June 2019 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH 09/29] Revert "bcache: set CACHE_SET_IO_DISABLE in bch_cached_dev_error()"

by Coly Li

This reverts commit 6147305c73e4511ca1a975b766b97a779d442567. Although this patch helps the failed bcache device to stop faster when too many I/O errors detected on corresponding cached device, setting CACHE_SET_IO_DISABLE bit to cache set c->flags was not a good idea. This operation will disable all I/Os on cache set, which means other attached bcache devices won't work neither. Without this patch, the failed bcache device can also be stopped eventually if internal I/O accomplished (e.g. writeback). Therefore here I revert it. Fixes: 6147305c73e4 ("bcache: set CACHE_SET_IO_DISABLE in bch_cached_dev_error()") Reported-by: Yong Li <mr.liyong(a)qq.com> Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli(a)suse.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- drivers/md/bcache/super.c | 17 ----------------- 1 file changed, 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/super.c b/drivers/md/bcache/super.c index 1b63ac876169..eaaa046fd95d 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/super.c +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/super.c @@ -1437,8 +1437,6 @@ int bch_flash_dev_create(struct cache_set *c, uint64_t size) bool bch_cached_dev_error(struct cached_dev *dc) { - struct cache_set *c; - if (!dc || test_bit(BCACHE_DEV_CLOSING, &dc->disk.flags)) return false; @@ -1449,21 +1447,6 @@ bool bch_cached_dev_error(struct cached_dev *dc) pr_err("stop %s: too many IO errors on backing device %s\n", dc->disk.disk->disk_name, dc->backing_dev_name); - /* - * If the cached device is still attached to a cache set, - * even dc->io_disable is true and no more I/O requests - * accepted, cache device internal I/O (writeback scan or - * garbage collection) may still prevent bcache device from - * being stopped. So here CACHE_SET_IO_DISABLE should be - * set to c->flags too, to make the internal I/O to cache - * device rejected and stopped immediately. - * If c is NULL, that means the bcache device is not attached - * to any cache set, then no CACHE_SET_IO_DISABLE bit to set. - */ - c = dc->disk.c; - if (c && test_and_set_bit(CACHE_SET_IO_DISABLE, &c->flags)) - pr_info("CACHE_SET_IO_DISABLE already set"); - bcache_device_stop(&dc->disk); return true; } -- 2.16.4

5 years, 12 months

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[PATCH 02/29] bcache: Revert "bcache: free heap cache_set->flush_btree in bch_journal_free"

by Coly Li

This reverts commit 6268dc2c4703aabfb0b35681be709acf4c2826c6. This patch depends on commit c4dc2497d50d ("bcache: fix high CPU occupancy during journal") which is reverted in previous patch. So revert this one too. Fixes: 6268dc2c4703 ("bcache: free heap cache_set->flush_btree in bch_journal_free") Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli(a)suse.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Shenghui Wang <shhuiw(a)foxmail.com> --- drivers/md/bcache/journal.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/journal.c b/drivers/md/bcache/journal.c index 621ebf5c62a5..f18c1e7b012c 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/journal.c +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/journal.c @@ -839,7 +839,6 @@ void bch_journal_free(struct cache_set *c) free_pages((unsigned long) c->journal.w[1].data, JSET_BITS); free_pages((unsigned long) c->journal.w[0].data, JSET_BITS); free_fifo(&c->journal.pin); - free_heap(&c->flush_btree); } int bch_journal_alloc(struct cache_set *c) -- 2.16.4

5 years, 12 months

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[PATCH 01/29] bcache: Revert "bcache: fix high CPU occupancy during journal"

by Coly Li

This reverts commit c4dc2497d50d9c6fb16aa0d07b6a14f3b2adb1e0. This patch enlarges a race between normal btree flush code path and flush_btree_write(), which causes deadlock when journal space is exhausted. Reverts this patch makes the race window from 128 btree nodes to only 1 btree nodes. Fixes: c4dc2497d50d ("bcache: fix high CPU occupancy during journal") Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli(a)suse.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Tang Junhui <tang.junhui.linux(a)gmail.com> --- drivers/md/bcache/bcache.h | 2 -- drivers/md/bcache/journal.c | 47 +++++++++++++++------------------------------ drivers/md/bcache/util.h | 2 -- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/bcache.h b/drivers/md/bcache/bcache.h index fdf75352e16a..e30a983a68cd 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/bcache.h +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/bcache.h @@ -726,8 +726,6 @@ struct cache_set { #define BUCKET_HASH_BITS 12 struct hlist_head bucket_hash[1 << BUCKET_HASH_BITS]; - - DECLARE_HEAP(struct btree *, flush_btree); }; struct bbio { diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/journal.c b/drivers/md/bcache/journal.c index 12dae9348147..621ebf5c62a5 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/journal.c +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/journal.c @@ -391,12 +391,6 @@ int bch_journal_replay(struct cache_set *s, struct list_head *list) } /* Journalling */ -#define journal_max_cmp(l, r) \ - (fifo_idx(&c->journal.pin, btree_current_write(l)->journal) < \ - fifo_idx(&(c)->journal.pin, btree_current_write(r)->journal)) -#define journal_min_cmp(l, r) \ - (fifo_idx(&c->journal.pin, btree_current_write(l)->journal) > \ - fifo_idx(&(c)->journal.pin, btree_current_write(r)->journal)) static void btree_flush_write(struct cache_set *c) { @@ -404,35 +398,25 @@ static void btree_flush_write(struct cache_set *c) * Try to find the btree node with that references the oldest journal * entry, best is our current candidate and is locked if non NULL: */ - struct btree *b; - int i; + struct btree *b, *best; + unsigned int i; atomic_long_inc(&c->flush_write); - retry: - spin_lock(&c->journal.lock); - if (heap_empty(&c->flush_btree)) { - for_each_cached_btree(b, c, i) - if (btree_current_write(b)->journal) { - if (!heap_full(&c->flush_btree)) - heap_add(&c->flush_btree, b, - journal_max_cmp); - else if (journal_max_cmp(b, - heap_peek(&c->flush_btree))) { - c->flush_btree.data[0] = b; - heap_sift(&c->flush_btree, 0, - journal_max_cmp); - } + best = NULL; + + for_each_cached_btree(b, c, i) + if (btree_current_write(b)->journal) { + if (!best) + best = b; + else if (journal_pin_cmp(c, + btree_current_write(best)->journal, + btree_current_write(b)->journal)) { + best = b; } + } - for (i = c->flush_btree.used / 2 - 1; i >= 0; --i) - heap_sift(&c->flush_btree, i, journal_min_cmp); - } - - b = NULL; - heap_pop(&c->flush_btree, b, journal_min_cmp); - spin_unlock(&c->journal.lock); - + b = best; if (b) { mutex_lock(&b->write_lock); if (!btree_current_write(b)->journal) { @@ -870,8 +854,7 @@ int bch_journal_alloc(struct cache_set *c) j->w[0].c = c; j->w[1].c = c; - if (!(init_heap(&c->flush_btree, 128, GFP_KERNEL)) || - !(init_fifo(&j->pin, JOURNAL_PIN, GFP_KERNEL)) || + if (!(init_fifo(&j->pin, JOURNAL_PIN, GFP_KERNEL)) || !(j->w[0].data = (void *) __get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL, JSET_BITS)) || !(j->w[1].data = (void *) __get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL, JSET_BITS))) return -ENOMEM; diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/util.h b/drivers/md/bcache/util.h index 1fbced94e4cc..c029f7443190 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/util.h +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/util.h @@ -113,8 +113,6 @@ do { \ #define heap_full(h) ((h)->used == (h)->size) -#define heap_empty(h) ((h)->used == 0) - #define DECLARE_FIFO(type, name) \ struct { \ size_t front, back, size, mask; \ -- 2.16.4

5 years, 12 months

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[PATCH 4.14 00/81] 4.14.126-stable review

