From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
keyctl_restrict_keyring() allows through a NULL restriction when the
"type" is non-NULL, which causes a NULL pointer dereference in
asymmetric_lookup_restriction() when it calls strcmp() on the
restriction string.
But no key types actually use a "NULL restriction" to mean anything, so
update keyctl_restrict_keyring() to reject it with EINVAL.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com>
Fixes: 97d3aa0f3134 ("KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
---
security/keys/keyctl.c | 24 ++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 76d22f726ae4..1ffe60bb2845 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1588,9 +1588,8 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
* The caller must have Setattr permission to change keyring restrictions.
*
* The requested type name may be a NULL pointer to reject all attempts
- * to link to the keyring. If _type is non-NULL, _restriction can be
- * NULL or a pointer to a string describing the restriction. If _type is
- * NULL, _restriction must also be NULL.
+ * to link to the keyring. In this case, _restriction must also be NULL.
+ * Otherwise, both _type and _restriction must be non-NULL.
*
* Returns 0 if successful.
*/
@@ -1598,7 +1597,6 @@ long keyctl_restrict_keyring(key_serial_t id, const char __user *_type,
const char __user *_restriction)
{
key_ref_t key_ref;
- bool link_reject = !_type;
char type[32];
char *restriction = NULL;
long ret;
@@ -1607,31 +1605,29 @@ long keyctl_restrict_keyring(key_serial_t id, const char __user *_type,
if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
if (_type) {
- ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
- if (ret < 0)
+ if (!_restriction)
goto error;
- }
- if (_restriction) {
- if (!_type) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
+ ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
+ if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- }
restriction = strndup_user(_restriction, PAGE_SIZE);
if (IS_ERR(restriction)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(restriction);
goto error;
}
+ } else {
+ if (_restriction)
+ goto error;
}
- ret = keyring_restrict(key_ref, link_reject ? NULL : type, restriction);
+ ret = keyring_restrict(key_ref, _type ? type : NULL, restriction);
kfree(restriction);
-
error:
key_ref_put(key_ref);
-
return ret;
}
--
2.15.0.531.g2ccb3012c9-goog
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usb: xhci: fix TDS for MTK xHCI1.1
to my usb git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git
in the usb-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 72b663a99c074a8d073e7ecdae446cfb024ef551 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chunfeng Yun <chunfeng.yun(a)mediatek.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 18:10:06 +0200
Subject: usb: xhci: fix TDS for MTK xHCI1.1
For MTK's xHCI 1.0 or latter, TD size is the number of max
packet sized packets remaining in the TD, not including
this TRB (following spec).
For MTK's xHCI 0.96 and older, TD size is the number of max
packet sized packets remaining in the TD, including this TRB
(not following spec).
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chunfeng Yun <chunfeng.yun(a)mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
index 6eb87c6e4d24..c5cbc685c691 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
@@ -3112,7 +3112,7 @@ static u32 xhci_td_remainder(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, int transferred,
{
u32 maxp, total_packet_count;
- /* MTK xHCI is mostly 0.97 but contains some features from 1.0 */
+ /* MTK xHCI 0.96 contains some features from 1.0 */
if (xhci->hci_version < 0x100 && !(xhci->quirks & XHCI_MTK_HOST))
return ((td_total_len - transferred) >> 10);
@@ -3121,8 +3121,8 @@ static u32 xhci_td_remainder(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, int transferred,
trb_buff_len == td_total_len)
return 0;
- /* for MTK xHCI, TD size doesn't include this TRB */
- if (xhci->quirks & XHCI_MTK_HOST)
+ /* for MTK xHCI 0.96, TD size include this TRB, but not in 1.x */
+ if ((xhci->quirks & XHCI_MTK_HOST) && (xhci->hci_version < 0x100))
trb_buff_len = 0;
maxp = usb_endpoint_maxp(&urb->ep->desc);
--
2.15.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
xhci: Don't add a virt_dev to the devs array before it's fully
to my usb git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git
in the usb-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 5d9b70f7d52eb14bb37861c663bae44de9521c35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 18:10:05 +0200
Subject: xhci: Don't add a virt_dev to the devs array before it's fully
allocated
Avoid null pointer dereference if some function is walking through the
devs array accessing members of a new virt_dev that is mid allocation.
