November 2019 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH v2 1/2] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Free previous EQ page when setting up a new one

by Greg Kurz

The EQ page is allocated by the guest and then passed to the hypervisor with the H_INT_SET_QUEUE_CONFIG hcall. A reference is taken on the page before handing it over to the HW. This reference is dropped either when the guest issues the H_INT_RESET hcall or when the KVM device is released. But, the guest can legitimately call H_INT_SET_QUEUE_CONFIG several times, either to reset the EQ (vCPU hot unplug) or to set a new EQ (guest reboot). In both cases the existing EQ page reference is leaked because we simply overwrite it in the XIVE queue structure without calling put_page(). This is especially visible when the guest memory is backed with huge pages: start a VM up to the guest userspace, either reboot it or unplug a vCPU, quit QEMU. The leak is observed by comparing the value of HugePages_Free in /proc/meminfo before and after the VM is run. Ideally we'd want the XIVE code to handle the EQ page de-allocation at the platform level. This isn't the case right now because the various XIVE drivers have different allocation needs. It could maybe worth introducing hooks for this purpose instead of exposing XIVE internals to the drivers, but this is certainly a huge work to be done later. In the meantime, for easier backport, fix both vCPU unplug and guest reboot leaks by introducing a wrapper around xive_native_configure_queue() that does the necessary cleanup. Reported-by: Satheesh Rajendran <sathnaga(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.2 Fixes: 13ce3297c576 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Add controls for the EQ configuration") Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg(a)kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug(a)kaod.org> --- v2: use wrapper as suggested by Cedric --- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_xive_native.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_xive_native.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_xive_native.c index 34bd123fa024..0e1fc5a16729 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_xive_native.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_xive_native.c @@ -50,6 +50,24 @@ static void kvmppc_xive_native_cleanup_queue(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int prio) } } +static int kvmppc_xive_native_configure_queue(u32 vp_id, struct xive_q *q, + u8 prio, __be32 *qpage, + u32 order, bool can_escalate) +{ + int rc; + __be32 *qpage_prev = q->qpage; + + rc = xive_native_configure_queue(vp_id, q, prio, qpage, order, + can_escalate); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (qpage_prev) + put_page(virt_to_page(qpage_prev)); + + return rc; +} + void kvmppc_xive_native_cleanup_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct kvmppc_xive_vcpu *xc = vcpu->arch.xive_vcpu; @@ -575,19 +593,14 @@ static int kvmppc_xive_native_set_queue_config(struct kvmppc_xive *xive, q->guest_qaddr = 0; q->guest_qshift = 0; - rc = xive_native_configure_queue(xc->vp_id, q, priority, - NULL, 0, true); + rc = kvmppc_xive_native_configure_queue(xc->vp_id, q, priority, + NULL, 0, true); if (rc) { pr_err("Failed to reset queue %d for VCPU %d: %d\n", priority, xc->server_num, rc); return rc; } - if (q->qpage) { - put_page(virt_to_page(q->qpage)); - q->qpage = NULL; - } - return 0; } @@ -646,8 +659,8 @@ static int kvmppc_xive_native_set_queue_config(struct kvmppc_xive *xive, * OPAL level because the use of END ESBs is not supported by * Linux. */ - rc = xive_native_configure_queue(xc->vp_id, q, priority, - (__be32 *) qaddr, kvm_eq.qshift, true); + rc = kvmppc_xive_native_configure_queue(xc->vp_id, q, priority, + (__be32 *) qaddr, kvm_eq.qshift, true); if (rc) { pr_err("Failed to configure queue %d for VCPU %d: %d\n", priority, xc->server_num, rc);

6 years

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[PATCH] Smack: check length in smk_set_cipso()

by Denis Efremov

It's possible to trigger out-of-bounds read in smk_set_cipso(). For example (from root): $ echo "test 1" > /sys/fs/smackfs/cipso2 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in vsscanf+0x2203/0x2990 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888061b023c9 by task bash/5578 The patch adds length checks for SMK_LONG_FMT format. The bug was found by syzkaller. Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris(a)namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge(a)hallyn.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov(a)linux.com> --- security/smack/smackfs.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index e3e05c04dbd1..fad50a5a807b 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -878,6 +878,9 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, else rule += strlen(skp->smk_known) + 1; + if (rule - data + 2 * SMK_DIGITLEN - 1 >= count) + goto out; + ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &maplevel); if (ret != 1 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL) goto out; @@ -887,15 +890,19 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (ret != 1 || catlen > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM) goto out; - if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT && - count != (SMK_CIPSOMIN + catlen * SMK_DIGITLEN)) + rule += SMK_DIGITLEN; + + if ((format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT && + count != (SMK_CIPSOMIN + catlen * SMK_DIGITLEN)) || + (format == SMK_LONG_FMT && + count != (rule - data + catlen * SMK_DIGITLEN))) goto out; memset(mapcatset, 0, sizeof(mapcatset)); for (i = 0; i < catlen; i++) { - rule += SMK_DIGITLEN; ret = sscanf(rule, "%u", &cat); + rule += SMK_DIGITLEN; if (ret != 1 || cat > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM) goto out; -- 2.21.0

