November 2018 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] Btrfs: fix cur_offset in the error case for nocow" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 506481b20e818db40b6198815904ecd2d6daee64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Robbie Ko <robbieko(a)synology.com> Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2018 18:04:04 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] Btrfs: fix cur_offset in the error case for nocow When the cow_file_range fails, the related resources are unlocked according to the range [start..end), so the unlock cannot be repeated in run_delalloc_nocow. In some cases (e.g. cur_offset <= end && cow_start != -1), cur_offset is not updated correctly, so move the cur_offset update before cow_file_range. kernel BUG at mm/page-writeback.c:2663! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP CPU: 3 PID: 31525 Comm: kworker/u8:7 Tainted: P O Hardware name: Realtek_RTD1296 (DT) Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-1) task: ffffffc076db3380 ti: ffffffc02e9ac000 task.ti: ffffffc02e9ac000 PC is at clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x1bc/0x1e8 LR is at clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x14/0x1e8 pc : [<ffffffc00033c91c>] lr : [<ffffffc00033c774>] pstate: 40000145 sp : ffffffc02e9af4f0 Process kworker/u8:7 (pid: 31525, stack limit = 0xffffffc02e9ac020) Call trace: [<ffffffc00033c91c>] clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x1bc/0x1e8 [<ffffffbffc514674>] extent_clear_unlock_delalloc+0x1e4/0x210 [btrfs] [<ffffffbffc4fb168>] run_delalloc_nocow+0x3b8/0x948 [btrfs] [<ffffffbffc4fb948>] run_delalloc_range+0x250/0x3a8 [btrfs] [<ffffffbffc514c0c>] writepage_delalloc.isra.21+0xbc/0x1d8 [btrfs] [<ffffffbffc516048>] __extent_writepage+0xe8/0x248 [btrfs] [<ffffffbffc51630c>] extent_write_cache_pages.isra.17+0x164/0x378 [btrfs] [<ffffffbffc5185a8>] extent_writepages+0x48/0x68 [btrfs] [<ffffffbffc4f5828>] btrfs_writepages+0x20/0x30 [btrfs] [<ffffffc00033d758>] do_writepages+0x30/0x88 [<ffffffc0003ba0f4>] __writeback_single_inode+0x34/0x198 [<ffffffc0003ba6c4>] writeback_sb_inodes+0x184/0x3c0 [<ffffffc0003ba96c>] __writeback_inodes_wb+0x6c/0xc0 [<ffffffc0003bac20>] wb_writeback+0x1b8/0x1c0 [<ffffffc0003bb0f0>] wb_workfn+0x150/0x250 [<ffffffc0002b0014>] process_one_work+0x1dc/0x388 [<ffffffc0002b02f0>] worker_thread+0x130/0x500 [<ffffffc0002b6344>] kthread+0x10c/0x110 [<ffffffc000284590>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40 Code: d503201f a9025bb5 a90363b7 f90023b9 (d4210000) CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Robbie Ko <robbieko(a)synology.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c index f4d31fd62eed..55761b1519f5 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c @@ -1531,12 +1531,11 @@ static noinline int run_delalloc_nocow(struct inode *inode, } btrfs_release_path(path); - if (cur_offset <= end && cow_start == (u64)-1) { + if (cur_offset <= end && cow_start == (u64)-1) cow_start = cur_offset; - cur_offset = end; - } if (cow_start != (u64)-1) { + cur_offset = end; ret = cow_file_range(inode, locked_page, cow_start, end, end, page_started, nr_written, 1, NULL); if (ret)

5 years, 11 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] btrfs: fix pinned underflow after transaction aborted" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From fcd5e74288f7d36991b1f0fb96b8c57079645e38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lu Fengqi <lufq.fnst(a)cn.fujitsu.com> Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2018 20:24:03 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: fix pinned underflow after transaction aborted When running generic/475, we may get the following warning in dmesg: [ 6902.102154] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 18013 at fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:9776 btrfs_free_block_groups+0x2af/0x3b0 [btrfs] [ 6902.109160] CPU: 3 PID: 18013 Comm: umount Tainted: G W O 4.19.0-rc8+ #8 [ 6902.110971] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 [ 6902.112857] RIP: 0010:btrfs_free_block_groups+0x2af/0x3b0 [btrfs] [ 6902.118921] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000459bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 6902.120315] RAX: ffff880175050bb0 RBX: ffff8801124a8000 RCX: 0000000000170007 [ 6902.121969] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000170007 RDI: ffffffff8125fb74 [ 6902.123716] RBP: ffff880175055d10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 6902.125417] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880175055d88 [ 6902.127129] R13: ffff880175050bb0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dead000000000100 [ 6902.129060] FS: 