August 2018 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH v2 4/9] mmc: meson-mx-sdio: fix OF child-node lookup

by Johan Hovold

Use the new of_get_compatible_child() helper to lookup the slot child node instead of using of_find_compatible_node(), which searches the entire tree from a given start node and thus can return an unrelated (i.e. non-child) node. This also addresses a potential use-after-free (e.g. after probe deferral) as the tree-wide helper drops a reference to its first argument (i.e. the node of the device being probed). While at it, also fix up the related slot-node reference leak. Fixes: ed80a13bb4c4 ("mmc: meson-mx-sdio: Add a driver for the Amlogic Meson8 and Meson8b SoCs") Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.15 Cc: Carlo Caione <carlo(a)endlessm.com> Cc: Martin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl(a)googlemail.com> Cc: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson(a)linaro.org> Acked-by: Martin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl(a)googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/mmc/host/meson-mx-sdio.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/meson-mx-sdio.c b/drivers/mmc/host/meson-mx-sdio.c index 09cb89645d06..2cfec33178c1 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/host/meson-mx-sdio.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/host/meson-mx-sdio.c @@ -517,19 +517,23 @@ static struct mmc_host_ops meson_mx_mmc_ops = { static struct platform_device *meson_mx_mmc_slot_pdev(struct device *parent) { struct device_node *slot_node; + struct platform_device *pdev; /* * TODO: the MMC core framework currently does not support * controllers with multiple slots properly. So we only register * the first slot for now */ - slot_node = of_find_compatible_node(parent->of_node, NULL, "mmc-slot"); + slot_node = of_get_compatible_child(parent->of_node, "mmc-slot"); if (!slot_node) { dev_warn(parent, "no 'mmc-slot' sub-node found\n"); return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); } - return of_platform_device_create(slot_node, NULL, parent); + pdev = of_platform_device_create(slot_node, NULL, parent); + of_node_put(slot_node); + + return pdev; } static int meson_mx_mmc_add_host(struct meson_mx_mmc_host *host) -- 2.18.0

6 years, 3 months

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Re: reboot on wandboard fails with v4.14.67 (bisected to 2059e527a6)

by Fabio Estevam

Hi Rasmus, > On 2018-08-29 11:55, Rasmus Villemoes wrote: >> We're using imx_v6_v7_defconfig on our Wandboards. After upgrading to >> v4.14.67, reboot no longer works (or, well, takes a very long time when >> the watchdog is configured). >> >> v4.14.66 works fine, the breakage bisects to >> 2059e527a659cf16d6bb709f1c8509f7a7623fc4 (ARM: imx_v6_v7_defconfig: >> Select ULPI support), and reverting that on top of v4.14.67 again works. > > FWIW, v4.18 (the mainline release containing the upstream commit > 157bcc0609) works fine, while v4.17.19 which also has that commit > backported (as df06ca1f56) fails. So I'm guessing there must be some > other commits in v4.18 that happen to make imx_v6_v7_defconfig work. Thanks for reporting. Commit 157bcc06094c3 ("ARM: imx_v6_v7_defconfig: Select ULPI support") was meant to be applied for 4.18 only. I think we should revert it from earlier stable versions. Thanks

6 years, 3 months

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[PATCH] Partially revert "HID: generic: create one input report per application type"

by Benjamin Tissoires

This partially reverts commit f07b3c1da92db108662f99417a212fc1eddc44d1. It looks like some mice are not correctly treated by HID_QUIRK_INPUT_PER_APP. Those mice have the following report descriptor: 0x05, 0x01, // Usage Page (Generic Desktop) 0 0x09, 0x02, // Usage (Mouse) 2 0xa1, 0x01, // Collection (Application) 4 0x85, 0x01, // Report ID (1) 6 0x09, 0x01, // Usage (Pointer) 8 0xa1, 0x00, // Collection (Physical) 10 0x95, 0x05, // Report Count (5) 12 0x75, 0x01, // Report Size (1) 14 0x05, 0x09, // Usage Page (Button) 16 0x19, 0x01, // Usage Minimum (1) 18 0x29, 0x05, // Usage Maximum (5) 20 0x15, 0x00, // Logical Minimum (0) 22 0x25, 0x01, // Logical Maximum (1) 24 0x81, 0x02, // Input (Data,Var,Abs) 26 ... 0xc0, // End Collection 57 0x85, 0x02, // Report ID (2) 58 0x09, 0x01, // Usage (Consumer Control) 60 0xa1, 0x00, // Collection (Physical) 62 0x75, 0x0c, // Report Size (12) 64 0x95, 0x02, // Report Count (2) 66 0x05, 0x01, // Usage Page (Generic Desktop) 68 0x09, 0x30, // Usage (X) 70 0x09, 0x31, // Usage (Y) 72 0x16, 0x01, 0xf8, // Logical Minimum (-2047) 74 0x26, 0xff, 0x07, // Logical Maximum (2047) 77 0x81, 0x06, // Input (Data,Var,Rel) 80 0xc0, // End Collection 82 0xc0, // End Collection 83 ... Both the cursor position and the buttons are located in the same application collection (Mouse) and the kernel should only create one input device for those. However, for an undetermined reason, the kernel splits the device in 2, making systemd not tagging the second mouse with the coordinates only as a mouse. And then userspace ignores it which leads to a mouse where only the buttons are working. Until the quirk gets properly fixed, we should probably revert applying it to all of the generic devices and re-enable it when the root reason has been found. link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200847 link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200849 link: https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/59699 link: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/issues/45165 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v4.18+ Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires(a)redhat.com> --- drivers/hid/hid-generic.c | 15 --------------- 1 file changed, 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-generic.c b/drivers/hid/hid-generic.c index 3b6eccbc2519..c25b4718de44 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-generic.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-generic.c @@ -56,20 +56,6 @@ static bool hid_generic_match(struct hid_device *hdev, return true; } -static int hid_generic_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, - const struct hid_device_id *id) -{ - int ret; - - hdev->quirks |= HID_QUIRK_INPUT_PER_APP; - - ret = hid_parse(hdev); - if (ret) - return ret; - - return hid_hw_start(hdev, HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT); -} - static const struct hid_device_id hid_table[] = { { HID_DEVICE(HID_BUS_ANY, HID_GROUP_ANY, HID_ANY_ID, HID_ANY_ID) }, { } @@ -80,7 +66,6 @@ static struct hid_driver hid_generic = { .name = "hid-generic", .id_table = hid_table, .match = hid_generic_match, - .probe = hid_generic_probe, }; module_hid_driver(hid_generic); -- 2.14.3

6 years, 3 months

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[PATCH v2 6/9] net: bcmgenet: fix OF child-node lookup

by Johan Hovold

Use the new of_get_compatible_child() helper to lookup the mdio child node instead of using of_find_compatible_node(), which searches the entire tree from a given start node and thus can return an unrelated (i.e. non-child) node. This also addresses a potential use-after-free (e.g. after probe deferral) as the tree-wide helper drops a reference to its first argument (i.e. the node of the device being probed). Fixes: aa09677cba42 ("net: bcmgenet: add MDIO routines") Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 3.15 Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli(a)gmail.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmmii.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmmii.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmmii.c index 5333274a283c..87fc65560ceb 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmmii.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmmii.c @@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static struct device_node *bcmgenet_mii_of_find_mdio(struct bcmgenet_priv *priv) if (!compat) return NULL; - priv->mdio_dn = of_find_compatible_node(dn, NULL, compat); + priv->mdio_dn = of_get_compatible_child(dn, compat); kfree(compat); if (!priv->mdio_dn) { dev_err(kdev, "unable to find MDIO bus node\n"); -- 2.18.0

6 years, 3 months

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[PATCH] crypto: remove speck

