July 2019 - Linux-stable-mirror

[patch 002/147] mm/nvdimm: add is_ioremap_addr and use that to check ioremap address

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

From: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar(a)linux.ibm.com> Subject: mm/nvdimm: add is_ioremap_addr and use that to check ioremap address Architectures like powerpc use different address range to map ioremap and vmalloc range. The memunmap() check used by the nvdimm layer was wrongly using is_vmalloc_addr() to check for ioremap range which fails for ppc64. This result in ppc64 not freeing the ioremap mapping. The side effect of this is an unbind failure during module unload with papr_scm nvdimm driver Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190701134038.14165-1-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar(a)linux.ibm.com> Fixes: b5beae5e224f ("powerpc/pseries: Add driver for PAPR SCM regions") Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/pgtable.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ include/linux/mm.h | 5 +++++ kernel/iomem.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pgtable.h~mm-nvdimm-add-is_ioremap_addr-and-use-that-to-check-ioremap-address +++ a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -140,6 +140,20 @@ static inline void pte_frag_set(mm_conte } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 +#define is_ioremap_addr is_ioremap_addr +static inline bool is_ioremap_addr(const void *x) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)x; + + return addr >= IOREMAP_BASE && addr < IOREMAP_END; +#else + return false; +#endif +} +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64 */ + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_PGTABLE_H */ --- a/include/linux/mm.h~mm-nvdimm-add-is_ioremap_addr-and-use-that-to-check-ioremap-address +++ a/include/linux/mm.h @@ -633,6 +633,11 @@ static inline bool is_vmalloc_addr(const return false; #endif } + +#ifndef is_ioremap_addr +#define is_ioremap_addr(x) is_vmalloc_addr(x) +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_MMU extern int is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(const void *x); #else --- a/kernel/iomem.c~mm-nvdimm-add-is_ioremap_addr-and-use-that-to-check-ioremap-address +++ a/kernel/iomem.c @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(memremap); void memunmap(void *addr) { - if (is_vmalloc_addr(addr)) + if (is_ioremap_addr(addr)) iounmap((void __iomem *) addr); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(memunmap); _