Add the virt_dev to xhci->devs[i] _after_ the virt_device and all its
members are properly allocated.
issue found by KASAN: null-ptr-deref in xhci_find_slot_id_by_port
"Quick analysis suggests that xhci_alloc_virt_device() is not mutex
protected. If so, there is a time frame where xhci->devs[slot_id] is set
but not fully initialized. Specifically, xhci->devs[i]->udev can be NULL."
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci-mem.c | 15 +++++++++++----
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-mem.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-mem.c
index 15f7d422885f..3a29b32a3bd0 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-mem.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-mem.c
@@ -971,10 +971,9 @@ int xhci_alloc_virt_device(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, int slot_id,
return 0;
}
- xhci->devs[slot_id] = kzalloc(sizeof(*xhci->devs[slot_id]), flags);
- if (!xhci->devs[slot_id])
+ dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev), flags);
+ if (!dev)
return 0;
- dev = xhci->devs[slot_id];
/* Allocate the (output) device context that will be used in the HC. */
dev->out_ctx = xhci_alloc_container_ctx(xhci, XHCI_CTX_TYPE_DEVICE, flags);
@@ -1015,9 +1014,17 @@ int xhci_alloc_virt_device(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, int slot_id,
trace_xhci_alloc_virt_device(dev);
+ xhci->devs[slot_id] = dev;
+
return 1;
fail:
- xhci_free_virt_device(xhci, slot_id);
+
+ if (dev->in_ctx)
+ xhci_free_container_ctx(xhci, dev->in_ctx);
+ if (dev->out_ctx)
+ xhci_free_container_ctx(xhci, dev->out_ctx);
+ kfree(dev);
+
return 0;
}
--
2.15.1
The checks for whether another region/block header could be present
are subtracting the size from the current offset. Obviously we should
instead subtract the offset from the size.
The checks for whether the region/block data fit in the file are
adding the data size to the current offset and header size, without
checking for integer overflow. Rearrange these so that overflow is
impossible.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings(a)codethink.co.uk>
---
sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c b/sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c
index 65c059b5ffd7..66e32f5d2917 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c
@@ -1733,7 +1733,7 @@ static int wm_adsp_load(struct wm_adsp *dsp)
le64_to_cpu(footer->timestamp));
while (pos < firmware->size &&
- pos - firmware->size > sizeof(*region)) {
+ sizeof(*region) < firmware->size - pos) {
region = (void *)&(firmware->data[pos]);
region_name = "Unknown";
reg = 0;
@@ -1782,8 +1782,8 @@ static int wm_adsp_load(struct wm_adsp *dsp)
regions, le32_to_cpu(region->len), offset,
region_name);
- if ((pos + le32_to_cpu(region->len) + sizeof(*region)) >
- firmware->size) {
+ if (le32_to_cpu(region->len) >
+ firmware->size - pos - sizeof(*region)) {
adsp_err(dsp,
"%s.%d: %s region len %d bytes exceeds file length %zu\n",
file, regions, region_name,
@@ -2253,7 +2253,7 @@ static int wm_adsp_load_coeff(struct wm_adsp *dsp)
blocks = 0;
while (pos < firmware->size &&
- pos - firmware->size > sizeof(*blk)) {
+ sizeof(*blk) < firmware->size - pos) {
blk = (void *)(&firmware->data[pos]);
type = le16_to_cpu(blk->type);
@@ -2327,8 +2327,8 @@ static int wm_adsp_load_coeff(struct wm_adsp *dsp)
}
if (reg) {
- if ((pos + le32_to_cpu(blk->len) + sizeof(*blk)) >
- firmware->size) {
+ if (le32_to_cpu(blk->len) >
+ firmware->size - pos - sizeof(*blk)) {
adsp_err(dsp,
"%s.%d: %s region len %d bytes exceeds file length %zu\n",
file, blocks, region_name,
--
2.15.0.rc0
On 12/08/2017 05:36 AM, Mark Brown wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 07, 2017 at 09:03:01PM +0000, alexander.levin(a)verizon.com wrote:
>> On Thu, Dec 07, 2017 at 05:25:02PM +0000, Mark Brown wrote:
>
>>> We shouldn't be getting into adding completely new DT properties in
>>> stable backports like this. Old kernels have the bindings they have.