00007f4507223780(0000) GS:ffff88017ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6902.130996] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6902.132558] CR2: 00005623599cac78 CR3: 000000014b700001 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 6902.134270] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 6902.135981] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 6902.137836] Call Trace: [ 6902.138939] close_ctree+0x171/0x330 [btrfs] [ 6902.140181] ? kthread_stop+0x146/0x1f0 [ 6902.141277] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 [ 6902.142517] kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 [ 6902.143554] btrfs_kill_super+0x13/0x100 [btrfs] [ 6902.144790] deactivate_locked_super+0x2f/0x70 [ 6902.146014] cleanup_mnt+0x3b/0x70 [ 6902.147020] task_work_run+0x9e/0xd0 [ 6902.148036] do_syscall_64+0x470/0x600 [ 6902.149142] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [ 6902.150375] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 6902.151640] RIP: 0033:0x7f45077a6a7b [ 6902.157324] RSP: 002b:00007ffd589f3e68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 [ 6902.159187] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000055e8eec732b0 RCX: 00007f45077a6a7b [ 6902.160834] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000055e8eec73490 [ 6902.162526] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000055e8eec734b0 R09: 00007ffd589f26c0 [ 6902.164141] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055e8eec73490 [ 6902.165815] R13: 00007f4507ac61a4 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffd589f40d8 [ 6902.167553] irq event stamp: 0 [ 6902.168998] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] (null) [ 6902.170731] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff810cd810>] copy_process.part.55+0x3b0/0x1f00 [ 6902.172773] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff810cd810>] copy_process.part.55+0x3b0/0x1f00 [ 6902.174671] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] (null) [ 6902.176407] ---[ end trace 463138c2986b275c ]--- [ 6902.177636] BTRFS info (device dm-3): space_info 4 has 273465344 free, is not full [ 6902.179453] BTRFS info (device dm-3): space_info total=276824064, used=4685824, pinned=18446744073708158976, reserved=0, may_use=0, readonly=65536 In the above line there's "pinned=18446744073708158976" which is an unsigned u64 value of -1392640, an obvious underflow. When transaction_kthread is running cleanup_transaction(), another fsstress is running btrfs_commit_transaction(). The btrfs_finish_extent_commit() may get the same range as btrfs_destroy_pinned_extent() got, which causes the pinned underflow. Fixes: d4b450cd4b33 ("Btrfs: fix race between transaction commit and empty block group removal") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Lu Fengqi <lufq.fnst(a)cn.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c index b0ab41da91d1..00ee5e37e989 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c @@ -4359,13 +4359,23 @@ static int btrfs_destroy_pinned_extent(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, unpin = pinned_extents; again: while (1) { + /* + * The btrfs_finish_extent_commit() may get the same range as + * ours between find_first_extent_bit and clear_extent_dirty. + * Hence, hold the unused_bg_unpin_mutex to avoid double unpin + * the same extent range. + */ + mutex_lock(&fs_info->unused_bg_unpin_mutex); ret = find_first_extent_bit(unpin, 0, &start, &end, EXTENT_DIRTY, NULL); - if (ret) + if (ret) { + mutex_unlock(&fs_info->unused_bg_unpin_mutex); break; + } clear_extent_dirty(unpin, start, end); btrfs_error_unpin_extent_range(fs_info, start, end); + mutex_unlock(&fs_info->unused_bg_unpin_mutex); cond_resched(); }

5 years, 11 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] btrfs: fix pinned underflow after transaction aborted" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From fcd5e74288f7d36991b1f0fb96b8c57079645e38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lu Fengqi <lufq.fnst(a)cn.fujitsu.com> Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2018 20:24:03 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: fix pinned underflow after transaction aborted When running generic/475, we may get the following warning in dmesg: [ 6902.102154] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 18013 at fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:9776 btrfs_free_block_groups+0x2af/0x3b0 [btrfs] [ 6902.109160] CPU: 3 PID: 18013 Comm: umount Tainted: G W O 4.19.0-rc8+ #8 [ 6902.110971] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 [ 6902.112857] RIP: 0010:btrfs_free_block_groups+0x2af/0x3b0 [btrfs] [ 6902.118921] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000459bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 6902.120315] RAX: ffff880175050bb0 RBX: ffff8801124a8000 RCX: 0000000000170007 [ 6902.121969] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000170007 RDI: ffffffff8125fb74 [ 6902.123716] RBP: ffff880175055d10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 6902.125417] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880175055d88 [ 6902.127129] R13: ffff880175050bb0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dead000000000100 [ 6902.129060] FS: 00007f4507223780(0000) GS:ffff88017ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6902.130996] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6902.132558] CR2: 00005623599cac78 CR3: 000000014b700001 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 6902.134270] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 6902.135981] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 6902.137836] Call Trace: [ 6902.138939] close_ctree+0x171/0x330 [btrfs] [ 6902.140181] ? kthread_stop+0x146/0x1f0 [ 6902.141277] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 [ 6902.142517] kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 [ 6902.143554] btrfs_kill_super+0x13/0x100 [btrfs] [ 6902.144790] deactivate_locked_super+0x2f/0x70 [ 6902.146014] cleanup_mnt+0x3b/0x70 [ 6902.147020] task_work_run+0x9e/0xd0 [ 6902.148036] do_syscall_64+0x470/0x600 [ 6902.149142] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [ 6902.150375] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 6902.151640] RIP: 0033:0x7f45077a6a7b [ 6902.157324] RSP: 002b:00007ffd589f3e68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 [ 6902.159187] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000055e8eec732b0 RCX: 00007f45077a6a7b [ 6902.160834] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000055e8eec73490 [ 6902.162526] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000055e8eec734b0 R09: 00007ffd589f26c0 [ 6902.164141] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055e8eec73490 [ 6902.165815] R13: 00007f4507ac61a4 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffd589f40d8 [ 6902.167553] irq event stamp: 0 [ 6902.168998] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] (null) [ 6902.170731] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff810cd810>] copy_process.part.55+0x3b0/0x1f00 [ 6902.172773] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff810cd810>] copy_process.part.55+0x3b0/0x1f00 [ 6902.174671] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] (null) [ 6902.176407] ---[ end trace 463138c2986b275c ]--- [ 6902.177636] BTRFS info (device dm-3): space_info 4 has 273465344 free, is not full [ 6902.179453] BTRFS info (device dm-3): space_info total=276824064, used=4685824, pinned=18446744073708158976, reserved=0, may_use=0, readonly=65536 In the above line there's "pinned=18446744073708158976" which is an unsigned u64 value of -1392640, an obvious underflow. When transaction_kthread is running cleanup_transaction(), another fsstress is running btrfs_commit_transaction(). The btrfs_finish_extent_commit() may get the same range as btrfs_destroy_pinned_extent() got, which causes the pinned underflow. Fixes: d4b450cd4b33 ("Btrfs: fix race between transaction commit and empty block group removal") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Lu Fengqi <lufq.fnst(a)cn.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c index b0ab41da91d1..00ee5e37e989 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c @@ -4359,13 +4359,23 @@ static int btrfs_destroy_pinned_extent(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, unpin = pinned_extents; again: while (1) { + /* + * The btrfs_finish_extent_commit() may get the same range as + * ours between find_first_extent_bit and clear_extent_dirty. + * Hence, hold the unused_bg_unpin_mutex to avoid double unpin + * the same extent range. + */ + mutex_lock(&fs_info->unused_bg_unpin_mutex); ret = find_first_extent_bit(unpin, 0, &start, &end, EXTENT_DIRTY, NULL); - if (ret) + if (ret) { + mutex_unlock(&fs_info->unused_bg_unpin_mutex); break; + } clear_extent_dirty(unpin, start, end); btrfs_error_unpin_extent_range(fs_info, start, end); + mutex_unlock(&fs_info->unused_bg_unpin_mutex); cond_resched(); }