5 years, 6 months

1
0
0 0

[patch 001/147] mm: vmscan: scan anonymous pages on file refaults

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

From: Kuo-Hsin Yang <vovoy(a)chromium.org> Subject: mm: vmscan: scan anonymous pages on file refaults When file refaults are detected and there are many inactive file pages, the system never reclaim anonymous pages, the file pages are dropped aggressively when there are still a lot of cold anonymous pages and system thrashes. This issue impacts the performance of applications with large executable, e.g. chrome. With this patch, when file refault is detected, inactive_list_is_low() always returns true for file pages in get_scan_count() to enable scanning anonymous pages. The problem can be reproduced by the following test program. ---8<--- void fallocate_file(const char *filename, off_t size) { struct stat st; int fd; if (!stat(filename, &st) && st.st_size >= size) return; fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600); if (fd < 0) { perror("create file"); exit(1); } if (posix_fallocate(fd, 0, size)) { perror("fallocate"); exit(1); } close(fd); } long *alloc_anon(long size) { long *start = malloc(size); memset(start, 1, size); return start; } long access_file(const char *filename, long size, long rounds) { int fd, i; volatile char *start1, *end1, *start2; const int page_size = getpagesize(); long sum = 0; fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); if (fd == -1) { perror("open"); exit(1); } /* * Some applications, e.g. chrome, use a lot of executable file * pages, map some of the pages with PROT_EXEC flag to simulate * the behavior. */ start1 = mmap(NULL, size / 2, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); if (start1 == MAP_FAILED) { perror("mmap"); exit(1); } end1 = start1 + size / 2; start2 = mmap(NULL, size / 2, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, size / 2); if (start2 == MAP_FAILED) { perror("mmap"); exit(1); } for (i = 0; i < rounds; ++i) { struct timeval before, after; volatile char *ptr1 = start1, *ptr2 = start2; gettimeofday(&before, NULL); for (; ptr1 < end1; ptr1 += page_size, ptr2 += page_size) sum += *ptr1 + *ptr2; gettimeofday(&after, NULL); printf("File access time, round %d: %f (sec) ", i, (after.tv_sec - before.tv_sec) + (after.tv_usec - before.tv_usec) / 1000000.0); } return sum; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { const long MB = 1024 * 1024; long anon_mb, file_mb, file_rounds; const char filename[] = "large"; long *ret1; long ret2; if (argc != 4) { printf("usage: thrash ANON_MB FILE_MB FILE_ROUNDS "); exit(0); } anon_mb = atoi(argv[1]); file_mb = atoi(argv[2]); file_rounds = atoi(argv[3]); fallocate_file(filename, file_mb * MB); printf("Allocate %ld MB anonymous pages ", anon_mb); ret1 = alloc_anon(anon_mb * MB); printf("Access %ld MB file pages ", file_mb); ret2 = access_file(filename, file_mb * MB, file_rounds); printf("Print result to prevent optimization: %ld ", *ret1 + ret2); return 0; } ---8<--- Running the test program on 2GB RAM VM with kernel 5.2.0-rc5, the program fills ram with 2048 MB memory, access a 200 MB file for 10 times. Without this patch, the file cache is dropped aggresively and every access to the file is from disk. $ ./thrash 2048 200 10 Allocate 2048 MB anonymous pages Access 200 MB file pages File access time, round 0: 2.489316 (sec) File access time, round 1: 2.581277 (sec) File access time, round 2: 2.487624 (sec) File access time, round 3: 2.449100 (sec) File access time, round 4: 2.420423 (sec) File access time, round 5: 2.343411 (sec) File access time, round 6: 2.454833 (sec) File access time, round 7: 2.483398 (sec) File access time, round 8: 2.572701 (sec) File access time, round 9: 2.493014 (sec) With this patch, these file pages can be cached. $ ./thrash 2048 200 10 Allocate 2048 MB