try to set year earlier than 2000 then hardware clock get reset to "epoch". This patch check for year value between 2000 to 2099 otherwise returns "EINVAL" error. In conclusion this patch restricts system to set hardware clock to set year below and above the year 2000 and 2099 respectively.
Signed-off-by: Aashish P Sonawane mailto:AashishPSonawane@eaton.com
Suggested-by: Meghan Saitwal mailto:MeghanSaitwal@eaton.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------diff --git a/drivers/rtc/rtc-s35390a.c b/drivers/rtc/rtc-s35390a.c
index 84806ff763cf..aea52548571e 100644
--- a/drivers/rtc/rtc-s35390a.c
+++ b/drivers/rtc/rtc-s35390a.c
@@ -214,6 +214,9 @@ static int s35390a_rtc_set_time(struct device *dev, struct rtc_time *tm)
int i, err;
char buf[7], status;
+ if (tm->tm_year < 100 || tm->tm_year > 199)
+ return EINVAL;
+
dev_dbg(&client->dev, "%s: tm is secs=%d, mins=%d, hours=%d mday=%d, "
"mon=%d, year=%d, wday=%d\n", __func__, tm->tm_sec,
tm->tm_min, tm->tm_hour, tm->tm_mday, tm->tm_mon, tm->tm_year,
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
/dev/mem: Bail out upon SIGKILL.
to my char-misc git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git
in the char-misc-testing branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will be merged to the char-misc-next branch sometime soon,
after it passes testing, and the merge window is open.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 8619e5bdeee8b2c685d686281f2d2a6017c4bc15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2019 22:13:25 +0900
Subject: /dev/mem: Bail out upon SIGKILL.
syzbot found that a thread can stall for minutes inside read_mem() or
write_mem() after that thread was killed by SIGKILL [1]. Reading from
iomem areas of /dev/mem can be slow, depending on the hardware.
While reading 2GB at one read() is legal, delaying termination of killed
thread for minutes is bad. Thus, allow reading/writing /dev/mem and
/dev/kmem to be preemptible and killable.
[ 1335.912419][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134565632
[ 1335.943194][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134561536
[ 1335.978280][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134557440
[ 1336.011147][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134553344
[ 1336.041897][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134549248
Theoretically, reading/writing /dev/mem and /dev/kmem can become
"interruptible". But this patch chose "killable". Future patch will make
them "interruptible" so that we can revert to "killable" if some program
regressed.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a0e3436829698d5824231251fad9d8e998f94f…
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+8ab2d0f39fb79fe6ca40(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1566825205-10703-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@…
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/char/mem.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index b08dc50f9f26..9eb564c002f6 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -97,6 +97,13 @@ void __weak unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
}
#endif
+static inline bool should_stop_iteration(void)
+{
+ if (need_resched())
+ cond_resched();
+ return fatal_signal_pending(current);
+}
+
/*
* This funcion reads the *physical* memory. The f_pos points directly to the
* memory location.
@@ -175,6 +182,8 @@ static ssize_t read_mem(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
p += sz;
count -= sz;
read += sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration())
+ break;
}
kfree(bounce);
@@ -251,6 +260,8 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
p += sz;
count -= sz;
written += sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration())
+ break;
}
*ppos += written;
@@ -468,6 +479,10 @@ static ssize_t read_kmem(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
read += sz;
low_count -= sz;
count -= sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration()) {
+ count = 0;
+ break;
+ }
}
}
@@ -492,6 +507,8 @@ static ssize_t read_kmem(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
buf += sz;
read += sz;
p += sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration())
+ break;
}
free_page((unsigned long)kbuf);
}
@@ -544,6 +561,8 @@ static ssize_t do_write_kmem(unsigned long p, const char __user *buf,
p += sz;
count -= sz;
written += sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration())
+ break;
}
*ppos += written;
@@ -595,6 +614,8 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
buf += sz;
virtr += sz;
p += sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration())
+ break;
}
free_page((unsigned long)kbuf);
}
--
2.23.0
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
firmware: google: check if size is valid when decoding VPD data
to my char-misc git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git
in the char-misc-testing branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will be merged to the char-misc-next branch sometime soon,
after it passes testing, and the merge window is open.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 4b708b7b1a2c09fbdfff6b942ebe3a160213aacd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hung-Te Lin <hungte(a)chromium.org>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 10:23:58 +0800
Subject: firmware: google: check if size is valid when decoding VPD data
The VPD implementation from Chromium Vital Product Data project used to
parse data from untrusted input without checking if the meta data is
invalid or corrupted. For example, the size from decoded content may
be negative value, or larger than whole input buffer. Such invalid data
may cause buffer overflow.
