February 2018 - Linux-stable-mirror

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86uaccess_Use___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:49 2018 -0800 From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com commit 304ec1b050310548db33063e567123fae8fd0301 Quoting Linus: I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends, but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_ accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache. __uaccess_begin_nospec() covers __get_user() and copy_from_iter() where the limit check is far away from the user pointer de-reference. In those cases a barrier_nospec() prevents speculation with a potential pointer to privileged memory. uaccess_try_nospec covers get_user_try. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727416953.33451.10508284228526170604.stgit@dwi… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 6 +++--- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h | 6 +++--- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 12 ++++++------ arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ do { \ ({ \ int __gu_err; \ __inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \ - __uaccess_begin(); \ + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ __get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), (size), __gu_err, -EFAULT); \ __uaccess_end(); \ (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \ @@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long bu * get_user_ex(...); * } get_user_catch(err) */ -#define get_user_try uaccess_try +#define get_user_try uaccess_try_nospec #define get_user_catch(err) uaccess_catch(err) #define get_user_ex(x, ptr) do { \ @@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ extern void __cmpxchg_wrong_size(void) __typeof__(ptr) __uval = (uval); \ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __old = (old); \ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __new = (new); \ - __uaccess_begin(); \ + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ switch (size) { \ case 1: \ { \ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h @@ -29,21 +29,21 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *to, const void switch (n) { case 1: ret = 0; - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u8 *)to, from, ret, "b", "b", "=q", 1); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 2: ret = 0; - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u16 *)to, from, ret, "w", "w", "=r", 2); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 4: ret = 0; - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u32 *)to, from, ret, "l", "k", "=r", 4); __uaccess_end(); --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h @@ -55,31 +55,31 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *dst, const void return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size); switch (size) { case 1: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u8 *)dst, (u8 __user *)src, ret, "b", "b", "=q", 1); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 2: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u16 *)dst, (u16 __user *)src, ret, "w", "w", "=r", 2); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 4: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u32 *)dst, (u32 __user *)src, ret, "l", "k", "=r", 4); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 8: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, ret, "q", "", "=r", 8); __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 10: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, ret, "q", "", "=r", 10); if (likely(!ret)) @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *dst, const void __uaccess_end(); return ret; case 16: - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); __get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, ret, "q", "", "=r", 16); if (likely(!ret)) --- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c @@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ do { \ unsigned long __copy_user_ll(void *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) { - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); if (movsl_is_ok(to, from, n)) __copy_user(to, from, n); else @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_user_ll); unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) { - __uaccess_begin(); + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY if (n > 64 && static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) n = __copy_user_intel_nocache(to, from, n); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org are queue-4.14/objtool_Add_support_for_alternatives_at_the_end_of_a_section.patch queue-4.14/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.14/x86_Introduce_barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Use_Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier_in_context_switch.patch queue-4.14/x86get_user_Use_pointer_masking_to_limit_speculation.patch queue-4.14/x86_Introduce___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.14/x86paravirt_Remove_noreplace-paravirt_cmdline_option.patch queue-4.14/KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.14/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.14/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.14/array_index_nospec_Sanitize_speculative_array_de-references.patch queue-4.14/Documentation_Document_array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.14/x86entry64_Remove_the_SYSCALL64_fast_path.patch queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Remove_the_esprsp_thunk.patch queue-4.14/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.14/scripts-faddr2line-fix-cross_compile-unset-error.patch queue-4.14/KVMSVM_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.14/x86asm_Move_status_from_thread_struct_to_thread_info.patch queue-4.14/KVMx86_Add_IBPB_support.patch queue-4.14/x86_Implement_array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Emulate_MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.patch queue-4.14/nl80211_Sanitize_array_index_in_parse_txq_params.patch queue-4.14/moduleretpoline_Warn_about_missing_retpoline_in_module.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.14/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch queue-4.14/KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.14/x86uaccess_Use___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.14/x86entry64_Push_extra_regs_right_away.patch queue-4.14/x86usercopy_Replace_open_coded_stacclac_with___uaccess_begin_end.patch queue-4.14/vfs_fdtable_Prevent_bounds-check_bypass_via_speculative_execution.patch queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.14/objtool_Warn_on_stripped_section_symbol.patch queue-4.14/x86spectre_Report_get_user_mitigation_for_spectre_v1.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch queue-4.14/x86syscall_Sanitize_syscall_table_de-references_under_speculation.patch queue-4.14/objtool_Improve_retpoline_alternative_handling.patch