anonymous pages Access 200 MB file pages File access time, round 0: 2.475189 (sec) File access time, round 1: 2.440777 (sec) File access time, round 2: 2.411671 (sec) File access time, round 3: 1.955267 (sec) File access time, round 4: 0.029924 (sec) File access time, round 5: 0.000808 (sec) File access time, round 6: 0.000771 (sec) File access time, round 7: 0.000746 (sec) File access time, round 8: 0.000738 (sec) File access time, round 9: 0.000747 (sec) Checked the swap out stats during the test [1], 19006 pages swapped out with this patch, 3418 pages swapped out without this patch. There are more swap out, but I think it's within reasonable range when file backed data set doesn't fit into the memory. $ ./thrash 2000 100 2100 5 1 # ANON_MB FILE_EXEC FILE_NOEXEC ROUNDS PROCESSES Allocate 2000 MB anonymous pages active_anon: 1613644, inactive_anon: 348656, active_file: 892, inactive_file: 1384 (kB) pswpout: 7972443, pgpgin: 478615246 Access 100 MB executable file pages Access 2100 MB regular file pages File access time, round 0: 12.165, (sec) active_anon: 1433788, inactive_anon: 478116, active_file: 17896, inactive_file: 24328 (kB) File access time, round 1: 11.493, (sec) active_anon: 1430576, inactive_anon: 477144, active_file: 25440, inactive_file: 26172 (kB) File access time, round 2: 11.455, (sec) active_anon: 1427436, inactive_anon: 476060, active_file: 21112, inactive_file: 28808 (kB) File access time, round 3: 11.454, (sec) active_anon: 1420444, inactive_anon: 473632, active_file: 23216, inactive_file: 35036 (kB) File access time, round 4: 11.479, (sec) active_anon: 1413964, inactive_anon: 471460, active_file: 31728, inactive_file: 32224 (kB) pswpout: 7991449 (+ 19006), pgpgin: 489924366 (+ 11309120) With 4 processes accessing non-overlapping parts of a large file, 30316 pages swapped out with this patch, 5152 pages swapped out without this patch. The swapout number is small comparing to pgpgin. [1]: https://github.com/vovo/testing/blob/master/mem_thrash.c Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190701081038.GA83398@google.com Fixes: e9868505987a ("mm,vmscan: only evict file pages when we have plenty") Fixes: 7c5bd705d8f9 ("mm: memcg: only evict file pages when we have plenty") Signed-off-by: Kuo-Hsin Yang <vovoy(a)chromium.org> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao(a)chromium.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman(a)techsingularity.net> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev(a)gmail.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan(a)kernel.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [4.12+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/vmscan.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/mm/vmscan.c~mm-vmscan-scan-anonymous-pages-on-file-refaults +++ a/mm/vmscan.c @@ -2125,7 +2125,7 @@ static void shrink_active_list(unsigned * 10TB 320 32GB */ static bool inactive_list_is_low(struct lruvec *lruvec, bool file, - struct scan_control *sc, bool actual_reclaim) + struct scan_control *sc, bool trace) { enum lru_list active_lru = file * LRU_FILE + LRU_ACTIVE; struct pglist_data *pgdat = lruvec_pgdat(lruvec); @@ -2151,7 +2151,7 @@ static bool inactive_list_is_low(struct * rid of the stale workingset quickly. */ refaults = lruvec_page_state_local(lruvec, WORKINGSET_ACTIVATE); - if (file && actual_reclaim && lruvec->refaults != refaults) { + if (file && lruvec->refaults != refaults) { inactive_ratio = 0; } else { gb = (inactive + active) >> (30 - PAGE_SHIFT); @@ -2161,7 +2161,7 @@ static bool inactive_list_is_low(struct inactive_ratio = 1; } - if (actual_reclaim) + if (trace) trace_mm_vmscan_inactive_list_is_low(pgdat->node_id, sc->reclaim_idx, lruvec_lru_size(lruvec, inactive_lru, MAX_NR_ZONES), inactive, lruvec_lru_size(lruvec, active_lru, MAX_NR_ZONES), active, _

