February 2018 - Linux-stable-mirror

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-speculation-add-basic-ibpb-indirect-branch-prediction-barrier-support.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:30:27 CET 2018 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 16:14:15 +0000 Subject: x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> (cherry picked from commit 20ffa1caecca4db8f79fe665acdeaa5af815a24d) Expose indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() for use in subsequent patches. [ tglx: Add IBPB status to spectre_v2 sysfs file ] Co-developed-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: ashok.raj(a)intel.com Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-8-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 +++++++++- 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -202,6 +202,8 @@ /* Because the ALTERNATIVE scheme is for members of the X86_FEATURE club... */ #define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o nokaiser */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled*/ + /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */ #define X86_FEATURE_VNMI ( 8*32+ 1) /* Intel Virtual NMI */ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -218,5 +218,18 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) #endif } +static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) +{ + asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", + "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t" + "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t" + "movl $0, %%edx\n\t" + "wrmsr", + X86_FEATURE_IBPB) + : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD), + [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB) + : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory"); +} + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -262,6 +262,13 @@ retpoline_auto: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n"); } + + /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB); + pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n"); + } } #undef pr_fmt @@ -291,7 +298,8 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ? ", IPBP" : "", spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : ""); } #endif Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-push-extra-regs-right-away.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-clean-up-spectre-v2-related-cpuid-flags.patch queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-move-status-from-thread_struct-to-thread_info.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-remove-the-syscall64-fast-path.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/x86-nospec-fix-header-guards-names.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-avoid-retpolines-for-built-in-__init-functions.patch queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-bugs-make-retpoline-module-warning-conditional.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-check-config_retpoline-in-command-line-parser.patch queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternative-print-unadorned-pointers.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpuid-fix-up-virtual-ibrs-ibpb-stibp-feature-bits-on-intel.patch queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-fix-spelling-mistake-vunerable-vulnerable.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-simplify-spectre_v2-command-line-parsing.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-add-basic-ibpb-indirect-branch-prediction-barrier-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-mark-constant-arrays-as-__initconst.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-fix-typo-ibrs_att-which-should-be-ibrs_all.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-bugs-drop-one-mitigation-from-dmesg.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch

6 years, 11 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-speculation-fix-typo-ibrs_att-which-should-be-ibrs_all.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:33:09 CET 2018 From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny(a)oracle.com> Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 19:12:20 +0000 Subject: x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny(a)oracle.com> (cherry picked from commit af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881) Fixes: 117cc7a908c83 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit") Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202191220.blvgkgutojecxr3b@starbug-vm.ie.ora… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future - * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided. + * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided. */ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) { Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from darren.kenny(a)oracle.com are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-fix-typo-ibrs_att-which-should-be-ibrs_all.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch

6 years, 11 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:03:21 -0800 Subject: x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> (cherry picked from commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360) Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references. Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby(a)suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening(a)lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: alan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwi… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devic { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); } ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.j.williams(a)intel.com are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch

6 years, 11 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-spectre-simplify-spectre_v2-command-line-parsing.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018 From: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 11:27:21 +0000 Subject: x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing From: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> (cherry picked from commit 9005c6834c0ffdfe46afa76656bd9276cca864f6) [dwmw2: Use ARRAY_SIZE] Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed(a)amazon.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517484441-1420-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -118,13 +118,13 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_mod static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason) { if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) - pr_info("%s\n", reason); + pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason); } static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason) { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) - pr_info("%s\n", reason); + pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason); } static inline bool retp_compiler(void) @@ -139,42 +139,68 @@ static inline bool match_option(const ch return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len); } +static const struct { + const char *option; + enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd; + bool secure; +} mitigation_options[] = { + { "off", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, false }, + { "on", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, true }, + { "retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, false }, + { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, false }, + { "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false }, + { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false }, +}; + static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) { char arg[20]; - int ret; + int ret, i; + enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + + if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2")) + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE; + else { + ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, + sizeof(arg)); + if (ret < 0) + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; - ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, - sizeof(arg)); - if (ret > 0) { - if (match_option(arg, ret, "off")) { - goto disable; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "on")) { - spec2_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline")) { - spec2_print_if_insecure("retpoline selected on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,amd")) { - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) { - pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n"); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; - } - spec2_print_if_insecure("AMD retpoline selected on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,generic")) { - spec2_print_if_insecure("generic retpoline selected on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC; - } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "auto")) { + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) { + if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option)) + continue; + cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd; + break; + } + + if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) { + pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } } - if (!cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2")) + if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE || + cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD || + cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) && + !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) { + pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; -disable: - spec2_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line."); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE; + } + + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) { + pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n"); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + + if (mitigation_options[i].secure) + spec2_print_if_secure(mitigation_options[i].option); + else + spec2_print_if_insecure(mitigation_options[i].option); + + return cmd; } /* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from karahmed(a)amazon.de are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-clean-up-spectre-v2-related-cpuid-flags.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-avoid-retpolines-for-built-in-__init-functions.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpuid-fix-up-virtual-ibrs-ibpb-stibp-feature-bits-on-intel.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-simplify-spectre_v2-command-line-parsing.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-add-basic-ibpb-indirect-branch-prediction-barrier-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