6 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end}" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86usercopy_Replace_open_coded_stacclac_with___uaccess_begin_end.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:44 2018 -0800 From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com commit b5c4ae4f35325d520b230bab6eb3310613b72ac1 In preparation for converting some __uaccess_begin() instances to __uacess_begin_nospec(), make sure all 'from user' uaccess paths are using the _begin(), _end() helpers rather than open-coded stac() and clac(). No functional changes. Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727416438.33451.17309465232057176966.stgit@dwi… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c @@ -331,12 +331,12 @@ do { \ unsigned long __copy_user_ll(void *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) { - stac(); + __uaccess_begin(); if (movsl_is_ok(to, from, n)) __copy_user(to, from, n); else n = __copy_user_intel(to, from, n); - clac(); + __uaccess_end(); return n; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_user_ll); @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_user_ll); unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) { - stac(); + __uaccess_begin(); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY if (n > 64 && static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) n = __copy_user_intel_nocache(to, from, n); @@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocach #else __copy_user(to, from, n); #endif - clac(); + __uaccess_end(); return n; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from mingo(a)redhat.com are queue-4.14/x86_Introduce_barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.14/x86_Introduce___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.14/x86usercopy_Replace_open_coded_stacclac_with___uaccess_begin_end.patch

6 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86speculation_Use_Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier_in_context_switch.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch From: Tim Chen tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Date: Mon Jan 29 22:04:47 2018 +0000 From: Tim Chen tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com commit 18bf3c3ea8ece8f03b6fc58508f2dfd23c7711c7 Flush indirect branches when switching into a process that marked itself non dumpable. This protects high value processes like gpg better, without having too high performance overhead. If done naïvely, we could switch to a kernel idle thread and then back to the original process, such as: process A -> idle -> process A In such scenario, we do not have to do IBPB here even though the process is non-dumpable, as we are switching back to the same process after a hiatus. To avoid the redundant IBPB, which is expensive, we track the last mm user context ID. The cost is to have an extra u64 mm context id to track the last mm we were using before switching to the init_mm used by idle. Avoiding the extra IBPB is probably worth the extra memory for this common scenario. For those cases where tlb_defer_switch_to_init_mm() returns true (non PCID), lazy tlb will defer switch to init_mm, so we will not be changing the mm for the process A -> idle -> process A switch. So IBPB will be skipped for this case. Thanks to the reviewers and Andy Lutomirski for the suggestion of using ctx_id which got rid of the problem of mm pointer recycling. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: linux(a)dominikbrodowski.net Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: luto(a)kernel.org Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517263487-3708-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h @@ -174,6 +174,8 @@ struct tlb_state { struct mm_struct *loaded_mm; u16 loaded_mm_asid; u16 next_asid; + /* last user mm's ctx id */ + u64 last_ctx_id; /* * We can be in one of several states: --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c @@ -6,13 +6,14 @@ #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> +#include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <asm/tlbflush.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/cache.h> #include <asm/apic.h> #include <asm/uv/uv.h> -#include <linux/debugfs.h> /* * TLB flushing, formerly SMP-only @@ -247,6 +248,27 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct } else { u16 new_asid; bool need_flush; + u64 last_ctx_id = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id); + + /* + * Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch + * predictor when switching between processes. This stops + * one process from doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another. + * + * As an optimization, flush indirect branches only when + * switching into processes that disable dumping. This + * protects high value processes like gpg, without having + * too high performance overhead. IBPB is *expensive*! + * + * This will not flush branches when switching into kernel + * threads. It will also not flush if we switch to idle + * thread and back to the same process. It will flush if we + * switch to a different non-dumpable process. + */ + if (tsk && tsk->mm && + tsk->mm->context.ctx_id != last_ctx_id && + get_dumpable(tsk->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) { /* @@ -292,6 +314,14 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct trace_tlb_flush_rcuidle(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, 0); } + /* + * Record last user mm's context id, so we can avoid + * flushing branch buffer with IBPB if we switch back + * to the same user. + */ + if (next != &init_mm) + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id, next->context.ctx_id); + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm, next); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid, new_asid); } @@ -369,6 +399,7 @@ void initialize_tlbstate_and_flush(void) write_cr3(build_cr3(mm->pgd, 0)); /* Reinitialize tlbstate. */ + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id, mm->context.ctx_id); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid, 0); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.next_asid, 1); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[0].ctx_id, mm->context.ctx_id); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com are queue-4.14/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Use_Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier_in_context_switch.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.14/x86paravirt_Remove_noreplace-paravirt_cmdline_option.patch queue-4.14/KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.14/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.14/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Remove_the_esprsp_thunk.patch queue-4.14/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.14/KVMSVM_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.14/KVMx86_Add_IBPB_support.patch queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Emulate_MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.14/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch queue-4.14/KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch

6 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86syscall_Sanitize_syscall_table_de-references_under_speculation.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:59 2018 -0800 From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com commit 2fbd7af5af8665d18bcefae3e9700be07e22b681 The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel space. Use array_index_nospec() to prevent any out of bounds speculation. While retpoline prevents speculating into a userspace directed target it does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern is leaking memory relative to the syscall table base, by observing instruction cache behavior. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417984.33451.1216731042505722161.stgit@dwil… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/entry/common.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/context_tracking.h> #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/uprobes.h> #include <linux/livepatch.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> @@ -284,7 +285,8 @@ __visible void do_syscall_64(struct pt_r * regs->orig_ax, which changes the behavior of some syscalls. */ if (likely((nr & __SYSCALL_MASK) < NR_syscalls)) { - regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr & __SYSCALL_MASK]( + nr = array_index_nospec(nr & __SYSCALL_MASK, NR_syscalls); + regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr]( regs->di, regs->si, regs->dx, regs->r10, regs->r8, regs->r9); } @@ -320,6 +322,7 @@ static __always_inline void do_syscall_3 } if (likely(nr < IA32_NR_syscalls)) { + nr = array_index_nospec(nr, IA32_NR_syscalls); /* * It's possible that a 32-bit syscall implementation * takes a 64-bit parameter but nonetheless assumes that Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org are queue-4.14/objtool_Add_support_for_alternatives_at_the_end_of_a_section.patch queue-4.14/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.14/x86_Introduce_barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Use_Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier_in_context_switch.patch queue-4.14/x86get_user_Use_pointer_masking_to_limit_speculation.patch queue-4.14/x86_Introduce___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.14/x86paravirt_Remove_noreplace-paravirt_cmdline_option.patch queue-4.14/KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.14/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.14/x86alternative_Print_unadorned_pointers.patch queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.14/array_index_nospec_Sanitize_speculative_array_de-references.patch queue-4.14/Documentation_Document_array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.14/x86entry64_Remove_the_SYSCALL64_fast_path.patch queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Remove_the_esprsp_thunk.patch queue-4.14/x86bugs_Drop_one_mitigation_from_dmesg.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.14/scripts-faddr2line-fix-cross_compile-unset-error.patch queue-4.14/KVMSVM_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.14/x86asm_Move_status_from_thread_struct_to_thread_info.patch queue-4.14/KVMx86_Add_IBPB_support.patch queue-4.14/x86_Implement_array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Emulate_MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.patch queue-4.14/nl80211_Sanitize_array_index_in_parse_txq_params.patch queue-4.14/moduleretpoline_Warn_about_missing_retpoline_in_module.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.14/x86nospec_Fix_header_guards_names.patch queue-4.14/KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.14/x86uaccess_Use___uaccess_begin_nospec()_and_uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.14/x86entry64_Push_extra_regs_right_away.patch queue-4.14/x86usercopy_Replace_open_coded_stacclac_with___uaccess_begin_end.patch queue-4.14/vfs_fdtable_Prevent_bounds-check_bypass_via_speculative_execution.patch queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.14/objtool_Warn_on_stripped_section_symbol.patch queue-4.14/x86spectre_Report_get_user_mitigation_for_spectre_v1.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch queue-4.14/x86syscall_Sanitize_syscall_table_de-references_under_speculation.patch queue-4.14/objtool_Improve_retpoline_alternative_handling.patch