5 years, 6 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tpm: Fix TPM 1.2 Shutdown sequence to prevent future TPM" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From db4d8cb9c9f2af71c4d087817160d866ed572cc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vadim Sukhomlinov <sukhomlinov(a)google.com> Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2019 15:01:18 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] tpm: Fix TPM 1.2 Shutdown sequence to prevent future TPM operations TPM 2.0 Shutdown involve sending TPM2_Shutdown to TPM chip and disabling future TPM operations. TPM 1.2 behavior was different, future TPM operations weren't disabled, causing rare issues. This patch ensures that future TPM operations are disabled. Fixes: d1bd4a792d39 ("tpm: Issue a TPM2_Shutdown for TPM2 devices.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vadim Sukhomlinov <sukhomlinov(a)google.com> [dianders: resolved merge conflicts with mainline] Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders(a)chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen(a)linux.intel.com> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 90325e1749fb..d47ad10a35fe 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -289,15 +289,15 @@ static int tpm_class_shutdown(struct device *dev) { struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(dev, struct tpm_chip, dev); + down_write(&chip->ops_sem); if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { - down_write(&chip->ops_sem); if (!tpm_chip_start(chip)) { tpm2_shutdown(chip, TPM2_SU_CLEAR); tpm_chip_stop(chip); } - chip->ops = NULL; - up_write(&chip->ops_sem); } + chip->ops = NULL; + up_write(&chip->ops_sem); return 0; }