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.126 release. There are 81 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know. Responses should be made by Sat 15 Jun 2019 07:54:51 AM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late. The whole patch series can be found in one patch at: https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.126-r… or in the git tree and branch at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y and the diffstat can be found below. thanks, greg k-h ------------- Pseudo-Shortlog of commits: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Linux 4.14.126-rc1 Helen Koike <helen.koike(a)collabora.com> drm: don't block fb changes for async plane updates Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Revert "drm/nouveau: add kconfig option to turn off nouveau legacy contexts. (v3)" Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Revert "Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections" Dennis Zhou <dennis(a)kernel.org> percpu: do not search past bitmap when allocating an area Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov(a)gmail.com> gpio: vf610: Do not share irq_chip Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com> usb: typec: fusb302: Check vconn is off when we start toggling Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski(a)samsung.com> ARM: exynos: Fix undefined instruction during Exynos5422 resume Phong Hoang <phong.hoang.wz(a)renesas.com> pwm: Fix deadlock warning when removing PWM device Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk(a)kernel.org> ARM: dts: exynos: Always enable necessary APIO_1V8 and ABB_1V8 regulators on Arndale Octa Christoph Vogtländer <c.vogtlaender(a)sigma-surface-science.com> pwm: tiehrpwm: Update shadow register for disabling PWMs Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> dmaengine: idma64: Use actual device for DMA transfers Tony Lindgren <tony(a)atomide.com> gpio: gpio-omap: add check for off wake capable gpios Kangjie Lu <kjlu(a)umn.edu> PCI: xilinx: Check for __get_free_pages() failure Paolo Valente <paolo.valente(a)linaro.org> block, bfq: increase idling for weight-raised queues Kangjie Lu <kjlu(a)umn.edu> video: imsttfb: fix potential NULL pointer dereferences Kangjie Lu <kjlu(a)umn.edu> video: hgafb: fix potential NULL pointer dereference Marek Vasut <marek.vasut+renesas(a)gmail.com> PCI: rcar: Fix 64bit MSI message address handling Kangjie Lu <kjlu(a)umn.edu> PCI: rcar: Fix a potential NULL pointer dereference Sven Van Asbroeck <thesven73(a)gmail.com> power: supply: max14656: fix potential use-before-alloc Junxiao Chang <junxiao.chang(a)intel.com> platform/x86: intel_pmc_ipc: adding error handling Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> ALSA: seq: Protect in-kernel ioctl calls with mutex Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> PCI: rpadlpar: Fix leaked device_node references in add/remove paths Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov(a)gmail.com> ARM: dts: imx6qdl: Specify IMX6QDL_CLK_IPG as "ipg" clock to SDMA Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov(a)gmail.com> ARM: dts: imx6sx: Specify IMX6SX_CLK_IPG as "ipg" clock to SDMA Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov(a)gmail.com> ARM: dts: imx6ul: Specify IMX6UL_CLK_IPG as "ipg" clock to SDMA Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov(a)gmail.com> ARM: dts: imx7d: Specify IMX7D_CLK_IPG as "ipg" clock to SDMA Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov(a)gmail.com> ARM: dts: imx6sx: Specify IMX6SX_CLK_IPG as "ahb" clock to SDMA Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov(a)gmail.com> ARM: dts: imx53: Specify IMX5_CLK_IPG as "ahb" clock to SDMA Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov(a)gmail.com> ARM: dts: imx50: Specify IMX5_CLK_IPG as "ahb" clock to SDMA Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov(a)gmail.com> ARM: dts: imx51: Specify IMX5_CLK_IPG as "ahb" clock to SDMA Douglas Anderson <dianders(a)chromium.org> soc: rockchip: Set the proper PWM for rk3288 Douglas Anderson <dianders(a)chromium.org> clk: rockchip: Turn on "aclk_dmac1" for suspend on rk3288 Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor(a)gmail.com> soc: mediatek: pwrap: Zero initialize rdata in pwrap_init_cipher Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kishon(a)ti.com> PCI: keystone: Prevent ARM32 specific code to be compiled for ARM64 Enrico Granata <egranata(a)chromium.org> platform/chrome: cros_ec_proto: check for NULL transfer function Wenwen Wang <wang6495(a)umn.edu> x86/PCI: Fix PCI IRQ routing table memory leak Farhan Ali <alifm(a)linux.ibm.com> vfio: Fix WARNING "do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING" J. Bruce Fields <bfields(a)redhat.com> nfsd: allow fh_want_write to be called twice Kirill Smelkov <kirr(a)nexedi.com> fuse: retrieve: cap requested size to negotiated max_write Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz <jorge.ramirez-ortiz(a)linaro.org> nvmem: core: fix read buffer in place Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> ALSA: hda - Register irq handler after the chip initialization Keith Busch <keith.busch(a)intel.com> nvme-pci: unquiesce admin queue on shutdown Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kishon(a)ti.com> misc: pci_endpoint_test: Fix test_reg_bar to be updated in pci_endpoint_test Lu Baolu <baolu.lu(a)linux.intel.com> iommu/vt-d: Set intel_iommu_gfx_mapped correctly Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> blk-mq: move cancel of requeue_work into blk_mq_release Vladimir Zapolskiy <vz(a)mleia.com> watchdog: fix compile time error of pretimeout governors Georg Hofmann <georg(a)hofmannsweb.com> watchdog: imx2_wdt: Fix set_timeout for big timeout values Serge Semin <fancer.lancer(a)gmail.com> mips: Make sure dt memory regions are valid Ludovic Barre <ludovic.barre(a)st.com> mmc: mmci: Prevent polling for busy detection in IRQ context Maciej Żenczykowski <maze(a)google.com> uml: fix a boot splat wrt use of cpu_all_mask YueHaibing <yuehaibing(a)huawei.com> configfs: fix possible use-after-free in configfs_register_group John Sperbeck <jsperbeck(a)google.com> percpu: remove spurious lock dependency between percpu and sched Chao Yu <yuchao0(a)huawei.com> f2fs: fix to do sanity check on valid block count of segment Chao Yu <yuchao0(a)huawei.com> f2fs: fix to avoid panic in dec_valid_block_count() Chao Yu <yuchao0(a)huawei.com> f2fs: fix to clear dirty inode in error path of f2fs_iget() Chao Yu <yuchao0(a)huawei.com> f2fs: fix to avoid panic in do_recover_data() Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar(a)redhat.com> ntp: Allow TAI-UTC offset to be set to zero Martin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl(a)googlemail.com> pwm: meson: Use the spin-lock only to protect register modifications Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> EDAC/mpc85xx: Prevent building as a module Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> objtool: Don't use ignore flag for fake jumps Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn(a)thinci.com> drm/bridge: adv7511: Fix low refresh rate selection Stephane Eranian <eranian(a)google.com> perf/x86/intel: Allow PEBS multi-entry in watermark mode Tony Lindgren <tony(a)atomide.com> mfd: twl6040: Fix device init errors for ACCCTL register Ben Skeggs <bskeggs(a)redhat.com> drm/nouveau/disp/dp: respect sink limits when selecting failsafe link configuration Binbin Wu <binbin.wu(a)intel.com> mfd: intel-lpss: Set the device in reset state when init Daniel Gomez <dagmcr(a)gmail.com> mfd: tps65912-spi: Add missing of table registration Amit Kucheria <amit.kucheria(a)linaro.org> drivers: thermal: tsens: Don't print error message on -EPROBE_DEFER Jiada Wang <jiada_wang(a)mentor.com> thermal: rcar_gen3_thermal: disable interrupt in .remove Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov(a)gmail.com> kernel/sys.c: prctl: fix false positive in validate_prctl_map() Qian Cai <cai(a)lca.pw> mm/slab.c: fix an infinite loop in leaks_show() Yue Hu <huyue2(a)yulong.com> mm/cma_debug.c: fix the break condition in cma_maxchunk_get() Yue Hu <huyue2(a)yulong.com> mm/cma.c: fix the bitmap status to show failed allocation reason Yue Hu <huyue2(a)yulong.com> mm/cma.c: fix crash on CMA allocation if bitmap allocation fails Linxu Fang <fanglinxu(a)huawei.com> mem-hotplug: fix node spanned pages when we have a node with only ZONE_MOVABLE Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz(a)oracle.com> hugetlbfs: on restore reserve error path retain subpool reservation Jérôme Glisse <jglisse(a)redhat.com> mm/hmm: select mmu notifier when selecting HMM Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> ARM: prevent tracing IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE Li Rongqing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> ipc: prevent lockup on alloc_msg and free_msg Christian Brauner <christian(a)brauner.io> sysctl: return -EINVAL if val violates minmax Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> fs/fat/file.c: issue flush after the writeback of FAT Kangjie Lu <kjlu(a)umn.edu> rapidio: fix a NULL pointer dereference when create_workqueue() fails ------------- Diffstat: Makefile | 4 ++-- arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5420-arndale-octa.dts | 2 ++ arch/arm/boot/dts/imx50.dtsi | 2 +- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx51.dtsi | 2 +- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx53.dtsi | 2 +- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl.dtsi | 2 +- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sl.dtsi | 2 +- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sx.dtsi | 2 +- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6ul.dtsi | 2 +- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx7s.dtsi | 4 ++-- arch/arm/include/asm/hardirq.h | 1 + arch/arm/kernel/smp.c | 6 ++++- arch/arm/mach-exynos/suspend.c | 19 +++++++++++++++ arch/mips/kernel/prom.c | 14 ++++++++++- arch/um/kernel/time.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 2 +- arch/x86/pci/irq.c | 10 ++++++-- block/bfq-iosched.c | 2 ++ block/blk-core.c | 1 - block/blk-mq.c | 2 ++ drivers/clk/rockchip/clk-rk3288.c | 11 +++++++++ drivers/dma/idma64.c | 6 +++-- drivers/dma/idma64.h | 2 ++ drivers/edac/Kconfig | 4 ++-- drivers/gpio/gpio-omap.c | 25 +++++++++++++------- drivers/gpio/gpio-vf610.c | 26 ++++++++++---------- drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/adv7511/adv7511_drv.c | 6 ++--- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c | 10 ++++++++ drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/Kconfig | 13 +--------- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_drm.c | 7 ++---- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/engine/disp/dp.c | 11 +++++++-- drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 7 +++--- drivers/mfd/intel-lpss.c | 3 +++ drivers/mfd/tps65912-spi.c | 1 + drivers/mfd/twl6040.c | 13 +++++++++- drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c | 1 + drivers/mmc/host/mmci.c | 5 ++-- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 5 +++- drivers/nvmem/core.c | 15 ++++++++---- drivers/pci/dwc/pci-keystone.c | 4 ++++ drivers/pci/host/pcie-rcar.c | 10 +++++--- drivers/pci/host/pcie-xilinx.c | 12 ++++++++-- drivers/pci/hotplug/rpadlpar_core.c | 4 ++++ drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_proto.c | 11 +++++++++ drivers/platform/x86/intel_pmc_ipc.c | 6 ++++- drivers/power/supply/max14656_charger_detector.c | 14 +++++------ drivers/pwm/core.c | 10 ++++---- drivers/pwm/pwm-meson.c | 25 +++++++++++++------- drivers/pwm/pwm-tiehrpwm.c | 2 ++ drivers/pwm/sysfs.c | 14 +---------- drivers/rapidio/rio_cm.c | 8 +++++++ drivers/soc/mediatek/mtk-pmic-wrap.c | 2 +- drivers/soc/rockchip/grf.c | 2 ++ drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx.c | 7 +----- drivers/staging/typec/fusb302/fusb302.c | 2 ++ drivers/thermal/qcom/tsens.c | 3 ++- drivers/thermal/rcar_gen3_thermal.c | 3 +++ drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dw.c | 4 ++-- drivers/vfio/vfio.c | 30 ++++++++---------------- drivers/video/fbdev/hgafb.c | 2 ++ drivers/video/fbdev/imsttfb.c | 5 ++++ drivers/watchdog/Kconfig | 1 + drivers/watchdog/imx2_wdt.c | 4 +++- fs/configfs/dir.c | 17 ++++++++++---- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 12 ++++++++-- fs/f2fs/inode.c | 1 + fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 10 +++++++- fs/f2fs/segment.h | 3 +-- fs/fat/file.c | 11 ++++++--- fs/fuse/dev.c | 2 +- fs/nfsd/vfs.h | 5 +++- include/drm/drm_modeset_helper_vtables.h | 8 +++++++ include/linux/pwm.h | 5 ---- include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 3 --- ipc/mqueue.c | 10 ++++++-- ipc/msgutil.c | 6 +++++ kernel/sys.c | 2 +- kernel/sysctl.c | 6 +++-- kernel/time/ntp.c | 2 +- mm/Kconfig | 2 +- mm/cma.c | 23 +++++++++++------- mm/cma_debug.c | 2 +- mm/hugetlb.c | 21 +++++++++++++---- mm/page_alloc.c | 6 +++-- mm/percpu.c | 9 +++++-- mm/slab.c | 6 ++++- net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 8 ------- sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 9 +++++-- sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 6 ++--- tools/objtool/check.c | 8 ++++--- 90 files changed, 428 insertions(+), 214 deletions(-)