by Jason A. Donenfeld

These are unused, undesired, and have never actually been used by anybody. The original authors of this code have changed their mind about its inclusion. Therefore, this patch removes it. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst | 10 - arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig | 6 - arch/arm/crypto/Makefile | 2 - arch/arm/crypto/speck-neon-core.S | 434 --------------- arch/arm/crypto/speck-neon-glue.c | 288 ---------- arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig | 6 - arch/arm64/crypto/Makefile | 3 - arch/arm64/crypto/speck-neon-core.S | 352 ------------ arch/arm64/crypto/speck-neon-glue.c | 282 ---------- arch/m68k/configs/amiga_defconfig | 1 - arch/m68k/configs/apollo_defconfig | 1 - arch/m68k/configs/atari_defconfig | 1 - arch/m68k/configs/bvme6000_defconfig | 1 - arch/m68k/configs/hp300_defconfig | 1 - arch/m68k/configs/mac_defconfig | 1 - arch/m68k/configs/multi_defconfig | 1 - arch/m68k/configs/mvme147_defconfig | 1 - arch/m68k/configs/mvme16x_defconfig | 1 - arch/m68k/configs/q40_defconfig | 1 - arch/m68k/configs/sun3_defconfig | 1 - arch/m68k/configs/sun3x_defconfig | 1 - arch/s390/defconfig | 1 - crypto/Kconfig | 14 - crypto/Makefile | 1 - crypto/speck.c | 307 ----------- crypto/testmgr.c | 24 - crypto/testmgr.h | 738 -------------------------- fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 4 - fs/crypto/keyinfo.c | 10 - include/crypto/speck.h | 62 --- include/uapi/linux/fs.h | 2 - 31 files changed, 2558 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 arch/arm/crypto/speck-neon-core.S delete mode 100644 arch/arm/crypto/speck-neon-glue.c delete mode 100644 arch/arm64/crypto/speck-neon-core.S delete mode 100644 arch/arm64/crypto/speck-neon-glue.c delete mode 100644 crypto/speck.c delete mode 100644 include/crypto/speck.h diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst index 48b424de85bb..cfbc18f0d9c9 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst @@ -191,21 +191,11 @@ Currently, the following pairs of encryption modes are supported: - AES-256-XTS for contents and AES-256-CTS-CBC for filenames - AES-128-CBC for contents and AES-128-CTS-CBC for filenames -- Speck128/256-XTS for contents and Speck128/256-CTS-CBC for filenames It is strongly recommended to use AES-256-XTS for contents encryption. AES-128-CBC was added only for low-powered embedded devices with crypto accelerators such as CAAM or CESA that do not support XTS. -Similarly, Speck128/256 support was only added for older or low-end -CPUs which cannot do AES fast enough -- especially ARM CPUs which have -NEON instructions but not the Cryptography Extensions -- and for which -it would not otherwise be feasible to use encryption at all. It is -not recommended to use Speck on CPUs that have AES instructions. -Speck support is only available if it has been enabled in the crypto -API via CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK. Also, on ARM platforms, to get -acceptable performance CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK_NEON must be enabled. - New encryption modes can be added relatively easily, without changes to individual filesystems. However, authenticated encryption (AE) modes are not currently supported because of the difficulty of dealing diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig b/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig index 925d1364727a..b8e69fe282b8 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig @@ -121,10 +121,4 @@ config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER select CRYPTO_CHACHA20 -config CRYPTO_SPECK_NEON - tristate "NEON accelerated Speck cipher algorithms" - depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON - select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER - select CRYPTO_SPECK - endif diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile b/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile index 8de542c48ade..bd5bceef0605 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile @@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_NEON) += sha1-arm-neon.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_ARM) += sha256-arm.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_ARM) += sha512-arm.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON) += chacha20-neon.o -obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK_NEON) += speck-neon.o ce-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM_CE) += aes-arm-ce.o ce-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_CE) += sha1-arm-ce.o @@ -54,7 +53,6 @@ ghash-arm-ce-y := ghash-ce-core.o ghash-ce-glue.o crct10dif-arm-ce-y := crct10dif-ce-core.o crct10dif-ce-glue.o crc32-arm-ce-y:= crc32-ce-core.o crc32-ce-glue.o chacha20-neon-y := chacha20-neon-core.o chacha20-neon-glue.o -speck-neon-y := speck-neon-core.o speck-neon-glue.o ifdef REGENERATE_ARM_CRYPTO quiet_cmd_perl = PERL $@ diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/speck-neon-core.S b/arch/arm/crypto/speck-neon-core.S deleted file mode 100644 index 57caa742016e..000000000000 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/speck-neon-core.S +++ /dev/null @@ -1,434 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -/* - * NEON-accelerated implementation of Speck128-XTS and Speck64-XTS - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Google, Inc - * - * Author: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> - */ - -#include <linux/linkage.h> - - .text - .fpu neon - - // arguments - ROUND_KEYS .req r0 // const {u64,u32} *round_keys - NROUNDS .req r1 // int nrounds - DST .req r2 // void *dst - SRC .req r3 // const void *src - NBYTES .req r4 // unsigned int nbytes - TWEAK .req r5 // void *tweak - - // registers which hold the data being encrypted/decrypted - X0 .req q0 - X0_L .req d0 - X0_H .req d1 - Y0 .req q1 - Y0_H .req d3 - X1 .req q2 - X1_L .req d4 - X1_H .req d5 - Y1 .req q3 - Y1_H .req d7 - X2 .req q4 - X2_L .req d8 - X2_H .req d9 - Y2 .req q5 - Y2_H .req d11 - X3 .req q6 - X3_L .req d12 - X3_H .req d13 - Y3 .req q7 - Y3_H .req d15 - - // the round key, duplicated in all lanes - ROUND_KEY .req q8 - ROUND_KEY_L .req d16 - ROUND_KEY_H .req d17 - - // index vector for vtbl-based 8-bit rotates - ROTATE_TABLE .req d18 - - // multiplication table for updating XTS tweaks - GF128MUL_TABLE .req d19 - GF64MUL_TABLE .req d19 - - // current XTS tweak value(s) - TWEAKV .req q10 - TWEAKV_L .req d20 - TWEAKV_H .req d21 - - TMP0 .req q12 - TMP0_L .req d24 - TMP0_H .req d25 - TMP1 .req q13 - TMP2 .req q14 - TMP3 .req q15 - - .align 4 -.Lror64_8_table: - .byte 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0 -.Lror32_8_table: - .byte 1, 2, 3, 0, 5, 6, 7, 4 -.Lrol64_8_table: - .byte 7, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 -.Lrol32_8_table: - .byte 3, 0, 1, 2, 7, 4, 5, 6 -.Lgf128mul_table: - .byte 0, 0x87 - .fill 14 -.Lgf64mul_table: - .byte 0, 0x1b, (0x1b << 1), (0x1b << 1) ^ 0x1b - .fill 12 - -/* - * _speck_round_128bytes() - Speck encryption round on 128 bytes at a time - * - * Do one Speck encryption round on the 128 bytes (8 blocks for Speck128, 16 for - * Speck64) stored in X0-X3 and Y0-Y3, using the round key stored in all lanes - * of ROUND_KEY. 'n' is the lane size: 64 for Speck128, or 32 for Speck64. - * - * The 8-bit rotates are implemented using vtbl instead of vshr + vsli because - * the vtbl approach is faster on some processors and the same speed on others. - */ -.macro _speck_round_128bytes n - - // x = ror(x, 8) - vtbl.8 X0_L, {X0_L}, ROTATE_TABLE - vtbl.8 X0_H, {X0_H}, ROTATE_TABLE - vtbl.8 X1_L, {X1_L}, ROTATE_TABLE - vtbl.8 X1_H, {X1_H}, ROTATE_TABLE - vtbl.8 X2_L, {X2_L}, ROTATE_TABLE - vtbl.8 X2_H, {X2_H}, ROTATE_TABLE - vtbl.8 X3_L, {X3_L}, ROTATE_TABLE - vtbl.8 X3_H, {X3_H}, ROTATE_TABLE - - // x += y - vadd.u\n X0, Y0 - vadd.u\n X1, Y1 - vadd.u\n X2, Y2 - vadd.u\n X3, Y3 - - // x ^= k - veor X0, ROUND_KEY - veor X1, ROUND_KEY - veor X2, ROUND_KEY - veor X3, ROUND_KEY - - // y = rol(y, 3) - vshl.u\n TMP0, Y0, #3 - vshl.u\n TMP1, Y1, #3 - vshl.u\n TMP2, Y2, #3 - vshl.u\n TMP3, Y3, #3 - vsri.u\n TMP0, Y0, #(\n - 3) - vsri.u\n TMP1, Y1, #(\n - 3) - vsri.u\n TMP2, Y2, #(\n - 3) - vsri.u\n TMP3, Y3, #(\n - 3) - - // y ^= x - veor Y0, TMP0, X0 - veor Y1, TMP1, X1 - veor Y2, TMP2, X2 - veor Y3, TMP3, X3 -.endm - -/* - * _speck_unround_128bytes() - Speck decryption round on 128 bytes at a time - * - * This is the inverse of _speck_round_128bytes(). - */ -.macro _speck_unround_128bytes n - - // y ^= x - veor TMP0, Y0, X0 - veor TMP1, Y1, X1 - veor TMP2, Y2, X2 - veor TMP3, Y3, X3 - - // y = ror(y, 3) - vshr.u\n Y0, TMP0, #3 - vshr.u\n Y1, TMP1, #3 - vshr.u\n Y2, TMP2, #3 - vshr.u\n Y3, TMP3, #3 - vsli.u\n Y0, TMP0, #(\n - 3) - vsli.u\n Y1, TMP1, #(\n - 3) - vsli.u\n Y2, TMP2, #(\n - 3) - vsli.u\n Y3, TMP3, #(\n - 3) - - // x ^= k - veor X0, ROUND_KEY - veor X1, ROUND_KEY - veor X2, ROUND_KEY - veor X3, ROUND_KEY - - // x -= y - vsub.u\n X0, Y0 - vsub.u\n X1, Y1 - vsub.u\n X2, Y2 - vsub.u\n X3, Y3 - - // x = rol(x, 8); - vtbl.8 X0_L, {X0_L}, ROTATE_TABLE - vtbl.8 X0_H, {X0_H}, ROTATE_TABLE - vtbl.8 X1_L, {X1_L}, ROTATE_TABLE - vtbl.8 X1_H, {X1_H}, ROTATE_TABLE - vtbl.8 X2_L, {X2_L}, ROTATE_TABLE - vtbl.8 X2_H, {X2_H}, ROTATE_TABLE - vtbl.8 X3_L, {X3_L}, ROTATE_TABLE - vtbl.8 X3_H, {X3_H}, ROTATE_TABLE -.endm - -.macro _xts128_precrypt_one dst_reg, tweak_buf, tmp - - // Load the next source block - vld1.8 {\dst_reg}, [SRC]! - - // Save the current tweak in the tweak buffer - vst1.8 {TWEAKV}, [\tweak_buf:128]! - - // XOR the next source block with the current tweak - veor \dst_reg, TWEAKV - - /* - * Calculate the next tweak by multiplying the current one by x, - * modulo p(x) = x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1. - */ - vshr.u64 \tmp, TWEAKV, #63 - vshl.u64 TWEAKV, #1 - veor TWEAKV_H, \tmp\()_L - vtbl.8 \tmp\()_H, {GF128MUL_TABLE}, \tmp\()_H - veor TWEAKV_L, \tmp\()_H -.endm - -.macro _xts64_precrypt_two dst_reg, tweak_buf, tmp - - // Load the next two source blocks - vld1.8 {\dst_reg}, [SRC]! - - // Save the current two tweaks in the tweak buffer - vst1.8 {TWEAKV}, [\tweak_buf:128]! - - // XOR the next two source blocks with the current two tweaks - veor \dst_reg, TWEAKV - - /* - * Calculate the next two tweaks by multiplying the current ones by x^2, - * modulo p(x) = x^64 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1. - */ - vshr.u64 \tmp, TWEAKV, #62 - vshl.u64 TWEAKV, #2 - vtbl.8 \tmp\()_L, {GF64MUL_TABLE}, \tmp\()_L - vtbl.8 \tmp\()_H, {GF64MUL_TABLE}, \tmp\()_H - veor TWEAKV, \tmp -.endm - -/* - * _speck_xts_crypt() - Speck-XTS encryption/decryption - * - * Encrypt or decrypt NBYTES bytes of data from the SRC buffer to the DST buffer - * using Speck-XTS, specifically the variant with a block size of '2n' and round - * count given by NROUNDS. The expanded round keys are given in ROUND_KEYS, and - * the current XTS tweak value is given in TWEAK. It's assumed that NBYTES is a - * nonzero multiple of 128. - */ -.macro _speck_xts_crypt n, decrypting - push {r4-r7} - mov r7, sp - - /* - * The first four parameters were passed in registers r0-r3. Load the - * additional parameters, which were passed on the stack. - */ - ldr NBYTES, [sp, #16] - ldr TWEAK, [sp, #20] - - /* - * If decrypting, modify the ROUND_KEYS parameter to point to the last - * round key rather than the first, since for decryption the round keys - * are used in reverse order. - */ -.if \decrypting -.if \n == 64 - add ROUND_KEYS, ROUND_KEYS, NROUNDS, lsl #3 - sub ROUND_KEYS, #8 -.else - add ROUND_KEYS, ROUND_KEYS, NROUNDS, lsl #2 - sub ROUND_KEYS, #4 -.endif -.endif - - // Load the index vector for vtbl-based 8-bit rotates -.if \decrypting - ldr r12, =.Lrol\n\()_8_table -.else - ldr r12, =.Lror\n\()_8_table -.endif - vld1.8 {ROTATE_TABLE}, [r12:64] - - // One-time XTS preparation - - /* - * Allocate stack space to store 128 bytes worth of tweaks. For - * performance, this space is aligned to a 16-byte boundary so that we - * can use the load/store instructions that declare 16-byte alignment. - * For Thumb2 compatibility, don't do the 'bic' directly on 'sp'. - */ - sub r12, sp, #128 - bic r12, #0xf - mov sp, r12 - -.if \n == 64 - // Load first tweak - vld1.8 {TWEAKV}, [TWEAK] - - // Load GF(2^128) multiplication table - ldr r12, =.Lgf128mul_table - vld1.8 {GF128MUL_TABLE}, [r12:64] -.else - // Load first tweak - vld1.8 {TWEAKV_L}, [TWEAK] - - // Load GF(2^64) multiplication table - ldr r12, =.Lgf64mul_table - vld1.8 {GF64MUL_TABLE}, [r12:64] - - // Calculate second tweak, packing it together with the first - vshr.u64 TMP0_L, TWEAKV_L, #63 - vtbl.u8 TMP0_L, {GF64MUL_TABLE}, TMP0_L - vshl.u64 TWEAKV_H, TWEAKV_L, #1 - veor TWEAKV_H, TMP0_L -.endif - -.Lnext_128bytes_\@: - - /* - * Load the source blocks into {X,Y}[0-3], XOR them with their XTS tweak - * values, and save the tweaks on the stack for later. Then - * de-interleave the 'x' and 'y' elements of each block, i.e. make it so - * that the X[0-3] registers contain only the second halves of blocks, - * and the Y[0-3] registers contain only the first halves of blocks. - * (Speck uses the order (y, x) rather than the more intuitive (x, y).) - */ - mov r12, sp -.if \n == 64 - _xts128_precrypt_one X0, r12, TMP0 - _xts128_precrypt_one Y0, r12, TMP0 - _xts128_precrypt_one X1, r12, TMP0 - _xts128_precrypt_one Y1, r12, TMP0 - _xts128_precrypt_one X2, r12, TMP0 - _xts128_precrypt_one Y2, r12, TMP0 - _xts128_precrypt_one X3, r12, TMP0 - _xts128_precrypt_one Y3, r12, TMP0 - vswp X0_L, Y0_H - vswp X1_L, Y1_H - vswp X2_L, Y2_H - vswp X3_L, Y3_H -.else - _xts64_precrypt_two X0, r12, TMP0 - _xts64_precrypt_two Y0, r12, TMP0 - _xts64_precrypt_two X1, r12, TMP0 - _xts64_precrypt_two Y1, r12, TMP0 - _xts64_precrypt_two X2, r12, TMP0 - _xts64_precrypt_two Y2, r12, TMP0 - _xts64_precrypt_two X3, r12, TMP0 - _xts64_precrypt_two Y3, r12, TMP0 - vuzp.32 Y0, X0 - vuzp.32 Y1, X1 - vuzp.32 Y2, X2 - vuzp.32 Y3, X3 -.endif - - // Do the cipher rounds - - mov r12, ROUND_KEYS - mov r6, NROUNDS - -.Lnext_round_\@: -.if \decrypting -.if \n == 64 - vld1.64 ROUND_KEY_L, [r12] - sub r12, #8 - vmov ROUND_KEY_H, ROUND_KEY_L -.else - vld1.32 {ROUND_KEY_L[],ROUND_KEY_H[]}, [r12] - sub r12, #4 -.endif - _speck_unround_128bytes \n -.else -.if \n == 64 - vld1.64 ROUND_KEY_L, [r12]! - vmov ROUND_KEY_H, ROUND_KEY_L -.else - vld1.32 {ROUND_KEY_L[],ROUND_KEY_H[]}, [r12]! -.endif - _speck_round_128bytes \n -.endif - subs r6, r6, #1 - bne .Lnext_round_\@ - - // Re-interleave the 'x' and 'y' elements of each block -.if \n == 64 - vswp X0_L, Y0_H - vswp X1_L, Y1_H - vswp X2_L, Y2_H - vswp X3_L, Y3_H -.else - vzip.32 Y0, X0 - vzip.32 Y1, X1 - vzip.32 Y2, X2 - vzip.32 Y3, X3 -.endif - - // XOR the encrypted/decrypted blocks with the tweaks we saved earlier - mov r12, sp - vld1.8 {TMP0, TMP1}, [r12:128]! - vld1.8 {TMP2, TMP3}, [r12:128]! - veor X0, TMP0 - veor Y0, TMP1 - veor X1, TMP2 - veor Y1, TMP3 - vld1.8 {TMP0, TMP1}, [r12:128]! - vld1.8 {TMP2, TMP3}, [r12:128]! - veor X2, TMP0 - veor Y2, TMP1 - veor X3, TMP2 - veor Y3, TMP3 - - // Store the ciphertext in the destination buffer - vst1.8 {X0, Y0}, [DST]! - vst1.8 {X1, Y1}, [DST]! - vst1.8 {X2, Y2}, [DST]! - vst1.8 {X3, Y3}, [DST]! - - // Continue if there are more 128-byte chunks remaining, else return - subs NBYTES, #128 - bne .Lnext_128bytes_\@ - - // Store the next tweak -.if \n == 64 - vst1.8 {TWEAKV}, [TWEAK] -.else - vst1.8 {TWEAKV_L}, [TWEAK] -.endif - - mov sp, r7 - pop {r4-r7} - bx lr -.endm - -ENTRY(speck128_xts_encrypt_neon) - _speck_xts_crypt n=64, decrypting=0 -ENDPROC(speck128_xts_encrypt_neon) - -ENTRY(speck128_xts_decrypt_neon) - _speck_xts_crypt n=64, decrypting=1 -ENDPROC(speck128_xts_decrypt_neon) - -ENTRY(speck64_xts_encrypt_neon) - _speck_xts_crypt n=32, decrypting=0 -ENDPROC(speck64_xts_encrypt_neon) - -ENTRY(speck64_xts_decrypt_neon) - _speck_xts_crypt n=32, decrypting=1 -ENDPROC(speck64_xts_decrypt_neon) diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/speck-neon-glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/speck-neon-glue.c deleted file mode 100644 index f012c3ea998f..000000000000 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/speck-neon-glue.