5 years, 11 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] watchdog/core: Add missing prototypes for weak functions" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 81bd415c91eb966118d773dddf254aebf3022411 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Malaterre <malat(a)debian.org> Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2018 21:42:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] watchdog/core: Add missing prototypes for weak functions MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The split out of the hard lockup detector exposed two new weak functions, but no prototypes for them, which triggers the build warning: kernel/watchdog.c:109:12: warning: no previous prototype for ‘watchdog_nmi_enable’ [-Wmissing-prototypes] kernel/watchdog.c:115:13: warning: no previous prototype for ‘watchdog_nmi_disable’ [-Wmissing-prototypes] Add the prototypes. Fixes: 73ce0511c436 ("kernel/watchdog.c: move hardlockup detector to separate file") Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat(a)debian.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger(a)oracle.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180606194232.17653-1-malat@debian.org diff --git a/include/linux/nmi.h b/include/linux/nmi.h index 08f9247e9827..9003e29cde46 100644 --- a/include/linux/nmi.h +++ b/include/linux/nmi.h @@ -119,6 +119,8 @@ static inline int hardlockup_detector_perf_init(void) { return 0; } void watchdog_nmi_stop(void); void watchdog_nmi_start(void); int watchdog_nmi_probe(void); +int watchdog_nmi_enable(unsigned int cpu); +void watchdog_nmi_disable(unsigned int cpu); /** * touch_nmi_watchdog - restart NMI watchdog timeout.

5 years, 11 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] bonding/802.3ad: fix link_failure_count tracking" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From ea53abfab960909d622ca37bcfb8e1c5378d21cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarod Wilson <jarod(a)redhat.com> Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2018 14:59:46 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] bonding/802.3ad: fix link_failure_count tracking Commit 4d2c0cda07448ea6980f00102dc3964eb25e241c set slave->link to BOND_LINK_DOWN for 802.3ad bonds whenever invalid speed/duplex values were read, to fix a problem with slaves getting into weird states, but in the process, broke tracking of link failures, as going straight to BOND_LINK_DOWN when a link is indeed down (cable pulled, switch rebooted) means we broke out of bond_miimon_inspect()'s BOND_LINK_DOWN case because !link_state was already true, we never incremented commit, and never got a chance to call bond_miimon_commit(), where slave->link_failure_count would be incremented. I believe the simple fix here is to mark the slave as BOND_LINK_FAIL, and let bond_miimon_inspect() transition the link from _FAIL to either _UP or _DOWN, and in the latter case, we now get proper incrementing of link_failure_count again. Fixes: 4d2c0cda0744 ("bonding: speed/duplex update at NETDEV_UP event") CC: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb(a)google.com> CC: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> CC: netdev(a)vger.kernel.org CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c index ffa37adb7681..333387f1f1fe 100644 --- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c @@ -3112,13 +3112,13 @@ static int bond_slave_netdev_event(unsigned long event, case NETDEV_CHANGE: /* For 802.3ad mode only: * Getting invalid Speed/Duplex values here will put slave - * in weird state. So mark it as link-down for the time + * in weird state. So mark it as link-fail for the time * being and let link-monitoring (miimon) set it right when * correct speeds/duplex are available. */ if (bond_update_speed_duplex(slave) && BOND_MODE(bond) == BOND_MODE_8023AD) - slave->link = BOND_LINK_DOWN; + slave->link = BOND_LINK_FAIL; if (BOND_MODE(bond) == BOND_MODE_8023AD) bond_3ad_adapter_speed_duplex_changed(slave);

5 years, 11 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 53c613fe6349994f023245519265999eed75957f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina(a)suse.cz> Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2018 14:38:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation STIBP is a feature provided by certain Intel ucodes / CPUs. This feature (once enabled) prevents cross-hyperthread control of decisions made by indirect branch predictors. Enable this feature if - the CPU is vulnerable to spectre v2 - the CPU supports SMT and has SMT siblings online - spectre_v2 mitigation autoselection is enabled (default) After some previous discussion, this leaves STIBP on all the time, as wrmsr on crossing kernel boundary is a no-no. This could perhaps later be a bit more optimized (like disabling it in NOHZ, experiment with disabling it in idle, etc) if needed. Note that the synchronization of the mask manipulation via newly added spec_ctrl_mutex is currently not strictly needed, as the only updater is already being serialized by cpu_add_remove_lock, but let's make this a little bit more future-proof. Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina(a)suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com> Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler(a)intel.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438240.