To fix that, the size parameters passed to vpd_decode functions should
be changed to unsigned integer (u32) type, and the parsing of entry
header should be refactored so every size field is correctly verified
before starting to decode.
Fixes: ad2ac9d5c5e0 ("firmware: Google VPD: import lib_vpd source files")
Signed-off-by: Hung-Te Lin <hungte(a)chromium.org>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd(a)chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830022402.214442-1-hungte@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c | 4 +-
drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++------------
drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.h | 6 +--
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c
index 0739f3b70347..db0812263d46 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c
@@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ static int vpd_section_check_key_name(const u8 *key, s32 key_len)
return VPD_OK;
}
-static int vpd_section_attrib_add(const u8 *key, s32 key_len,
- const u8 *value, s32 value_len,
+static int vpd_section_attrib_add(const u8 *key, u32 key_len,
+ const u8 *value, u32 value_len,
void *arg)
{
int ret;
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.c b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.c
index 92e3258552fc..dda525c0f968 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.c
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
#include "vpd_decode.h"
-static int vpd_decode_len(const s32 max_len, const u8 *in,
- s32 *length, s32 *decoded_len)
+static int vpd_decode_len(const u32 max_len, const u8 *in,
+ u32 *length, u32 *decoded_len)
{
u8 more;
int i = 0;
@@ -30,18 +30,39 @@ static int vpd_decode_len(const s32 max_len, const u8 *in,
} while (more);
*decoded_len = i;
+ return VPD_OK;
+}
+
+static int vpd_decode_entry(const u32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf,
+ u32 *_consumed, const u8 **entry, u32 *entry_len)
+{
+ u32 decoded_len;
+ u32 consumed = *_consumed;
+
+ if (vpd_decode_len(max_len - consumed, &input_buf[consumed],
+ entry_len, &decoded_len) != VPD_OK)
+ return VPD_FAIL;
+ if (max_len - consumed < decoded_len)
+ return VPD_FAIL;
+
+ consumed += decoded_len;
+ *entry = input_buf + consumed;
+
+ /* entry_len is untrusted data and must be checked again. */
+ if (max_len - consumed < *entry_len)
+ return VPD_FAIL;
+ consumed += decoded_len;
+ *_consumed = consumed;
return VPD_OK;
}
-int vpd_decode_string(const s32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf, s32 *consumed,
+int vpd_decode_string(const u32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf, u32 *consumed,
vpd_decode_callback callback, void *callback_arg)
{
int type;
- int res;
- s32 key_len;
- s32 value_len;
- s32 decoded_len;
+ u32 key_len;
+ u32 value_len;
const u8 *key;
const u8 *value;
@@ -56,26 +77,14 @@ int vpd_decode_string(const s32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf, s32 *consumed,
case VPD_TYPE_STRING:
(*consumed)++;
- /* key */
- res = vpd_decode_len(max_len - *consumed, &input_buf[*consumed],
- &key_len, &decoded_len);
- if (res != VPD_OK || *consumed + decoded_len >= max_len)
+ if (vpd_decode_entry(max_len, input_buf, consumed, &key,
+ &key_len) != VPD_OK)
return VPD_FAIL;
- *consumed += decoded_len;
- key = &input_buf[*consumed];
- *consumed += key_len;
-
- /* value */
- res = vpd_decode_len(max_len - *consumed, &input_buf[*consumed],
- &value_len, &decoded_len);
- if (res != VPD_OK || *consumed + decoded_len > max_len)
+ if (vpd_decode_entry(max_len, input_buf, consumed, &value,
+ &value_len) != VPD_OK)
return VPD_FAIL;
- *consumed += decoded_len;
- value = &input_buf[*consumed];
- *consumed += value_len;
-
if (type == VPD_TYPE_STRING)
return callback(key, key_len, value, value_len,
callback_arg);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.h b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.h
index cf8c2ace155a..8dbe41cac599 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.h
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ enum {
};
/* Callback for vpd_decode_string to invoke. */
-typedef int vpd_decode_callback(const u8 *key, s32 key_len,
- const u8 *value, s32 value_len,
+typedef int vpd_decode_callback(const u8 *key, u32 key_len,
+ const u8 *value, u32 value_len,
void *arg);
/*
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ typedef int vpd_decode_callback(const u8 *key, s32 key_len,
* If one entry is successfully decoded, sends it to callback and returns the
* result.