5 years, 12 months

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[PATCH v2] Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre

by Tim Chen

Thomas, Here's a revised version of the spectre documentation. I took out discussions on BPF as Alexi found issues with the original blurbs on BPF. Alexi suggested a separate bpf_security.rst document instead. Thanks. Tim --->8--- Add documentation for Spectre vulnerability and the mitigation mechanisms: - Explain the problem and risks - Document the mitigation mechanisms - Document the command line controls - Document the sysfs files Co-developed-by: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 619 ++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst | 2 + 3 files changed, 622 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst index ffc064c1ec68..49311f3da6f2 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst @@ -9,5 +9,6 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. .. toctree:: :maxdepth: 1 + spectre l1tf mds diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1756183a199d --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -0,0 +1,619 @@ +Spectre side channels +===================== + +Spectre is a class of side channel attacks that exploit branch prediction +and speculative execution on modern CPUs to read memory, possibly +bypassing access controls. Speculative execution side channel exploits +do not modify memory but attempt to infer privileged data in the memory. + +This document covers Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2. + +Affected processors +------------------- + +Speculative execution side channel methods affect a wide range of modern +high performance processors, since most modern high speed processors +use branch predictions and speculative executions. + +The following CPUs are vulnerable: + + - Intel Core, Atom, Pentium, and Xeon processors + - AMD Phenom, EPYC, and Zen processors + - IBM POWER and zSeries processors + - Higher end ARM processors + - Apple CPUs + - Higher end MIPS CPUs + - Likely most other high performance CPUs. Contact your CPU vendor for details. + +Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the Spectre +vulnerability files in sysfs. See :ref:`spectre_sys_info`. + +Related CVEs +------------ + +The following CVE entries describe Spectre variants: + + ============= ======================= ================= + CVE-2017-5753 Bounds check bypass Spectre variant 1 + CVE-2017-5715 Branch target injection Spectre variant 2 + ============= ======================= ================= + +Problem +------- + +CPUs use speculative operations to improve performance. That may leave +traces of memory accesses or computations in the processor's caches, +buffers, and branch predictors. Malicious software may be able to +influence the speculative execution paths, and then use the side effects +of the speculative execution in the CPUs caches and buffers to infer +privileged data touched during the speculative execution. + +Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of +conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative +execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory. See [1] [5] +[7] [10] [11]. + +Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass) +--------------------------------------- + +The bounds check bypass attack [2] takes advantage of speculative +execution that bypass conditional branch instructions used for memory +access bounds check (e.g. checking if the index of an array results in +memory access within a valid range). This results in memory accesses to +invalid memory (say with out-of-bound index) that are done speculatively +before validation checks resolve. Such speculative memory accesses can +leave side effects, creating side channels which leak information to +the attacker. + +There are some extensions of Spectre variant 1 attacks for reading +data over the network, see [12]. However such attacks are difficult, +low bandwidth, fragile, and are considered low risk. + +Spectre variant 2 (Branch Target Injection) +------------------------------------------- + +The branch target injection attack takes advantage of speculative +execution of indirect branches [3]. The indirect branch predictors +inside the processor used to guess the target of indirect branches can +be influenced by an attacker, causing gadget code to be speculatively +executed, thus exposing sensitive data touched by the victim. The side +effects left in the CPU's caches during speculative execution can be +measured to infer data values. + +.. _poison_btb: + +In Spectre variant 2 attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect +branches in the victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target +buffer of a CPU used for predicting indirect branch addresses. Such +poisoning could be done by indirect branching into existing code, with the +address offset of the indirect branch under the attacker's control. Since +the branch prediction hardware does not fully disambiguate branch address +and uses the offset for prediction, this could cause privileged code's +indirect branch to jump to a gadget code with the same offset. + +The most useful gadgets take an attacker-controlled input parameter (such +as a register value) so that the memory read can be controlled. Gadgets +without input parameters might be possible, but the attacker would have +very little control over what memory can be read, reducing the risk of +the attack revealing useful data. + +One other variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the +return stack buffer (RSB) [13] to cause speculative RET execution to go +to an gadget. An attacker's imbalanced CALL instructions might "poison" +entries in the return stack buffer which are later consumed by a victim's +RET instruction. This attack can be mitigated by flushing the return +stack buffer on context switch, or VM exit. + +Attack scenarios +---------------- + +The following list of attack scenarios have been anticipated, but may +not cover all possible attack vectors. + +1. A user process attacking the kernel +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + The attacker passes a parameter to the kernel via a register or via a + known address in memory during a syscall. Such parameter may be used + later by the kernel as an index to an array or to derive a pointer + for Spectre variant 1 attack. The index or pointer is invalid, but + bound checks are bypassed in the code branch taken for speculative + execution. This could cause privileged memory to be accessed and + leaked. + + For kernel code that has been identified where data pointers could + potentially be influenced for Spectre attacks, new "nospec" accessor + macros are used to prevent speculative loading of data. + + Spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch + target buffer (BTB) before issuing syscall to launch an attack. + After entering the kernel, the kernel could use the poisoned branch + target buffer on indirect jump and jump to gadget code in speculative + execution. + + If an attacker tries to control the memory addresses leaked during + speculative execution, he would also need to pass a parameter to the + gadget, either through a register or a known address in memory. After + the gadget has executed, he can measure the side effect. + + The kernel can protect itself against consuming poisoned branch + target buffer entries by using return trampolines (also known as + "retpoline") [3] [9] for all indirect branches. Return trampolines + trap speculative execution paths to prevent jumping to gadget code + during speculative execution. x86 CPUs with enhanced Indirect + Branch Restricted Speculation (enhanced IBRS) available in hardware + should use the feature to mitigate Spectre variant 2 instead of + retpoline. Enhanced IBRS is more efficient than retpoline. + + There may be gadget code in firmware code which could be exploited + with Spectre variant 2 attack by a rogue user process. To mitigate + such attacks on x86, Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) + feature is turned on before the kernel invokes any firmware code. + +2. A user process attacking another user process +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + A malicious user process can try to attack another user process, + either via a context switch on the same hardware thread, or from the + sibling hyperthread sharing a physical processor core on simultaneous + multi-threading (SMT) system. + + Spectre variant 1 attacks generally require passing parameters between + the processes, which needs a data passing relationship, such as remote + procedure calls (RPC). Those parameters are used in gadget code to + derive invalid data pointers accessing privileged memory. + + Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched by a rogue process by + :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer. This can + influence the indirect branch targets for a victim process that either + runs later on the same hardware thread, or running concurrently on + a sibling hardware thread running on the same physical core. + + On x86, a user process can protect itself against Spectre variant 2 + attacks by using prctl syscall to disable indirect branch speculation + for itself. An administrator can also cordon off an unsafe process + from polluting the branch target buffer by disabling the process's + indirect branch speculation. This comes with a performance cost from + disabling indirect branch speculation and clearing the branch target + buffer. On SMT CPU, for a process that has indirect branch speculation + disabled, Single Threaded Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP) [4] + is turned on to prevent the sibling thread from controlling branch + target buffer. In addition, Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) + is issued to clear the branch target buffer when context switching + to and from such process. + + On x86, the return stack buffer is stuffed on context switch. + This prevents the branch target buffer from being used for branch + prediction when the return stack buffer underflow while switching to + a deeper call stack. Any poisoned entries in the return stack buffer + left by the previous process will also be cleared. + + User programs should use address space randomization to make attacks + more difficult (Set /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2). + +3. A virtualized guest attacking the host +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + The attack mechanism is similar to how user processes attack the + kernel. The kernel is entered via hyper calls or other virtualization + exit paths. + + For Spectre variant 1 attack, rogue guests can pass parameters (e.g. in + registers) via hyper-calls to derive invalid pointers to speculate + into privileged memory after entering the kernel. For places where + such kernel code are identified, nospec accessor macros are used to + stop speculative memory access. + + For Spectre variant 2 attack, rogue guests can :ref:`poison + <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or return stack buffer, causing + the kernel to jump to gadget code in the speculative execution paths. + + To mitigate variant 2, the host kernel can use return trampoline + for indirect branches to bypass poisoned branch target buffer, and + flushes return stack buffer on VM exit. This prevents rogue guest + from affecting indirect branching in host kernel. + + To protect host processes from rogue guests, host processes can have + indirect branch speculation disabled via prctl. The branch target + buffer is cleared before context switching to such processes. + +4. A virtualized guest attacking other guest +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + A rogue guest may attack another guest to get data accessible by the + other guest. + + Spectre variant 1 attack is possible if parameters can be passed + between guests. This may be done via mechanisms such as shared memory + or message passing. Such parameters could be used to derive data + pointers to privileged data in guest. The privileged data could be + accessed by gadget code in the victim's speculation paths. + + Spectre variant 2 attack can be launched from a rogue guest by + :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or return stack + buffer. Such poisoned entries could be used to influence speculation + execution paths in the victim guest. Linux kernel mitigates such + attacks by flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit and also clears + the branch target buffer before switching to a new guest. + +.. _spectre_sys_info: + +Spectre system information +-------------------------- + +The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current +mitigation status of the system for Spectre: whether the system is +vulnerable, and which mitigations are active. + +The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 1 mitigation status is: + + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 + +The possible values in this file are: + + ======================================= ================================= + 'Mitigation: __user pointer sanitation' Protection in kernel on a case by + case base with explicit pointer + sanitation. + ======================================= ================================= + +However, the protections are put in place on a case by case basis, +and there is no guarantee that all possible attack vectors for Spectre +variant 1 are covered. + +The spectre_v2 kernel file reports if the kernel has been compiled with +retpoline mitigation or if the CPU has hardware mitigation, and if the +CPU has support for additional process-specific mitigation. + +This file also reports CPU features enabled by microcode to mitigate +attack between user processes: + +1. Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) to add additional + isolation between processes of different users. +2. Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP) to add additional + isolation between CPU threads running on the same core. + +These CPU features may impact performance when used and can be enabled +per process on a case-by-case base. + +The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 2 mitigation status is: + + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 + +The possible values in this file are: + + - Kernel status: + + ==================================== ================================= + 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable + 'Vulnerable' Vulnerable, no mitigation + 'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline' Software-focused mitigation + 'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline' AMD-specific software mitigation + 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS' Hardware-focused mitigation + ==================================== ================================= + + - Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is + used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only). + + ========== ============================================================= + 'IBRS_FW' Protection against user program attacks when calling firmware + ========== ============================================================= + + - Indirect branch prediction barrier (IBPB) status for protection between + processes of different users. This feature can be controlled through + prctl per process, or through kernel command line options. This is + x86 only feature. For more details see below. + + =================== ======================================================== + 'IBPB: disabled' IBPB unused + 'IBPB: always-on' Use IBPB on all tasks + 'IBPB: conditional' Use IBPB on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks + =================== ======================================================== + + - Single threaded indirect branch prediction (STIBP) status for protection + between different hyper threads. This feature can be controlled through + prctl per process, or through kernel command line options. This is x86 + only feature. For more details see below. + + ==================== ======================================================== + 'STIBP: disabled' STIBP unused + 'STIBP: forced' Use STIBP on all tasks + 'STIBP: conditional' Use STIBP on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks + ==================== ======================================================== + + - Return stack buffer (RSB) protection status: + + ============= =========================================== + 'RSB filling' Protection of RSB on context switch enabled + ============= =========================================== + +Full mitigation might require an microcode update from the CPU +vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will +report vulnerability. + +Turning on mitigation for Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2 +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +1. Kernel mitigation +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + For Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel codes (as determined by code + audit or scanning tools) are annotated on a case by case basis to use + nospec accessor macros for bounds clipping [2] to avoid any usable + disclosure gadgets. However, it may not cover all attack vectors for + Spectre variant 1. + + For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, the compiler turns indirect calls or + jumps in the kernel into an equivalent return trampolines (retpoline) + [3] [9] to go to the target addresses. Speculative execution paths + under retpolines are trapped in an infinite loop to prevent any + speculative execution jumping to a gadget. + + To turn on retpoline mitigation on a vulnerable CPU, the kernel + needs to be compiled with a gcc compiler that supports the + -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register options. + If the kernel is compiled with a clangs compiler, the compiler needs + to support -mretpoline-external-thunk option. The kernel config + CONFIG_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and CPU needs to run with + the latest updated microcode. + + On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all, + cases. See [3] for more details. + + On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. enhanced + IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time. + + The retpoline mitigation is on by default on vulnerable CPUs. It can + be forced on or off by the administrator via the kernel command line + and sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`. + + On x86, indirect branch restricted speculation is turned on by default + before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits + using the firmware. + + Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y + and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes + attacks on the kernel generally more difficult. + +2. User program mitigation +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + User programs can mitigate Spectre variant 1 using LFENCE or "bounds + clipping". For more details see [2]. + + For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, individual user programs + can be compiled with return trampolines for indirect branches. + This protects them from consuming poisoned entries in Branch Target + Buffer left by malicious software. Alternatively, the programs + can disable their indirect branch speculation via prctl (See + :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`) + On x86, this will turn on STIBP to guard against attacks from the + sibling thread when the user program is running, and use IBPB to + flush the branch target buffer when switching to/from the program. + + Restricting indirect branch speculation on a user program will + also prevent the program from launching a variant 2 attack + on x86. All sand-boxed SECCOMP programs have indirect branch + speculation restricted by default. Administrators can change + that behavior via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. + See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`. + + Programs that disable their indirect branch speculation will have + more overheads and run slower. + + User programs should use address space randomization + (/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2) to make attacks more + difficult. + +3. VM mitigation +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + Within the kernel, Spectre variant 1 attacks from rogue guests + are mitigated on a case by case basis in VM exit paths. Vulnerable + codes use nospec accessor macros for "bounds clipping", to avoid any + usable disclosure gadgets. However, this may not cover all variant + 1 attack vectors. + + For Spectre variant 2 attacks from rogue guests to the kernel, the + Linux kernel uses retpoline to prevent consumption of poisoned entries + in branch target buffer left by rogue guests. It also flushes the + return stack buffer on every VM exit to prevent return stack buffer + underflow so poisoned branch target buffer could be used, or attacker + guests leaving poisoned entries in the return stack buffer. + + To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks, the branch target buffer is + sanitized by flushing before switching to a new guest on a CPU. + + These mitigations are turned on by default on vulnerable CPUs. + + The kernel also allows guests to use any microcode based mitigation + they chose to use (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86). + +.. _mitigation_control_command_line: + +Mitigation control on the kernel command line +--------------------------------------------- + +Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the +kernel command line. + + nospectre_v2 [X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 + (indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may + allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent + to spectre_v2=off. + + + spectre_v2= [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 + (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability. + The default operation protects the kernel from + user space attacks. + + on - unconditionally enable, implies + spectre_v2_user=on + off - unconditionally disable, implies + spectre_v2_user=off + auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is + vulnerable + + Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a + mitigation method at run time according to the + CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the + CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the + compiler with which the kernel was built. + + Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation + against user space to user space task attacks. + + Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and + the user space protections. + + Specific mitigations can also be selected manually: + + retpoline - replace indirect branches + retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline + retpoline,amd - AMD-specific minimal thunk + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + spectre_v2=auto. + +For user space mitigation: + + spectre_v2_user= + [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 + (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between + user space tasks + + on - Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is + enforced by spectre_v2=on + + off - Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is + enforced by spectre_v2=off + + prctl - Indirect branch speculation is enabled, + but mitigation can be enabled via prctl + per thread. The mitigation control state + is inherited on fork. + + prctl,ibpb + - Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is + controlled per thread. IBPB is issued + always when switching between different user + space processes. + + seccomp + - Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp + threads will enable the mitigation unless + they explicitly opt out. + + seccomp,ibpb + - Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is + controlled per thread. IBPB is issued + always when switching between different + user space processes. + + auto - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on + the available CPU features and vulnerability. + + Default mitigation: + If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl" + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + spectre_v2_user=auto. + + In general the kernel by default selects + reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To + disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations boot with + spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations + cannot be disabled. + +Mitigation selection guide +-------------------------- + +1. Trusted userspace +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + If all userspace applications are from trusted sources and do not + execute externally supplied untrusted code, then the mitigations can + be disabled. + +2. Protect sensitive programs +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + For security-sensitive programs that have secrets (e.g. crypto + keys), protection against Spectre variant 2 can be put in place by + disabling indirect branch speculation when the program is running + (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`). + +3. Sandbox untrusted programs +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + Untrusted programs that could be a source of attacks can be cordoned + off by disabling their indirect branch speculation when they are run + (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`). + This prevents untrusted programs from polluting the branch target + buffer. All programs running in SECCOMP sandboxes have indirect + branch speculation restricted by default. This behavior can be + changed via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See + :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`. + +3. High security mode +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + All Spectre variant 2 mitigations can be forced on at boot time for all + programs (See "on" option in :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`). + This will add overhead as indirect branch speculations for all programs + will be restricted. + + On x86, branch target buffer will be flushed with IBPB when switching + to a new program. STIBP is left on all the time to protect programs + against variant 2 attacks originating from programs running on + sibling threads. + + Alternatively, STIBP can be used only when running programs + whose indirect branch speculation is explicitly disabled, + while IBPB is still used all the time when switching to a new + program to clear Branch Target Buffer (See "ibpb" option in + :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`). This "ibpb" option has + less performance cost than the "on" option, which leaves STIBP on + all the time. + +References on Spectre +--------------------- + +Intel white papers: + +[1] `Intel analysis of speculative execution side channels <https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/Intel-Analys…>`_. + +[2] `Bounds check bypass <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/bou…>`_. + +[3] `Deep dive: Retpoline: A branch target injection mitigation <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-re…>`_. + +[4] `Deep Dive: Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-si…>`_. + +AMD white papers: + +[5] `AMD64 technology indirect branch control extension <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Upda…>`_. + +[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesfo…>`_. + +ARM white papers: + +[7] `Cache speculation side-channels <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processo…>`_. + +[8] `Cache speculation issues update <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processo…>`_. + +Google white paper: + +[9] `Retpoline: a software construct for preventing branch-target-injection <https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886>`_. + +MIPS white paper: + +[10] `MIPS: response on speculative execution and side channel vulnerabilities <https://www.mips.com/blog/mips-response-on-speculative-execution-and-side-c…>`_. + +Academic papers: + +[11] `Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution <https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf>`_. + +[12] `NetSpectre: Read Arbitrary Memory over Network <https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.10535>`_. + +[13] `Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack Buffer <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot18/woot18-paper-koruyeh.…>`_. diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst index 1129c7550a48..7ddd8f667459 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst @@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation misfeature will fail. +.. _set_spec_ctrl: + PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL ----------------------- -- 2.20.1