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,288 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -/* - * NEON-accelerated implementation of Speck128-XTS and Speck64-XTS - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Google, Inc - * - * Note: the NIST recommendation for XTS only specifies a 128-bit block size, - * but a 64-bit version (needed for Speck64) is fairly straightforward; the math - * is just done in GF(2^64) instead of GF(2^128), with the reducing polynomial - * x^64 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 from the original XEX paper (Rogaway, 2004: - * "Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and Refinements to Modes - * OCB and PMAC"), represented as 0x1B. - */ - -#include <asm/hwcap.h> -#include <asm/neon.h> -#include <asm/simd.h> -#include <crypto/algapi.h> -#include <crypto/gf128mul.h> -#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h> -#include <crypto/speck.h> -#include <crypto/xts.h> -#include <linux/kernel.h> -#include <linux/module.h> - -/* The assembly functions only handle multiples of 128 bytes */ -#define SPECK_NEON_CHUNK_SIZE 128 - -/* Speck128 */ - -struct speck128_xts_tfm_ctx { - struct speck128_tfm_ctx main_key; - struct speck128_tfm_ctx tweak_key; -}; - -asmlinkage void speck128_xts_encrypt_neon(const u64 *round_keys, int nrounds, - void *dst, const void *src, - unsigned int nbytes, void *tweak); - -asmlinkage void speck128_xts_decrypt_neon(const u64 *round_keys, int nrounds, - void *dst, const void *src, - unsigned int nbytes, void *tweak); - -typedef void (*speck128_crypt_one_t)(const struct speck128_tfm_ctx *, - u8 *, const u8 *); -typedef void (*speck128_xts_crypt_many_t)(const u64 *, int, void *, - const void *, unsigned int, void *); - -static __always_inline int -__speck128_xts_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, - speck128_crypt_one_t crypt_one, - speck128_xts_crypt_many_t crypt_many) -{ - struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); - const struct speck128_xts_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); - struct skcipher_walk walk; - le128 tweak; - int err; - - err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true); - - crypto_speck128_encrypt(&ctx->tweak_key, (u8 *)&tweak, walk.iv); - - while (walk.nbytes > 0) { - unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes; - u8 *dst = walk.dst.virt.addr; - const u8 *src = walk.src.virt.addr; - - if (nbytes >= SPECK_NEON_CHUNK_SIZE && may_use_simd()) { - unsigned int count; - - count = round_down(nbytes, SPECK_NEON_CHUNK_SIZE); - kernel_neon_begin(); - (*crypt_many)(ctx->main_key.round_keys, - ctx->main_key.nrounds, - dst, src, count, &tweak); - kernel_neon_end(); - dst += count; - src += count; - nbytes -= count; - } - - /* Handle any remainder with generic code */ - while (nbytes >= sizeof(tweak)) { - le128_xor((le128 *)dst, (const le128 *)src, &tweak); - (*crypt_one)(&ctx->main_key, dst, dst); - le128_xor((le128 *)dst, (const le128 *)dst, &tweak); - gf128mul_x_ble(&tweak, &tweak); - - dst += sizeof(tweak); - src += sizeof(tweak); - nbytes -= sizeof(tweak); - } - err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes); - } - - return err; -} - -static int speck128_xts_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) -{ - return __speck128_xts_crypt(req, crypto_speck128_encrypt, - speck128_xts_encrypt_neon); -} - -static int speck128_xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) -{ - return __speck128_xts_crypt(req, crypto_speck128_decrypt, - speck128_xts_decrypt_neon); -} - -static int speck128_xts_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, - unsigned int keylen) -{ - struct speck128_xts_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); - int err; - - err = xts_verify_key(tfm, key, keylen); - if (err) - return err; - - keylen /= 2; - - err = crypto_speck128_setkey(&ctx->main_key, key, keylen); - if (err) - return err; - - return crypto_speck128_setkey(&ctx->tweak_key, key + keylen, keylen); -} - -/* Speck64 */ - -struct speck64_xts_tfm_ctx { - struct speck64_tfm_ctx main_key; - struct speck64_tfm_ctx tweak_key; -}; - -asmlinkage void speck64_xts_encrypt_neon(const u32 *round_keys, int nrounds, - void *dst, const void *src, - unsigned int nbytes, void *tweak); - -asmlinkage void speck64_xts_decrypt_neon(const u32 *round_keys, int nrounds, - void *dst, const void *src, - unsigned int nbytes, void *tweak); - -typedef void (*speck64_crypt_one_t)(const struct speck64_tfm_ctx *, - u8 *, const u8 *); -typedef void (*speck64_xts_crypt_many_t)(const u32 *, int, void *, - const void *, unsigned int, void *); - -static __always_inline int -__speck64_xts_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, speck64_crypt_one_t crypt_one, - speck64_xts_crypt_many_t crypt_many) -{ - struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); - const struct speck64_xts_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); - struct skcipher_walk walk; - __le64 tweak; - int err; - - err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true); - - crypto_speck64_encrypt(&ctx->tweak_key, (u8 *)&tweak, walk.iv); - - while (walk.nbytes > 0) { - unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes; - u8 *dst = walk.dst.virt.addr; - const u8 *src = walk.src.virt.addr; - - if (nbytes >= SPECK_NEON_CHUNK_SIZE && may_use_simd()) { - unsigned int count; - - count = round_down(nbytes, SPECK_NEON_CHUNK_SIZE); - kernel_neon_begin(); - (*crypt_many)(ctx->main_key.round_keys, - ctx->main_key.nrounds, - dst, src, count, &tweak); - kernel_neon_end(); - dst += count; - src += count; - nbytes -= count; - } - - /* Handle any remainder with generic code */ - while (nbytes >= sizeof(tweak)) { - *(__le64 *)dst = *(__le64 *)src ^ tweak; - (*crypt_one)(&ctx->main_key, dst, dst); - *(__le64 *)dst ^= tweak; - tweak = cpu_to_le64((le64_to_cpu(tweak) << 1) ^ - ((tweak & cpu_to_le64(1ULL << 63)) ? - 0x1B : 0)); - dst += sizeof(tweak); - src += sizeof(tweak); - nbytes -= sizeof(tweak); - } - err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes); - } - - return err; -} - -static int speck64_xts_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) -{ - return __speck64_xts_crypt(req, crypto_speck64_encrypt, - speck64_xts_encrypt_neon); -} - -static int speck64_xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) -{ - return __speck64_xts_crypt(req, crypto_speck64_decrypt, - speck64_xts_decrypt_neon); -} - -static int speck64_xts_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, - unsigned int keylen) -{ - struct speck64_xts_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); - int err; - - err = xts_verify_key(tfm, key, keylen); - if (err) - return err; - - keylen /= 2; - - err = crypto_speck64_setkey(&ctx->main_key, key, keylen); - if (err) - return err; - - return crypto_speck64_setkey(&ctx->tweak_key, key + keylen, keylen); -} - -static struct skcipher_alg speck_algs[] = { - { - .base.cra_name = "xts(speck128)", - .base.cra_driver_name = "xts-speck128-neon", - .base.cra_priority = 300, - .base.cra_blocksize = SPECK128_BLOCK_SIZE, - .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct speck128_xts_tfm_ctx), - .base.cra_alignmask = 7, - .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - .min_keysize = 2 * SPECK128_128_KEY_SIZE, - .max_keysize = 2 * SPECK128_256_KEY_SIZE, - .ivsize = SPECK128_BLOCK_SIZE, - .walksize = SPECK_NEON_CHUNK_SIZE, - .setkey = speck128_xts_setkey, - .encrypt = speck128_xts_encrypt, - .decrypt = speck128_xts_decrypt, - }, { - .base.cra_name = "xts(speck64)", - .base.cra_driver_name = "xts-speck64-neon", - .base.cra_priority = 300, - .base.cra_blocksize = SPECK64_BLOCK_SIZE, - .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct speck64_xts_tfm_ctx), - .base.cra_alignmask = 7, - .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - .min_keysize = 2 * SPECK64_96_KEY_SIZE, - .max_keysize = 2 * SPECK64_128_KEY_SIZE, - .ivsize = SPECK64_BLOCK_SIZE, - .walksize = SPECK_NEON_CHUNK_SIZE, - .setkey = speck64_xts_setkey, - .encrypt = speck64_xts_encrypt, - .decrypt = speck64_xts_decrypt, - } -}; - -static int __init speck_neon_module_init(void) -{ - if (!(elf_hwcap & HWCAP_NEON)) - return -ENODEV; - return crypto_register_skciphers(speck_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(speck_algs)); -} - -static void __exit speck_neon_module_exit(void) -{ - crypto_unregister_skciphers(speck_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(speck_algs)); -} - -module_init(speck_neon_module_init); -module_exit(speck_neon_module_exit); - -MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Speck block cipher (NEON-accelerated)"); -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>"); -MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xts(speck128)"); -MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xts-speck128-neon"); -MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xts(speck64)"); -MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xts-speck64-neon"); diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig index e3fdb0fd6f70..d51944ff9f91 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig @@ -119,10 +119,4 @@ config CRYPTO_AES_ARM64_BS select CRYPTO_AES_ARM64 select CRYPTO_SIMD -config CRYPTO_SPECK_NEON - tristate "NEON accelerated Speck cipher algorithms" - depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON - select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER - select CRYPTO_SPECK - endif diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/Makefile b/arch/arm64/crypto/Makefile index bcafd016618e..7bc4bda6d9c6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/Makefile @@ -56,9 +56,6 @@ sha512-arm64-y := sha512-glue.o sha512-core.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON) += chacha20-neon.o chacha20-neon-y := chacha20-neon-core.o chacha20-neon-glue.o -obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK_NEON) += speck-neon.o -speck-neon-y := speck-neon-core.o speck-neon-glue.o - obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM64) += aes-arm64.o aes-arm64-y := aes-cipher-core.o aes-cipher-glue.o diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/speck-neon-core.S b/arch/arm64/crypto/speck-neon-core.S deleted file mode 100644 index b14463438b09..000000000000 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/speck-neon-core.S +++ /dev/null @@ -1,352 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -/* - * ARM64 NEON-accelerated implementation of Speck128-XTS and Speck64-XTS - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Google, Inc - * - * Author: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> - */ - -#include <linux/linkage.h> - - .text - - // arguments - ROUND_KEYS .req x0 // const {u64,u32} *round_keys - NROUNDS .req w1 // int nrounds - NROUNDS_X .req x1 - DST .req x2 // void *dst - SRC .req x3 // const void *src - NBYTES .req w4 // unsigned int nbytes - TWEAK .req x5 // void *tweak - - // registers which hold the data being encrypted/decrypted - // (underscores avoid a naming collision with ARM64 registers x0-x3) - X_0 .req v0 - Y_0 .req v1 - X_1 .req v2 - Y_1 .req v3 - X_2 .req v4 - Y_2 .req v5 - X_3 .req v6 - Y_3 .req v7 - - // the round key, duplicated in all lanes - ROUND_KEY .req v8 - - // index vector for tbl-based 8-bit rotates - ROTATE_TABLE .req v9 - ROTATE_TABLE_Q .req q9 - - // temporary registers - TMP0 .req v10 - TMP1 .req v11 - TMP2 .req v12 - TMP3 .req v13 - - // multiplication table for updating XTS tweaks - GFMUL_TABLE .req v14 - GFMUL_TABLE_Q .req q14 - - // next XTS tweak value(s) - TWEAKV_NEXT .req v15 - - // XTS tweaks for the blocks currently being encrypted/decrypted - TWEAKV0 .req v16 - TWEAKV1 .req v17 - TWEAKV2 .req v18 - TWEAKV3 .req v19 - TWEAKV4 .req v20 - TWEAKV5 .req v21 - TWEAKV6 .req v22 - TWEAKV7 .req v23 - - .align 4 -.Lror64_8_table: - .octa 0x080f0e0d0c0b0a090007060504030201 -.Lror32_8_table: - .octa 0x0c0f0e0d080b0a090407060500030201 -.Lrol64_8_table: - .octa 0x0e0d0c0b0a09080f0605040302010007 -.Lrol32_8_table: - .octa 0x0e0d0c0f0a09080b0605040702010003 -.Lgf128mul_table: - .octa 0x00000000000000870000000000000001 -.Lgf64mul_table: - .octa 0x0000000000000000000000002d361b00 - -/* - * _speck_round_128bytes() - Speck encryption round on 128 bytes at a time - * - * Do one Speck encryption round on the 128 bytes (8 blocks for Speck128, 16 for - * Speck64) stored in X0-X3 and Y0-Y3, using the round key stored in all lanes - * of ROUND_KEY. 'n' is the lane size: 64 for Speck128, or 32 for Speck64. - * 'lanes' is the lane specifier: "2d" for Speck128 or "4s" for Speck64. - */ -.macro _speck_round_128bytes n, lanes - - // x = ror(x, 8) - tbl X_0.16b, {X_0.16b}, ROTATE_TABLE.16b - tbl X_1.16b, {X_1.16b}, ROTATE_TABLE.16b - tbl X_2.16b, {X_2.16b}, ROTATE_TABLE.16b - tbl X_3.16b, {X_3.16b}, ROTATE_TABLE.16b - - // x += y - add X_0.\lanes, X_0.\lanes, Y_0.\lanes - add X_1.\lanes, X_1.\lanes, Y_1.\lanes - add X_2.\lanes, X_2.\lanes, Y_2.\lanes - add X_3.\lanes, X_3.\lanes, Y_3.\lanes - - // x ^= k - eor X_0.16b, X_0.16b, ROUND_KEY.16b - eor X_1.16b, X_1.16b, ROUND_KEY.16b - eor X_2.16b, X_2.16b, ROUND_KEY.16b - eor X_3.16b, X_3.16b, ROUND_KEY.16b - - // y = rol(y, 3) - shl TMP0.\lanes, Y_0.\lanes, #3 - shl TMP1.\lanes, Y_1.\lanes, #3 - shl TMP2.\lanes, Y_2.\lanes, #3 - shl TMP3.\lanes, Y_3.\lanes, #3 - sri TMP0.\lanes, Y_0.\lanes, #(\n - 3) - sri TMP1.\lanes, Y_1.\lanes, #(\n - 3) - sri TMP2.\lanes, Y_2.\lanes, #(\n - 3) - sri TMP3.\lanes, Y_3.\lanes, #(\n - 3) - - // y ^= x - eor Y_0.16b, TMP0.16b, X_0.16b - eor Y_1.16b, TMP1.16b, X_1.16b - eor Y_2.16b, TMP2.16b, X_2.16b - eor Y_3.16b, TMP3.16b, X_3.16b -.endm - -/* - * _speck_unround_128bytes() - Speck decryption round on 128 bytes at a time - * - * This is the inverse of _speck_round_128bytes(). - */ -.macro _speck_unround_128bytes n, lanes - - // y ^= x - eor TMP0.16b, Y_0.16b, X_0.16b - eor TMP1.16b, Y_1.16b, X_1.16b - eor TMP2.16b, Y_2.16b, X_2.16b - eor TMP3.16b, Y_3.16b, X_3.16b - - // y = ror(y, 3) - ushr Y_0.\lanes, TMP0.\lanes, #3 - ushr Y_1.\lanes, TMP1.\lanes, #3 - ushr Y_2.\lanes, TMP2.\lanes, #3 - ushr Y_3.\lanes, TMP3.\lanes, #3 - sli Y_0.\lanes, TMP0.\lanes, #(\n - 3) - sli Y_1.\lanes, TMP1.\lanes, #(\n - 3) - sli Y_2.\lanes, TMP2.\lanes, #(\n - 3) - sli Y_3.\lanes, TMP3.\lanes, #(\n - 3) - - // x ^= k - eor X_0.16b, X_0.16b, ROUND_KEY.16b - eor X_1.16b, X_1.16b, ROUND_KEY.16b - eor X_2.16b, X_2.16b, ROUND_KEY.16b - eor X_3.16b, X_3.16b, ROUND_KEY.16b - - // x -= y - sub X_0.\lanes, X_0.\lanes, Y_0.\lanes - sub X_1.\lanes, X_1.\lanes, Y_1.\lanes - sub X_2.\lanes, X_2.\lanes, Y_2.\lanes - sub X_3.\lanes, X_3.\lanes, Y_3.