*/
-int vpd_decode_string(const s32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf, s32 *consumed,
+int vpd_decode_string(const u32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf, u32 *consumed,
vpd_decode_callback callback, void *callback_arg);
#endif /* __VPD_DECODE_H */
--
2.23.0
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
firmware: google: check if size is valid when decoding VPD data
to my char-misc git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git
in the char-misc-testing branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will be merged to the char-misc-next branch sometime soon,
after it passes testing, and the merge window is open.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From d616b75cb793a0707345ccf4c6f239b6d16e1e5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hung-Te Lin <hungte(a)chromium.org>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 10:23:58 +0800
Subject: firmware: google: check if size is valid when decoding VPD data
The VPD implementation from Chromium Vital Product Data project used to
parse data from untrusted input without checking if the meta data is
invalid or corrupted. For example, the size from decoded content may
be negative value, or larger than whole input buffer. Such invalid data
may cause buffer overflow.
To fix that, the size parameters passed to vpd_decode functions should
be changed to unsigned integer (u32) type, and the parsing of entry
header should be refactored so every size field is correctly verified
before starting to decode.
Fixes: ad2ac9d5c5e0 ("firmware: Google VPD: import lib_vpd source files")
Signed-off-by: Hung-Te Lin <hungte(a)chromium.org>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd(a)chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830022402.214442-1-hungte@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c | 4 +-
drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++------------
drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.h | 6 +--
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c
index 0739f3b70347..db0812263d46 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c
@@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ static int vpd_section_check_key_name(const u8 *key, s32 key_len)
return VPD_OK;
}
-static int vpd_section_attrib_add(const u8 *key, s32 key_len,
- const u8 *value, s32 value_len,
+static int vpd_section_attrib_add(const u8 *key, u32 key_len,
+ const u8 *value, u32 value_len,
void *arg)
{
int ret;
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.c b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.c
index 92e3258552fc..dda525c0f968 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.c
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
#include "vpd_decode.h"
-static int vpd_decode_len(const s32 max_len, const u8 *in,
- s32 *length, s32 *decoded_len)
+static int vpd_decode_len(const u32 max_len, const u8 *in,
+ u32 *length, u32 *decoded_len)
{
u8 more;
int i = 0;
@@ -30,18 +30,39 @@ static int vpd_decode_len(const s32 max_len, const u8 *in,
} while (more);
*decoded_len = i;
+ return VPD_OK;
+}
+
+static int vpd_decode_entry(const u32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf,
+ u32 *_consumed, const u8 **entry, u32 *entry_len)
+{
+ u32 decoded_len;
+ u32 consumed = *_consumed;
+
+ if (vpd_decode_len(max_len - consumed, &input_buf[consumed],
+ entry_len, &decoded_len) != VPD_OK)
+ return VPD_FAIL;
+ if (max_len - consumed < decoded_len)
+ return VPD_FAIL;
+
+ consumed += decoded_len;
+ *entry = input_buf + consumed;
+
+ /* entry_len is untrusted data and must be checked again. */
+ if (max_len - consumed < *entry_len)
+ return VPD_FAIL;
+ consumed += decoded_len;
+ *_consumed = consumed;
return VPD_OK;
}
-int vpd_decode_string(const s32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf, s32 *consumed,
+int vpd_decode_string(const u32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf, u32 *consumed,
vpd_decode_callback callback, void *callback_arg)
{
int type;
- int res;
- s32 key_len;
- s32 value_len;
- s32 decoded_len;
+ u32 key_len;
+ u32 value_len;
const u8 *key;
const u8 *value;
@@ -56,26 +77,14 @@ int vpd_decode_string(const s32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf, s32 *consumed,