5 years, 12 months

3
2
0 0

[PATCH] Revert "ALSA: hda/realtek - Improve the headset mic for Acer Aspire laptops"

by Hui Wang

This reverts commit 9cb40eb184c4220d244a532bd940c6345ad9dbd9. This patch introduces noise and headphone playback issue after rebooting or suspending/resuming. Let us revert it. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203831 Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang(a)canonical.com> --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 16 +++++----------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 1afb268f3da0..179e4be1f747 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -6268,15 +6268,13 @@ static const struct hda_fixup alc269_fixups[] = { .chain_id = ALC269_FIXUP_THINKPAD_ACPI, }, [ALC255_FIXUP_ACER_MIC_NO_PRESENCE] = { - .type = HDA_FIXUP_VERBS, - .v.verbs = (const struct hda_verb[]) { - /* Enable the Mic */ - { 0x20, AC_VERB_SET_COEF_INDEX, 0x45 }, - { 0x20, AC_VERB_SET_PROC_COEF, 0x5089 }, - {} + .type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS, + .v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) { + { 0x19, 0x01a1913c }, /* use as headset mic, without its own jack detect */ + { } }, .chained = true, - .chain_id = ALC269_FIXUP_LIFEBOOK_EXTMIC + .chain_id = ALC255_FIXUP_HEADSET_MODE }, [ALC255_FIXUP_ASUS_MIC_NO_PRESENCE] = { .type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS, @@ -7320,10 +7318,6 @@ static const struct snd_hda_pin_quirk alc269_pin_fixup_tbl[] = { {0x18, 0x02a11030}, {0x19, 0x0181303F}, {0x21, 0x0221102f}), - SND_HDA_PIN_QUIRK(0x10ec0255, 0x1025, "Acer", ALC255_FIXUP_ACER_MIC_NO_PRESENCE, - {0x12, 0x90a60140}, - {0x14, 0x90170120}, - {0x21, 0x02211030}), SND_HDA_PIN_QUIRK(0x10ec0255, 0x1025, "Acer", ALC255_FIXUP_ACER_MIC_NO_PRESENCE, {0x12, 0x90a601c0}, {0x14, 0x90171120}, -- 2.17.1

5 years, 12 months

2
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[PATCH v3 0/3] xen/swiotlb: fix an issue and improve swiotlb-xen

by Juergen Gross

While hunting an issue in swiotlb-xen I stumbled over a wrong test and found some areas for improvement. Juergen Gross (3): xen/swiotlb: fix condition for calling xen_destroy_contiguous_region() xen/swiotlb: simplify range_straddles_page_boundary() xen/swiotlb: remember having called xen_create_contiguous_region() drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c | 34 ++++++++++------------------------ include/linux/page-flags.h | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) -- 2.16.4