\lanes - - // x = rol(x, 8) - tbl X_0.16b, {X_0.16b}, ROTATE_TABLE.16b - tbl X_1.16b, {X_1.16b}, ROTATE_TABLE.16b - tbl X_2.16b, {X_2.16b}, ROTATE_TABLE.16b - tbl X_3.16b, {X_3.16b}, ROTATE_TABLE.16b -.endm - -.macro _next_xts_tweak next, cur, tmp, n -.if \n == 64 - /* - * Calculate the next tweak by multiplying the current one by x, - * modulo p(x) = x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1. - */ - sshr \tmp\().2d, \cur\().2d, #63 - and \tmp\().16b, \tmp\().16b, GFMUL_TABLE.16b - shl \next\().2d, \cur\().2d, #1 - ext \tmp\().16b, \tmp\().16b, \tmp\().16b, #8 - eor \next\().16b, \next\().16b, \tmp\().16b -.else - /* - * Calculate the next two tweaks by multiplying the current ones by x^2, - * modulo p(x) = x^64 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1. - */ - ushr \tmp\().2d, \cur\().2d, #62 - shl \next\().2d, \cur\().2d, #2 - tbl \tmp\().16b, {GFMUL_TABLE.16b}, \tmp\().16b - eor \next\().16b, \next\().16b, \tmp\().16b -.endif -.endm - -/* - * _speck_xts_crypt() - Speck-XTS encryption/decryption - * - * Encrypt or decrypt NBYTES bytes of data from the SRC buffer to the DST buffer - * using Speck-XTS, specifically the variant with a block size of '2n' and round - * count given by NROUNDS. The expanded round keys are given in ROUND_KEYS, and - * the current XTS tweak value is given in TWEAK. It's assumed that NBYTES is a - * nonzero multiple of 128. - */ -.macro _speck_xts_crypt n, lanes, decrypting - - /* - * If decrypting, modify the ROUND_KEYS parameter to point to the last - * round key rather than the first, since for decryption the round keys - * are used in reverse order. - */ -.if \decrypting - mov NROUNDS, NROUNDS /* zero the high 32 bits */ -.if \n == 64 - add ROUND_KEYS, ROUND_KEYS, NROUNDS_X, lsl #3 - sub ROUND_KEYS, ROUND_KEYS, #8 -.else - add ROUND_KEYS, ROUND_KEYS, NROUNDS_X, lsl #2 - sub ROUND_KEYS, ROUND_KEYS, #4 -.endif -.endif - - // Load the index vector for tbl-based 8-bit rotates -.if \decrypting - ldr ROTATE_TABLE_Q, .Lrol\n\()_8_table -.else - ldr ROTATE_TABLE_Q, .Lror\n\()_8_table -.endif - - // One-time XTS preparation -.if \n == 64 - // Load first tweak - ld1 {TWEAKV0.16b}, [TWEAK] - - // Load GF(2^128) multiplication table - ldr GFMUL_TABLE_Q, .Lgf128mul_table -.else - // Load first tweak - ld1 {TWEAKV0.8b}, [TWEAK] - - // Load GF(2^64) multiplication table - ldr GFMUL_TABLE_Q, .Lgf64mul_table - - // Calculate second tweak, packing it together with the first - ushr TMP0.2d, TWEAKV0.2d, #63 - shl TMP1.2d, TWEAKV0.2d, #1 - tbl TMP0.8b, {GFMUL_TABLE.16b}, TMP0.8b - eor TMP0.8b, TMP0.8b, TMP1.8b - mov TWEAKV0.d[1], TMP0.d[0] -.endif - -.Lnext_128bytes_\@: - - // Calculate XTS tweaks for next 128 bytes - _next_xts_tweak TWEAKV1, TWEAKV0, TMP0, \n - _next_xts_tweak TWEAKV2, TWEAKV1, TMP0, \n - _next_xts_tweak TWEAKV3, TWEAKV2, TMP0, \n - _next_xts_tweak TWEAKV4, TWEAKV3, TMP0, \n - _next_xts_tweak TWEAKV5, TWEAKV4, TMP0, \n - _next_xts_tweak TWEAKV6, TWEAKV5, TMP0, \n - _next_xts_tweak TWEAKV7, TWEAKV6, TMP0, \n - _next_xts_tweak TWEAKV_NEXT, TWEAKV7, TMP0, \n - - // Load the next source blocks into {X,Y}[0-3] - ld1 {X_0.16b-Y_1.16b}, [SRC], #64 - ld1 {X_2.16b-Y_3.16b}, [SRC], #64 - - // XOR the source blocks with their XTS tweaks - eor TMP0.16b, X_0.16b, TWEAKV0.16b - eor Y_0.16b, Y_0.16b, TWEAKV1.16b - eor TMP1.16b, X_1.16b, TWEAKV2.16b - eor Y_1.16b, Y_1.16b, TWEAKV3.16b - eor TMP2.16b, X_2.16b, TWEAKV4.16b - eor Y_2.16b, Y_2.16b, TWEAKV5.16b - eor TMP3.16b, X_3.16b, TWEAKV6.16b - eor Y_3.16b, Y_3.16b, TWEAKV7.16b - - /* - * De-interleave the 'x' and 'y' elements of each block, i.e. make it so - * that the X[0-3] registers contain only the second halves of blocks, - * and the Y[0-3] registers contain only the first halves of blocks. - * (Speck uses the order (y, x) rather than the more intuitive (x, y).) - */ - uzp2 X_0.\lanes, TMP0.\lanes, Y_0.\lanes - uzp1 Y_0.\lanes, TMP0.\lanes, Y_0.\lanes - uzp2 X_1.\lanes, TMP1.\lanes, Y_1.\lanes - uzp1 Y_1.\lanes, TMP1.\lanes, Y_1.\lanes - uzp2 X_2.\lanes, TMP2.\lanes, Y_2.\lanes - uzp1 Y_2.\lanes, TMP2.\lanes, Y_2.\lanes - uzp2 X_3.\lanes, TMP3.\lanes, Y_3.\lanes - uzp1 Y_3.\lanes, TMP3.\lanes, Y_3.\lanes - - // Do the cipher rounds - mov x6, ROUND_KEYS - mov w7, NROUNDS -.Lnext_round_\@: -.if \decrypting - ld1r {ROUND_KEY.\lanes}, [x6] - sub x6, x6, #( \n / 8 ) - _speck_unround_128bytes \n, \lanes -.else - ld1r {ROUND_KEY.\lanes}, [x6], #( \n / 8 ) - _speck_round_128bytes \n, \lanes -.endif - subs w7, w7, #1 - bne .Lnext_round_\@ - - // Re-interleave the 'x' and 'y' elements of each block - zip1 TMP0.\lanes, Y_0.\lanes, X_0.\lanes - zip2 Y_0.\lanes, Y_0.\lanes, X_0.\lanes - zip1 TMP1.\lanes, Y_1.\lanes, X_1.\lanes - zip2 Y_1.\lanes, Y_1.\lanes, X_1.\lanes - zip1 TMP2.\lanes, Y_2.\lanes, X_2.\lanes - zip2 Y_2.\lanes, Y_2.\lanes, X_2.\lanes - zip1 TMP3.\lanes, Y_3.\lanes, X_3.\lanes - zip2 Y_3.\lanes, Y_3.\lanes, X_3.\lanes - - // XOR the encrypted/decrypted blocks with the tweaks calculated earlier - eor X_0.16b, TMP0.16b, TWEAKV0.16b - eor Y_0.16b, Y_0.16b, TWEAKV1.16b - eor X_1.16b, TMP1.16b, TWEAKV2.16b - eor Y_1.16b, Y_1.16b, TWEAKV3.16b - eor X_2.16b, TMP2.16b, TWEAKV4.16b - eor Y_2.16b, Y_2.16b, TWEAKV5.16b - eor X_3.16b, TMP3.16b, TWEAKV6.16b - eor Y_3.16b, Y_3.16b, TWEAKV7.16b - mov TWEAKV0.16b, TWEAKV_NEXT.16b - - // Store the ciphertext in the destination buffer - st1 {X_0.16b-Y_1.16b}, [DST], #64 - st1 {X_2.16b-Y_3.16b}, [DST], #64 - - // Continue if there are more 128-byte chunks remaining - subs NBYTES, NBYTES, #128 - bne .Lnext_128bytes_\@ - - // Store the next tweak and return -.if \n == 64 - st1 {TWEAKV_NEXT.16b}, [TWEAK] -.else - st1 {TWEAKV_NEXT.8b}, [TWEAK] -.endif - ret -.endm - -ENTRY(speck128_xts_encrypt_neon) - _speck_xts_crypt n=64, lanes=2d, decrypting=0 -ENDPROC(speck128_xts_encrypt_neon) - -ENTRY(speck128_xts_decrypt_neon) - _speck_xts_crypt n=64, lanes=2d, decrypting=1 -ENDPROC(speck128_xts_decrypt_neon) - -ENTRY(speck64_xts_encrypt_neon) - _speck_xts_crypt n=32, lanes=4s, decrypting=0 -ENDPROC(speck64_xts_encrypt_neon) - -ENTRY(speck64_xts_decrypt_neon) - _speck_xts_crypt n=32, lanes=4s, decrypting=1 -ENDPROC(speck64_xts_decrypt_neon) diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/speck-neon-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/speck-neon-glue.c deleted file mode 100644 index 6e233aeb4ff4..000000000000 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/speck-neon-glue.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,282 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -/* - * NEON-accelerated implementation of Speck128-XTS and Speck64-XTS - * (64-bit version; based on the 32-bit version) - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Google, Inc - */ - -#include <asm/hwcap.h> -#include <asm/neon.h> -#include <asm/simd.h> -#include <crypto/algapi.h> -#include <crypto/gf128mul.h> -#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h> -#include <crypto/speck.h> -#include <crypto/xts.h> -#include <linux/kernel.h> -#include <linux/module.h> - -/* The assembly functions only handle multiples of 128 bytes */ -#define SPECK_NEON_CHUNK_SIZE 128 - -/* Speck128 */ - -struct speck128_xts_tfm_ctx { - struct speck128_tfm_ctx main_key; - struct speck128_tfm_ctx tweak_key; -}; - -asmlinkage void speck128_xts_encrypt_neon(const u64 *round_keys, int nrounds, - void *dst, const void *src, - unsigned int nbytes, void *tweak); - -asmlinkage void speck128_xts_decrypt_neon(const u64 *round_keys, int nrounds, - void *dst, const void *src, - unsigned int nbytes, void *tweak); - -typedef void (*speck128_crypt_one_t)(const struct speck128_tfm_ctx *, - u8 *, const u8 *); -typedef void (*speck128_xts_crypt_many_t)(const u64 *, int, void *, - const void *, unsigned int, void *); - -static __always_inline int -__speck128_xts_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, - speck128_crypt_one_t crypt_one, - speck128_xts_crypt_many_t crypt_many) -{ - struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); - const struct speck128_xts_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); - struct skcipher_walk walk; - le128 tweak; - int err; - - err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true); - - crypto_speck128_encrypt(&ctx->tweak_key, (u8 *)&tweak, walk.iv); - - while (walk.nbytes > 0) { - unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes; - u8 *dst = walk.dst.virt.addr; - const u8 *src = walk.src.virt.addr; - - if (nbytes >= SPECK_NEON_CHUNK_SIZE && may_use_simd()) { - unsigned int count; - - count = round_down(nbytes, SPECK_NEON_CHUNK_SIZE); - kernel_neon_begin(); - (*crypt_many)(ctx->main_key.round_keys, - ctx->main_key.nrounds, - dst, src, count, &tweak); - kernel_neon_end(); - dst += count; - src += count; - nbytes -= count; - } - - /* Handle any remainder with generic code */ - while (nbytes >= sizeof(tweak)) { - le128_xor((le128 *)dst, (const le128 *)src, &tweak); - (*crypt_one)(&ctx->main_key, dst, dst); - le128_xor((le128 *)dst, (const le128 *)dst, &tweak); - gf128mul_x_ble(&tweak, &tweak); - - dst += sizeof(tweak); - src += sizeof(tweak); - nbytes -= sizeof(tweak); - } - err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes); - } - - return err; -} - -static int speck128_xts_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) -{ - return __speck128_xts_crypt(req, crypto_speck128_encrypt, - speck128_xts_encrypt_neon); -} - -static int speck128_xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) -{ - return __speck128_xts_crypt(req, crypto_speck128_decrypt, - speck128_xts_decrypt_neon); -} - -static int speck128_xts_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, - unsigned int keylen) -{ - struct speck128_xts_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); - int err; - - err = xts_verify_key(tfm, key, keylen); - if (err) - return err; - - keylen /= 2; - - err = crypto_speck128_setkey(&ctx->main_key, key, keylen); - if (err) - return err; - - return crypto_speck128_setkey(&ctx->tweak_key, key + keylen, keylen); -} - -/* Speck64 */ - -struct speck64_xts_tfm_ctx { - struct speck64_tfm_ctx main_key; - struct speck64_tfm_ctx tweak_key; -}; - -asmlinkage void speck64_xts_encrypt_neon(const u32 *round_keys, int nrounds, - void *dst, const void *src, - unsigned int nbytes, void *tweak); - -asmlinkage void speck64_xts_decrypt_neon(const u32 *round_keys, int nrounds, - void *dst, const void *src, - unsigned int nbytes, void *tweak); - -typedef void (*speck64_crypt_one_t)(const struct speck64_tfm_ctx *, - u8 *, const u8 *); -typedef void (*speck64_xts_crypt_many_t)(const u32 *, int, void *, - const void *, unsigned int, void *); - -static __always_inline int -__speck64_xts_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, speck64_crypt_one_t crypt_one, - speck64_xts_crypt_many_t crypt_many) -{ - struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); - const struct speck64_xts_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); - struct skcipher_walk walk; - __le64 tweak; - int err; - - err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true); - - crypto_speck64_encrypt(&ctx->tweak_key, (u8 *)&tweak, walk.iv); - - while (walk.nbytes > 0) { - unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes; - u8 *dst = walk.dst.virt.addr; - const u8 *src = walk.src.virt.addr; - - if (nbytes >= SPECK_NEON_CHUNK_SIZE && may_use_simd()) { - unsigned int count; - - count = round_down(nbytes, SPECK_NEON_CHUNK_SIZE); - kernel_neon_begin(); - (*crypt_many)(ctx->main_key.round_keys, - ctx->main_key.nrounds, - dst, src, count, &tweak); - kernel_neon_end(); - dst += count; - src += count; - nbytes -= count; - } - - /* Handle any remainder with generic code */ - while (nbytes >= sizeof(tweak)) { - *(__le64 *)dst = *(__le64 *)src ^ tweak; - (*crypt_one)(&ctx->main_key, dst, dst); - *(__le64 *)dst ^= tweak; - tweak = cpu_to_le64((le64_to_cpu(tweak) << 1) ^ - ((tweak & cpu_to_le64(1ULL << 63)) ? - 0x1B : 0)); - dst += sizeof(tweak); - src += sizeof(tweak); - nbytes -= sizeof(tweak); - } - err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes); - } - - return err; -} - -static int speck64_xts_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) -{ - return __speck64_xts_crypt(req, crypto_speck64_encrypt, - speck64_xts_encrypt_neon); -} - -static int speck64_xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) -{ - return __speck64_xts_crypt(req, crypto_speck64_decrypt, - speck64_xts_decrypt_neon); -} - -static int speck64_xts_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, - unsigned int keylen) -{ - struct speck64_xts_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); - int err; - - err = xts_verify_key(tfm, key, keylen); - if (err) - return err; - - keylen /= 2; - - err = crypto_speck64_setkey(&ctx->main_key, key, keylen); - if (err) - return err; - - return crypto_speck64_setkey(&ctx->tweak_key, key + keylen, keylen); -} - -static struct skcipher_alg speck_algs[] = { - { - .base.cra_name = "xts(speck128)", - .base.cra_driver_name = "xts-speck128-neon", - .base.cra_priority = 300, - .base.cra_blocksize = SPECK128_BLOCK_SIZE, - .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct speck128_xts_tfm_ctx), - .base.cra_alignmask = 7, - .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - .min_keysize = 2 * SPECK128_128_KEY_SIZE, - .max_keysize = 2 * SPECK128_256_KEY_SIZE, - .ivsize = SPECK128_BLOCK_SIZE, - .walksize = SPECK_NEON_CHUNK_SIZE, - .setkey = speck128_xts_setkey, - .encrypt = speck128_xts_encrypt, - .decrypt = speck128_xts_decrypt, - }, { - .base.cra_name = "xts(speck64)", - .base.cra_driver_name = "xts-speck64-neon", - .base.cra_priority = 300, - .base.cra_blocksize = SPECK64_BLOCK_SIZE, - .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct speck64_xts_tfm_ctx), - .base.cra_alignmask = 7, - .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - .min_keysize = 2 * SPECK64_96_KEY_SIZE, - .max_keysize = 2 * SPECK64_128_KEY_SIZE, - .ivsize = SPECK64_BLOCK_SIZE, - .walksize = SPECK_NEON_CHUNK_SIZE, - .setkey = speck64_xts_setkey, - .encrypt = speck64_xts_encrypt, - .decrypt = speck64_xts_decrypt, - } -}; - -static int __init speck_neon_module_init(void) -{ - if (!(elf_hwcap & HWCAP_ASIMD)) - return -ENODEV; - return crypto_register_skciphers(speck_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(speck_algs)); -} - -static void __exit speck_neon_module_exit(void) -{ - crypto_unregister_skciphers(speck_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(speck_algs)); -} - -module_init(speck_neon_module_init); -module_exit(speck_neon_module_exit); - -MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Speck block cipher (NEON-accelerated)"); -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>"); -MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xts(speck128)"); -MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xts-speck128-neon"); -MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xts(speck64)"); -MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xts-speck64-neon"); diff --git a/arch/m68k/configs/amiga_defconfig b/arch/m68k/configs/amiga_defconfig index a874e54404d1..4d4c76ab0bac 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/configs/amiga_defconfig +++ b/arch/m68k/configs/amiga_defconfig @@ -650,7 +650,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m diff --git a/arch/m68k/configs/apollo_defconfig b/arch/m68k/configs/apollo_defconfig index 8ce39e23aa42..0fd006c19fa3 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/configs/apollo_defconfig +++ b/arch/m68k/configs/apollo_defconfig @@ -609,7 +609,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m diff --git a/arch/m68k/configs/atari_defconfig b/arch/m68k/configs/atari_defconfig index 346c4e75edf8..9343e8d5cf60 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/configs/atari_defconfig +++ b/arch/m68k/configs/atari_defconfig @@ -631,7 +631,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m diff --git a/arch/m68k/configs/bvme6000_defconfig b/arch/m68k/configs/bvme6000_defconfig index fca9c7aa71a3..a10fff6e7b50 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/configs/bvme6000_defconfig +++ b/arch/m68k/configs/bvme6000_defconfig @@ -601,7 +601,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m diff --git a/arch/m68k/configs/hp300_defconfig b/arch/m68k/configs/hp300_defconfig index f9eab174915c..db81d8ea9d03 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/configs/hp300_defconfig +++ b/arch/m68k/configs/hp300_defconfig @@ -611,7 +611,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m diff --git a/arch/m68k/configs/mac_defconfig b/arch/m68k/configs/mac_defconfig index b52e597899eb..2546617a1147 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/configs/mac_defconfig +++ b/arch/m68k/configs/mac_defconfig @@ -633,7 +633,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m diff --git a/arch/m68k/configs/multi_defconfig b/arch/m68k/configs/multi_defconfig index 2a84eeec5b02..dc9b0d885e8b 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/configs/multi_defconfig +++ b/arch/m68k/configs/multi_defconfig @@ -713,7 +713,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m diff --git a/arch/m68k/configs/mvme147_defconfig b/arch/m68k/configs/mvme147_defconfig index 476e69994340..0d815a375ba0 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/configs/mvme147_defconfig +++ b/arch/m68k/configs/mvme147_defconfig @@ -601,7 +601,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m diff --git a/arch/m68k/configs/mvme16x_defconfig b/arch/m68k/configs/mvme16x_defconfig index 1477cda9146e..0cb8109b4c9e 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/configs/mvme16x_defconfig +++ b/arch/m68k/configs/mvme16x_defconfig @@ -601,7 +601,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m diff --git a/arch/m68k/configs/q40_defconfig b/arch/m68k/configs/q40_defconfig index b3a543dc48a0..e91a1c28bba7 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/configs/q40_defconfig +++ b/arch/m68k/configs/q40_defconfig @@ -624,7 +624,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m diff --git a/arch/m68k/configs/sun3_defconfig b/arch/m68k/configs/sun3_defconfig index d543ed5dfa96..3b2f0914c34f 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/configs/sun3_defconfig +++ b/arch/m68k/configs/sun3_defconfig @@ -602,7 +602,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m diff --git a/arch/m68k/configs/sun3x_defconfig b/arch/m68k/configs/sun3x_defconfig index a67e54246023..e4365ef4f5ed 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/configs/sun3x_defconfig +++ b/arch/m68k/configs/sun3x_defconfig @@ -603,7 +603,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m diff --git a/arch/s390/defconfig b/arch/s390/defconfig index f40600eb1762..5134c71a4937 100644 --- a/arch/s390/defconfig +++ b/arch/s390/defconfig @@ -221,7 +221,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEFLATE=m diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig index f3e40ac56d93..59e32623a7ce 100644 --- a/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/Kconfig @@ -1590,20 +1590,6 @@ config CRYPTO_SM4 If unsure, say N. -config CRYPTO_SPECK - tristate "Speck cipher algorithm" - select CRYPTO_ALGAPI - help - Speck is a lightweight block cipher that is tuned for optimal - performance in software (rather than hardware). - - Speck may not be as secure as AES, and should only be used on systems - where AES is not fast enough. - - See also: <https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/404.pdf> - - If unsure, say N. - config CRYPTO_TEA tristate "TEA, XTEA and XETA cipher algorithms" select CRYPTO_ALGAPI diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile index 6d1d40eeb964..f6a234d08882 100644 --- a/crypto/Makefile +++ b/crypto/Makefile @@ -115,7 +115,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA) += tea.