case VPD_TYPE_STRING:
(*consumed)++;
- /* key */
- res = vpd_decode_len(max_len - *consumed, &input_buf[*consumed],
- &key_len, &decoded_len);
- if (res != VPD_OK || *consumed + decoded_len >= max_len)
+ if (vpd_decode_entry(max_len, input_buf, consumed, &key,
+ &key_len) != VPD_OK)
return VPD_FAIL;
- *consumed += decoded_len;
- key = &input_buf[*consumed];
- *consumed += key_len;
-
- /* value */
- res = vpd_decode_len(max_len - *consumed, &input_buf[*consumed],
- &value_len, &decoded_len);
- if (res != VPD_OK || *consumed + decoded_len > max_len)
+ if (vpd_decode_entry(max_len, input_buf, consumed, &value,
+ &value_len) != VPD_OK)
return VPD_FAIL;
- *consumed += decoded_len;
- value = &input_buf[*consumed];
- *consumed += value_len;
-
if (type == VPD_TYPE_STRING)
return callback(key, key_len, value, value_len,
callback_arg);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.h b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.h
index cf8c2ace155a..8dbe41cac599 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.h
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ enum {
};
/* Callback for vpd_decode_string to invoke. */
-typedef int vpd_decode_callback(const u8 *key, s32 key_len,
- const u8 *value, s32 value_len,
+typedef int vpd_decode_callback(const u8 *key, u32 key_len,
+ const u8 *value, u32 value_len,
void *arg);
/*
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ typedef int vpd_decode_callback(const u8 *key, s32 key_len,
* If one entry is successfully decoded, sends it to callback and returns the
* result.
*/
-int vpd_decode_string(const s32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf, s32 *consumed,
+int vpd_decode_string(const u32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf, u32 *consumed,
vpd_decode_callback callback, void *callback_arg);
#endif /* __VPD_DECODE_H */
--
2.23.0
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
/dev/mem: Bail out upon SIGKILL.
to my char-misc git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git
in the char-misc-testing branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will be merged to the char-misc-next branch sometime soon,
after it passes testing, and the merge window is open.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From e1b19733d5a9e0aed3f5594a51b21601b4618578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2019 22:13:25 +0900
Subject: /dev/mem: Bail out upon SIGKILL.
syzbot found that a thread can stall for minutes inside read_mem() or
write_mem() after that thread was killed by SIGKILL [1]. Reading from
iomem areas of /dev/mem can be slow, depending on the hardware.
While reading 2GB at one read() is legal, delaying termination of killed
thread for minutes is bad. Thus, allow reading/writing /dev/mem and
/dev/kmem to be preemptible and killable.
[ 1335.912419][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134565632
[ 1335.943194][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134561536
[ 1335.978280][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134557440
[ 1336.011147][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134553344
[ 1336.041897][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134549248
Theoretically, reading/writing /dev/mem and /dev/kmem can become
"interruptible". But this patch chose "killable". Future patch will make
them "interruptible" so that we can revert to "killable" if some program
regressed.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a0e3436829698d5824231251fad9d8e998f94f…
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+8ab2d0f39fb79fe6ca40(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1566825205-10703-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@…
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/char/mem.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index b08dc50f9f26..9eb564c002f6 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -97,6 +97,13 @@ void __weak unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
}
#endif
+static inline bool should_stop_iteration(void)
+{
+ if (need_resched())
+ cond_resched();
+ return fatal_signal_pending(current);
+}
+
/*
* This funcion reads the *physical* memory. The f_pos points directly to the
* memory location.