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 40bdaea97fe7..53eb14a65610 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -35,12 +35,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); -/* - * Our boot-time value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR. We read it once so that any - * writes to SPEC_CTRL contain whatever reserved bits have been set. - */ -u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_base; +/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */ +u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base); +static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex); /* * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in @@ -325,6 +323,46 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) return cmd; } +static bool stibp_needed(void) +{ + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE) + return false; + + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static void update_stibp_msr(void *info) +{ + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); +} + +void arch_smt_update(void) +{ + u64 mask; + + if (!stibp_needed()) + return; + + mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex); + mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base; + if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED) + mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; + else + mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; + + if (mask != x86_spec_ctrl_base) { + pr_info("Spectre v2 cross-process SMT mitigation: %s STIBP\n", + cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? + "Enabling" : "Disabling"); + x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask; + on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1); + } + mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex); +} + static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(); @@ -424,6 +462,9 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); } + + /* Enable STIBP if appropriate */ + arch_smt_update(); } #undef pr_fmt @@ -814,6 +855,8 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf) static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf, unsigned int bug) { + int ret; + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); @@ -831,10 +874,12 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2: - return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "", + (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ", STIBP" : "", spectre_v2_module_string()); + return ret; case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]); diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c index aa7fe85ad62e..2fb49916ea56 100644 --- a/kernel/cpu.c +++ b/kernel/cpu.c @@ -2025,6 +2025,12 @@ static void cpuhp_online_cpu_device(unsigned int cpu) kobject_uevent(&dev->kobj, KOBJ_ONLINE); } +/* + * Architectures that need SMT-specific errata handling during SMT hotplug + * should override this. + */ +void __weak arch_smt_update(void) { }; + static int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval) { int cpu, ret = 0; @@ -2051,8 +2057,10 @@ static int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval) */ cpuhp_offline_cpu_device(cpu); } - if (!ret) + if (!ret) { cpu_smt_control = ctrlval; + arch_smt_update(); + } cpu_maps_update_done(); return ret; } @@ -2063,6 +2071,7 @@ static int cpuhp_smt_enable(void) cpu_maps_update_begin(); cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_ENABLED; + arch_smt_update(); for_each_present_cpu(cpu) { /* Skip online CPUs and CPUs on offline nodes */ if (cpu_online(cpu) || !node_online(cpu_to_node(cpu)))

5 years, 11 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] acpi, nfit: Fix ARS overflow continuation" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 3fa58dcab50a0aa16817f16a8d38aee869eb3fb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2018 00:30:22 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] acpi, nfit: Fix ARS overflow continuation When the platform BIOS is unable to report all the media error records it requires the OS to restart the scrub at a prescribed location. The driver detects the overflow condition, but then fails to report it to the ARS state machine after reaping the records. Propagate -ENOSPC correctly to continue the ARS operation. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 1cf03c00e7c1 ("nfit: scrub and register regions in a workqueue") Reported-by: Jacek Zloch <jacek.zloch(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> diff --git a/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c b/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c index f8c638f3c946..5970b8f5f768 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c @@ -2928,9 +2928,9 @@ static int acpi_nfit_query_poison(struct acpi_nfit_desc *acpi_desc) return rc; if (ars_status_process_records(acpi_desc)) - return -ENOMEM; + dev_err(acpi_desc->dev, "Failed to process ARS records\n"); - return 0; + return rc; } static int ars_register(struct acpi_nfit_desc *acpi_desc,