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KHAZAD) += khazad.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANUBIS) += anubis.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED) += seed.o -obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK) += speck.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20) += salsa20_generic.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20) += chacha20_generic.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_POLY1305) += poly1305_generic.o diff --git a/crypto/speck.c b/crypto/speck.c deleted file mode 100644 index 58aa9f7f91f7..000000000000 --- a/crypto/speck.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,307 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -/* - * Speck: a lightweight block cipher - * - * Copyright (c) 2018 Google, Inc - * - * Speck has 10 variants, including 5 block sizes. For now we only implement - * the variants Speck128/128, Speck128/192, Speck128/256, Speck64/96, and - * Speck64/128. Speck${B}/${K} denotes the variant with a block size of B bits - * and a key size of K bits. The Speck128 variants are believed to be the most - * secure variants, and they use the same block size and key sizes as AES. The - * Speck64 variants are less secure, but on 32-bit processors are usually - * faster. The remaining variants (Speck32, Speck48, and Speck96) are even less - * secure and/or not as well suited for implementation on either 32-bit or - * 64-bit processors, so are omitted. - * - * Reference: "The Simon and Speck Families of Lightweight Block Ciphers" - * https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/404.pdf - * - * In a correspondence, the Speck designers have also clarified that the words - * should be interpreted in little-endian format, and the words should be - * ordered such that the first word of each block is 'y' rather than 'x', and - * the first key word (rather than the last) becomes the first round key. - */ - -#include <asm/unaligned.h> -#include <crypto/speck.h> -#include <linux/bitops.h> -#include <linux/crypto.h> -#include <linux/init.h> -#include <linux/module.h> - -/* Speck128 */ - -static __always_inline void speck128_round(u64 *x, u64 *y, u64 k) -{ - *x = ror64(*x, 8); - *x += *y; - *x ^= k; - *y = rol64(*y, 3); - *y ^= *x; -} - -static __always_inline void speck128_unround(u64 *x, u64 *y, u64 k) -{ - *y ^= *x; - *y = ror64(*y, 3); - *x ^= k; - *x -= *y; - *x = rol64(*x, 8); -} - -void crypto_speck128_encrypt(const struct speck128_tfm_ctx *ctx, - u8 *out, const u8 *in) -{ - u64 y = get_unaligned_le64(in); - u64 x = get_unaligned_le64(in + 8); - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < ctx->nrounds; i++) - speck128_round(&x, &y, ctx->round_keys[i]); - - put_unaligned_le64(y, out); - put_unaligned_le64(x, out + 8); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_speck128_encrypt); - -static void speck128_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in) -{ - crypto_speck128_encrypt(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), out, in); -} - -void crypto_speck128_decrypt(const struct speck128_tfm_ctx *ctx, - u8 *out, const u8 *in) -{ - u64 y = get_unaligned_le64(in); - u64 x = get_unaligned_le64(in + 8); - int i; - - for (i = ctx->nrounds - 1; i >= 0; i--) - speck128_unround(&x, &y, ctx->round_keys[i]); - - put_unaligned_le64(y, out); - put_unaligned_le64(x, out + 8); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_speck128_decrypt); - -static void speck128_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in) -{ - crypto_speck128_decrypt(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), out, in); -} - -int crypto_speck128_setkey(struct speck128_tfm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *key, - unsigned int keylen) -{ - u64 l[3]; - u64 k; - int i; - - switch (keylen) { - case SPECK128_128_KEY_SIZE: - k = get_unaligned_le64(key); - l[0] = get_unaligned_le64(key + 8); - ctx->nrounds = SPECK128_128_NROUNDS; - for (i = 0; i < ctx->nrounds; i++) { - ctx->round_keys[i] = k; - speck128_round(&l[0], &k, i); - } - break; - case SPECK128_192_KEY_SIZE: - k = get_unaligned_le64(key); - l[0] = get_unaligned_le64(key + 8); - l[1] = get_unaligned_le64(key + 16); - ctx->nrounds = SPECK128_192_NROUNDS; - for (i = 0; i < ctx->nrounds; i++) { - ctx->round_keys[i] = k; - speck128_round(&l[i % 2], &k, i); - } - break; - case SPECK128_256_KEY_SIZE: - k = get_unaligned_le64(key); - l[0] = get_unaligned_le64(key + 8); - l[1] = get_unaligned_le64(key + 16); - l[2] = get_unaligned_le64(key + 24); - ctx->nrounds = SPECK128_256_NROUNDS; - for (i = 0; i < ctx->nrounds; i++) { - ctx->round_keys[i] = k; - speck128_round(&l[i % 3], &k, i); - } - break; - default: - return -EINVAL; - } - - return 0; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_speck128_setkey); - -static int speck128_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key, - unsigned int keylen) -{ - return crypto_speck128_setkey(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), key, keylen); -} - -/* Speck64 */ - -static __always_inline void speck64_round(u32 *x, u32 *y, u32 k) -{ - *x = ror32(*x, 8); - *x += *y; - *x ^= k; - *y = rol32(*y, 3); - *y ^= *x; -} - -static __always_inline void speck64_unround(u32 *x, u32 *y, u32 k) -{ - *y ^= *x; - *y = ror32(*y, 3); - *x ^= k; - *x -= *y; - *x = rol32(*x, 8); -} - -void crypto_speck64_encrypt(const struct speck64_tfm_ctx *ctx, - u8 *out, const u8 *in) -{ - u32 y = get_unaligned_le32(in); - u32 x = get_unaligned_le32(in + 4); - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < ctx->nrounds; i++) - speck64_round(&x, &y, ctx->round_keys[i]); - - put_unaligned_le32(y, out); - put_unaligned_le32(x, out + 4); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_speck64_encrypt); - -static void speck64_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in) -{ - crypto_speck64_encrypt(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), out, in); -} - -void crypto_speck64_decrypt(const struct speck64_tfm_ctx *ctx, - u8 *out, const u8 *in) -{ - u32 y = get_unaligned_le32(in); - u32 x = get_unaligned_le32(in + 4); - int i; - - for (i = ctx->nrounds - 1; i >= 0; i--) - speck64_unround(&x, &y, ctx->round_keys[i]); - - put_unaligned_le32(y, out); - put_unaligned_le32(x, out + 4); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_speck64_decrypt); - -static void speck64_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in) -{ - crypto_speck64_decrypt(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), out, in); -} - -int crypto_speck64_setkey(struct speck64_tfm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *key, - unsigned int keylen) -{ - u32 l[3]; - u32 k; - int i; - - switch (keylen) { - case SPECK64_96_KEY_SIZE: - k = get_unaligned_le32(key); - l[0] = get_unaligned_le32(key + 4); - l[1] = get_unaligned_le32(key + 8); - ctx->nrounds = SPECK64_96_NROUNDS; - for (i = 0; i < ctx->nrounds; i++) { - ctx->round_keys[i] = k; - speck64_round(&l[i % 2], &k, i); - } - break; - case SPECK64_128_KEY_SIZE: - k = get_unaligned_le32(key); - l[0] = get_unaligned_le32(key + 4); - l[1] = get_unaligned_le32(key + 8); - l[2] = get_unaligned_le32(key + 12); - ctx->nrounds = SPECK64_128_NROUNDS; - for (i = 0; i < ctx->nrounds; i++) { - ctx->round_keys[i] = k; - speck64_round(&l[i % 3], &k, i); - } - break; - default: - return -EINVAL; - } - - return 0; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_speck64_setkey); - -static int speck64_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key, - unsigned int keylen) -{ - return crypto_speck64_setkey(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), key, keylen); -} - -/* Algorithm definitions */ - -static struct crypto_alg speck_algs[] = { - { - .cra_name = "speck128", - .cra_driver_name = "speck128-generic", - .cra_priority = 100, - .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER, - .cra_blocksize = SPECK128_BLOCK_SIZE, - .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct speck128_tfm_ctx), - .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - .cra_u = { - .cipher = { - .cia_min_keysize = SPECK128_128_KEY_SIZE, - .cia_max_keysize = SPECK128_256_KEY_SIZE, - .cia_setkey = speck128_setkey, - .cia_encrypt = speck128_encrypt, - .cia_decrypt = speck128_decrypt - } - } - }, { - .cra_name = "speck64", - .cra_driver_name = "speck64-generic", - .cra_priority = 100, - .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER, - .cra_blocksize = SPECK64_BLOCK_SIZE, - .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct speck64_tfm_ctx), - .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - .cra_u = { - .cipher = { - .cia_min_keysize = SPECK64_96_KEY_SIZE, - .cia_max_keysize = SPECK64_128_KEY_SIZE, - .cia_setkey = speck64_setkey, - .cia_encrypt = speck64_encrypt, - .cia_decrypt = speck64_decrypt - } - } - } -}; - -static int __init speck_module_init(void) -{ - return crypto_register_algs(speck_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(speck_algs)); -} - -static void __exit speck_module_exit(void) -{ - crypto_unregister_algs(speck_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(speck_algs)); -} - -module_init(speck_module_init); -module_exit(speck_module_exit); - -MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Speck block cipher (generic)"); -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>"); -MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("speck128"); -MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("speck128-generic"); -MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("speck64"); -MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("speck64-generic"); diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c index 11e45352fd0b..1ed03bf6a977 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.c +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c @@ -3000,18 +3000,6 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = { .suite = { .cipher = __VECS(sm4_tv_template) } - }, { - .alg = "ecb(speck128)", - .test = alg_test_skcipher, - .suite = { - .cipher = __VECS(speck128_tv_template) - } - }, { - .alg = "ecb(speck64)", - .test = alg_test_skcipher, - .suite = { - .cipher = __VECS(speck64_tv_template) - } }, { .alg = "ecb(tea)", .test = alg_test_skcipher, @@ -3539,18 +3527,6 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = { .suite = { .cipher = __VECS(serpent_xts_tv_template) } - }, { - .alg = "xts(speck128)", - .test = alg_test_skcipher, - .suite = { - .cipher = __VECS(speck128_xts_tv_template) - } - }, { - .alg = "xts(speck64)", - .test = alg_test_skcipher, - .suite = { - .cipher = __VECS(speck64_xts_tv_template) - } }, { .alg = "xts(twofish)", .test = alg_test_skcipher, diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h index b950aa234e43..36572c665026 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.h +++ b/crypto/testmgr.h @@ -10141,744 +10141,6 @@ static const struct cipher_testvec sm4_tv_template[] = { } }; -/* - * Speck test vectors taken from the original paper: - * "The Simon and Speck Families of Lightweight Block Ciphers" - * https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/404.pdf - * - * Note that the paper does not make byte and word order clear. But it was - * confirmed with the authors that the intended orders are little endian byte - * order and (y, x) word order. Equivalently, the printed test vectors, when - * looking at only the bytes (ignoring the whitespace that divides them into - * words), are backwards: the left-most byte is actually the one with the - * highest memory address, while the right-most byte is actually the one with - * the lowest memory address. - */ - -static const struct cipher_testvec speck128_tv_template[] = { - { /* Speck128/128 */ - .key = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" - "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f", - .klen = 16, - .ptext = "\x20\x6d\x61\x64\x65\x20\x69\x74" - "\x20\x65\x71\x75\x69\x76\x61\x6c", - .ctext = "\x18\x0d\x57\x5c\xdf\xfe\x60\x78" - "\x65\x32\x78\x79\x51\x98\x5d\xa6", - .len = 16, - }, { /* Speck128/192 */ - .key = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" - "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" - "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17", - .klen = 24, - .ptext = "\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x74\x6f\x20\x43" - "\x68\x69\x65\x66\x20\x48\x61\x72", - .ctext = "\x86\x18\x3c\xe0\x5d\x18\xbc\xf9" - "\x66\x55\x13\x13\x3a\xcf\xe4\x1b", - .len = 16, - }, { /* Speck128/256 */ - .key = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" - "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" - "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17" - "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f", - .klen = 32, - .ptext = "\x70\x6f\x6f\x6e\x65\x72\x2e\x20" - "\x49\x6e\x20\x74\x68\x6f\x73\x65", - .ctext = "\x43\x8f\x18\x9c\x8d\xb4\xee\x4e" - "\x3e\xf5\xc0\x05\x04\x01\x09\x41", - .len = 16, - }, -}; - -/* - * Speck128-XTS test vectors, taken from the AES-XTS test vectors with the - * ciphertext recomputed with Speck128 as the cipher - */ -static const struct cipher_testvec speck128_xts_tv_template[] = { - { - .key = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", - .klen = 32, - .iv = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", - .ptext = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", - .ctext = "\xbe\xa0\xe7\x03\xd7\xfe\xab\x62" - "\x3b\x99\x4a\x64\x74\x77\xac\xed" - "\xd8\xf4\xa6\xcf\xae\xb9\x07\x42" - "\x51\xd9\xb6\x1d\xe0\x5e\xbc\x54", - .len = 32, - }, { - .key = "\x11\x11\x11\x11\x11\x11\x11\x11" - "\x11\x11\x11\x11\x11\x11\x11\x11" - "\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22" - "\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22", - .klen = 32, - .iv = "\x33\x33\x33\x33\x33\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", - .ptext = "\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44" - "\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44" - "\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44" - "\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44", - .ctext = "\xfb\x53\x81\x75\x6f\x9f\x34\xad" - "\x7e\x01\xed\x7b\xcc\xda\x4e\x4a" - "\xd4\x84\xa4\x53\xd5\x88\x73\x1b" - "\xfd\xcb\xae\x0d\xf3\x04\xee\xe6", - .len = 32, - }, { - .key = "\xff\xfe\xfd\xfc\xfb\xfa\xf9\xf8" - "\xf7\xf6\xf5\xf4\xf3\xf2\xf1\xf0" - "\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22" - "\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22", - .klen = 32, - .iv = "\x33\x33\x33\x33\x33\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", - .ptext = "\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44" - "\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44" - "\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44" - "\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44", - .ctext = "\x21\x52\x84\x15\xd1\xf7\x21\x55" - "\xd9\x75\x4a\xd3\xc5\xdb\x9f\x7d" - "\xda\x63\xb2\xf1\x82\xb0\x89\x59" - "\x86\xd4\xaa\xaa\xdd\xff\x4f\x92", - .len = 32, - }, { - .key = "\x27\x18\x28\x18\x28\x45\x90\x45" - "\x23\x53\x60\x28\x74\x71\x35\x26" - "\x31\x41\x59\x26\x53\x58\x97\x93" - "\x23\x84\x62\x64\x33\x83\x27\x95", - .klen = 32, - .iv = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", - .ptext = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" - "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" - "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17" - "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f" - "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27" - "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f" - "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37" - "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f" - "\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47" - "\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f" - "\x50\x51\x52\x53\x54\x55\x56\x57" - "\x58\x59\x5a\x5b\x5c\x5d\x5e\x5f" - "\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67" - "\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f" - "\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77" - "\x78\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f" - "\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87" - "\x88\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f" - "\x90\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97" - "\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f" - "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7" - "\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf" - "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7" - "\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf" - "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7" - "\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" - "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7" - "\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf" - "\xe0\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7" - "\xe8\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef" - "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7" - "\xf8\xf9\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff" - "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" - "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" - "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17" - "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f" - "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27" - "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f" - "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37" - "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f" - "\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47" - "\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f" - "\x50\x51\x52\x53\x54\x55\x56\x57" - "\x58\x59\x5a\x5b\x5c\x5d\x5e\x5f" - "\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67" - "\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f" - "\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77" - "\x78\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f" - "\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87" - "\x88\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f" - "\x90\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97" - "\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f" - "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7" - "\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf" - "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7" - "\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf" - "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7" - "\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" - "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7" - "\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf" - "\xe0\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7" - "\xe8\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef" - "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7" - "\xf8\xf9\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff", - .ctext = "\x57\xb5\xf8\x71\x6e\x6d\xdd\x82" - "\x53\xd0\xed\x2d\x30\xc1\x20\xef" - "\x70\x67\x5e\xff\x09\x70\xbb\xc1" - "\x3a\x7b\x48\x26\xd9\x0b\xf4\x48" - "\xbe\xce\xb1\xc7\xb2\x67\xc4\xa7" - "\x76\xf8\x36\x30\xb7\xb4\x9a\xd9" - "\xf5\x9d\xd0\x7b\xc1\x06\x96\x44" - "\x19\xc5\x58\x84\x63\xb9\x12\x68" - "\x68\xc7\xaa\x18\x98\xf2\x1f\x5c" - "\x39\xa6\xd8\x32\x2b\xc3\x51\xfd" - "\x74\x79\x2e\xb4\x44\xd7\x69\xc4" - "\xfc\x29\xe6\xed\x26\x1e\xa6\x9d" - "\x1c\xbe\x00\x0e\x7f\x3a\xca\xfb" - "\x6d\x13\x65\xa0\xf9\x31\x12\xe2" - "\x26\xd1\xec\x2b\x0a\x8b\x59\x99" - "\xa7\x49\xa0\x0e\x09\x33\x85\x50" - "\xc3\x23\xca\x7a\xdd\x13\x45\x5f" - "\xde\x4c\xa7\xcb\x00\x8a\x66\x6f" - "\xa2\xb6\xb1\x2e\xe1\xa0\x18\xf6" - "\xad\xf3\xbd\xeb\xc7\xef\x55\x4f" - "\x79\x91\x8d\x36\x13\x7b\xd0\x4a" - "\x6c\x39\xfb\x53\xb8\x6f\x02\x51" - "\xa5\x20\xac\x24\x1c\x73\x59\x73" - "\x58\x61\x3a\x87\x58\xb3\x20\x56" - "\x39\x06\x2b\x4d\xd3\x20\x2b\x89" - "\x3f\xa2\xf0\x96\xeb\x7f\xa4\xcd" - "\x11\xae\xbd\xcb\x3a\xb4\xd9\x91" - "\x09\x35\x71\x50\x65\xac\x92\xe3" - "\x7b\x32\xc0\x7a\xdd\xd4\xc3\x92" - "\x6f\xeb\x79\xde\x6f\xd3\x25\xc9" - "\xcd\x63\xf5\x1e\x7a\x3b\x26\x9d" - "\x77\x04\x80\xa9\xbf\x38\xb5\xbd" - "\xb8\x05\x07\xbd\xfd\xab\x7b\xf8" - "\x2a\x26\xcc\x49\x14\x6d\x55\x01" - "\x06\x94\xd8\xb2\x2d\x53\x83\x1b" - "\x8f\xd4\xdd\x57\x12\x7e\x18\xba" - "\x8e\xe2\x4d\x80\xef\x7e\x6b\x9d" - "\x24\xa9\x60\xa4\x97\x85\x86\x2a" - "\x01\x00\x09\xf1\xcb\x4a\x24\x1c" - "\xd8\xf6\xe6\x5b\xe7\x5d\xf2\xc4" - "\x97\x1c\x10\xc6\x4d\x66\x4f\x98" - "\x87\x30\xac\xd5\xea\x73\x49\x10" - "\x80\xea\xe5\x5f\x4d\x5f\x03\x33" - "\x66\x02\x35\x3d\x60\x06\x36\x4f" - "\x14\x1c\xd8\x07\x1f\x78\xd0\xf8" - "\x4f\x6c\x62\x7c\x15\xa5\x7c\x28" - "\x7c\xcc\xeb\x1f\xd1\x07\x90\x93" - "\x7e\xc2\xa8\x3a\x80\xc0\xf5\x30" - "\xcc\x75\xcf\x16\x26\xa9\x26\x3b" - "\xe7\x68\x2f\x15\x21\x5b\xe4\x00" - "\xbd\x48\x50\xcd\x75\x70\xc4\x62" - "\xbb\x41\xfb\x89\x4a\x88\x3b\x3b" - "\x51\x66\x02\x69\x04\x97\x36\xd4" - "\x75\xae\x0b\xa3\x42\xf8\xca\x79" - "\x8f\x93\xe9\xcc\x38\xbd\xd6\xd2" - "\xf9\x70\x4e\xc3\x6a\x8e\x25\xbd" - "\xea\x15\x5a\xa0\x85\x7e\x81\x0d" - "\x03\xe7\x05\x39\xf5\x05\x26\xee" - "\xec\xaa\x1f\x3d\xc9\x98\x76\x01" - "\x2c\xf4\xfc\xa3\x88\x77\x38\xc4" - "\x50\x65\x50\x6d\x04\x1f\xdf\x5a" - "\xaa\xf2\x01\xa9\xc1\x8d\xee\xca" - "\x47\x26\xef\x39\xb8\xb4\xf2\xd1" - "\xd6\xbb\x1b\x2a\xc1\x34\x14\xcf", - .len = 512, - }, { - .key = "\x27\x18\x28\x18\x28\x45\x90\x45" - "\x23\x53\x60\x28\x74\x71\x35\x26" - "\x62\x49\x77\x57\x24\x70\x93\x69" - "\x99\x59\x57\x49\x66\x96\x76\x27" - "\x31\x41\x59\x26\x53\x58\x97\x93" - "\x23\x84\x62\x64\x33\x83\x27\x95" - "\x02\x88\x41\x97\x16\x93\x99\x37" - "\x51\x05\x82\x09\x74\x94\x45\x92", - .klen = 64, - .iv = "\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", - .ptext = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" - "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" - "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17" - "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f" - "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27" - "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f" - "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37" - "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f" - "\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47" - "\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f" - "\x50\x51\x52\x53\x54\x55\x56\x57" - "\x58\x59\x5a\x5b\x5c\x5d\x5e\x5f" - "\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67" - "\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f" - "\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77" - "\x78\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f" - "\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87" - "\x88\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f" - "\x90\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97" - "\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f" - "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7" - "\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf" - "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7" - "\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf" - "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7" - "\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" - "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7" - "\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf" - "\xe0\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7" - "\xe8\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef" - "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7" - "\xf8\xf9\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff" - "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" - "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" - "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17" - "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f" - "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27" - "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f" - "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37" - "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f" - "\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47" - "\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f" - "\x50\x51\x52\x53\x54\x55\x56\x57" - "\x58\x59\x5a\x5b\x5c\x5d\x5e\x5f" - "\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67" - "\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f" - "\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77" - "\x78\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f" - "\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87" - "\x88\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f" - "\x90\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97" - "\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f" - "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7" - "\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf" - "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7" - "\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf" - "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7" - "\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" - "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7" - "\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf" - "\xe0\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7" - "\xe8\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef" - "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7" - "\xf8\xf9\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff", - .ctext = "\xc5\x85\x2a\x4b\x73\xe4\xf6\xf1" - "\x7e\xf9\xf6\xe9\xa3\x73\x36\xcb" - "\xaa\xb6\x22\xb0\x24\x6e\x3d\x73" - "\x92\x99\xde\xd3\x76\xed\xcd\x63" - "\x64\x3a\x22\x57\xc1\x43\x49\xd4" - "\x79\x36\x31\x19\x62\xae\x10\x7e" - "\x7d\xcf\x7a\xe2\x6b\xce\x27\xfa" - "\xdc\x3d\xd9\x83\xd3\x42\x4c\xe0" - "\x1b\xd6\x1d\x1a\x6f\xd2\x03\x00" - "\xfc\x81\x99\x8a\x14\x62\xf5\x7e" - "\x0d\xe7\x12\xe8\x17\x9d\x0b\xec" - "\xe2\xf7\xc9\xa7\x63\xd1\x79\xb6" - "\x62\x62\x37\xfe\x0a\x4c\x4a\x37" - "\x70\xc7\x5e\x96\x5f\xbc\x8e\x9e" - "\x85\x3c\x4f\x26\x64\x85\xbc\x68" - "\xb0\xe0\x86\x5e\x26\x41\xce\x11" - "\x50\xda\x97\x14\xe9\x9e\xc7\x6d" - "\x3b\xdc\x43\xde\x2b\x27\x69\x7d" - "\xfc\xb0\x28\xbd\x8f\xb1\xc6\x31" - "\x14\x4d\xf0\x74\x37\xfd\x07\x25" - "\x96\x55\xe5\xfc\x9e\x27\x2a\x74" - "\x1b\x83\x4d\x15\x83\xac\x57\xa0" - "\xac\xa5\xd0\x38\xef\x19\x56\x53" - "\x25\x4b\xfc\xce\x04\x23\xe5\x6b" - "\xf6\xc6\x6c\x32\x0b\xb3\x12\xc5" - "\xed\x22\x34\x1c\x5d\xed\x17\x06" - "\x36\xa3\xe6\x77\xb9\x97\x46\xb8" - "\xe9\x3f\x7e\xc7\xbc\x13\x5c\xdc" - "\x6e\x3f\x04\x5e\xd1\x59\xa5\x82" - "\x35\x91\x3d\x1b\xe4\x97\x9f\x92" - "\x1c\x5e\x5f\x6f\x41\xd4\x62\xa1" - "\x8d\x39\xfc\x42\xfb\x38\x80\xb9" - "\x0a\xe3\xcc\x6a\x93\xd9\x7a\xb1" - "\xe9\x69\xaf\x0a\x6b\x75\x38\xa7" - "\xa1\xbf\xf7\xda\x95\x93\x4b\x78" - "\x19\xf5\x94\xf9\xd2\x00\x33\x37" - "\xcf\xf5\x9e\x9c\xf3\xcc\xa6\xee" - "\x42\xb2\x9e\x2c\x5f\x48\x23\x26" - "\x15\x25\x17\x03\x3d\xfe\x2c\xfc" - "\xeb\xba\xda\xe0\x00\x05\xb6\xa6" - "\x07\xb3\xe8\x36\x5b\xec\x5b\xbf" - "\xd6\x5b\x00\x74\xc6\x97\xf1\x6a" - "\x49\xa1\xc3\xfa\x10\x52\xb9\x14" - "\xad\xb7\x73\xf8\x78\x12\xc8\x59" - "\x17\x80\x4c\x57\x39\xf1\x6d\x80" - "\x25\x77\x0f\x5e\x7d\xf0\xaf\x21" - "\xec\xce\xb7\xc8\x02\x8a\xed\x53" - "\x2c\x25\x68\x2e\x1f\x85\x5e\x67" - "\xd1\x07\x7a\x3a\x89\x08\xe0\x34" - "\xdc\xdb\x26\xb4\x6b\x77\xfc\x40" - "\x31\x15\x72\xa0\xf0\x73\xd9\x3b" - "\xd5\xdb\xfe\xfc\x8f\xa9\x44\xa2" - "\x09\x9f\xc6\x33\xe5\xe2\x88\xe8" - "\xf3\xf0\x1a\xf4\xce\x12\x0f\xd6" - "\xf7\x36\xe6\xa4\xf4\x7a\x10\x58" - "\xcc\x1f\x48\x49\x65\x47\x75\xe9" - "\x28\xe1\x65\x7b\xf2\xc4\xb5\x07" - "\xf2\xec\x76\xd8\x8f\x09\xf3\x16" - "\xa1\x51\x89\x3b\xeb\x96\x42\xac" - "\x65\xe0\x67\x63\x29\xdc\xb4\x7d" - "\xf2\x41\x51\x6a\xcb\xde\x3c\xfb" - "\x66\x8d\x13\xca\xe0\x59\x2a\x00" - "\xc9\x53\x4c\xe6\x9e\xe2\x73\xd5" - "\x67\x19\xb2\xbd\x9a\x63\xd7\x5c", - .len = 512, - .also_non_np = 1, - .np = 3, - .tap = { 512 - 20, 4, 16 }, - } -}; - -static const struct cipher_testvec speck64_tv_template[] = { - { /* Speck64/96 */ - .key = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x08\x09\x0a\x0b" - "\x10\x11\x12\x13", - .klen = 12, - .ptext = "\x65\x61\x6e\x73\x20\x46\x61\x74", - .ctext = "\x6c\x94\x75\x41\xec\x52\x79\x9f", - .len = 8, - }, { /* Speck64/128 */ - .key = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x08\x09\x0a\x0b" - "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x18\x19\x1a\x1b", - .klen = 16, - .ptext = "\x2d\x43\x75\x74\x74\x65\x72\x3b", - .ctext = "\x8b\x02\x4e\x45\x48\xa5\x6f\x8c", - .len = 8, - }, -}; - -/* - * Speck64-XTS test vectors, taken from the AES-XTS test vectors with the - * ciphertext recomputed with Speck64 as the cipher, and key lengths adjusted - */ -static const struct cipher_testvec speck64_xts_tv_template[] = { - { - .key = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", - .klen = 24, - .iv = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", - .ptext = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", - .ctext = "\x84\xaf\x54\x07\x19\xd4\x7c\xa6" - "\xe4\xfe\xdf\xc4\x1f\x34\xc3\xc2" - "\x80\xf5\x72\xe7\xcd\xf0\x99\x22" - "\x35\xa7\x2f\x06\xef\xdc\x51\xaa", - .len = 32, - }, { - .key = "\x11\x11\x11\x11\x11\x11\x11\x11" - "\x11\x11\x11\x11\x11\x11\x11\x11" - "\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22", - .klen = 24, - .iv = "\x33\x33\x33\x33\x33\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", - .ptext = "\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44" - "\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44" - "\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44" - "\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44", - .ctext = "\x12\x56\x73\xcd\x15\x87\xa8\x59" - "\xcf\x84\xae\xd9\x1c\x66\xd6\x9f" - "\xb3\x12\x69\x7e\x36\xeb\x52\xff" - "\x62\xdd\xba\x90\xb3\xe1\xee\x99", - .len = 32, - }, { - .key = "\xff\xfe\xfd\xfc\xfb\xfa\xf9\xf8" - "\xf7\xf6\xf5\xf4\xf3\xf2\xf1\xf0" - "\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22\x22", - .klen = 24, - .iv = "\x33\x33\x33\x33\x33\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", - .ptext = "\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44" - "\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44" - "\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44" - "\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44\x44", - .ctext = "\x15\x1b\xe4\x2c\xa2\x5a\x2d\x2c" - "\x27\x36\xc0\xbf\x5d\xea\x36\x37" - "\x2d\x1a\x88\xbc\x66\xb5\xd0\x0b" - "\xa1\xbc\x19\xb2\x0f\x3b\x75\x34", - .len = 32, - }, { - .key = "\x27\x18\x28\x18\x28\x45\x90\x45" - "\x23\x53\x60\x28\x74\x71\x35\x26" - "\x31\x41\x59\x26\x53\x58\x97\x93", - .klen = 24, - .iv = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", - .ptext = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" - "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" - "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17" - "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f" - "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27" - "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f" - "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37" - "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f" - "\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47" - "\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f" - "\x50\x51\x52\x53\x54\x55\x56\x57" - "\x58\x59\x5a\x5b\x5c\x5d\x5e\x5f" - "\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67" - "\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f" - "\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77" - "\x78\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f" - "\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87" - "\x88\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f" - "\x90\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97" - "\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f" - "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7" - "\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf" - "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7" - "\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf" - "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7" - "\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" - "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7" - "\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf" - "\xe0\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7" - "\xe8\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef" - "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7" - "\xf8\xf9\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff" - "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" - "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" - "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17" - "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f" - "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27" - "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f" - "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37" - "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f" - "\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47" - "\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f" - "\x50\x51\x52\x53\x54\x55\x56\x57" - "\x58\x59\x5a\x5b\x5c\x5d\x5e\x5f" - "\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67" - "\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f" - "\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77" - "\x78\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f" - "\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87" - "\x88\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f" - "\x90\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97" - "\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f" - "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7" - "\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf" - "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7" - "\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf" - "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7" - "\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" - "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7" - "\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf" - "\xe0\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7" - "\xe8\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef" - "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7" - "\xf8\xf9\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff", - .ctext = "\xaf\xa1\x81\xa6\x32\xbb\x15\x8e" - "\xf8\x95\x2e\xd3\xe6\xee\x7e\x09" - "\x0c\x1a\xf5\x02\x97\x8b\xe3\xb3" - "\x11\xc7\x39\x96\xd0\x95\xf4\x56" - "\xf4\xdd\x03\x38\x01\x44\x2c\xcf" - "\x88\xae\x8e\x3c\xcd\xe7\xaa\x66" - "\xfe\x3d\xc6\xfb\x01\x23\x51\x43" - "\xd5\xd2\x13\x86\x94\x34\xe9\x62" - "\xf9\x89\xe3\xd1\x7b\xbe\xf8\xef" - "\x76\x35\x04\x3f\xdb\x23\x9d\x0b" - "\x85\x42\xb9\x02\xd6\xcc\xdb\x96" - "\xa7\x6b\x27\xb6\xd4\x45\x8f\x7d" - "\xae\xd2\x04\xd5\xda\xc1\x7e\x24" - "\x8c\x73\xbe\x48\x7e\xcf\x65\x28" - "\x29\xe5\xbe\x54\x30\xcb\x46\x95" - "\x4f\x2e\x8a\x36\xc8\x27\xc5\xbe" - "\xd0\x1a\xaf\xab\x26\xcd\x9e\x69" - "\xa1\x09\x95\x71\x26\xe9\xc4\xdf" - "\xe6\x31\xc3\x46\xda\xaf\x0b\x41" - "\x1f\xab\xb1\x8e\xd6\xfc\x0b\xb3" - "\x82\xc0\x37\x27\xfc\x91\xa7\x05" - "\xfb\xc5\xdc\x2b\x74\x96\x48\x43" - "\x5d\x9c\x19\x0f\x60\x63\x3a\x1f" - "\x6f\xf0\x03\xbe\x4d\xfd\xc8\x4a" - "\xc6\xa4\x81\x6d\xc3\x12\x2a\x5c" - "\x07\xff\xf3\x72\x74\x48\xb5\x40" - "\x50\xb5\xdd\x90\x43\x31\x18\x15" - "\x7b\xf2\xa6\xdb\x83\xc8\x4b\x4a" - "\x29\x93\x90\x8b\xda\x07\xf0\x35" - "\x6d\x90\x88\x09\x4e\x83\xf5\x5b" - "\x94\x12\xbb\x33\x27\x1d\x3f\x23" - "\x51\xa8\x7c\x07\xa2\xae\x77\xa6" - "\x50\xfd\xcc\xc0\x4f\x80\x7a\x9f" - "\x66\xdd\xcd\x75\x24\x8b\x33\xf7" - "\x20\xdb\x83\x9b\x4f\x11\x63\x6e" - "\xcf\x37\xef\xc9\x11\x01\x5c\x45" - "\x32\x99\x7c\x3c\x9e\x42\x89\xe3" - "\x70\x6d\x15\x9f\xb1\xe6\xb6\x05" - "\xfe\x0c\xb9\x49\x2d\x90\x6d\xcc" - "\x5d\x3f\xc1\xfe\x89\x0a\x2e\x2d" - "\xa0\xa8\x89\x3b\x73\x39\xa5\x94" - "\x4c\xa4\xa6\xbb\xa7\x14\x46\x89" - "\x10\xff\xaf\xef\xca\xdd\x4f\x80" - "\xb3\xdf\x3b\xab\xd4\xe5\x5a\xc7" - "\x33\xca\x00\x8b\x8b\x3f\xea\xec" - "\x68\x8a\xc2\x6d\xfd\xd4\x67\x0f" - "\x22\x31\xe1\x0e\xfe\x5a\x04\xd5" - "\x64\xa3\xf1\x1a\x76\x28\xcc\x35" - "\x36\xa7\x0a\x74\xf7\x1c\x44\x9b" - "\xc7\x1b\x53\x17\x02\xea\xd1\xad" - "\x13\x51\x73\xc0\xa0\xb2\x05\x32" - "\xa8\xa2\x37\x2e\xe1\x7a\x3a\x19" - "\x26\xb4\x6c\x62\x5d\xb3\x1a\x1d" - "\x59\xda\xee\x1a\x22\x18\xda\x0d" - "\x88\x0f\x55\x8b\x72\x62\xfd\xc1" - "\x69\x13\xcd\x0d\x5f\xc1\x09\x52" - "\xee\xd6\xe3\x84\x4d\xee\xf6\x88" - "\xaf\x83\xdc\x76\xf4\xc0\x93\x3f" - "\x4a\x75\x2f\xb0\x0b\x3e\xc4\x54" - "\x7d\x69\x8d\x00\x62\x77\x0d\x14" - "\xbe\x7c\xa6\x7d\xc5\x24\x4f\xf3" - "\x50\xf7\x5f\xf4\xc2\xca\x41\x97" - "\x37\xbe\x75\x74\xcd\xf0\x75\x6e" - "\x25\x23\x94\xbd\xda\x8d\xb0\xd4", - .len = 512, - }, { - .key = "\x27\x18\x28\x18\x28\x45\x90\x45" - "\x23\x53\x60\x28\x74\x71\x35\x26" - "\x62\x49\x77\x57\x24\x70\x93\x69" - "\x99\x59\x57\x49\x66\x96\x76\x27", - .klen = 32, - .iv = "\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" - "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", - .ptext = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" - "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" - "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17" - "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f" - "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27" - "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f" - "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37" - "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f" - "\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47" - "\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f" - "\x50\x51\x52\x53\x54\x55\x56\x57" - "\x58\x59\x5a\x5b\x5c\x5d\x5e\x5f" - "\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67" - "\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f" - "\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77" - "\x78\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f" - "\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87" - "\x88\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f" - "\x90\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97" - "\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f" - "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7" - "\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf" - "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7" - "\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf" - "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7" - "\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" - "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7" - "\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf" - "\xe0\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7" - "\xe8\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef" - "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7" - "\xf8\xf9\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff" - "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" - "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" - "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17" - "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f" - "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27" - "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f" - "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37" - "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f" - "\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47" - "\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f" - "\x50\x51\x52\x53\x54\x55\x56\x57" - "\x58\x59\x5a\x5b\x5c\x5d\x5e\x5f" - "\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67" - "\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f" - "\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77" - "\x78\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f" - "\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87" - "\x88\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f" - "\x90\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97" - "\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f" - "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7" - "\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf" - "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7" - "\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf" - "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7" - "\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" - "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7" - "\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf" - "\xe0\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7" - "\xe8\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef" - "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7" - "\xf8\xf9\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff", - .ctext = "\x55\xed\x71\xd3\x02\x8e\x15\x3b" - "\xc6\x71\x29\x2d\x3e\x89\x9f\x59" - "\x68\x6a\xcc\x8a\x56\x97\xf3\x95" - "\x4e\x51\x08\xda\x2a\xf8\x6f\x3c" - "\x78\x16\xea\x80\xdb\x33\x75\x94" - "\xf9\x29\xc4\x2b\x76\x75\x97\xc7" - "\xf2\x98\x2c\xf9\xff\xc8\xd5\x2b" - "\x18\xf1\xaf\xcf\x7c\xc5\x0b\xee" - "\xad\x3c\x76\x7c\xe6\x27\xa2\x2a" - "\xe4\x66\xe1\xab\xa2\x39\xfc\x7c" - "\xf5\xec\x32\x74\xa3\xb8\x03\x88" - "\x52\xfc\x2e\x56\x3f\xa1\xf0\x9f" - "\x84\x5e\x46\xed\x20\x89\xb6\x44" - "\x8d\xd0\xed\x54\x47\x16\xbe\x95" - "\x8a\xb3\x6b\x72\xc4\x32\x52\x13" - "\x1b\xb0\x82\xbe\xac\xf9\x70\xa6" - "\x44\x18\xdd\x8c\x6e\xca\x6e\x45" - "\x8f\x1e\x10\x07\x57\x25\x98\x7b" - "\x17\x8c\x78\xdd\x80\xa7\xd9\xd8" - "\x63\xaf\xb9\x67\x57\xfd\xbc\xdb" - "\x44\xe9\xc5\x65\xd1\xc7\x3b\xff" - "\x20\xa0\x80\x1a\xc3\x9a\xad\x5e" - "\x5d\x3b\xd3\x07\xd9\xf5\xfd\x3d" - "\x4a\x8b\xa8\xd2\x6e\x7a\x51\x65" - "\x6c\x8e\x95\xe0\x45\xc9\x5f\x4a" - "\x09\x3c\x3d\x71\x7f\x0c\x84\x2a" - "\xc8\x48\x52\x1a\xc2\xd5\xd6\x78" - "\x92\x1e\xa0\x90\x2e\xea\xf0\xf3" - "\xdc\x0f\xb1\xaf\x0d\x9b\x06\x2e" - "\x35\x10\x30\x82\x0d\xe7\xc5\x9b" - "\xde\x44\x18\xbd\x9f\xd1\x45\xa9" - "\x7b\x7a\x4a\xad\x35\x65\x27\xca" - "\xb2\xc3\xd4\x9b\x71\x86\x70\xee" - "\xf1\x89\x3b\x85\x4b\x5b\xaa\xaf" - "\xfc\x42\xc8\x31\x59\xbe\x16\x60" - "\x4f\xf9\xfa\x12\xea\xd0\xa7\x14" - "\xf0\x7a\xf3\xd5\x8d\xbd\x81\xef" - "\x52\x7f\x29\x51\x94\x20\x67\x3c" - "\xd1\xaf\x77\x9f\x22\x5a\x4e\x63" - "\xe7\xff\x73\x25\xd1\xdd\x96\x8a" - "\x98\x52\x6d\xf3\xac\x3e\xf2\x18" - "\x6d\xf6\x0a\x29\xa6\x34\x3d\xed" - "\xe3\x27\x0d\x9d\x0a\x02\x44\x7e" - "\x5a\x7e\x67\x0f\x0a\x9e\xd6\xad" - "\x91\xe6\x4d\x81\x8c\x5c\x59\xaa" - "\xfb\xeb\x56\x53\xd2\x7d\x4c\x81" - "\x65\x53\x0f\x41\x11\xbd\x98\x99" - "\xf9\xc6\xfa\x51\x2e\xa3\xdd\x8d" - "\x84\x98\xf9\x34\xed\x33\x2a\x1f" - "\x82\xed\xc1\x73\x98\xd3\x02\xdc" - "\xe6\xc2\x33\x1d\xa2\xb4\xca\x76" - "\x63\x51\x34\x9d\x96\x12\xae\xce" - "\x83\xc9\x76\x5e\xa4\x1b\x53\x37" - "\x17\xd5\xc0\x80\x1d\x62\xf8\x3d" - "\x54\x27\x74\xbb\x10\x86\x57\x46" - "\x68\xe1\xed\x14\xe7\x9d\xfc\x84" - "\x47\xbc\xc2\xf8\x19\x4b\x99\xcf" - "\x7a\xe9\xc4\xb8\x8c\x82\x72\x4d" - "\x7b\x4f\x38\x55\x36\x71\x64\xc1" - "\xfc\x5c\x75\x52\x33\x02\x18\xf8" - "\x17\xe1\x2b\xc2\x43\x39\xbd\x76" - "\x9b\x63\x76\x32\x2f\x19\x72\x10" - "\x9f\x21\x0c\xf1\x66\x50\x7f\xa5" - "\x0d\x1f\x46\xe0\xba\xd3\x2f\x3c", - .len = 512, - .also_non_np = 1, - .np = 3, - .tap = { 512 - 20, 4, 16 }, - } -}; - /* Cast6 test vectors from RFC 2612 */ static const struct cipher_testvec cast6_tv_template[] = { { diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h index 39c20ef26db4..79debfc9cef9 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h @@ -83,10 +83,6 @@ static inline bool fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(u32 contents_mode, filenames_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS) return true; - if (contents_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_SPECK128_256_XTS && - filenames_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_SPECK128_256_CTS) - return true; - return false; } diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c index e997ca51192f..7874c9bb2fc5 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c @@ -174,16 +174,6 @@ static struct fscrypt_mode { .cipher_str = "cts(cbc(aes))", .keysize = 16, }, - [FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_SPECK128_256_XTS] = { - .friendly_name = "Speck128/256-XTS", - .cipher_str = "xts(speck128)", - .keysize = 64, - }, - [FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_SPECK128_256_CTS] = { - .friendly_name = "Speck128/256-CTS-CBC", - .cipher_str = "cts(cbc(speck128))", - .keysize = 32, - }, }; static struct fscrypt_mode * diff --git a/include/crypto/speck.h b/include/crypto/speck.h deleted file mode 100644 index 73cfc952d405..000000000000 --- a/include/crypto/speck.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -/* - * Common values for the Speck algorithm - */ - -#ifndef _CRYPTO_SPECK_H -#define _CRYPTO_SPECK_H - -#include <linux/types.h> - -/* Speck128 */ - -#define SPECK128_BLOCK_SIZE 16 - -#define SPECK128_128_KEY_SIZE 16 -#define SPECK128_128_NROUNDS 32 - -#define SPECK128_192_KEY_SIZE 24 -#define SPECK128_192_NROUNDS 33 - -#define SPECK128_256_KEY_SIZE 32 -#define SPECK128_256_NROUNDS 34 - -struct speck128_tfm_ctx { - u64 round_keys[SPECK128_256_NROUNDS]; - int nrounds; -}; - -void crypto_speck128_encrypt(const struct speck128_tfm_ctx *ctx, - u8 *out, const u8 *in); - -void crypto_speck128_decrypt(const struct speck128_tfm_ctx *ctx, - u8 *out, const u8 *in); - -int crypto_speck128_setkey(struct speck128_tfm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *key, - unsigned int keysize); - -/* Speck64 */ - -#define SPECK64_BLOCK_SIZE 8 - -#define SPECK64_96_KEY_SIZE 12 -#define SPECK64_96_NROUNDS 26 - -#define SPECK64_128_KEY_SIZE 16 -#define SPECK64_128_NROUNDS 27 - -struct speck64_tfm_ctx { - u32 round_keys[SPECK64_128_NROUNDS]; - int nrounds; -}; - -void crypto_speck64_encrypt(const struct speck64_tfm_ctx *ctx, - u8 *out, const u8 *in); - -void crypto_speck64_decrypt(const struct speck64_tfm_ctx *ctx, - u8 *out, const u8 *in); - -int crypto_speck64_setkey(struct speck64_tfm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *key, - unsigned int keysize); - -#endif /* _CRYPTO_SPECK_H */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h index 73e01918f996..9d132f8f2df8 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h @@ -279,8 +279,6 @@ struct fsxattr { #define FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS 4 #define FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC 5 #define FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CTS 6 -#define FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_SPECK128_256_XTS 7 -#define FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_SPECK128_256_CTS 8 struct fscrypt_policy { __u8 version; -- 2.18.0