@@ -175,6 +182,8 @@ static ssize_t read_mem(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
p += sz;
count -= sz;
read += sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration())
+ break;
}
kfree(bounce);
@@ -251,6 +260,8 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
p += sz;
count -= sz;
written += sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration())
+ break;
}
*ppos += written;
@@ -468,6 +479,10 @@ static ssize_t read_kmem(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
read += sz;
low_count -= sz;
count -= sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration()) {
+ count = 0;
+ break;
+ }
}
}
@@ -492,6 +507,8 @@ static ssize_t read_kmem(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
buf += sz;
read += sz;
p += sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration())
+ break;
}
free_page((unsigned long)kbuf);
}
@@ -544,6 +561,8 @@ static ssize_t do_write_kmem(unsigned long p, const char __user *buf,
p += sz;
count -= sz;
written += sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration())
+ break;
}
*ppos += written;
@@ -595,6 +614,8 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
buf += sz;
virtr += sz;
p += sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration())
+ break;
}
free_page((unsigned long)kbuf);
}
--
2.23.0
This bit was fliped on for "syncing dependencies between camera and
graphics". BSpec has no recollection why, and it is causing
unrecoverable GPU hangs with Vulkan compute workloads.
>From BSpec, setting bit5 to 0 enables relaxed padding requiremets for
buffers, 1D and 2D non-array, non-MSAA, non-mip-mapped linear surfaces;
and *must* be set to 0h on skl+ to ensure "Out of Bounds" case is
suppressed.
Reported-by: Jason Ekstrand <jason(a)jlekstrand.net>
Suggested-by: Jason Ekstrand <jason(a)jlekstrand.net>
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=110998
Fixes: 8424171e135c ("drm/i915/gen9: h/w w/a: syncing dependencies between camera and graphics")
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk>
Tested-by: denys.kostin(a)globallogic.com
Cc: Jason Ekstrand <jason(a)jlekstrand.net>
Cc: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.1+
---
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_workarounds.c | 5 -----
1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_workarounds.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_workarounds.c
index 8639fcccdb42..243d3f77be13 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_workarounds.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_workarounds.c
@@ -297,11 +297,6 @@ static void gen9_ctx_workarounds_init(struct intel_engine_cs *engine,
FLOW_CONTROL_ENABLE |
PARTIAL_INSTRUCTION_SHOOTDOWN_DISABLE);
- /* Syncing dependencies between camera and graphics:skl,bxt,kbl */
- if (!IS_COFFEELAKE(i915))
- WA_SET_BIT_MASKED(HALF_SLICE_CHICKEN3,
- GEN9_DISABLE_OCL_OOB_SUPPRESS_LOGIC);
-
/* WaEnableYV12BugFixInHalfSliceChicken7:skl,bxt,kbl,glk,cfl */
/* WaEnableSamplerGPGPUPreemptionSupport:skl,bxt,kbl,cfl */
WA_SET_BIT_MASKED(GEN9_HALF_SLICE_CHICKEN7,
--
2.23.0
The patch below does not apply to the 5.2-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From b9500577d361522a3d9f14da8cf41dc1d824904e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho(a)intel.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2019 20:17:32 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] iwlwifi: pcie: handle switching killer Qu B0 NICs to C0
We need to use a different firmware for C0 versions of killer Qu NICs.
Add structures for them and handle them in the if block that detects
C0 revisions.
Additionally, instead of having an inclusive check for QnJ devices,
make the selection exclusive, so that switching to QnJ is the
exception, not the default. This prevents us from having to add all
the non-QnJ cards to an exclusion list. To do so, only go into the
QnJ block if the device has an RF ID type HR and HW revision QnJ.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.2
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho(a)intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190821171732.2266-1-luca@coelho.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com>
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/cfg/22000.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/cfg/22000.c
index 1f500cddb3a7..55b713255b8e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/cfg/22000.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/cfg/22000.c
@@ -556,6 +556,30 @@ const struct iwl_cfg killer1650i_2ax_cfg_qu_b0_hr_b0 = {
.max_tx_agg_size = IEEE80211_MAX_AMPDU_BUF_HT,
};
+const struct iwl_cfg killer1650s_2ax_cfg_qu_c0_hr_b0 = {
+ .name = "Killer(R) Wi-Fi 6 AX1650i 160MHz Wireless Network Adapter (201NGW)",
+ .fw_name_pre = IWL_QU_C_HR_B_FW_PRE,
+ IWL_DEVICE_22500,
+ /*
+ * This device doesn't support receiving BlockAck with a large bitmap
+ * so we need to restrict the size of transmitted aggregation to the
+ * HT size; mac80211 would otherwise pick the HE max (256) by default.