6 years, 11 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-spectre-check-config_retpoline-in-command-line-parser.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:30:27 CET 2018 From: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst(a)cn.fujitsu.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 14:13:50 +0800 Subject: x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser From: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst(a)cn.fujitsu.com> (cherry picked from commit 9471eee9186a46893726e22ebb54cade3f9bc043) The spectre_v2 option 'auto' does not check whether CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. As a consequence it fails to emit the appropriate warning and sets feature flags which have no effect at all. Add the missing IS_ENABLED() check. Fixes: da285121560e ("x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation") Signed-off-by: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst(a)cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: Tomohiro" <misono.tomohiro(a)jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f5892721-7528-3647-08fb-f8d10e65ad87@cn.fujitsu.c… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -212,10 +212,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit return; case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: - /* FALLTRHU */ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO: - goto retpoline_auto; - + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + goto retpoline_auto; + break; case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD: if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) goto retpoline_amd; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from douly.fnst(a)cn.fujitsu.com are queue-4.9/x86-spectre-check-config_retpoline-in-command-line-parser.patch

6 years, 11 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable"" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-spectre-fix-spelling-mistake-vunerable-vulnerable.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018 From: Colin Ian King <colin.king(a)canonical.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 19:32:18 +0000 Subject: x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" From: Colin Ian King <colin.king(a)canonical.com> (cherry picked from commit e698dcdfcda41efd0984de539767b4cddd235f1e) Trivial fix to spelling mistake in pr_err error message text. Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: kernel-janitors(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180130193218.9271-1-colin.king@canonical.com Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpol if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline) return true; - pr_err("System may be vunerable to spectre v2\n"); + pr_err("System may be vulnerable to spectre v2\n"); spectre_v2_bad_module = true; return false; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from colin.king(a)canonical.com are queue-4.9/x86-spectre-fix-spelling-mistake-vunerable-vulnerable.patch

6 years, 11 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-avoid-retpolines-for-built-in-__init-functions.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 11:27:20 +0000 Subject: x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> (cherry picked from commit 66f793099a636862a71c59d4a6ba91387b155e0c) There's no point in building init code with retpolines, since it runs before any potentially hostile userspace does. And before the retpoline is actually ALTERNATIVEd into place, for much of it. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517484441-1420-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- include/linux/init.h | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/include/linux/init.h +++ b/include/linux/init.h @@ -4,6 +4,13 @@ #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/types.h> +/* Built-in __init functions needn't be compiled with retpoline */ +#if defined(RETPOLINE) && !defined(MODULE) +#define __noretpoline __attribute__((indirect_branch("keep"))) +#else +#define __noretpoline +#endif + /* These macros are used to mark some functions or * initialized data (doesn't apply to uninitialized data) * as `initialization' functions. The kernel can take this @@ -39,7 +46,7 @@ /* These are for everybody (although not all archs will actually discard it in modules) */ -#define __init __section(.init.text) __cold notrace __latent_entropy +#define __init __section(.init.text) __cold notrace __latent_entropy __noretpoline #define __initdata __section(.init.data) #define __initconst __section(.init.rodata) #define __exitdata __section(.exit.data) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-push-extra-regs-right-away.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-clean-up-spectre-v2-related-cpuid-flags.patch queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-move-status-from-thread_struct-to-thread_info.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-remove-the-syscall64-fast-path.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/x86-nospec-fix-header-guards-names.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-avoid-retpolines-for-built-in-__init-functions.patch queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-bugs-make-retpoline-module-warning-conditional.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-check-config_retpoline-in-command-line-parser.patch queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternative-print-unadorned-pointers.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpuid-fix-up-virtual-ibrs-ibpb-stibp-feature-bits-on-intel.patch queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-fix-spelling-mistake-vunerable-vulnerable.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-simplify-spectre_v2-command-line-parsing.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-add-basic-ibpb-indirect-branch-prediction-barrier-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-mark-constant-arrays-as-__initconst.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-fix-typo-ibrs_att-which-should-be-ibrs_all.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-bugs-drop-one-mitigation-from-dmesg.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch

6 years, 11 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB() to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:30:27 CET 2018 From: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Date: Sat, 27 Jan 2018 16:24:33 +0000 Subject: x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB() From: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> (cherry picked from commit 1dde7415e99933bb7293d6b2843752cbdb43ec11) Simplify it to call an asm-function instead of pasting 41 insn bytes at every call site. Also, add alignment to the macro as suggested here: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 [dwmw2: Clean up comments, let it clobber %ebx and just tell the compiler] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517070274-12128-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.… Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 3 - arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 3 - arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 70 +++------------------------------- arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 1 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -237,7 +237,8 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW + /* Clobbers %ebx */ + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW #endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -435,7 +435,8 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW + /* Clobbers %rbx */ + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW #endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h @@ -37,4 +37,7 @@ INDIRECT_THUNK(dx) INDIRECT_THUNK(si) INDIRECT_THUNK(di) INDIRECT_THUNK(bp) +asmlinkage void __fill_rsb(void); +asmlinkage void __clear_rsb(void); + #endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -7,50 +7,6 @@ #include <asm/alternative-asm.h> #include <asm/cpufeatures.h> -/* - * Fill the CPU return stack buffer. - * - * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an - * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution. - * - * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based - * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to - * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes - * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would - * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used. - * - * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and - * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that - * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there. - */ - -#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */ -#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */ - -/* - * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be - * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation - * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop. - */ -#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \ - mov $(nr/2), reg; \ -771: \ - call 772f; \ -773: /* speculation trap */ \ - pause; \ - lfence; \ - jmp 773b; \ -772: \ - call 774f; \ -775: /* speculation trap */ \ - pause; \ - lfence; \ - jmp 775b; \ -774: \ - dec reg; \ - jnz 771b; \ - add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; - #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ /* @@ -121,17 +77,10 @@ #endif .endm - /* - * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP - * monstrosity above, manually. - */ -.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req +/* This clobbers the BX register */ +.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER nr:req ftr:req #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE - ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \ - __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \ - \ftr -.Lskip_rsb_\@: + ALTERNATIVE "", "call __clear_rsb", \ftr #endif .endm @@ -206,15 +155,10 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - unsigned long loops; - - asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE - ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f", - __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)), - X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) - "910:" - : "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT - : : "memory" ); + alternative_input("", + "call __fill_rsb", + X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, + ASM_NO_INPUT_CLOBBER(_ASM_BX, "memory")); #endif } --- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM) += lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o +OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_retpoline.o :=y obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include <asm/alternative-asm.h> #include <asm/export.h> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> +#include <asm/bitsperlong.h> .macro THUNK reg .section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk @@ -46,3 +47,58 @@ GENERATE_THUNK(r13) GENERATE_THUNK(r14) GENERATE_THUNK(r15) #endif + +/* + * Fill the CPU return stack buffer. + * + * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an + * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution. + * + * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based + * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to + * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes + * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would + * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used. + * + * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be + * the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation + * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop. + */ +.macro STUFF_RSB nr:req sp:req + mov $(\nr / 2), %_ASM_BX + .align 16 +771: + call 772f +773: /* speculation trap */ + pause + lfence + jmp 773b + .align 16 +772: + call 774f +775: /* speculation trap */ + pause + lfence + jmp 775b + .align 16 +774: + dec %_ASM_BX + jnz 771b + add $((BITS_PER_LONG/8) * \nr), \sp +.endm + +#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */ + +ENTRY(__fill_rsb) + STUFF_RSB RSB_FILL_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP + ret +END(__fill_rsb) +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fill_rsb) + +#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */ + +ENTRY(__clear_rsb) + STUFF_RSB RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP + ret +END(__clear_rsb) +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__clear_rsb) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bp(a)alien8.de are queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-push-extra-regs-right-away.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-clean-up-spectre-v2-related-cpuid-flags.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-move-status-from-thread_struct-to-thread_info.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/x86-microcode-amd-do-not-load-when-running-on-a-hypervisor.patch queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-remove-the-syscall64-fast-path.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/x86-nospec-fix-header-guards-names.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-avoid-retpolines-for-built-in-__init-functions.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-bugs-make-retpoline-module-warning-conditional.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-check-config_retpoline-in-command-line-parser.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternative-print-unadorned-pointers.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpuid-fix-up-virtual-ibrs-ibpb-stibp-feature-bits-on-intel.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-simplify-spectre_v2-command-line-parsing.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-add-basic-ibpb-indirect-branch-prediction-barrier-support.patch queue-4.9/x86-speculation-fix-typo-ibrs_att-which-should-be-ibrs_all.patch queue-4.9/x86-bugs-drop-one-mitigation-from-dmesg.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