5 years, 6 months

3
4
0 0

[PATCH 4.9] fscrypt: don't set policy for a dead directory

by Eric Biggers

From: Hongjie Fang <hongjiefang(a)asrmicro.com> commit 5858bdad4d0d0fc18bf29f34c3ac836e0b59441f upstream. [Please apply to 4.9-stable.] The directory may have been removed when entering fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(). If so, the empty_dir() check will return error for ext4 file system. ext4_rmdir() sets i_size = 0, then ext4_empty_dir() reports an error because 'inode->i_size < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(2)'. If the fs is mounted with errors=panic, it will trigger a panic issue. Add the check IS_DEADDIR() to fix this problem. Fixes: 9bd8212f981e ("ext4 crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.1+ Signed-off-by: Hongjie Fang <hongjiefang(a)asrmicro.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- fs/crypto/policy.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c index c160d2d0e18d77..57a97b38a2fa2c 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/policy.c +++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c @@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ int fscrypt_process_policy(struct file *filp, if (!inode_has_encryption_context(inode)) { if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) ret = -ENOTDIR; + else if (IS_DEADDIR(inode)) + ret = -ENOENT; else if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir) ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; else if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir(inode)) -- 2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog

5 years, 6 months

2
1
0 0

[PATCH 4.4] fscrypt: don't set policy for a dead directory

by Eric Biggers

From: Hongjie Fang <hongjiefang(a)asrmicro.com> commit 5858bdad4d0d0fc18bf29f34c3ac836e0b59441f upstream. [Please apply to 4.4-stable.] The directory may have been removed when entering fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(). If so, the empty_dir() check will return error for ext4 file system. ext4_rmdir() sets i_size = 0, then ext4_empty_dir() reports an error because 'inode->i_size < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(2)'. If the fs is mounted with errors=panic, it will trigger a panic issue. Add the check IS_DEADDIR() to fix this problem. Fixes: 9bd8212f981e ("ext4 crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.1+ Signed-off-by: Hongjie Fang <hongjiefang(a)asrmicro.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- fs/ext4/crypto_policy.c | 2 ++ fs/f2fs/crypto_policy.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/crypto_policy.c b/fs/ext4/crypto_policy.c index e4f4fc4e56abee..77bd7bfb632913 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/crypto_policy.c +++ b/fs/ext4/crypto_policy.c @@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ int ext4_process_policy(const struct ext4_encryption_policy *policy, if (!ext4_inode_has_encryption_context(inode)) { if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) return -EINVAL; + if (IS_DEADDIR(inode)) + return -ENOENT; if (!ext4_empty_dir(inode)) return -ENOTEMPTY; return ext4_create_encryption_context_from_policy(inode, diff --git a/fs/f2fs/crypto_policy.c b/fs/f2fs/crypto_policy.c index 884f3f0fe29d32..613ca32ec24887 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/crypto_policy.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/crypto_policy.c @@ -99,6 +99,8 @@ int f2fs_process_policy(const struct f2fs_encryption_policy *policy, return -EINVAL; if (!f2fs_inode_has_encryption_context(inode)) { + if (IS_DEADDIR(inode)) + return -ENOENT; if (!f2fs_empty_dir(inode)) return -ENOTEMPTY; return f2fs_create_encryption_context_from_policy(inode, -- 2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog

5 years, 6 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH v3 2/6] coresight: etm4x: use explicit barriers on enable/disable

by Andrew Murray

Synchronization is recommended before disabling the trace registers to prevent any start or stop points being speculative at the point of disabling the unit (section 7.3.77 of ARM IHI 0064D). Synchronization is also recommended after programming the trace registers to ensure all updates are committed prior to normal code resuming (section 4.3.7 of ARM IHI 0064D). Let's ensure these syncronization points are present in the code and clearly commented. Note that we could rely on the barriers in CS_LOCK and coresight_disclaim_device_unlocked or the context switch to user space - however coresight may be of use in the kernel. On armv8 the mb macro is defined as dsb(sy) - Given that the etm4x is only used on armv8 let's directly use dsb(sy) instead of mb(). This removes some ambiguity and makes it easier to correlate the code with the TRM. Signed-off-by: Andrew Murray <andrew.murray(a)arm.com> Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose(a)arm.com> CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x.c index c89190d464ab..3825a39e9a49 100644 --- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x.c +++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x.c @@ -188,6 +188,13 @@ static int etm4_enable_hw(struct etmv4_drvdata *drvdata) dev_err(etm_dev, "timeout while waiting for Idle Trace Status\n"); + /* + * As recommended by section 4.3.7 ("Synchronization when using the + * memory-mapped interface") of ARM IHI 0064D + */ + dsb(sy); + isb(); + done: CS_LOCK(drvdata->base); @@ -453,8 +460,12 @@ static void etm4_disable_hw(void *info) /* EN, bit[0] Trace unit enable bit */ control &= ~0x1; - /* make sure everything completes before disabling */ - mb(); + /* + * Make sure everything completes before disabling, as recommended + * by section 7.3.77 ("TRCVICTLR, ViewInst Main Control Register, + * SSTATUS") of ARM IHI 0064D + */ + dsb(sy); isb(); writel_relaxed(control, drvdata->base + TRCPRGCTLR); -- 2.21.0