6 years, 3 months

6
10
0 0

[PATCH] staging: android: ion: check for kref overflow

by Daniel Rosenberg

This patch is against 4.9. It does not apply to master due to a large rework of ion in 4.12 which removed the affected functions altogther. 4c23cbff073f3b9b ("staging: android: ion: Remove import interface") Userspace can cause the kref to handles to increment arbitrarily high. Ensure it does not overflow. Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c index 6f9974cb0e152..48821948fa487 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c +++ b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ * */ +#include <linux/atomic.h> #include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/file.h> @@ -305,6 +306,16 @@ static void ion_handle_get(struct ion_handle *handle) kref_get(&handle->ref); } +/* Must hold the client lock */ +static struct ion_handle *ion_handle_get_check_overflow( + struct ion_handle *handle) +{ + if (atomic_read(&handle->ref.refcount) + 1 == 0) + return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW); + ion_handle_get(handle); + return handle; +} + int ion_handle_put_nolock(struct ion_handle *handle) { return kref_put(&handle->ref, ion_handle_destroy); @@ -347,9 +358,9 @@ struct ion_handle *ion_handle_get_by_id_nolock(struct ion_client *client, handle = idr_find(&client->idr, id); if (handle) - ion_handle_get(handle); + return ion_handle_get_check_overflow(handle); - return handle ? handle : ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } struct ion_handle *ion_handle_get_by_id(struct ion_client *client, @@ -1100,7 +1111,7 @@ struct ion_handle *ion_import_dma_buf(struct ion_client *client, /* if a handle exists for this buffer just take a reference to it */ handle = ion_handle_lookup(client, buffer); if (!IS_ERR(handle)) { - ion_handle_get(handle); + handle = ion_handle_get_check_overflow(handle); mutex_unlock(&client->lock); goto end; } -- 2.19.0.rc0.228.g281dcd1b4d0-goog

6 years, 3 months

2
5
0 0

[PATCH] usb: Avoid use-after-free by flushing endpoints early in usb_set_interface()

by Mathias Nyman

The steps taken by usb core to set a new interface is very different from what is done on the xHC host side. xHC hardware will do everything in one go. One command is used to set up new endpoints, free old endpoints, check bandwidth, and run the new endpoints. All this is done by xHC when usb core asks the hcd to check for available bandwidth. At this point usb core has not yet flushed the old endpoints, which will cause use-after-free issues in xhci driver as queued URBs are cancelled on a re-allocated endpoint. To resolve this add a call to usb_disable_interface() which will flush the endpoints before calling usb_hcd_alloc_bandwidth() Additional checks in xhci driver will also be implemented to gracefully handle stale URB cancel on freed and re-allocated endpoints Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com> --- drivers/usb/core/message.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/message.c b/drivers/usb/core/message.c index 228672f..304bef2 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/message.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/message.c @@ -1377,6 +1377,13 @@ int usb_set_interface(struct usb_device *dev, int interface, int alternate) return -EINVAL; } + /* + * usb3 hosts configure the interface in usb_hcd_alloc_bandwidth, + * including freeing dropped endpoint ring buffers. + * Make sure the interface endpoints are flushed before that + */ + usb_disable_interface(dev, iface, false); + /* Make sure we have enough bandwidth for this alternate interface. * Remove the current alt setting and add the new alt setting. */ -- 2.7.4

6 years, 3 months

2
2
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] btrfs: use correct compare function of dirty_metadata_bytes" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From d814a49198eafa6163698bdd93961302f3a877a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ethan Lien <ethanlien(a)synology.com> Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2018 15:44:58 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: use correct compare function of dirty_metadata_bytes We use customized, nodesize batch value to update dirty_metadata_bytes. We should also use batch version of compare function or we will easily goto fast path and get false result from percpu_counter_compare(). Fixes: e2d845211eda ("Btrfs: use percpu counter for dirty metadata count") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Ethan Lien <ethanlien(a)synology.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c index 6023eed3e805..e3858b2fe014 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c @@ -959,8 +959,9 @@ static int btree_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, fs_info = BTRFS_I(mapping->host)->root->fs_info; /* this is a bit racy, but that's ok */ - ret = percpu_counter_compare(&fs_info->dirty_metadata_bytes, - BTRFS_DIRTY_METADATA_THRESH); + ret = __percpu_counter_compare(&fs_info->dirty_metadata_bytes, + BTRFS_DIRTY_METADATA_THRESH, + fs_info->dirty_metadata_batch); if (ret < 0) return 0; } @@ -4134,8 +4135,9 @@ static void __btrfs_btree_balance_dirty(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, if (flush_delayed) btrfs_balance_delayed_items(fs_info); - ret = percpu_counter_compare(&fs_info->dirty_metadata_bytes, - BTRFS_DIRTY_METADATA_THRESH); + ret = __percpu_counter_compare(&fs_info->dirty_metadata_bytes, + BTRFS_DIRTY_METADATA_THRESH, + fs_info->dirty_metadata_batch); if (ret > 0) { balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited(fs_info->btree_inode->i_mapping); }

6 years, 3 months

2
1
0 0

[PATCH] MIPS: VDSO: Match data page cache colouring when D$ aliases

by Paul Burton

When a system suffers from dcache aliasing a user program may observe stale VDSO data from an aliased cache line. Notably this can break the expectation that clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, ...) is, as its name suggests, monotonic. In order to ensure that users observe updates to the VDSO data page as intended, align the user mappings of the VDSO data page such that their cache colouring matches that of the virtual address range which the kernel will use to update the data page - typically its unmapped address within kseg0. This ensures that we don't introduce aliasing cache lines for the VDSO data page, and therefore that userland will observe updates without requiring cache invalidation. Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton(a)mips.com> Reported-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke(a)hauke-m.de> Reported-by: Rene Nielsen <rene.nielsen(a)microsemi.com> Reported-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni(a)bootlin.com> Fixes: ebb5e78cc634 ("MIPS: Initial implementation of a VDSO") Cc: James Hogan <jhogan(a)kernel.org> Cc: linux-mips(a)linux-mips.org Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v4.4+ --- Hi Alexandre, Could you try this out on your Ocelot system? Hopefully it'll solve the problem just as well as James' patch but doesn't need the questionable change to arch_get_unmapped_area_common(). Thanks, Paul --- arch/mips/kernel/vdso.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/vdso.c b/arch/mips/kernel/vdso.c index 019035d7225c..5fb617a42335 100644 --- a/arch/mips/kernel/vdso.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/vdso.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/ioport.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/slab.h> @@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ #include <asm/abi.h> #include <asm/mips-cps.h> +#include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/vdso.h> /* Kernel-provided data used by the VDSO. */ @@ -128,12 +130,30 @@ int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int uses_interp) vvar_size = gic_size + PAGE_SIZE; size = vvar_size + image->size; + /* + * Find a region that's large enough for us to perform the + * colour-matching alignment below. + */ + if (cpu_has_dc_aliases) + size += shm_align_mask + 1; + base = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0, size, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR_VALUE(base)) { ret = base; goto out; } + /* + * If we suffer from dcache aliasing, ensure that the VDSO data page is + * coloured the same as the kernel's mapping of that memory. This + * ensures that when the kernel updates the VDSO data userland will see + * it without requiring cache invalidations. + */ + if (cpu_has_dc_aliases) { + base = __ALIGN_MASK(base, shm_align_mask); + base += ((unsigned long)&vdso_data - gic_size) & shm_align_mask; + } + data_addr = base + gic_size; vdso_addr = data_addr + PAGE_SIZE; -- 2.18.0

6 years, 3 months

4
5
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.18 001/113] cifs: check if SMB2 PDU size has been padded and suppress the warning

by Sasha Levin

From: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber(a)redhat.com> [ Upstream commit e6c47dd0da1e3a484e778046fc10da0b20606a86 ] Some SMB2/3 servers, Win2016 but possibly others too, adds padding not only between PDUs in a compound but also to the final PDU. This padding extends the PDU to a multiple of 8 bytes. Check if the unexpected length looks like this might be the case and avoid triggering the log messages for : "SMB2 server sent bad RFC1001 len %d not %d\n" Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin(a)microsoft.com> --- fs/cifs/smb2misc.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2misc.c b/fs/cifs/smb2misc.c index 3ff7cec2da81..239215dcc00b 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2misc.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2misc.c @@ -240,6 +240,13 @@ smb2_check_message(char *buf, unsigned int len, struct TCP_Server_Info *srvr) if (clc_len == len + 1) return 0; + /* + * Some windows servers (win2016) will pad also the final + * PDU in a compound to 8 bytes. + */ + if (((clc_len + 7) & ~7) == len) + return 0; + /* * MacOS server pads after SMB2.1 write response with 3 bytes * of junk. Other servers match RFC1001 len to actual -- 2.17.1

6 years, 3 months

4
71
0 0

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Linux-stable-mirror August 2018