+ */
+ .max_tx_agg_size = IEEE80211_MAX_AMPDU_BUF_HT,
+};
+
+const struct iwl_cfg killer1650i_2ax_cfg_qu_c0_hr_b0 = {
+ .name = "Killer(R) Wi-Fi 6 AX1650s 160MHz Wireless Network Adapter (201D2W)",
+ .fw_name_pre = IWL_QU_C_HR_B_FW_PRE,
+ IWL_DEVICE_22500,
+ /*
+ * This device doesn't support receiving BlockAck with a large bitmap
+ * so we need to restrict the size of transmitted aggregation to the
+ * HT size; mac80211 would otherwise pick the HE max (256) by default.
+ */
+ .max_tx_agg_size = IEEE80211_MAX_AMPDU_BUF_HT,
+};
+
const struct iwl_cfg iwl22000_2ax_cfg_jf = {
.name = "Intel(R) Dual Band Wireless AX 22000",
.fw_name_pre = IWL_QU_B_JF_B_FW_PRE,
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/iwl-config.h b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/iwl-config.h
index 1c1bf1b281cd..6c04f8223aff 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/iwl-config.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/iwl-config.h
@@ -577,6 +577,8 @@ extern const struct iwl_cfg iwl_ax1650i_cfg_quz_hr;
extern const struct iwl_cfg iwl_ax1650s_cfg_quz_hr;
extern const struct iwl_cfg killer1650s_2ax_cfg_qu_b0_hr_b0;
extern const struct iwl_cfg killer1650i_2ax_cfg_qu_b0_hr_b0;
+extern const struct iwl_cfg killer1650s_2ax_cfg_qu_c0_hr_b0;
+extern const struct iwl_cfg killer1650i_2ax_cfg_qu_c0_hr_b0;
extern const struct iwl_cfg killer1650x_2ax_cfg;
extern const struct iwl_cfg killer1650w_2ax_cfg;
extern const struct iwl_cfg iwl9461_2ac_cfg_qu_b0_jf_b0;
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/drv.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/drv.c
index 7c5aaeaf7fe5..d9ed53b7c768 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/drv.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/drv.c
@@ -1062,6 +1062,10 @@ static int iwl_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
iwl_trans->cfg = &iwl9560_2ac_cfg_qu_c0_jf_b0;
else if (iwl_trans->cfg == &iwl9560_2ac_160_cfg_qu_b0_jf_b0)
iwl_trans->cfg = &iwl9560_2ac_160_cfg_qu_c0_jf_b0;
+ else if (iwl_trans->cfg == &killer1650s_2ax_cfg_qu_b0_hr_b0)
+ iwl_trans->cfg = &killer1650s_2ax_cfg_qu_c0_hr_b0;
+ else if (iwl_trans->cfg == &killer1650i_2ax_cfg_qu_b0_hr_b0)
+ iwl_trans->cfg = &killer1650i_2ax_cfg_qu_c0_hr_b0;
}
/* same thing for QuZ... */
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/trans.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/trans.c
index 935e35dafce5..db62c8314603 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/trans.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/trans.c
@@ -3602,12 +3602,7 @@ struct iwl_trans *iwl_trans_pcie_alloc(struct pci_dev *pdev,
}
} else if (CSR_HW_RF_ID_TYPE_CHIP_ID(trans->hw_rf_id) ==
CSR_HW_RF_ID_TYPE_CHIP_ID(CSR_HW_RF_ID_TYPE_HR) &&
- ((trans->cfg != &iwl_ax200_cfg_cc &&
- trans->cfg != &iwl_ax201_cfg_qu_hr &&
- trans->cfg != &killer1650x_2ax_cfg &&
- trans->cfg != &killer1650w_2ax_cfg &&
- trans->cfg != &iwl_ax201_cfg_quz_hr) ||
- trans->hw_rev == CSR_HW_REV_TYPE_QNJ_B0)) {
+ trans->hw_rev == CSR_HW_REV_TYPE_QNJ_B0) {
u32 hw_status;
hw_status = iwl_read_prph(trans, UMAG_GEN_HW_STATUS);