>
>> I thought that this one just adjust the example to match the code, and
>> doesn't actually change anything?
>
> No, there's a corresponding code change - the changelog is badly written.
>
Not this patch, this one was just the example was wrong, the driver
looks for, and always did look for, the "cirrus,gpio-nreset".
Only the tlv* drivers looked for the other property and needed code
changing, and those are separate patches.
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usbip: prevent vhci_hcd driver from leaking a socket pointer address
to my usb git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git
in the usb-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 2f2d0088eb93db5c649d2a5e34a3800a8a935fc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 14:16:49 -0700
Subject: usbip: prevent vhci_hcd driver from leaking a socket pointer address
When a client has a USB device attached over IP, the vhci_hcd driver is
locally leaking a socket pointer address via the
/sys/devices/platform/vhci_hcd/status file (world-readable) and in debug
output when "usbip --debug port" is run.
Fix it to not leak. The socket pointer address is not used at the moment
and it was made visible as a convenient way to find IP address from socket
pointer address by looking up /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6}.
As this opens a security hole, the fix replaces socket pointer address with
sockfd.
Reported-by: Secunia Research <vuln(a)secunia.com>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.h | 1 +
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c | 8 ++++----
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.h b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.h
index e5de35c8c505..473fb8a87289 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.h
@@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ struct usbip_device {
/* lock for status */
spinlock_t lock;
+ int sockfd;
struct socket *tcp_socket;
struct task_struct *tcp_rx;
diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
index e78f7472cac4..091f76b7196d 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
@@ -17,15 +17,20 @@
/*
* output example:
- * hub port sta spd dev socket local_busid
- * hs 0000 004 000 00000000 c5a7bb80 1-2.3
+ * hub port sta spd dev sockfd local_busid
+ * hs 0000 004 000 00000000 3 1-2.3
* ................................................
- * ss 0008 004 000 00000000 d8cee980 2-3.4
+ * ss 0008 004 000 00000000 4 2-3.4
* ................................................
*
- * IP address can be retrieved from a socket pointer address by looking
- * up /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6}. Also, a userland program may remember a
- * port number and its peer IP address.
+ * Output includes socket fd instead of socket pointer address to avoid
+ * leaking kernel memory address in:
+ * /sys/devices/platform/vhci_hcd.0/status and in debug output.
+ * The socket pointer address is not used at the moment and it was made
+ * visible as a convenient way to find IP address from socket pointer
+ * address by looking up /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6}. As this opens a security
+ * hole, the change is made to use sockfd instead.
+ *
*/
static void port_show_vhci(char **out, int hub, int port, struct vhci_device *vdev)
{
@@ -39,8 +44,8 @@ static void port_show_vhci(char **out, int hub, int port, struct vhci_device *vd
if (vdev->ud.status == VDEV_ST_USED) {
*out += sprintf(*out, "%03u %08x ",
vdev->speed, vdev->devid);
- *out += sprintf(*out, "%16p %s",
- vdev->ud.tcp_socket,
+ *out += sprintf(*out, "%u %s",
+ vdev->ud.sockfd,
dev_name(&vdev->udev->dev));
} else {
@@ -160,7 +165,8 @@ static ssize_t nports_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *s = out;
/*
- * Half the ports are for SPEED_HIGH and half for SPEED_SUPER, thus the * 2.
+ * Half the ports are for SPEED_HIGH and half for SPEED_SUPER,
+ * thus the * 2.