6 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86speculation_Fix_typo_IBRS_ATT_which_should_be_IBRS_ALL.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL From: Darren Kenny darren.kenny(a)oracle.com Date: Fri Feb 2 19:12:20 2018 +0000 From: Darren Kenny darren.kenny(a)oracle.com commit af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881 Fixes: 117cc7a908c83 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit") Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202191220.blvgkgutojecxr3b@starbug-vm.ie.ora… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future - * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided. + * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided. */ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) { Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from darren.kenny(a)oracle.com are queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.14/KVMSVM_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Emulate_MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Fix_typo_IBRS_ATT_which_should_be_IBRS_ALL.patch

6 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86spectre_Report_get_user_mitigation_for_spectre_v1.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com Date: Mon Jan 29 17:03:21 2018 -0800 From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams(a)intel.com commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360 Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references. Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwi… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devic { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); } ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jslaby(a)suse.cz are queue-4.14/x86spectre_Report_get_user_mitigation_for_spectre_v1.patch

6 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86spectre_Simplify_spectre_v2_command_line_parsing.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing From: KarimAllah Ahmed karahmed(a)amazon.de Date: Thu Feb 1 11:27:21 2018 +0000 From: KarimAllah Ahmed karahmed(a)amazon.de commit 9005c6834c0ffdfe46afa76656bd9276cca864f6 [dwmw2: Use ARRAY_SIZE] Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517484441-1420-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -119,13 +119,13 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_mod static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason) { if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) - pr_info("%s\n", reason); + pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason); } static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason) { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) - pr_info("%s\n", reason); + pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason); } static inline bool retp_compiler(void) @@ -140,42 +140,68 @@ static inline bool match_option(const ch return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len); } +static const struct { + const char *option; + enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd; + bool secure; +} mitigation_options[] = { + { "off", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, false }, + { "on", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, true }, + { "retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, false }, + { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, false }, + { "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false }, + { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false }, +}; + static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) { char arg[20]; - int ret; + int ret, i; + enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + + if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2")) + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE; + else { + ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, + sizeof(arg)); + if (ret < 0) + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; - ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, - sizeof(arg)); - if (ret > 0) { - if (match_option(arg, ret, "off")) { - goto disable; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "on")) { - spec2_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline")) { - spec2_print_if_insecure("retpoline selected on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,amd")) { - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) { - pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n"); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; - } - spec2_print_if_insecure("AMD retpoline selected on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,generic")) { - spec2_print_if_insecure("generic retpoline selected on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "auto")) { + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) { + if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option)) + continue; + cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd; + break; + } + + if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) { + pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } } - if (!cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2")) + if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE || + cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD || + cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) && + !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) { + pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; -disable: - spec2_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE; + } + + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) { + pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n"); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + + if (mitigation_options[i].secure) + spec2_print_if_secure(mitigation_options[i].option); + else + spec2_print_if_insecure(mitigation_options[i].option); + + return cmd; } /* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from karahmed(a)amazon.de are queue-4.14/x86spectre_Simplify_spectre_v2_command_line_parsing.patch queue-4.14/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Use_Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier_in_context_switch.patch queue-4.14/x86cpuid_Fix_up_virtual_IBRSIBPBSTIBP_feature_bits_on_Intel.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.14/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.14/KVMSVM_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.14/KVMx86_Add_IBPB_support.patch queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Emulate_MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch queue-4.14/KVMx86_Update_the_reverse_cpuid_list_to_include_CPUID_7_EDX.patch queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Avoid_retpolines_for_built-in___init_functions.patch