6 years

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[GIT PULL 1/3] intel_th: Fix a double put_device() in error path

by Alexander Shishkin

Commit a753bfcfdb1f ("intel_th: Make the switch allocate its subdevices") factored out intel_th_subdevice_alloc() from intel_th_populate(), but got the error path wrong, resulting in two instances of a double put_device() on a freshly initialized, but not 'added' device. Fix this by only doing one put_device() in the error path. Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin(a)linux.intel.com> Fixes: a753bfcfdb1f ("intel_th: Make the switch allocate its subdevices") Reported-by: Wen Yang <wenyang(a)linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v4.14+ --- drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/core.c | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/core.c b/drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/core.c index d5c1821b31c6..0dfd97bbde9e 100644 --- a/drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/core.c +++ b/drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/core.c @@ -649,10 +649,8 @@ intel_th_subdevice_alloc(struct intel_th *th, } err = intel_th_device_add_resources(thdev, res, subdev->nres); - if (err) { - put_device(&thdev->dev); + if (err) goto fail_put_device; - } if (subdev->type == INTEL_TH_OUTPUT) { if (subdev->mknode) @@ -667,10 +665,8 @@ intel_th_subdevice_alloc(struct intel_th *th, } err = device_add(&thdev->dev); - if (err) { - put_device(&thdev->dev); + if (err) goto fail_free_res; - } /* need switch driver to be loaded to enumerate the rest */ if (subdev->type == INTEL_TH_SWITCH && !req) { -- 2.24.0

6 years

2
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[GIT PULL 3/3] intel_th: pci: Add Tiger Lake CPU support

by Alexander Shishkin

This adds support for the Trace Hub in Tiger Lake CPU. Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c b/drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c index 04a956ece9f7..f777192890d2 100644 --- a/drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c +++ b/drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c @@ -209,6 +209,11 @@ static const struct pci_device_id intel_th_pci_id_table[] = { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x8a29), .driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x, }, + { + /* Tiger Lake CPU */ + PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x9a33), + .driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x, + }, { /* Tiger Lake PCH */ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0xa0a6), -- 2.24.0

6 years

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[GIT PULL 2/3] intel_th: pci: Add Ice Lake CPU support

by Alexander Shishkin

This adds support for the Trace Hub in Ice Lake CPU. Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c b/drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c index 91dfeba62485..04a956ece9f7 100644 --- a/drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c +++ b/drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c @@ -204,6 +204,11 @@ static const struct pci_device_id intel_th_pci_id_table[] = { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x45c5), .driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x, }, + { + /* Ice Lake CPU */ + PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x8a29), + .driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x, + }, { /* Tiger Lake PCH */ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0xa0a6), -- 2.24.0

6 years

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[PATCH] iwlmvm: don't send the IWL_MVM_RXQ_NSSN_SYNC notif to Rx queues

by Emmanuel Grumbach

The purpose of this was to keep all the queues updated with the Rx sequence numbers because unlikely yet possible situations where queues can't understand if a specific packet needs to be dropped or not. Unfortunately, it was reported that this caused issues in our DMA engine. We don't fully understand how this is related, but this is being currently debugged. For now, just don't send this notification to the Rx queues. This de-facto reverts my commit 3c514bf831ac12356b695ff054bef641b9e99593: iwlwifi: mvm: add a loose synchronization of the NSSN across Rx queues This issue was reported here: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204873 https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205001 and others maybe. Fixes: 3c514bf831ac ("iwlwifi: mvm: add a loose synchronization of the NSSN across Rx queues") CC: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 5.3+ Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach(a)intel.com> --- drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/rxmq.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/rxmq.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/rxmq.c index 75a7af5ad7b2..8925fe5976cb 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/rxmq.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/rxmq.c @@ -521,7 +521,11 @@ static void iwl_mvm_sync_nssn(struct iwl_mvm *mvm, u8 baid, u16 nssn) .nssn_sync.nssn = nssn, }; - iwl_mvm_sync_rx_queues_internal(mvm, (void *)&notif, sizeof(notif)); + /* + * This allow to synchronize the queues, but it has been reported + * to cause FH issues. Don't send the notification for now. + * iwl_mvm_sync_rx_queues_internal(mvm, (void *)&notif, sizeof(notif)); + */ } #define RX_REORDER_BUF_TIMEOUT_MQ (HZ / 10) -- 2.17.1