*/
out += sprintf(out, "%d\n", VHCI_PORTS * vhci_num_controllers);
return out - s;
@@ -366,6 +372,7 @@ static ssize_t store_attach(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
vdev->devid = devid;
vdev->speed = speed;
+ vdev->ud.sockfd = sockfd;
vdev->ud.tcp_socket = socket;
vdev->ud.status = VDEV_ST_NOTASSIGNED;
diff --git a/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c b/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c
index 627d1dfc332b..c9c81614a66a 100644
--- a/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c
+++ b/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c
@@ -50,14 +50,14 @@ static int parse_status(const char *value)
while (*c != '\0') {
int port, status, speed, devid;
- unsigned long socket;
+ int sockfd;
char lbusid[SYSFS_BUS_ID_SIZE];
struct usbip_imported_device *idev;
char hub[3];
- ret = sscanf(c, "%2s %d %d %d %x %lx %31s\n",
+ ret = sscanf(c, "%2s %d %d %d %x %u %31s\n",
hub, &port, &status, &speed,
- &devid, &socket, lbusid);
+ &devid, &sockfd, lbusid);
if (ret < 5) {
dbg("sscanf failed: %d", ret);
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static int parse_status(const char *value)
dbg("hub %s port %d status %d speed %d devid %x",
hub, port, status, speed, devid);
- dbg("socket %lx lbusid %s", socket, lbusid);
+ dbg("sockfd %u lbusid %s", sockfd, lbusid);
/* if a device is connected, look at it */
idev = &vhci_driver->idev[port];
--
2.15.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usbip: fix stub_send_ret_submit() vulnerability to null
to my usb git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git
in the usb-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From be6123df1ea8f01ee2f896a16c2b7be3e4557a5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 14:16:50 -0700
Subject: usbip: fix stub_send_ret_submit() vulnerability to null
transfer_buffer
stub_send_ret_submit() handles urb with a potential null transfer_buffer,
when it replays a packet with potential malicious data that could contain
a null buffer. Add a check for the condition when actual_length > 0 and
transfer_buffer is null.
Reported-by: Secunia Research <vuln(a)secunia.com>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/stub_tx.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_tx.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_tx.c
index b18bce96c212..53172b1f6257 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_tx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_tx.c
@@ -167,6 +167,13 @@ static int stub_send_ret_submit(struct stub_device *sdev)
memset(&pdu_header, 0, sizeof(pdu_header));
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+ if (urb->actual_length > 0 && !urb->transfer_buffer) {
+ dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev,
+ "urb: actual_length %d transfer_buffer null\n",
+ urb->actual_length);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (usb_pipetype(urb->pipe) == PIPE_ISOCHRONOUS)
iovnum = 2 + urb->number_of_packets;
else
--
2.15.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input
to my usb git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git
in the usb-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From c6688ef9f29762e65bce325ef4acd6c675806366 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 14:16:48 -0700
Subject: usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input
Harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input that could trigger
large memory allocations. Add checks to validate transfer_buffer_length
and number_of_packets to protect against bad input requesting for
unbounded memory allocations. Validate early in get_pipe() and return
failure.