5 years, 11 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] acpi, nfit: Fix ARS overflow continuation" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 3fa58dcab50a0aa16817f16a8d38aee869eb3fb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2018 00:30:22 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] acpi, nfit: Fix ARS overflow continuation When the platform BIOS is unable to report all the media error records it requires the OS to restart the scrub at a prescribed location. The driver detects the overflow condition, but then fails to report it to the ARS state machine after reaping the records. Propagate -ENOSPC correctly to continue the ARS operation. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 1cf03c00e7c1 ("nfit: scrub and register regions in a workqueue") Reported-by: Jacek Zloch <jacek.zloch(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> diff --git a/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c b/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c index f8c638f3c946..5970b8f5f768 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c @@ -2928,9 +2928,9 @@ static int acpi_nfit_query_poison(struct acpi_nfit_desc *acpi_desc) return rc; if (ars_status_process_records(acpi_desc)) - return -ENOMEM; + dev_err(acpi_desc->dev, "Failed to process ARS records\n"); - return 0; + return rc; } static int ars_register(struct acpi_nfit_desc *acpi_desc,

5 years, 11 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] acpi/nfit, x86/mce: Validate a MCE's address before using it" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From e8a308e5f47e545e0d41d0686c00f5f5217c5f61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma(a)intel.com> Date: Thu, 25 Oct 2018 18:37:29 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] acpi/nfit, x86/mce: Validate a MCE's address before using it The NFIT machine check handler uses the physical address from the mce structure, and compares it against information in the ACPI NFIT table to determine whether that location lies on an NVDIMM. The mce->addr field however may not always be valid, and this is indicated by the MCI_STATUS_ADDRV bit in the status field. Export mce_usable_address() which already performs validation for the address, and use it in the NFIT handler. Fixes: 6839a6d96f4e ("nfit: do an ARS scrub on hitting a latent media error") Reported-by: Robert Elliott <elliott(a)hpe.com> Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> CC: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> CC: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang(a)intel.com> CC: elliott(a)hpe.com CC: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa(a)zytor.com> CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com> CC: Len Brown <lenb(a)kernel.org> CC: linux-acpi(a)vger.kernel.org CC: linux-edac <linux-edac(a)vger.kernel.org> CC: linux-nvdimm(a)lists.01.org CC: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo(a)intel.com> CC: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw(a)rjwysocki.net> CC: Ross Zwisler <zwisler(a)kernel.org> CC: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> CC: Tony Luck <tony.luck(a)intel.com> CC: x86-ml <x86(a)kernel.org> CC: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam(a)amd.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181026003729.8420-2-vishal.l.verma@intel.com diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h index dbd9fe2f6163..c1a812bd5a27 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h @@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ static inline void mce_hygon_feature_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { return mce_am int mce_available(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); bool mce_is_memory_error(struct mce *m); bool mce_is_correctable(struct mce *m); +int mce_usable_address(struct mce *m); DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned, mce_exception_count); DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned, mce_poll_count); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c index 77527b8ea982..36d2696c9563 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c @@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ static void mce_report_event(struct pt_regs *regs) * be somewhat complicated (e.g. segment offset would require an instruction * parser). So only support physical addresses up to page granuality for now. */ -static int mce_usable_address(struct mce *m) +int mce_usable_address(struct mce *m) { if (!(m->status & MCI_STATUS_ADDRV)) return 0; @@ -505,6 +505,7 @@ static int mce_usable_address(struct mce *m) return 1; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_usable_address); bool mce_is_memory_error(struct mce *m) { diff --git a/drivers/acpi/nfit/mce.c b/drivers/acpi/nfit/mce.c index 7a51707f87e9..d6c1b10f6c25 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/nfit/mce.