5 years, 12 months

1
1
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✅ PASS: Stable queue: queue-5.1

by CKI Project

Hello, We ran automated tests on a patchset that was proposed for merging into this kernel tree. The patches were applied to: Kernel repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git Commit: 2df16141a2c4 - Linux 5.1.9 The results of these automated tests are provided below. Overall result: PASSED Merge: OK Compile: OK Tests: OK We hope that these logs can help you find the problem quickly. For the full detail on our testing procedures, please scroll to the bottom of this message. Please reply to this email if you have any questions about the tests that we ran or if you have any suggestions on how to make future tests more effective. ,-. ,-. ( C ) ( K ) Continuous `-',-.`-' Kernel ( I ) Integration `-' ______________________________________________________________________________ Merge testing ------------- We cloned this repository and checked out the following commit: Repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git Commit: 2df16141a2c4 - Linux 5.1.9 We then merged the patchset with `git am`: revert-drm-allow-render-capable-master-with-drm_auth.patch media-rockchip-vpu-fix-re-order-probe-error-remove-p.patch media-rockchip-vpu-add-missing-dont_use_autosuspend-.patch rapidio-fix-a-null-pointer-dereference-when-create_w.patch fs-fat-file.c-issue-flush-after-the-writeback-of-fat.patch sysctl-return-einval-if-val-violates-minmax.patch ipc-prevent-lockup-on-alloc_msg-and-free_msg.patch drm-msm-correct-attempted-null-pointer-dereference-i.patch drm-pl111-initialize-clock-spinlock-early.patch mm-mprotect.c-fix-compilation-warning-because-of-unu.patch arm-prevent-tracing-ipi_cpu_backtrace.patch mm-hmm-select-mmu-notifier-when-selecting-hmm.patch hugetlbfs-on-restore-reserve-error-path-retain-subpo.patch mm-memory_hotplug-release-memory-resource-after-arch.patch mem-hotplug-fix-node-spanned-pages-when-we-have-a-no.patch mm-cma.c-fix-crash-on-cma-allocation-if-bitmap-alloc.patch initramfs-free-initrd-memory-if-opening-initrd.image.patch mm-compaction.c-fix-an-undefined-behaviour.patch mm-memory_hotplug.c-fix-the-wrong-usage-of-n_high_me.patch mm-cma.c-fix-the-bitmap-status-to-show-failed-alloca.patch mm-page_mkclean-vs-madv_dontneed-race.patch mm-cma_debug.c-fix-the-break-condition-in-cma_maxchu.patch mm-slab.c-fix-an-infinite-loop-in-leaks_show.patch kernel-sys.c-prctl-fix-false-positive-in-validate_pr.patch thermal-rcar_gen3_thermal-disable-interrupt-in-.remo.patch drivers-thermal-tsens-don-t-print-error-message-on-e.patch mfd-tps65912-spi-add-missing-of-table-registration.patch mfd-intel-lpss-set-the-device-in-reset-state-when-in.patch drm-nouveau-disp-dp-respect-sink-limits-when-selecti.patch mfd-twl6040-fix-device-init-errors-for-accctl-regist.patch perf-x86-intel-allow-pebs-multi-entry-in-watermark-m.patch drm-nouveau-kms-gf119-gp10x-push-headsetcontroloutpu.patch drm-nouveau-fix-duplication-of-nv50_head_atom-struct.patch drm-bridge-adv7511-fix-low-refresh-rate-selection.patch objtool-don-t-use-ignore-flag-for-fake-jumps.patch drm-nouveau-kms-gv100-fix-spurious-window-immediate-.patch bpf-fix-undefined-behavior-in-narrow-load-handling.patch edac-mpc85xx-prevent-building-as-a-module.patch pwm-meson-use-the-spin-lock-only-to-protect-register.patch mailbox-stm32-ipcc-check-invalid-irq.patch ntp-allow-tai-utc-offset-to-be-set-to-zero.patch f2fs-fix-to-avoid-panic-in-do_recover_data.patch f2fs-fix-to-avoid-panic-in-f2fs_inplace_write_data.patch f2fs-fix-error-path-of-recovery.patch f2fs-fix-to-avoid-panic-in-f2fs_remove_inode_page.patch f2fs-fix-to-do-sanity-check-on-free-nid.patch f2fs-fix-to-clear-dirty-inode-in-error-path-of-f2fs_.patch f2fs-fix-to-avoid-panic-in-dec_valid_block_count.patch f2fs-fix-to-use-inline-space-only-if-inline_xattr-is.patch f2fs-fix-to-avoid-panic-in-dec_valid_node_count.patch f2fs-fix-to-do-sanity-check-on-valid-block-count-of-.patch f2fs-fix-to-avoid-deadloop-in-foreground-gc.patch f2fs-fix-to-retrieve-inline-xattr-space.patch f2fs-fix-to-do-checksum-even-if-inode-page-is-uptoda.patch media-atmel-atmel-isc-fix-asd-memory-allocation.patch percpu-remove-spurious-lock-dependency-between-percp.patch configfs-fix-possible-use-after-free-in-configfs_reg.patch uml-fix-a-boot-splat-wrt-use-of-cpu_all_mask.patch pci-dwc-free-msi-in-dw_pcie_host_init-error-path.patch pci-dwc-free-msi-irq-page-in-dw_pcie_free_msi.patch fbcon-don-t-reset-logo_shown-when-logo-is-currently-.patch ovl-do-not-generate-duplicate-fsnotify-events-for-fa.patch mmc-mmci-prevent-polling-for-busy-detection-in-irq-c.patch netfilter-nf_flow_table-fix-missing-error-check-for-.patch netfilter-nf_conntrack_h323-restore-boundary-check-c.patch mips-make-sure-dt-memory-regions-are-valid.patch netfilter-nf_tables-fix-base-chain-stat-rcu_derefere.patch watchdog-imx2_wdt-fix-set_timeout-for-big-timeout-va.patch watchdog-fix-compile-time-error-of-pretimeout-govern.patch blk-mq-move-cancel-of-requeue_work-into-blk_mq_relea.patch iommu-vt-d-set-intel_iommu_gfx_mapped-correctly.patch vfio-pci-nvlink2-fix-potential-vma-leak.patch misc-pci_endpoint_test-fix-test_reg_bar-to-be-update.patch pci-designware-ep-use-aligned-atu-window-for-raising.patch nvme-pci-unquiesce-admin-queue-on-shutdown.patch nvme-pci-shutdown-on-timeout-during-deletion.patch netfilter-nf_flow_table-check-ttl-value-in-flow-offl.patch netfilter-nf_flow_table-fix-netdev-refcnt-leak.patch alsa-hda-register-irq-handler-after-the-chip-initial.patch powerpc-pseries-track-lmb-nid-instead-of-using-devic.patch arm64-defconfig-update-ufshcd-for-hi3660-soc.patch iommu-vt-d-don-t-request-page-request-irq-under-dmar.patch nvmem-core-fix-read-buffer-in-place.patch nvmem-sunxi_sid-support-sid-on-a83t-and-h5.patch fuse-retrieve-cap-requested-size-to-negotiated-max_w.patch nfsd-allow-fh_want_write-to-be-called-twice.patch nfsd-avoid-uninitialized-variable-warning.patch vfio-fix-warning-do-not-call-blocking-ops-when-task_.patch iommu-arm-smmu-v3-don-t-disable-smmu-in-kdump-kernel.patch switchtec-fix-unintended-mask-of-mrpc-event.patch net-thunderbolt-unregister-thunderboltip-protocol-ha.patch x86-pci-fix-pci-irq-routing-table-memory-leak.patch soc-tegra-pmc-remove-reset-sysfs-entries-on-error.patch i40e-queues-are-reserved-despite-invalid-argument-er.patch power-supply-cpcap-battery-fix-signed-counter-sample.patch platform-chrome-cros_ec_proto-check-for-null-transfe.patch pci-keystone-invoke-phy_reset-api-before-enabling-ph.patch pci-keystone-prevent-arm32-specific-code-to-be-compi.patch soc-mediatek-pwrap-zero-initialize-rdata-in-pwrap_in.patch clk-rockchip-turn-on-aclk_dmac1-for-suspend-on-rk328.patch usb-ohci-da8xx-disable-the-regulator-if-the-overcurr.patch iommu-vt-d-flush-iotlb-for-untrusted-device-in-time.patch soc-rockchip-set-the-proper-pwm-for-rk3288.patch arm64-dts-imx8mq-mark-iomuxc_gpr-as-i.mx6q-compatibl.patch arm-dts-imx51-specify-imx5_clk_ipg-as-ahb-clock-to-s.patch arm-dts-imx50-specify-imx5_clk_ipg-as-ahb-clock-to-s.patch arm-dts-imx53-specify-imx5_clk_ipg-as-ahb-clock-to-s.patch arm-dts-imx6sx-specify-imx6sx_clk_ipg-as-ahb-clock-t.patch arm-dts-imx6sll-specify-imx6sll_clk_ipg-as-ipg-clock.patch arm-dts-imx7d-specify-imx7d_clk_ipg-as-ipg-clock-to-.patch arm-dts-imx6ul-specify-imx6ul_clk_ipg-as-ipg-clock-t.patch arm-dts-imx6sx-specify-imx6sx_clk_ipg-as-ipg-clock-t.patch arm-dts-imx6qdl-specify-imx6qdl_clk_ipg-as-ipg-clock.patch pci-rpadlpar-fix-leaked-device_node-references-in-ad.patch drm-amd-display-disable-link-before-changing-link-se.patch drm-amd-display-use-plane-color_space-for-dpp-if-spe.patch arm-omap2-pm33xx-core-do-not-turn-off-cefuse-as-ppa-.patch pinctrl-pinctrl-intel-move-gpio-suspend-resume-to-no.patch platform-x86-intel_pmc_ipc-adding-error-handling.patch power-supply-max14656-fix-potential-use-before-alloc.patch f2fs-fix-potential-recursive-call-when-enabling-data.patch net-hns3-return-0-and-print-warning-when-hit-duplica.patch pci-dwc-remove-default-msi-initialization-for-platfo.patch pci-rcar-fix-a-potential-null-pointer-dereference.patch pci-rcar-fix-64bit-msi-message-address-handling.patch scsi-qla2xxx-reset-the-fcf_async_-sent-active-flags.patch input-goodix-add-gt5663-ctp-support.patch video-hgafb-fix-potential-null-pointer-dereference.patch video-imsttfb-fix-potential-null-pointer-dereference.patch block-bfq-increase-idling-for-weight-raised-queues.patch pci-xilinx-check-for-__get_free_pages-failure.patch arm64-dts-qcom-qcs404-fix-regulator-supply-names.patch gpio-gpio-omap-add-check-for-off-wake-capable-gpios.patch gpio-gpio-omap-limit-errata-1.101-handling-to-wkup-d.patch ice-add-missing-case-in-print_link_msg-for-printing-.patch media-v4l2-ctrl-v4l2_ctrl_request_setup-returns-with.patch batman-adv-adjust-name-for-batadv_dat_send_data.patch ice-enable-lan_en-for-the-right-recipes.patch ice-do-not-set-lb_en-for-prune-switch-rules.patch dmaengine-idma64-use-actual-device-for-dma-transfers.patch pwm-tiehrpwm-update-shadow-register-for-disabling-pw.patch media-v4l2-fwnode-defaults-may-not-override-endpoint.patch arm-dts-exynos-always-enable-necessary-apio_1v8-and-.patch pwm-fix-deadlock-warning-when-removing-pwm-device.patch arm-exynos-fix-undefined-instruction-during-exynos54.patch usb-typec-fusb302-check-vconn-is-off-when-we-start-t.patch soc-renesas-identify-r-car-m3-w-es1.3.patch arm-shmobile-porter-enable-r-car-gen2-regulator-quir.patch gpio-vf610-do-not-share-irq_chip.patch percpu-do-not-search-past-bitmap-when-allocating-an-.patch revert-bluetooth-align-minimum-encryption-key-size-for-le-and-br-edr-connections.patch revert-drm-nouveau-add-kconfig-option-to-turn-off-nouveau-legacy-contexts.-v3.patch ovl-check-the-capability-before-cred-overridden.patch ovl-support-stacked-seek_hole-seek_data.patch alsa-seq-cover-unsubscribe_port-in-list_mutex.patch io_uring-fix-failure-to-verify-sq_aff-cpu.patch Compile testing --------------- We compiled the kernel for 4 architectures: aarch64: build options: -j20 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg configuration: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/aarch64/kernel-stable_queue_5.1-aa… kernel build: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/aarch64/kernel-stable_queue_5.1-aa… ppc64le: build options: -j20 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg configuration: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/ppc64le/kernel-stable_queue_5.1-pp… kernel build: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/ppc64le/kernel-stable_queue_5.1-pp… s390x: build options: -j20 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg configuration: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/s390x/kernel-stable_queue_5.1-s390… kernel build: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/s390x/kernel-stable_queue_5.1-s390… x86_64: build options: -j20 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg configuration: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/x86_64/kernel-stable_queue_5.1-x86… kernel build: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/x86_64/kernel-stable_queue_5.1-x86… Hardware testing ---------------- We booted each kernel and ran the following tests: aarch64: Host 1: ✅ Boot test [0] ✅ LTP lite [1] ✅ Loopdev Sanity [2] ✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility) [3] ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity [4] ✅ audit: audit testsuite test [5] ✅ httpd: mod_ssl smoke sanity [6] ✅ iotop: sanity [7] ✅ tuned: tune-processes-through-perf [8] ✅ Usex - version 1.9-29 [9] ✅ lvm thinp sanity [10] 🚧 ✅ Networking socket: fuzz [11] 🚧 ✅ storage: SCSI VPD [12] 🚧 ✅ storage: software RAID testing [13] 🚧 ✅ Libhugetlbfs - version 2.2.1 [14] Host 2: ✅ Boot test [0] ✅ xfstests: xfs [15] ✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite [16] ppc64le: ⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests from running on this architecture. This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested. s390x: Host 1: ✅ Boot test [0] ✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite [16] Host 2: ✅ Boot test [0] ✅ LTP lite [1] ✅ Loopdev Sanity [2] ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity [4] ✅ audit: audit testsuite test [5] ✅ httpd: mod_ssl smoke sanity [6] ✅ iotop: sanity [7] ✅ tuned: tune-processes-through-perf [8] ✅ lvm thinp sanity [10] 🚧 ✅ Networking socket: fuzz [11] 🚧 ✅ storage: software RAID testing [13] x86_64: ⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests from running on this architecture. This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested. Test source: 💚 Pull requests are welcome for new tests or improvements to existing tests! [0]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#distribution… [1]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#distribution… [2]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#filesystems/… [3]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#misc/amtu [4]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#/networking/… [5]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#packages/aud… [6]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#packages/htt… [7]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#packages/iot… [8]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#packages/tun… [9]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#standards/us… [10]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#storage/lvm/… [11]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#/networking/… [12]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#storage/scsi… [13]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#storage/swra… [14]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#vm/hugepage/… [15]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#/filesystems… [16]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#/packages/se… Waived tests (marked with 🚧) ----------------------------- This test run included waived tests. Such tests are executed but their results are not taken into account. Tests are waived when their results are not reliable enough, e.g. when they're just introduced or are being fixed.