Reported-by: Secunia Research <vuln(a)secunia.com>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c
index 4d61063c259d..493ac2928391 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c
@@ -322,11 +322,13 @@ static struct stub_priv *stub_priv_alloc(struct stub_device *sdev,
return priv;
}
-static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, int epnum, int dir)
+static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, struct usbip_header *pdu)
{
struct usb_device *udev = sdev->udev;
struct usb_host_endpoint *ep;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd = NULL;
+ int epnum = pdu->base.ep;
+ int dir = pdu->base.direction;
if (epnum < 0 || epnum > 15)
goto err_ret;
@@ -339,6 +341,15 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, int epnum, int dir)
goto err_ret;
epd = &ep->desc;
+
+ /* validate transfer_buffer_length */
+ if (pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length > INT_MAX) {
+ dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev,
+ "CMD_SUBMIT: -EMSGSIZE transfer_buffer_length %d\n",
+ pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_control(epd)) {
if (dir == USBIP_DIR_OUT)
return usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, epnum);
@@ -361,6 +372,21 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, int epnum, int dir)
}
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc(epd)) {
+ /* validate packet size and number of packets */
+ unsigned int maxp, packets, bytes;
+
+ maxp = usb_endpoint_maxp(epd);
+ maxp *= usb_endpoint_maxp_mult(epd);
+ bytes = pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length;
+ packets = DIV_ROUND_UP(bytes, maxp);
+
+ if (pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets < 0 ||
+ pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets > packets) {
+ dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev,
+ "CMD_SUBMIT: isoc invalid num packets %d\n",
+ pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets);
+ return -1;
+ }
if (dir == USBIP_DIR_OUT)
return usb_sndisocpipe(udev, epnum);
else
@@ -369,7 +395,7 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, int epnum, int dir)
err_ret:
/* NOT REACHED */
- dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev, "get pipe() invalid epnum %d\n", epnum);
+ dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev, "CMD_SUBMIT: invalid epnum %d\n", epnum);
return -1;
}
@@ -434,7 +460,7 @@ static void stub_recv_cmd_submit(struct stub_device *sdev,
struct stub_priv *priv;
struct usbip_device *ud = &sdev->ud;
struct usb_device *udev = sdev->udev;
- int pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu->base.ep, pdu->base.direction);
+ int pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu);
if (pipe == -1)
return;
@@ -456,7 +482,8 @@ static void stub_recv_cmd_submit(struct stub_device *sdev,
}
/* allocate urb transfer buffer, if needed */
- if (pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length > 0) {
+ if (pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length > 0 &&
+ pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length <= INT_MAX) {
priv->urb->transfer_buffer =
kzalloc(pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length,
GFP_KERNEL);
--
2.15.1
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
usbip: fix stub_rx: get_pipe() to validate endpoint number
to my usb git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git
in the usb-linus branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 635f545a7e8be7596b9b2b6a43cab6bbd5a88e43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 14:16:47 -0700
Subject: usbip: fix stub_rx: get_pipe() to validate endpoint number
get_pipe() routine doesn't validate the input endpoint number
and uses to reference ep_in and ep_out arrays. Invalid endpoint
number can trigger BUG(). Range check the epnum and returning
error instead of calling BUG().
Change caller stub_recv_cmd_submit() to handle the get_pipe()
error return.
Reported-by: Secunia Research <vuln(a)secunia.com>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh(a)osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c
index 536e037f541f..4d61063c259d 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c
@@ -328,15 +328,15 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, int epnum, int dir)
struct usb_host_endpoint *ep;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd = NULL;
+ if (epnum < 0 || epnum > 15)
+ goto err_ret;
+
if (dir == USBIP_DIR_IN)
ep = udev->ep_in[epnum & 0x7f];
else
ep = udev->ep_out[epnum & 0x7f];
- if (!ep) {
- dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev, "no such endpoint?, %d\n",
- epnum);
- BUG();
- }
+ if (!ep)
+ goto err_ret;
epd = &ep->desc;
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_control(epd)) {
@@ -367,9 +367,10 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, int epnum, int dir)
return usb_rcvisocpipe(udev, epnum);
}
+err_ret:
/* NOT REACHED */
- dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev, "get pipe, epnum %d\n", epnum);
- return 0;
+ dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev, "get pipe() invalid epnum %d\n", epnum);
+ return -1;
}
static void masking_bogus_flags(struct urb *urb)
@@ -435,6 +436,9 @@ static void stub_recv_cmd_submit(struct stub_device *sdev,
struct usb_device *udev = sdev->udev;
int pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu->base.ep, pdu->base.direction);
+ if (pipe == -1)
+ return;
+
priv = stub_priv_alloc(sdev, pdu);
if (!priv)
return;
--
2.15.1