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/nfit/mce.c @@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ static int nfit_handle_mce(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val, if (!mce_is_memory_error(mce) || mce_is_correctable(mce)) return NOTIFY_DONE; + /* Verify the address reported in the MCE is valid. */ + if (!mce_usable_address(mce)) + return NOTIFY_DONE; + /* * mce->addr contains the physical addr accessed that caused the * machine check. We need to walk through the list of NFITs, and see

5 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] acpi/nfit, x86/mce: Validate a MCE's address before using it" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From e8a308e5f47e545e0d41d0686c00f5f5217c5f61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma(a)intel.com> Date: Thu, 25 Oct 2018 18:37:29 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] acpi/nfit, x86/mce: Validate a MCE's address before using it The NFIT machine check handler uses the physical address from the mce structure, and compares it against information in the ACPI NFIT table to determine whether that location lies on an NVDIMM. The mce->addr field however may not always be valid, and this is indicated by the MCI_STATUS_ADDRV bit in the status field. Export mce_usable_address() which already performs validation for the address, and use it in the NFIT handler. Fixes: 6839a6d96f4e ("nfit: do an ARS scrub on hitting a latent media error") Reported-by: Robert Elliott <elliott(a)hpe.com> Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> CC: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> CC: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang(a)intel.com> CC: elliott(a)hpe.com CC: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa(a)zytor.com> CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com> CC: Len Brown <lenb(a)kernel.org> CC: linux-acpi(a)vger.kernel.org CC: linux-edac <linux-edac(a)vger.kernel.org> CC: linux-nvdimm(a)lists.01.org CC: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo(a)intel.com> CC: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw(a)rjwysocki.net> CC: Ross Zwisler <zwisler(a)kernel.org> CC: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> CC: Tony Luck <tony.luck(a)intel.com> CC: x86-ml <x86(a)kernel.org> CC: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam(a)amd.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181026003729.8420-2-vishal.l.verma@intel.com diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h index dbd9fe2f6163..c1a812bd5a27 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h @@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ static inline void mce_hygon_feature_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { return mce_am int mce_available(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); bool mce_is_memory_error(struct mce *m); bool mce_is_correctable(struct mce *m); +int mce_usable_address(struct mce *m); DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned, mce_exception_count); DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned, mce_poll_count); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c index 77527b8ea982..36d2696c9563 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c @@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ static void mce_report_event(struct pt_regs *regs) * be somewhat complicated (e.g. segment offset would require an instruction * parser). So only support physical addresses up to page granuality for now. */ -static int mce_usable_address(struct mce *m) +int mce_usable_address(struct mce *m) { if (!(m->status & MCI_STATUS_ADDRV)) return 0; @@ -505,6 +505,7 @@ static int mce_usable_address(struct mce *m) return 1; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_usable_address); bool mce_is_memory_error(struct mce *m) { diff --git a/drivers/acpi/nfit/mce.c b/drivers/acpi/nfit/mce.c index 7a51707f87e9..d6c1b10f6c25 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/nfit/mce.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/nfit/mce.c @@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ static int nfit_handle_mce(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val, if (!mce_is_memory_error(mce) || mce_is_correctable(mce)) return NOTIFY_DONE; + /* Verify the address reported in the MCE is valid. */ + if (!mce_usable_address(mce)) + return NOTIFY_DONE; + /* * mce->addr contains the physical addr accessed that caused the * machine check. We need to walk through the list of NFITs, and see

5 years, 11 months

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