5 years, 12 months

1
0
0 0

✅ PASS: Stable queue: queue-4.19

by CKI Project

Hello, We ran automated tests on a patchset that was proposed for merging into this kernel tree. The patches were applied to: Kernel repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git Commit: 768292d05361 - Linux 4.19.50 The results of these automated tests are provided below. Overall result: PASSED Merge: OK Compile: OK Tests: OK We hope that these logs can help you find the problem quickly. For the full detail on our testing procedures, please scroll to the bottom of this message. Please reply to this email if you have any questions about the tests that we ran or if you have any suggestions on how to make future tests more effective. ,-. ,-. ( C ) ( K ) Continuous `-',-.`-' Kernel ( I ) Integration `-' ______________________________________________________________________________ Merge testing ------------- We cloned this repository and checked out the following commit: Repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git Commit: 768292d05361 - Linux 4.19.50 We then merged the patchset with `git am`: rapidio-fix-a-null-pointer-dereference-when-create_w.patch fs-fat-file.c-issue-flush-after-the-writeback-of-fat.patch sysctl-return-einval-if-val-violates-minmax.patch ipc-prevent-lockup-on-alloc_msg-and-free_msg.patch drm-pl111-initialize-clock-spinlock-early.patch arm-prevent-tracing-ipi_cpu_backtrace.patch mm-hmm-select-mmu-notifier-when-selecting-hmm.patch hugetlbfs-on-restore-reserve-error-path-retain-subpo.patch mem-hotplug-fix-node-spanned-pages-when-we-have-a-no.patch mm-cma.c-fix-crash-on-cma-allocation-if-bitmap-alloc.patch initramfs-free-initrd-memory-if-opening-initrd.image.patch mm-cma.c-fix-the-bitmap-status-to-show-failed-alloca.patch mm-page_mkclean-vs-madv_dontneed-race.patch mm-cma_debug.c-fix-the-break-condition-in-cma_maxchu.patch mm-slab.c-fix-an-infinite-loop-in-leaks_show.patch kernel-sys.c-prctl-fix-false-positive-in-validate_pr.patch thermal-rcar_gen3_thermal-disable-interrupt-in-.remo.patch drivers-thermal-tsens-don-t-print-error-message-on-e.patch mfd-tps65912-spi-add-missing-of-table-registration.patch mfd-intel-lpss-set-the-device-in-reset-state-when-in.patch drm-nouveau-disp-dp-respect-sink-limits-when-selecti.patch mfd-twl6040-fix-device-init-errors-for-accctl-regist.patch perf-x86-intel-allow-pebs-multi-entry-in-watermark-m.patch drm-nouveau-kms-gf119-gp10x-push-headsetcontroloutpu.patch drm-bridge-adv7511-fix-low-refresh-rate-selection.patch objtool-don-t-use-ignore-flag-for-fake-jumps.patch drm-nouveau-kms-gv100-fix-spurious-window-immediate-.patch bpf-fix-undefined-behavior-in-narrow-load-handling.patch edac-mpc85xx-prevent-building-as-a-module.patch pwm-meson-use-the-spin-lock-only-to-protect-register.patch mailbox-stm32-ipcc-check-invalid-irq.patch ntp-allow-tai-utc-offset-to-be-set-to-zero.patch f2fs-fix-to-avoid-panic-in-do_recover_data.patch f2fs-fix-to-avoid-panic-in-f2fs_inplace_write_data.patch f2fs-fix-to-avoid-panic-in-f2fs_remove_inode_page.patch f2fs-fix-to-do-sanity-check-on-free-nid.patch f2fs-fix-to-clear-dirty-inode-in-error-path-of-f2fs_.patch f2fs-fix-to-avoid-panic-in-dec_valid_block_count.patch f2fs-fix-to-use-inline-space-only-if-inline_xattr-is.patch f2fs-fix-to-do-sanity-check-on-valid-block-count-of-.patch f2fs-fix-to-do-checksum-even-if-inode-page-is-uptoda.patch percpu-remove-spurious-lock-dependency-between-percp.patch configfs-fix-possible-use-after-free-in-configfs_reg.patch uml-fix-a-boot-splat-wrt-use-of-cpu_all_mask.patch pci-dwc-free-msi-in-dw_pcie_host_init-error-path.patch pci-dwc-free-msi-irq-page-in-dw_pcie_free_msi.patch ovl-do-not-generate-duplicate-fsnotify-events-for-fa.patch mmc-mmci-prevent-polling-for-busy-detection-in-irq-c.patch netfilter-nf_flow_table-fix-missing-error-check-for-.patch netfilter-nf_conntrack_h323-restore-boundary-check-c.patch mips-make-sure-dt-memory-regions-are-valid.patch netfilter-nf_tables-fix-base-chain-stat-rcu_derefere.patch watchdog-imx2_wdt-fix-set_timeout-for-big-timeout-va.patch watchdog-fix-compile-time-error-of-pretimeout-govern.patch blk-mq-move-cancel-of-requeue_work-into-blk_mq_relea.patch iommu-vt-d-set-intel_iommu_gfx_mapped-correctly.patch misc-pci_endpoint_test-fix-test_reg_bar-to-be-update.patch pci-designware-ep-use-aligned-atu-window-for-raising.patch nvme-pci-unquiesce-admin-queue-on-shutdown.patch nvme-pci-shutdown-on-timeout-during-deletion.patch netfilter-nf_flow_table-check-ttl-value-in-flow-offl.patch netfilter-nf_flow_table-fix-netdev-refcnt-leak.patch alsa-hda-register-irq-handler-after-the-chip-initial.patch nvmem-core-fix-read-buffer-in-place.patch nvmem-sunxi_sid-support-sid-on-a83t-and-h5.patch fuse-retrieve-cap-requested-size-to-negotiated-max_w.patch nfsd-allow-fh_want_write-to-be-called-twice.patch nfsd-avoid-uninitialized-variable-warning.patch vfio-fix-warning-do-not-call-blocking-ops-when-task_.patch iommu-arm-smmu-v3-don-t-disable-smmu-in-kdump-kernel.patch switchtec-fix-unintended-mask-of-mrpc-event.patch net-thunderbolt-unregister-thunderboltip-protocol-ha.patch x86-pci-fix-pci-irq-routing-table-memory-leak.patch i40e-queues-are-reserved-despite-invalid-argument-er.patch platform-chrome-cros_ec_proto-check-for-null-transfe.patch pci-keystone-prevent-arm32-specific-code-to-be-compi.patch soc-mediatek-pwrap-zero-initialize-rdata-in-pwrap_in.patch clk-rockchip-turn-on-aclk_dmac1-for-suspend-on-rk328.patch soc-rockchip-set-the-proper-pwm-for-rk3288.patch arm-dts-imx51-specify-imx5_clk_ipg-as-ahb-clock-to-s.patch arm-dts-imx50-specify-imx5_clk_ipg-as-ahb-clock-to-s.patch arm-dts-imx53-specify-imx5_clk_ipg-as-ahb-clock-to-s.patch arm-dts-imx6sx-specify-imx6sx_clk_ipg-as-ahb-clock-t.patch arm-dts-imx6sll-specify-imx6sll_clk_ipg-as-ipg-clock.patch arm-dts-imx7d-specify-imx7d_clk_ipg-as-ipg-clock-to-.patch arm-dts-imx6ul-specify-imx6ul_clk_ipg-as-ipg-clock-t.patch arm-dts-imx6sx-specify-imx6sx_clk_ipg-as-ipg-clock-t.patch arm-dts-imx6qdl-specify-imx6qdl_clk_ipg-as-ipg-clock.patch pci-rpadlpar-fix-leaked-device_node-references-in-ad.patch drm-amd-display-use-plane-color_space-for-dpp-if-spe.patch arm-omap2-pm33xx-core-do-not-turn-off-cefuse-as-ppa-.patch platform-x86-intel_pmc_ipc-adding-error-handling.patch power-supply-max14656-fix-potential-use-before-alloc.patch net-hns3-return-0-and-print-warning-when-hit-duplica.patch pci-rcar-fix-a-potential-null-pointer-dereference.patch pci-rcar-fix-64bit-msi-message-address-handling.patch scsi-qla2xxx-reset-the-fcf_async_-sent-active-flags.patch video-hgafb-fix-potential-null-pointer-dereference.patch video-imsttfb-fix-potential-null-pointer-dereference.patch block-bfq-increase-idling-for-weight-raised-queues.patch pci-xilinx-check-for-__get_free_pages-failure.patch gpio-gpio-omap-add-check-for-off-wake-capable-gpios.patch ice-add-missing-case-in-print_link_msg-for-printing-.patch dmaengine-idma64-use-actual-device-for-dma-transfers.patch pwm-tiehrpwm-update-shadow-register-for-disabling-pw.patch arm-dts-exynos-always-enable-necessary-apio_1v8-and-.patch pwm-fix-deadlock-warning-when-removing-pwm-device.patch arm-exynos-fix-undefined-instruction-during-exynos54.patch usb-typec-fusb302-check-vconn-is-off-when-we-start-t.patch soc-renesas-identify-r-car-m3-w-es1.3.patch gpio-vf610-do-not-share-irq_chip.patch percpu-do-not-search-past-bitmap-when-allocating-an-.patch revert-bluetooth-align-minimum-encryption-key-size-for-le-and-br-edr-connections.patch revert-drm-nouveau-add-kconfig-option-to-turn-off-nouveau-legacy-contexts.-v3.patch ovl-check-the-capability-before-cred-overridden.patch ovl-support-stacked-seek_hole-seek_data.patch drm-vc4-fix-fb-references-in-async-update.patch alsa-seq-cover-unsubscribe_port-in-list_mutex.patch Compile testing --------------- We compiled the kernel for 4 architectures: aarch64: build options: -j20 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg configuration: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/aarch64/kernel-stable_queue_4.19-a… kernel build: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/aarch64/kernel-stable_queue_4.19-a… ppc64le: build options: -j20 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg configuration: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/ppc64le/kernel-stable_queue_4.19-p… kernel build: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/ppc64le/kernel-stable_queue_4.19-p… s390x: build options: -j20 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg configuration: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/s390x/kernel-stable_queue_4.19-s39… kernel build: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/s390x/kernel-stable_queue_4.19-s39… x86_64: build options: -j20 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg configuration: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/x86_64/kernel-stable_queue_4.19-x8… kernel build: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/x86_64/kernel-stable_queue_4.19-x8… Hardware testing ---------------- We booted each kernel and ran the following tests: aarch64: Host 1: ✅ Boot test [0] ✅ LTP lite [1] ✅ Loopdev Sanity [2] ✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility) [3] ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity [4] ✅ audit: audit testsuite test [5] ✅ httpd: mod_ssl smoke sanity [6] ✅ iotop: sanity [7] ✅ tuned: tune-processes-through-perf [8] ✅ Usex - version 1.9-29 [9] ✅ lvm thinp sanity [10] 🚧 ✅ Networking socket: fuzz [11] 🚧 ✅ storage: SCSI VPD [12] 🚧 ✅ storage: software RAID testing [13] 🚧 ✅ Libhugetlbfs - version 2.2.1 [14] Host 2: ✅ Boot test [0] ✅ xfstests: xfs [15] ✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite [16] ppc64le: ⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests from running on this architecture. This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested. s390x: Host 1: ✅ Boot test [0] ✅ LTP lite [1] ✅ Loopdev Sanity [2] ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity [4] ✅ audit: audit testsuite test [5] ✅ httpd: mod_ssl smoke sanity [6] ✅ iotop: sanity [7] ✅ tuned: tune-processes-through-perf [8] ✅ lvm thinp sanity [10] 🚧 ✅ Networking socket: fuzz [11] 🚧 ✅ storage: software RAID testing [13] Host 2: ✅ Boot test [0] ✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite [16] x86_64: Host 1: ✅ Boot test [0] ✅ LTP lite [1] ✅ Loopdev Sanity [2] ✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility) [3] ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity [4] ✅ audit: audit testsuite test [5] ✅ httpd: mod_ssl smoke sanity [6] ✅ iotop: sanity [7] ✅ tuned: tune-processes-through-perf [8] ✅ Usex - version 1.9-29 [9] ✅ lvm thinp sanity [10] 🚧 ✅ Networking socket: fuzz [11] 🚧 ✅ storage: SCSI VPD [12] 🚧 ✅ storage: software RAID testing [13] 🚧 ✅ Libhugetlbfs - version 2.2.1 [14] Host 2: ✅ Boot test [0] ✅ xfstests: xfs [15] ✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite [16] Test source: 💚 Pull requests are welcome for new tests or improvements to existing tests! [0]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#distribution… [1]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#distribution… [2]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#filesystems/… [3]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#misc/amtu [4]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#/networking/… [5]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#packages/aud… [6]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#packages/htt… [7]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#packages/iot… [8]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#packages/tun… [9]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#standards/us… [10]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#storage/lvm/… [11]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#/networking/… [12]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#storage/scsi… [13]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#storage/swra… [14]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#vm/hugepage/… [15]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#/filesystems… [16]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#/packages/se… Waived tests (marked with 🚧) ----------------------------- This test run included waived tests. Such tests are executed but their results are not taken into account. Tests are waived when their results are not reliable enough, e.g. when they're just introduced or are being fixed.