6 years

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[PATCH v2] fork: fix pidfd_poll()'s return type

by Luc Van Oostenryck

pidfd_poll() is defined as returning 'unsigned int' but the .poll method is declared as returning '__poll_t', a bitwise type. Fix this by using the proper return type and using the EPOLL constants instead of the POLL ones, as required for __poll_t. Fixes: b53b0b9d9a61 ("pidfd: add polling support") Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel(a)joelfernandes.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian(a)brauner.io> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.3 Signed-off-by: Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner(a)ubuntu.com> --- kernel/fork.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 55af6931c6ec..13b38794efb5 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -1708,11 +1708,11 @@ static void pidfd_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *f) /* * Poll support for process exit notification. */ -static unsigned int pidfd_poll(struct file *file, struct poll_table_struct *pts) +static __poll_t pidfd_poll(struct file *file, struct poll_table_struct *pts) { struct task_struct *task; struct pid *pid = file->private_data; - int poll_flags = 0; + __poll_t poll_flags = 0; poll_wait(file, &pid->wait_pidfd, pts); @@ -1724,7 +1724,7 @@ static unsigned int pidfd_poll(struct file *file, struct poll_table_struct *pts) * group, then poll(2) should block, similar to the wait(2) family. */ if (!task || (task->exit_state && thread_group_empty(task))) - poll_flags = POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; + poll_flags = EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM; rcu_read_unlock(); return poll_flags; -- 2.24.0

6 years

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[tip: locking/core] futex: Prevent exit livelock

by tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner

The following commit has been merged into the locking/core branch of tip: Commit-ID: 3ef240eaff36b8119ac9e2ea17cbf41179c930ba Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/3ef240eaff36b8119ac9e2ea17cbf41179c930ba Author: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> AuthorDate: Wed, 06 Nov 2019 22:55:46 +01:00 Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> CommitterDate: Wed, 20 Nov 2019 09:40:38 +01:00 futex: Prevent exit livelock Oleg provided the following test case: int main(void) { struct sched_param sp = {}; sp.sched_priority = 2; assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0); int lock = vfork(); if (!lock) { sp.sched_priority = 1; assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0); _exit(0); } syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0); return 0; } This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is: parent child set FIFO prio 2 vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1 implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...) exit() do_exit() .... mm_release() tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING; exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case) complete() --> wakes parent sys_futex() loop infinite because tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well: task holds futex ... do_exit() tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING; --> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer) switch_to(other_task) return to user sys_futex() loop infinite as above Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD. To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so: - A refcount is held on the task - The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location - The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state is consistent and can be reevaluated. This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions. For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538 are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for those kernels are definitely not stable material. Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems") Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Stable Team <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de --- kernel/futex.c | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 91 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c index 4f9d7a4..03c518e 100644 --- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -1176,6 +1176,36 @@ out_error: return ret; } +/** + * wait_for_owner_exiting - Block until the owner has exited + * @exiting: Pointer to the exiting task + * + * Caller must hold a refcount on @exiting. + */ +static void wait_for_owner_exiting(int ret, struct task_struct *exiting) +{ + if (ret != -EBUSY) { + WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting); + return; + } + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret == -EBUSY && !exiting)) + return; + + mutex_lock(&exiting->futex_exit_mutex); + /* + * No point in doing state checking here. If the waiter got here + * while the task was in exec()->exec_futex_release() then it can + * have any FUTEX_STATE_* value when the waiter has acquired the + * mutex. OK, if running, EXITING or DEAD if it reached exit() + * already. Highly unlikely and not a problem. Just one more round + * through the futex maze. + */ + mutex_unlock(&exiting->futex_exit_mutex); + + put_task_struct(exiting); +} + static int handle_exit_race(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, struct task_struct *tsk) { @@ -1237,7 +1267,8 @@ static int handle_exit_race(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, * it after doing proper sanity checks. */ static int attach_to_pi_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, union futex_key *key, - struct futex_pi_state **ps) + struct futex_pi_state **ps, + struct task_struct **exiting) { pid_t pid = uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK; struct futex_pi_state *pi_state; @@ -1276,7 +1307,19 @@ static int attach_to_pi_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, union futex_key *key, int ret = handle_exit_race(uaddr, uval, p); raw_spin_unlock_irq(&p->pi_lock); - put_task_struct(p); + /* + * If the owner task is between FUTEX_STATE_EXITING and + * FUTEX_STATE_DEAD then store the task pointer and keep + * the reference on the task struct. The calling code will + * drop all locks, wait for the task to reach + * FUTEX_STATE_DEAD and then drop the refcount. This is + * required to prevent a live lock when the current task + * preempted the exiting task between the two states. + */ + if (ret == -EBUSY) + *exiting = p; + else + put_task_struct(p); return ret; } @@ -1315,7 +1358,8 @@ static int attach_to_pi_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, union futex_key *key, static int lookup_pi_state(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, - union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps) + union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps, + struct task_struct **exiting) { struct futex_q *top_waiter = futex_top_waiter(hb, key); @@ -1330,7 +1374,7 @@ static int lookup_pi_state(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, * We are the first waiter - try to look up the owner based on * @uval and attach to it. */ - return attach_to_pi_owner(uaddr, uval, key, ps); + return attach_to_pi_owner(uaddr, uval, key, ps, exiting); } static int lock_pi_update_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval) @@ -1358,6 +1402,8 @@ static int lock_pi_update_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval) * lookup * @task: the task to perform the atomic lock work for. This will * be "current" except in the case of requeue pi. + * @exiting: Pointer to store the task pointer of the owner task + * which is in the middle of exiting * @set_waiters: force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS bit (1) or not (0) * * Return: @@ -1366,11 +1412,17 @@ static int lock_pi_update_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval) * - <0 - error * * The hb->lock and futex_key refs shall be held by the caller. + * + * @exiting is only set when the return value is -EBUSY. If so, this holds + * a refcount on the exiting task on return and the caller needs to drop it + * after waiting for the exit to complete. */ static int futex_lock_pi_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps, - struct task_struct *task, int set_waiters) + struct task_struct *task, + struct task_struct **exiting, + int set_waiters) { u32 uval, newval, vpid = task_pid_vnr(task); struct futex_q *top_waiter; @@ -1440,7 +1492,7 @@ static int futex_lock_pi_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, * attach to the owner. If that fails, no harm done, we only * set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit in the user space variable. */ - return attach_to_pi_owner(uaddr, newval, key, ps); + return attach_to_pi_owner(uaddr, newval, key, ps, exiting); } /** @@ -1858,6 +1910,8 @@ void requeue_pi_wake_futex(struct futex_q *q, union futex_key *key, * @key1: the from futex key * @key2: the to futex key * @ps: address to store the pi_state pointer + * @exiting: Pointer to store the task pointer of the owner task + * which is in the middle of exiting * @set_waiters: force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS bit (1) or not (0) * * Try and get the lock on behalf of the top waiter if we can do it atomically. @@ -1865,16 +1919,20 @@ void requeue_pi_wake_futex(struct futex_q *q, union futex_key *key, * then direct futex_lock_pi_atomic() to force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS bit. * hb1 and hb2 must be held by the caller. * + * @exiting is only set when the return value is -EBUSY. If so, this holds + * a refcount on the exiting task on return and the caller needs to drop it + * after waiting for the exit to complete. + * * Return: * - 0 - failed to acquire the lock atomically; * - >0 - acquired the lock, return value is vpid of the top_waiter * - <0 - error */ -static int futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(u32 __user *pifutex, - struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1, - struct futex_hash_bucket *hb2, - union futex_key *key1, union futex_key *key2, - struct futex_pi_state **ps, int set_waiters) +static int +futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(u32 __user *pifutex, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1, + struct futex_hash_bucket *hb2, union futex_key *key1, + union futex_key *key2, struct futex_pi_state **ps, + struct task_struct **exiting, int set_waiters) { struct futex_q *top_waiter = NULL; u32 curval; @@ -1911,7 +1969,7 @@ static int futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(u32 __user *pifutex, */ vpid = task_pid_vnr(top_waiter->task); ret = futex_lock_pi_atomic(pifutex, hb2, key2, ps, top_waiter->task, - set_waiters); + exiting, set_waiters); if (ret == 1) { requeue_pi_wake_futex(top_waiter, key2, hb2); return vpid; @@ -2040,6 +2098,8 @@ retry_private: } if (requeue_pi && (task_count - nr_wake < nr_requeue)) { + struct task_struct *exiting = NULL; + /* * Attempt to acquire uaddr2 and wake the top waiter. If we * intend to requeue waiters, force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS @@ -2047,7 +2107,8 @@ retry_private: * faults rather in the requeue loop below. */ ret = futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(uaddr2, hb1, hb2, &key1, - &key2, &pi_state, nr_requeue); + &key2, &pi_state, + &exiting, nr_requeue); /* * At this point the top_waiter has either taken uaddr2 or is @@ -2074,7 +2135,8 @@ retry_private: * If that call succeeds then we have pi_state and an * initial refcount on it. */ - ret = lookup_pi_state(uaddr2, ret, hb2, &key2, &pi_state); + ret = lookup_pi_state(uaddr2, ret, hb2, &key2, + &pi_state, &exiting); } switch (ret) { @@ -2104,6 +2166,12 @@ retry_private: hb_waiters_dec(hb2); put_futex_key(&key2); put_futex_key(&key1); + /* + * Handle the case where the owner is in the middle of + * exiting. Wait for the exit to complete otherwise + * this task might loop forever, aka. live lock. + */ + wait_for_owner_exiting(ret, exiting); cond_resched(); goto retry; default: @@ -2810,6 +2878,7 @@ static int futex_lock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags, { struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to; struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = NULL; + struct task_struct *exiting = NULL; struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter; struct futex_hash_bucket *hb; struct futex_q q = futex_q_init; @@ -2831,7 +2900,8 @@ retry: retry_private: hb = queue_lock(&q); - ret = futex_lock_pi_atomic(uaddr, hb, &q.key, &q.pi_state, current, 0); + ret = futex_lock_pi_atomic(uaddr, hb, &q.key, &q.pi_state, current, + &exiting, 0); if (unlikely(ret)) { /* * Atomic work succeeded and we got the lock, @@ -2854,6 +2924,12 @@ retry_private: */ queue_unlock(hb); put_futex_key(&q.key); + /* + * Handle the case where the owner is in the middle of + * exiting. Wait for the exit to complete otherwise + * this task might loop forever, aka. live lock. + */ + wait_for_owner_exiting(ret, exiting); cond_resched(); goto retry; default:

6 years

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patch "thunderbolt: Power cycle the router if NVM authentication fails" added to char-misc-next

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled thunderbolt: Power cycle the router if NVM authentication fails to my char-misc git tree which can be found at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git in the char-misc-next branch. The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree (usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.) The patch will also be merged in the next major kernel release during the merge window. If you have any questions about this process, please let me know. >From 7a7ebfa85f4fac349f3ab219538c44efe18b0cf6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg(a)linux.intel.com> Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2019 13:25:44 +0300 Subject: thunderbolt: Power cycle the router if NVM authentication fails On zang's Dell XPS 13 9370 after Thunderbolt NVM firmware upgrade the Thunderbolt controller did not come back as expected. Only after the system was rebooted it became available again. It is not entirely clear what happened but I suspect the new NVM firmware image authentication failed for some reason. Regardless of this the router needs to be power cycled if NVM authentication fails in order to get it fully functional again. This modifies the driver to issue a power cycle in case the NVM authentication fails immediately when dma_port_flash_update_auth() returns. We also need to call tb_switch_set_uuid() earlier to be able to fetch possible NVM authentication failure when DMA port is added. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205457 Reported-by: zang <dump(a)tzib.net> Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/thunderbolt/switch.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/thunderbolt/switch.c b/drivers/thunderbolt/switch.c index 3f477df2730a..ca86a8e09c77 100644 --- a/drivers/thunderbolt/switch.c +++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/switch.c @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static int nvm_validate_and_write(struct tb_switch *sw) static int nvm_authenticate_host(struct tb_switch *sw) { - int ret; + int ret = 0; /* * Root switch NVM upgrade requires that we disconnect the @@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ static int nvm_authenticate_host(struct tb_switch *sw) * already). */ if (!sw->safe_mode) { + u32 status; + ret = tb_domain_disconnect_all_paths(sw->tb); if (ret) return ret; @@ -184,7 +186,16 @@ static int nvm_authenticate_host(struct tb_switch *sw) * everything goes well so getting timeout is expected. */ ret = dma_port_flash_update_auth(sw->dma_port); - return ret == -ETIMEDOUT ? 0 : ret; + if (!ret || ret == -ETIMEDOUT) + return 0; + + /* + * Any error from update auth operation requires power + * cycling of the host router. + */ + tb_sw_warn(sw, "failed to authenticate NVM, power cycling\n"); + if (dma_port_flash_update_auth_status(sw->dma_port, &status) > 0) + nvm_set_auth_status(sw, status); } /* @@ -192,7 +203,7 @@ static int nvm_authenticate_host(struct tb_switch *sw) * switch. */ dma_port_power_cycle(sw->dma_port); - return 0; + return ret; } static int nvm_authenticate_device(struct tb_switch *sw) @@ -200,8 +211,16 @@ static int nvm_authenticate_device(struct tb_switch *sw) int ret, retries = 10; ret = dma_port_flash_update_auth(sw->dma_port); - if (ret && ret != -ETIMEDOUT) + switch (ret) { + case 0: + case -ETIMEDOUT: + case -EACCES: + case -EINVAL: + /* Power cycle is required */ + break; + default: return ret; + } /* * Poll here for the authentication status. It takes some time @@ -1420,8 +1439,6 @@ static ssize_t nvm_authenticate_store(struct device *dev, */ nvm_authenticate_start(sw); ret = nvm_authenticate_host(sw); - if (ret) - nvm_authenticate_complete(sw); } else { ret = nvm_authenticate_device(sw); } @@ -1876,13 +1893,16 @@ static int tb_switch_add_dma_port(struct tb_switch *sw) int ret; switch (sw->generation) { - case 3: - break; - case 2: /* Only root switch can be upgraded */ if (tb_route(sw)) return 0; + + /* fallthrough */ + case 3: + ret = tb_switch_set_uuid(sw); + if (ret) + return ret; break; default: @@ -1906,6 +1926,19 @@ static int tb_switch_add_dma_port(struct tb_switch *sw) if (sw->no_nvm_upgrade) return 0; + /* + * If there is status already set then authentication failed + * when the dma_port_flash_update_auth() returned. Power cycling + * is not needed (it was done already) so only thing we do here + * is to unblock runtime PM of the root port. + */ + nvm_get_auth_status(sw, &status); + if (status) { + if (!tb_route(sw)) + nvm_authenticate_complete(sw); + return 0; + } + /* * Check status of the previous flash authentication. If there * is one we need to power cycle the switch in any case to make @@ -1921,9 +1954,6 @@ static int tb_switch_add_dma_port(struct tb_switch *sw) if (status) { tb_sw_info(sw, "switch flash authentication failed\n"); - ret = tb_switch_set_uuid(sw); - if (ret) - return ret; nvm_set_auth_status(sw, status); } -- 2.24.0

6 years

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[PATCH FIX] brcmfmac: disable PCIe interrupts before bus reset

by Rafał Miłecki

From: Rafał Miłecki <rafal(a)milecki.pl> Keeping interrupts on could result in brcmfmac freeing some resources and then IRQ handlers trying to use them. That was obviously a straight path for crashing a kernel. Example: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- brcmf_pcie_reset brcmf_pcie_bus_console_read brcmf_detach ... brcmf_fweh_detach brcmf_proto_detach brcmf_pcie_isr_thread ... brcmf_proto_msgbuf_rx_trigger ... drvr->proto->pd brcmf_pcie_release_irq [ 363.789218] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000038 [ 363.797339] pgd = c0004000 [ 363.800050] [00000038] *pgd=00000000 [ 363.803635] Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] SMP ARM (...) [ 364.029209] Backtrace: [ 364.031725] [<bf243838>] (brcmf_proto_msgbuf_rx_trigger [brcmfmac]) from [<bf2471dc>] (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread+0x228/0x274 [brcmfmac]) [ 364.043662] r7:00000001 r6:c8ca0000 r5:00010000 r4:c7b4f800 Fixes: 4684997d9eea ("brcmfmac: reset PCIe bus on a firmware crash") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.2+ Signed-off-by: Rafał Miłecki <rafal(a)milecki.pl> --- Kalle: if you are planning another pull request for 5.4 you may push this to the wireless-drivers. Otherwise make it wireless-drivers-next and lets have stable maintainers pick it. --- drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c index 3184dab41a5e..f64ce5074a55 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c @@ -1425,6 +1425,8 @@ static int brcmf_pcie_reset(struct device *dev) struct brcmf_fw_request *fwreq; int err; + brcmf_pcie_intr_disable(devinfo); + brcmf_pcie_bus_console_read(devinfo, true); brcmf_detach(dev); -- 2.21.0

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Linux-stable-mirror November 2019