5 years, 6 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH v4.4 00/45] V4.4 backport of arm64 Spectre patches

by Viresh Kumar

Hello, Here is an attempt to backport arm64 spectre patches to v4.4 stable tree. I have started this backport with Mark Rutland's backport of Spectre to 4.9 [1] and tried applying the upstream version of them over 4.4 and resolved conflicts by checking how they have been resolved in 4.9. I had to pick few extra upstream patches to avoid unnecessary conflicts (upstream commit ids mentioned): a842789837c0 arm64: remove duplicate macro __KERNEL__ check 64f8ebaf115b mm/kasan: add API to check memory regions bffe1baff5d5 arm64: kasan: instrument user memory access API 92406f0cc9e3 arm64: cpufeature: Add scope for capability check 9eb8a2cdf65c arm64: cputype info for Broadcom Vulcan 0d90718871fe arm64: cputype: Add MIDR values for Cavium ThunderX2 CPUs 98dd64f34f47 ARM: 8478/2: arm/arm64: add arm-smccc I had to drop few patches as well as they weren't getting applied properly due to missing files/features (upstream commit id mentioned): 93f339ef4175 arm64: cpufeature: __this_cpu_has_cap() shouldn't stop early 3c31fa5a06b4 arm64: Run enable method for errata work arounds on late CPUs 6840bdd73d07 arm64: KVM: Use per-CPU vector when BP hardening is enabled 90348689d500 arm64: KVM: Make PSCI_VERSION a fast path Since v4.4 doesn't contain arch/arm/kvm/hyp/switch.c file, changes for it are dropped from some of the patches. The commit log of specific patches are updated with this information. Also for commit id (from 4.9 stable): c24c205d2528 arm64: Add ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support I have dropped arch/arm64/crypto/sha256-core.S and sha512-core.S files as they weren't part of the upstream commit. Not sure why it was included by Mark as the commit log doesn't provide any reasoning for it. The patches in this series are pushed here [2]. This is only build/boot tested by me as I don't have access to the required test-suite which can verify spectre mitigations. @Julien: Can you please help reviewing / testing them ? Thanks. -- viresh [1] https://patches.linaro.org/cover/133195/ with top commit in 4.9 stable tree: a3b292fe0560 arm64: futex: Mask __user pointers prior to dereference [2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vireshk/linux.git stable/v4.4.y/spectre Andrey Ryabinin (1): mm/kasan: add API to check memory regions Catalin Marinas (1): arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro Jayachandran C (3): arm64: cputype info for Broadcom Vulcan arm64: cputype: Add MIDR values for Cavium ThunderX2 CPUs arm64: Branch predictor hardening for Cavium ThunderX2 Jens Wiklander (1): ARM: 8478/2: arm/arm64: add arm-smccc Laura Abbott (1): mm: Introduce lm_alias Marc Zyngier (14): arm64: Move post_ttbr_update_workaround to C code arm64: Move BP hardening to check_and_switch_context arm64: cpu_errata: Allow an erratum to be match for all revisions of a core arm64: KVM: Increment PC after handling an SMC trap arm/arm64: KVM: Add PSCI_VERSION helper arm/arm64: KVM: Add smccc accessors to PSCI code arm/arm64: KVM: Implement PSCI 1.0 support arm64: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling firmware/psci: Expose PSCI conduit firmware/psci: Expose SMCCC version through psci_ops arm/arm64: smccc: Make function identifiers an unsigned quantity arm/arm64: smccc: Implement SMCCC v1.1 inline primitive arm64: Add ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support arm64: Kill PSCI_GET_VERSION as a variant-2 workaround Mark Rutland (4): arm/arm64: KVM: Consolidate the PSCI include files arm/arm64: KVM: Advertise SMCCC v1.1 arm/arm64: KVM: Turn kvm_psci_version into a static inline arm64: KVM: Report SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Robin Murphy (3): arm64: Implement array_index_mask_nospec() arm64: Make USER_DS an inclusive limit arm64: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation Suzuki K Poulose (1): arm64: cpufeature: Add scope for capability check Will Deacon (13): arm64: barrier: Add CSDB macros to control data-value prediction arm64: entry: Ensure branch through syscall table is bounded under speculation arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit arm64: uaccess: Don't bother eliding access_ok checks in __{get, put}_user arm64: uaccess: Mask __user pointers for __arch_{clear, copy_*}_user arm64: cpufeature: Pass capability structure to ->enable callback drivers/firmware: Expose psci_get_version through psci_ops structure arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for high-priority synchronous exceptions arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0 arm64: cputype: Add missing MIDR values for Cortex-A72 and Cortex-A75 arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs arm64: futex: Mask __user pointers prior to dereference Yang Shi (1): arm64: kasan: instrument user memory access API Yury Norov (1): arm64: move TASK_* definitions to <asm/processor.h> zijun_hu (1): arm64: remove duplicate macro __KERNEL__ check MAINTAINERS | 14 ++ arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 6 + arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_psci.h | 27 --- arch/arm/kvm/arm.c | 2 +- arch/arm/kvm/handle_exit.c | 4 +- arch/arm/kvm/psci.c | 143 ++++++++++++--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 17 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 18 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h | 23 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 12 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 12 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h | 9 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 5 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_psci.h | 27 --- arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h | 15 -- arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 39 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 26 ++- arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 2 + arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 175 ++++++++++++------ arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 5 + arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c | 8 +- arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S | 75 ++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 185 ++++++++++++++++++- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 112 ++++++------ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 26 ++- arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c | 16 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp.S | 20 ++- arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S | 6 +- arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S | 4 +- arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S | 4 +- arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S | 4 +- arch/arm64/mm/context.c | 12 ++ arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 31 ++++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 12 +- drivers/firmware/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/firmware/psci.c | 58 +++++- include/kvm/arm_psci.h | 51 ++++++ include/linux/arm-smccc.h | 267 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/kasan-checks.h | 12 ++ include/linux/mm.h | 4 + include/linux/psci.h | 14 ++ include/uapi/linux/psci.h | 3 + mm/kasan/kasan.c | 12 ++ 43 files changed, 1270 insertions(+), 250 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_psci.h delete mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_psci.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S create mode 100644 include/kvm/arm_psci.h create mode 100644 include/linux/arm-smccc.h create mode 100644 include/linux/kasan-checks.h -- 2.21.0.rc0.269.g1a574e7a288b