5 years, 12 months

1
0
0 0

✅ PASS: Stable queue: queue-5.1

by CKI Project

Hello, We ran automated tests on a patchset that was proposed for merging into this kernel tree. The patches were applied to: Kernel repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git Commit: 2df16141a2c4 - Linux 5.1.9 The results of these automated tests are provided below. Overall result: PASSED Merge: OK Compile: OK Tests: OK We hope that these logs can help you find the problem quickly. For the full detail on our testing procedures, please scroll to the bottom of this message. Please reply to this email if you have any questions about the tests that we ran or if you have any suggestions on how to make future tests more effective. ,-. ,-. ( C ) ( K ) Continuous `-',-.`-' Kernel ( I ) Integration `-' ______________________________________________________________________________ Merge testing ------------- We cloned this repository and checked out the following commit: Repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git Commit: 2df16141a2c4 - Linux 5.1.9 We then merged the patchset with `git am`: revert-drm-allow-render-capable-master-with-drm_auth.patch media-rockchip-vpu-fix-re-order-probe-error-remove-p.patch media-rockchip-vpu-add-missing-dont_use_autosuspend-.patch rapidio-fix-a-null-pointer-dereference-when-create_w.patch fs-fat-file.c-issue-flush-after-the-writeback-of-fat.patch sysctl-return-einval-if-val-violates-minmax.patch ipc-prevent-lockup-on-alloc_msg-and-free_msg.patch drm-msm-correct-attempted-null-pointer-dereference-i.patch drm-pl111-initialize-clock-spinlock-early.patch mm-mprotect.c-fix-compilation-warning-because-of-unu.patch arm-prevent-tracing-ipi_cpu_backtrace.patch mm-hmm-select-mmu-notifier-when-selecting-hmm.patch hugetlbfs-on-restore-reserve-error-path-retain-subpo.patch mm-memory_hotplug-release-memory-resource-after-arch.patch mem-hotplug-fix-node-spanned-pages-when-we-have-a-no.patch mm-cma.c-fix-crash-on-cma-allocation-if-bitmap-alloc.patch initramfs-free-initrd-memory-if-opening-initrd.image.patch mm-compaction.c-fix-an-undefined-behaviour.patch mm-memory_hotplug.c-fix-the-wrong-usage-of-n_high_me.patch mm-cma.c-fix-the-bitmap-status-to-show-failed-alloca.patch mm-page_mkclean-vs-madv_dontneed-race.patch mm-cma_debug.c-fix-the-break-condition-in-cma_maxchu.patch mm-slab.c-fix-an-infinite-loop-in-leaks_show.patch kernel-sys.c-prctl-fix-false-positive-in-validate_pr.patch thermal-rcar_gen3_thermal-disable-interrupt-in-.remo.patch drivers-thermal-tsens-don-t-print-error-message-on-e.patch mfd-tps65912-spi-add-missing-of-table-registration.patch mfd-intel-lpss-set-the-device-in-reset-state-when-in.patch drm-nouveau-disp-dp-respect-sink-limits-when-selecti.patch mfd-twl6040-fix-device-init-errors-for-accctl-regist.patch perf-x86-intel-allow-pebs-multi-entry-in-watermark-m.patch drm-nouveau-kms-gf119-gp10x-push-headsetcontroloutpu.patch drm-nouveau-fix-duplication-of-nv50_head_atom-struct.patch drm-bridge-adv7511-fix-low-refresh-rate-selection.patch objtool-don-t-use-ignore-flag-for-fake-jumps.patch drm-nouveau-kms-gv100-fix-spurious-window-immediate-.patch bpf-fix-undefined-behavior-in-narrow-load-handling.patch edac-mpc85xx-prevent-building-as-a-module.patch pwm-meson-use-the-spin-lock-only-to-protect-register.patch mailbox-stm32-ipcc-check-invalid-irq.patch ntp-allow-tai-utc-offset-to-be-set-to-zero.patch f2fs-fix-to-avoid-panic-in-do_recover_data.patch f2fs-fix-to-avoid-panic-in-f2fs_inplace_write_data.patch f2fs-fix-error-path-of-recovery.patch f2fs-fix-to-avoid-panic-in-f2fs_remove_inode_page.patch f2fs-fix-to-do-sanity-check-on-free-nid.patch f2fs-fix-to-clear-dirty-inode-in-error-path-of-f2fs_.patch f2fs-fix-to-avoid-panic-in-dec_valid_block_count.patch f2fs-fix-to-use-inline-space-only-if-inline_xattr-is.patch f2fs-fix-to-avoid-panic-in-dec_valid_node_count.patch f2fs-fix-to-do-sanity-check-on-valid-block-count-of-.patch f2fs-fix-to-avoid-deadloop-in-foreground-gc.patch f2fs-fix-to-retrieve-inline-xattr-space.patch f2fs-fix-to-do-checksum-even-if-inode-page-is-uptoda.patch media-atmel-atmel-isc-fix-asd-memory-allocation.patch percpu-remove-spurious-lock-dependency-between-percp.patch configfs-fix-possible-use-after-free-in-configfs_reg.patch uml-fix-a-boot-splat-wrt-use-of-cpu_all_mask.patch pci-dwc-free-msi-in-dw_pcie_host_init-error-path.patch pci-dwc-free-msi-irq-page-in-dw_pcie_free_msi.patch fbcon-don-t-reset-logo_shown-when-logo-is-currently-.patch ovl-do-not-generate-duplicate-fsnotify-events-for-fa.patch mmc-mmci-prevent-polling-for-busy-detection-in-irq-c.patch netfilter-nf_flow_table-fix-missing-error-check-for-.patch netfilter-nf_conntrack_h323-restore-boundary-check-c.patch mips-make-sure-dt-memory-regions-are-valid.patch netfilter-nf_tables-fix-base-chain-stat-rcu_derefere.patch watchdog-imx2_wdt-fix-set_timeout-for-big-timeout-va.patch watchdog-fix-compile-time-error-of-pretimeout-govern.patch blk-mq-move-cancel-of-requeue_work-into-blk_mq_relea.patch iommu-vt-d-set-intel_iommu_gfx_mapped-correctly.patch vfio-pci-nvlink2-fix-potential-vma-leak.patch misc-pci_endpoint_test-fix-test_reg_bar-to-be-update.patch pci-designware-ep-use-aligned-atu-window-for-raising.patch nvme-pci-unquiesce-admin-queue-on-shutdown.patch nvme-pci-shutdown-on-timeout-during-deletion.patch netfilter-nf_flow_table-check-ttl-value-in-flow-offl.patch netfilter-nf_flow_table-fix-netdev-refcnt-leak.patch alsa-hda-register-irq-handler-after-the-chip-initial.patch powerpc-pseries-track-lmb-nid-instead-of-using-devic.patch arm64-defconfig-update-ufshcd-for-hi3660-soc.patch iommu-vt-d-don-t-request-page-request-irq-under-dmar.patch nvmem-core-fix-read-buffer-in-place.patch nvmem-sunxi_sid-support-sid-on-a83t-and-h5.patch fuse-retrieve-cap-requested-size-to-negotiated-max_w.patch nfsd-allow-fh_want_write-to-be-called-twice.patch nfsd-avoid-uninitialized-variable-warning.patch vfio-fix-warning-do-not-call-blocking-ops-when-task_.patch iommu-arm-smmu-v3-don-t-disable-smmu-in-kdump-kernel.patch switchtec-fix-unintended-mask-of-mrpc-event.patch net-thunderbolt-unregister-thunderboltip-protocol-ha.patch x86-pci-fix-pci-irq-routing-table-memory-leak.patch soc-tegra-pmc-remove-reset-sysfs-entries-on-error.patch i40e-queues-are-reserved-despite-invalid-argument-er.patch power-supply-cpcap-battery-fix-signed-counter-sample.patch platform-chrome-cros_ec_proto-check-for-null-transfe.patch pci-keystone-invoke-phy_reset-api-before-enabling-ph.patch pci-keystone-prevent-arm32-specific-code-to-be-compi.patch soc-mediatek-pwrap-zero-initialize-rdata-in-pwrap_in.patch clk-rockchip-turn-on-aclk_dmac1-for-suspend-on-rk328.patch usb-ohci-da8xx-disable-the-regulator-if-the-overcurr.patch iommu-vt-d-flush-iotlb-for-untrusted-device-in-time.patch soc-rockchip-set-the-proper-pwm-for-rk3288.patch arm64-dts-imx8mq-mark-iomuxc_gpr-as-i.mx6q-compatibl.patch arm-dts-imx51-specify-imx5_clk_ipg-as-ahb-clock-to-s.patch arm-dts-imx50-specify-imx5_clk_ipg-as-ahb-clock-to-s.patch arm-dts-imx53-specify-imx5_clk_ipg-as-ahb-clock-to-s.patch arm-dts-imx6sx-specify-imx6sx_clk_ipg-as-ahb-clock-t.patch arm-dts-imx6sll-specify-imx6sll_clk_ipg-as-ipg-clock.patch arm-dts-imx7d-specify-imx7d_clk_ipg-as-ipg-clock-to-.patch arm-dts-imx6ul-specify-imx6ul_clk_ipg-as-ipg-clock-t.patch arm-dts-imx6sx-specify-imx6sx_clk_ipg-as-ipg-clock-t.patch arm-dts-imx6qdl-specify-imx6qdl_clk_ipg-as-ipg-clock.patch pci-rpadlpar-fix-leaked-device_node-references-in-ad.patch drm-amd-display-disable-link-before-changing-link-se.patch drm-amd-display-use-plane-color_space-for-dpp-if-spe.patch arm-omap2-pm33xx-core-do-not-turn-off-cefuse-as-ppa-.patch pinctrl-pinctrl-intel-move-gpio-suspend-resume-to-no.patch platform-x86-intel_pmc_ipc-adding-error-handling.patch power-supply-max14656-fix-potential-use-before-alloc.patch f2fs-fix-potential-recursive-call-when-enabling-data.patch net-hns3-return-0-and-print-warning-when-hit-duplica.patch pci-dwc-remove-default-msi-initialization-for-platfo.patch pci-rcar-fix-a-potential-null-pointer-dereference.patch pci-rcar-fix-64bit-msi-message-address-handling.patch scsi-qla2xxx-reset-the-fcf_async_-sent-active-flags.patch input-goodix-add-gt5663-ctp-support.patch video-hgafb-fix-potential-null-pointer-dereference.patch video-imsttfb-fix-potential-null-pointer-dereference.patch block-bfq-increase-idling-for-weight-raised-queues.patch pci-xilinx-check-for-__get_free_pages-failure.patch arm64-dts-qcom-qcs404-fix-regulator-supply-names.patch gpio-gpio-omap-add-check-for-off-wake-capable-gpios.patch gpio-gpio-omap-limit-errata-1.101-handling-to-wkup-d.patch ice-add-missing-case-in-print_link_msg-for-printing-.patch media-v4l2-ctrl-v4l2_ctrl_request_setup-returns-with.patch batman-adv-adjust-name-for-batadv_dat_send_data.patch ice-enable-lan_en-for-the-right-recipes.patch ice-do-not-set-lb_en-for-prune-switch-rules.patch dmaengine-idma64-use-actual-device-for-dma-transfers.patch pwm-tiehrpwm-update-shadow-register-for-disabling-pw.patch media-v4l2-fwnode-defaults-may-not-override-endpoint.patch arm-dts-exynos-always-enable-necessary-apio_1v8-and-.patch pwm-fix-deadlock-warning-when-removing-pwm-device.patch arm-exynos-fix-undefined-instruction-during-exynos54.patch usb-typec-fusb302-check-vconn-is-off-when-we-start-t.patch soc-renesas-identify-r-car-m3-w-es1.3.patch arm-shmobile-porter-enable-r-car-gen2-regulator-quir.patch gpio-vf610-do-not-share-irq_chip.patch percpu-do-not-search-past-bitmap-when-allocating-an-.patch revert-bluetooth-align-minimum-encryption-key-size-for-le-and-br-edr-connections.patch revert-drm-nouveau-add-kconfig-option-to-turn-off-nouveau-legacy-contexts.-v3.patch ovl-check-the-capability-before-cred-overridden.patch ovl-support-stacked-seek_hole-seek_data.patch alsa-seq-cover-unsubscribe_port-in-list_mutex.patch io_uring-fix-failure-to-verify-sq_aff-cpu.patch Compile testing --------------- We compiled the kernel for 4 architectures: aarch64: build options: -j20 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg configuration: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/aarch64/kernel-stable_queue_5.1-aa… kernel build: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/aarch64/kernel-stable_queue_5.1-aa… ppc64le: build options: -j20 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg configuration: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/ppc64le/kernel-stable_queue_5.1-pp… kernel build: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/ppc64le/kernel-stable_queue_5.1-pp… s390x: build options: -j20 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg configuration: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/s390x/kernel-stable_queue_5.1-s390… kernel build: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/s390x/kernel-stable_queue_5.1-s390… x86_64: build options: -j20 INSTALL_MOD_STRIP=1 targz-pkg configuration: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/x86_64/kernel-stable_queue_5.1-x86… kernel build: https://artifacts.cki-project.org/builds/x86_64/kernel-stable_queue_5.1-x86… Hardware testing ---------------- We booted each kernel and ran the following tests: aarch64: Host 1: ✅ Boot test [0] ✅ xfstests: xfs [1] ✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite [2] Host 2: ✅ Boot test [0] ✅ LTP lite [3] ✅ Loopdev Sanity [4] ✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility) [5] ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity [6] ✅ audit: audit testsuite test [7] ✅ httpd: mod_ssl smoke sanity [8] ✅ iotop: sanity [9] ✅ tuned: tune-processes-through-perf [10] ✅ Usex - version 1.9-29 [11] ✅ lvm thinp sanity [12] 🚧 ✅ Networking socket: fuzz [13] 🚧 ✅ storage: SCSI VPD [14] 🚧 ✅ storage: software RAID testing [15] 🚧 ✅ Libhugetlbfs - version 2.2.1 [16] ppc64le: ⚡ Internal infrastructure issues prevented one or more tests from running on this architecture. This is not the fault of the kernel that was tested. s390x: Host 1: ✅ Boot test [0] ✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite [2] Host 2: ✅ Boot test [0] ✅ LTP lite [3] ✅ Loopdev Sanity [4] ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity [6] ✅ audit: audit testsuite test [7] ✅ httpd: mod_ssl smoke sanity [8] ✅ iotop: sanity [9] ✅ tuned: tune-processes-through-perf [10] ✅ lvm thinp sanity [12] 🚧 ✅ Networking socket: fuzz [13] 🚧 ✅ storage: software RAID testing [15] x86_64: Host 1: ✅ Boot test [0] ✅ LTP lite [3] ✅ Loopdev Sanity [4] ✅ AMTU (Abstract Machine Test Utility) [5] ✅ Ethernet drivers sanity [6] ✅ audit: audit testsuite test [7] ✅ httpd: mod_ssl smoke sanity [8] ✅ iotop: sanity [9] ✅ tuned: tune-processes-through-perf [10] ✅ Usex - version 1.9-29 [11] ✅ lvm thinp sanity [12] 🚧 ✅ Networking socket: fuzz [13] 🚧 ✅ storage: SCSI VPD [14] 🚧 ✅ storage: software RAID testing [15] 🚧 ✅ Libhugetlbfs - version 2.2.1 [16] Host 2: ✅ Boot test [0] ✅ xfstests: xfs [1] ✅ selinux-policy: serge-testsuite [2] Test source: 💚 Pull requests are welcome for new tests or improvements to existing tests! [0]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#distribution… [1]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#/filesystems… [2]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#/packages/se… [3]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#distribution… [4]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#filesystems/… [5]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#misc/amtu [6]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#/networking/… [7]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#packages/aud… [8]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#packages/htt… [9]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#packages/iot… [10]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#packages/tun… [11]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#standards/us… [12]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#storage/lvm/… [13]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#/networking/… [14]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#storage/scsi… [15]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#storage/swra… [16]: https://github.com/CKI-project/tests-beaker/archive/master.zip#vm/hugepage/… Waived tests (marked with 🚧) ----------------------------- This test run included waived tests. Such tests are executed but their results are not taken into account. Tests are waived when their results are not reliable enough, e.g. when they're just introduced or are being fixed.

5 years, 12 months

1
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Linux-stable-mirror June 2019