6 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86retpoline_Avoid_retpolines_for_built-in___init_functions.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions From: David Woodhouse dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk Date: Thu Feb 1 11:27:20 2018 +0000 From: David Woodhouse dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk commit 66f793099a636862a71c59d4a6ba91387b155e0c There's no point in building init code with retpolines, since it runs before any potentially hostile userspace does. And before the retpoline is actually ALTERNATIVEd into place, for much of it. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517484441-1420-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- include/linux/init.h | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/include/linux/init.h +++ b/include/linux/init.h @@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/types.h> +/* Built-in __init functions needn't be compiled with retpoline */ +#if defined(RETPOLINE) && !defined(MODULE) +#define __noretpoline __attribute__((indirect_branch("keep"))) +#else +#define __noretpoline +#endif + /* These macros are used to mark some functions or * initialized data (doesn't apply to uninitialized data) * as `initialization' functions. The kernel can take this @@ -40,7 +47,7 @@ /* These are for everybody (although not all archs will actually discard it in modules) */ -#define __init __section(.init.text) __cold __inittrace __latent_entropy +#define __init __section(.init.text) __cold __inittrace __latent_entropy __noretpoline #define __initdata __section(.init.data) #define __initconst __section(.init.rodata) #define __exitdata __section(.exit.data) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.14/x86spectre_Simplify_spectre_v2_command_line_parsing.patch queue-4.14/x86pti_Mark_constant_arrays_as___initconst.patch queue-4.14/x86pti_Do_not_enable_PTI_on_CPUs_which_are_not_vulnerable_to_Meltdown.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Use_Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier_in_context_switch.patch queue-4.14/x86cpuid_Fix_up_virtual_IBRSIBPBSTIBP_feature_bits_on_Intel.patch queue-4.14/x86spectre_Fix_spelling_mistake_vunerable-_vulnerable.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeature_Blacklist_SPEC_CTRLPRED_CMD_on_early_Spectre_v2_microcodes.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_Intel_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.14/KVM_VMX_Make_indirect_call_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.14/x86spectre_Check_CONFIG_RETPOLINE_in_command_line_parser.patch queue-4.14/x86msr_Add_definitions_for_new_speculation_control_MSRs.patch queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_CPUID_7_EDX_CPUID_leaf.patch queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Remove_the_esprsp_thunk.patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Add_AMD_feature_bits_for_Speculation_Control.patch queue-4.14/KVMSVM_Allow_direct_access_to_MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.patch queue-4.14/KVMx86_Add_IBPB_support.patch queue-4.14/KVMVMX_Emulate_MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Add_basic_IBPB_(Indirect_Branch_Prediction_Barrier)_support.patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Simplify_indirect_branch_prediction_barrier().patch queue-4.14/x86speculation_Fix_typo_IBRS_ATT_which_should_be_IBRS_ALL.patch queue-4.14/KVM_x86_Make_indirect_calls_in_emulator_speculation_safe.patch queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Simplify_vmexit_fill_RSB().patch queue-4.14/x86cpufeatures_Clean_up_Spectre_v2_related_CPUID_flags.patch queue-4.14/KVMx86_Update_the_reverse_cpuid_list_to_include_CPUID_7_EDX.patch queue-4.14/x86retpoline_Avoid_retpolines_for_built-in___init_functions.patch

6 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable"" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86spectre_Fix_spelling_mistake_vunerable-_vulnerable.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" From: Colin Ian King colin.king(a)canonical.com Date: Tue Jan 30 19:32:18 2018 +0000 From: Colin Ian King colin.king(a)canonical.com commit e698dcdfcda41efd0984de539767b4cddd235f1e Trivial fix to spelling mistake in pr_err error message text. Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: kernel-janitors(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180130193218.9271-1-colin.king@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpol if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline) return true; - pr_err("System may be vunerable to spectre v2\n"); + pr_err("System may be vulnerable to spectre v2\n"); spectre_v2_bad_module = true; return false; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from colin.king(a)canonical.com are queue-4.14/x86spectre_Fix_spelling_mistake_vunerable-_vulnerable.patch

6 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86spectre_Check_CONFIG_RETPOLINE_in_command_line_parser.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. Subject: x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser From: Dou Liyang douly.fnst(a)cn.fujitsu.com Date: Tue Jan 30 14:13:50 2018 +0800 From: Dou Liyang douly.fnst(a)cn.fujitsu.com commit 9471eee9186a46893726e22ebb54cade3f9bc043 The spectre_v2 option 'auto' does not check whether CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. As a consequence it fails to emit the appropriate warning and sets feature flags which have no effect at all. Add the missing IS_ENABLED() check. Fixes: da285121560e ("x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation") Signed-off-by: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst(a)cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: Tomohiro" <misono.tomohiro(a)jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f5892721-7528-3647-08fb-f8d10e65ad87@cn.fujitsu.c… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -213,10 +213,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit return; case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: - /* FALLTRHU */ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO: - goto retpoline_auto; - + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + goto retpoline_auto; + break; case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD: if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) goto retpoline_amd; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from douly.fnst(a)cn.fujitsu.com are queue-4.14/x86spectre_Check_CONFIG_RETPOLINE_in_command_line_parser.patch

6 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Linux-stable-mirror February 2018