5 years, 6 months

3
56
0 0

[git:media_tree/master] media: videodev2.h: change V4L2_PIX_FMT_BGRA444 define: fourcc was already in use

by Mauro Carvalho Chehab

This is an automatic generated email to let you know that the following patch were queued: Subject: media: videodev2.h: change V4L2_PIX_FMT_BGRA444 define: fourcc was already in use Author: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil(a)xs4all.nl> Date: Thu Jul 11 04:53:25 2019 -0400 The V4L2_PIX_FMT_BGRA444 define clashed with the pre-existing V4L2_PIX_FMT_SGRBG12 which strangely enough used the same fourcc, even though that fourcc made no sense for a Bayer format. In any case, you can't have duplicates, so change the fourcc of V4L2_PIX_FMT_BGRA444. Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco(a)xs4all.nl> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # for v5.2 and up Fixes: 6c84f9b1d2900 ("media: v4l: Add definitions for missing 16-bit RGB4444 formats") Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart(a)ideasonboard.com> Reviewed-by: Kieran Bingham <kieran.bingham+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung(a)kernel.org> include/uapi/linux/videodev2.h | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/videodev2.h b/include/uapi/linux/videodev2.h index 9d9705ceda76..2427bc4d8eba 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/videodev2.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/videodev2.h @@ -518,7 +518,13 @@ struct v4l2_pix_format { #define V4L2_PIX_FMT_RGBX444 v4l2_fourcc('R', 'X', '1', '2') /* 16 rrrrgggg bbbbxxxx */ #define V4L2_PIX_FMT_ABGR444 v4l2_fourcc('A', 'B', '1', '2') /* 16 aaaabbbb ggggrrrr */ #define V4L2_PIX_FMT_XBGR444 v4l2_fourcc('X', 'B', '1', '2') /* 16 xxxxbbbb ggggrrrr */ -#define V4L2_PIX_FMT_BGRA444 v4l2_fourcc('B', 'A', '1', '2') /* 16 bbbbgggg rrrraaaa */ + +/* + * Originally this had 'BA12' as fourcc, but this clashed with the older + * V4L2_PIX_FMT_SGRBG12 which inexplicably used that same fourcc. + * So use 'GA12' instead for V4L2_PIX_FMT_BGRA444. + */ +#define V4L2_PIX_FMT_BGRA444 v4l2_fourcc('G', 'A', '1', '2') /* 16 bbbbgggg rrrraaaa */ #define V4L2_PIX_FMT_BGRX444 v4l2_fourcc('B', 'X', '1', '2') /* 16 bbbbgggg rrrrxxxx */ #define V4L2_PIX_FMT_RGB555 v4l2_fourcc('R', 'G', 'B', 'O') /* 16 RGB-5-5-5 */ #define V4L2_PIX_FMT_ARGB555 v4l2_fourcc('A', 'R', '1', '5') /* 16 ARGB-1-5-5-5 */

5 years, 6 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] x86/mm, tracing: Fix CR2 corruption

by Steven Rostedt

[ added stable folks ] On Sun, 7 Jul 2019 11:17:09 -0700 Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> wrote: > On Sun, Jul 7, 2019 at 8:11 AM Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> wrote: > > > > FWIW, I'm leaning toward suggesting that we apply the trivial tracing > > fix and backport *that*. Then, in -tip, we could revert it and apply > > this patch instead. > > You don't have to have the same fix in stable as in -tip. > > It's fine to send something to stable that says "Fixed differently by > commit XYZ upstream". The main thing is to make sure that stable > doesn't have fixes that then get lost upstream (which we used to have > long long ago). > But isn't it easier for them to just pull the quick fix in, if it is in your tree? That is, it shouldn't be too hard to make the "quick fix" that gets backported on your tree (and probably better testing), and then add the proper fix on top of it. The stable folks will then just use the commit sha to know what to take, and feel more confident about taking it. -- Steve

5 years, 6 months

4
3
0 0

WTF: patch "[PATCH] ima: Make arch_policy_entry static" was seriously submitted to be applied to the 5.2-stable tree?

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below was submitted to be applied to the 5.2-stable tree. I fail to see how this patch meets the stable kernel rules as found at Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst. I could be totally wrong, and if so, please respond to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> and let me know why this patch should be applied. Otherwise, it is now dropped from my patch queues, never to be seen again. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 68f2529078f97dd4dc7f01bc4d495cf5f5814363 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YueHaibing <yuehaibing(a)huawei.com> Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 21:40:32 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] ima: Make arch_policy_entry static Fix sparse warning: security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:202:23: warning: symbol 'arch_policy_entry' was not declared. Should it be static? Fixes: 6191706246de ("ima: add support for arch specific policies") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing(a)huawei.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org (linux-5.0) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 1cc822a59054..cd1b7281244e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { }; /* An array of architecture specific rules */ -struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init; +static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init; static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules); static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);

5 years, 6 months

1
0
0 0

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Linux-stable-mirror July 2019