6 years, 11 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018 From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 22:13:33 -0600 Subject: x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> (cherry picked from commit 12c69f1e94c89d40696e83804dd2f0965b5250cd) The 'noreplace-paravirt' option disables paravirt patching, leaving the original pv indirect calls in place. That's highly incompatible with retpolines, unless we want to uglify paravirt even further and convert the paravirt calls to retpolines. As far as I can tell, the option doesn't seem to be useful for much other than introducing surprising corner cases and making the kernel vulnerable to Spectre v2. It was probably a debug option from the early paravirt days. So just remove it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj(a)intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima(a)intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty(a)rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick(a)intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron(a)akamai.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alok Kataria <akataria(a)vmware.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180131041333.2x6blhxirc2kclrq@treble Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 -- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 14 -------------- 2 files changed, 16 deletions(-) --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2805,8 +2805,6 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes norandmaps Don't use address space randomization. Equivalent to echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space - noreplace-paravirt [X86,IA-64,PV_OPS] Don't patch paravirt_ops - noreplace-smp [X86-32,SMP] Don't replace SMP instructions with UP alternatives --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -46,17 +46,6 @@ static int __init setup_noreplace_smp(ch } __setup("noreplace-smp", setup_noreplace_smp); -#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT -static int __initdata_or_module noreplace_paravirt = 0; - -static int __init setup_noreplace_paravirt(char *str) -{ - noreplace_paravirt = 1; - return 1; -} -__setup("noreplace-paravirt", setup_noreplace_paravirt); -#endif - #define DPRINTK(fmt, args...) \ do { \ if (debug_alternative) \ @@ -588,9 +577,6 @@ void __init_or_module apply_paravirt(str struct paravirt_patch_site *p; char insnbuf[MAX_PATCH_LEN]; - if (noreplace_paravirt) - return; - for (p = start; p < end; p++) { unsigned int used; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jpoimboe(a)redhat.com are queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-nospec-fix-header-guards-names.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-fix-inline-asm-call-constraints-for-gcc-4.4.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternative-print-unadorned-pointers.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-bugs-drop-one-mitigation-from-dmesg.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-pti-mark-constant-arrays-as-__initconst.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:33:09 CET 2018 From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 22:39:23 +0100 Subject: x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> (cherry picked from commit 4bf5d56d429cbc96c23d809a08f63cd29e1a702e) I'm seeing build failures from the two newly introduced arrays that are marked 'const' and '__initdata', which are mutually exclusive: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:882:43: error: 'cpu_no_speculation' causes a section type conflict with 'e820_table_firmware_init' arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:895:43: error: 'cpu_no_meltdown' causes a section type conflict with 'e820_table_firmware_init' The correct annotation is __initconst. Fixes: fec9434a12f3 ("x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie(a)google.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202213959.611210-1-arnd@arndb.de Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(s #endif } -static const __initdata struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_speculation[] = { +static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_speculation[] = { { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, @@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ static const __initdata struct x86_cpu_i {} }; -static const __initdata struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_meltdown[] = { +static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_meltdown[] = { { X86_VENDOR_AMD }, {} }; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from arnd(a)arndb.de are queue-4.9/auxdisplay-img-ascii-lcd-add-missing-module_description-author-license.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-fix-inline-asm-call-constraints-for-gcc-4.4.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-mark-constant-arrays-as-__initconst.patch

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Linux-stable-mirror February 2018