The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From f775b13eedee2f7f3c6fdd4e90fb79090ce5d339 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2017 16:54:23 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] x86,kvm: move qemu/guest FPU switching out to vcpu_run
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Currently, every time a VCPU is scheduled out, the host kernel will
first save the guest FPU/xstate context, then load the qemu userspace
FPU context, only to then immediately save the qemu userspace FPU
context back to memory. When scheduling in a VCPU, the same extraneous
FPU loads and saves are done.
This could be avoided by moving from a model where the guest FPU is
loaded and stored with preemption disabled, to a model where the
qemu userspace FPU is swapped out for the guest FPU context for
the duration of the KVM_RUN ioctl.
This is done under the VCPU mutex, which is also taken when other
tasks inspect the VCPU FPU context, so the code should already be
safe for this change. That should come as no surprise, given that
s390 already has this optimization.
This can fix a bug where KVM calls get_user_pages while owning the
FPU, and the file system ends up requesting the FPU again:
[258270.527947] __warn+0xcb/0xf0
[258270.527948] warn_slowpath_null+0x1d/0x20
[258270.527951] kernel_fpu_disable+0x3f/0x50
[258270.527953] __kernel_fpu_begin+0x49/0x100
[258270.527955] kernel_fpu_begin+0xe/0x10
[258270.527958] crc32c_pcl_intel_update+0x84/0xb0
[258270.527961] crypto_shash_update+0x3f/0x110
[258270.527968] crc32c+0x63/0x8a [libcrc32c]
[258270.527975] dm_bm_checksum+0x1b/0x20 [dm_persistent_data]
[258270.527978] node_prepare_for_write+0x44/0x70 [dm_persistent_data]
[258270.527985] dm_block_manager_write_callback+0x41/0x50 [dm_persistent_data]
[258270.527988] submit_io+0x170/0x1b0 [dm_bufio]
[258270.527992] __write_dirty_buffer+0x89/0x90 [dm_bufio]
[258270.527994] __make_buffer_clean+0x4f/0x80 [dm_bufio]
[258270.527996] __try_evict_buffer+0x42/0x60 [dm_bufio]
[258270.527998] dm_bufio_shrink_scan+0xc0/0x130 [dm_bufio]
[258270.528002] shrink_slab.part.40+0x1f5/0x420
[258270.528004] shrink_node+0x22c/0x320
[258270.528006] do_try_to_free_pages+0xf5/0x330
[258270.528008] try_to_free_pages+0xe9/0x190
[258270.528009] __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x40f/0xba0
[258270.528011] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x209/0x260
[258270.528014] alloc_pages_vma+0x1f1/0x250
[258270.528017] do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x123/0x660
[258270.528021] handle_mm_fault+0xfd3/0x1330
[258270.528025] __get_user_pages+0x113/0x640
[258270.528027] get_user_pages+0x4f/0x60
[258270.528063] __gfn_to_pfn_memslot+0x120/0x3f0 [kvm]
[258270.528108] try_async_pf+0x66/0x230 [kvm]
[258270.528135] tdp_page_fault+0x130/0x280 [kvm]
[258270.528149] kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x60/0x120 [kvm]
[258270.528158] handle_ept_violation+0x91/0x170 [kvm_intel]
[258270.528162] vmx_handle_exit+0x1ca/0x1400 [kvm_intel]
No performance changes were detected in quick ping-pong tests on
my 4 socket system, which is expected since an FPU+xstate load is
on the order of 0.1us, while ping-ponging between CPUs is on the
order of 20us, and somewhat noisy.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger(a)de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com>
[Fixed a bug where reset_vcpu called put_fpu without preceding load_fpu,
which happened inside from KVM_CREATE_VCPU ioctl. - Radim]
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 977de5fb968b..62527e053ee4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -536,7 +536,20 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_page_cache;
struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_page_header_cache;
+ /*
+ * QEMU userspace and the guest each have their own FPU state.
+ * In vcpu_run, we switch between the user and guest FPU contexts.
+ * While running a VCPU, the VCPU thread will have the guest FPU
+ * context.
+ *
+ * Note that while the PKRU state lives inside the fpu registers,
+ * it is switched out separately at VMENTER and VMEXIT time. The
+ * "guest_fpu" state here contains the guest FPU context, with the
+ * host PRKU bits.
+ */
+ struct fpu user_fpu;
struct fpu guest_fpu;
+
u64 xcr0;
u64 guest_supported_xcr0;
u32 guest_xstate_size;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index eee8e7faf1af..c8da1680a7d6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -2937,7 +2937,6 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
pagefault_enable();
kvm_x86_ops->vcpu_put(vcpu);
- kvm_put_guest_fpu(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.last_host_tsc = rdtsc();
}
@@ -5254,13 +5253,10 @@ static void emulator_halt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
static void emulator_get_fpu(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
- preempt_disable();
- kvm_load_guest_fpu(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt));
}
static void emulator_put_fpu(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
- preempt_enable();
}
static int emulator_intercept(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
@@ -6952,7 +6948,6 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
preempt_disable();
kvm_x86_ops->prepare_guest_switch(vcpu);
- kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
/*
* Disable IRQs before setting IN_GUEST_MODE. Posted interrupt
@@ -7297,12 +7292,14 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *kvm_run)
}
}
+ kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
+
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io)) {
int (*cui)(struct kvm_vcpu *) = vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io;
vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = NULL;
r = cui(vcpu);
if (r <= 0)
- goto out;
+ goto out_fpu;
} else
WARN_ON(vcpu->arch.pio.count || vcpu->mmio_needed);
@@ -7311,6 +7308,8 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *kvm_run)
else
r = vcpu_run(vcpu);
+out_fpu:
+ kvm_put_guest_fpu(vcpu);
out:
post_kvm_run_save(vcpu);
kvm_sigset_deactivate(vcpu);
@@ -7704,32 +7703,25 @@ static void fx_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vcpu->arch.cr0 |= X86_CR0_ET;
}
+/* Swap (qemu) user FPU context for the guest FPU context. */
void kvm_load_guest_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- if (vcpu->guest_fpu_loaded)
- return;
-
- /*
- * Restore all possible states in the guest,
- * and assume host would use all available bits.
- * Guest xcr0 would be loaded later.
- */
- vcpu->guest_fpu_loaded = 1;
- __kernel_fpu_begin();
+ preempt_disable();
+ copy_fpregs_to_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.user_fpu);
/* PKRU is separately restored in kvm_x86_ops->run. */
__copy_kernel_to_fpregs(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.state,
~XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU);
+ preempt_enable();
trace_kvm_fpu(1);
}
+/* When vcpu_run ends, restore user space FPU context. */
void kvm_put_guest_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- if (!vcpu->guest_fpu_loaded)
- return;
-
- vcpu->guest_fpu_loaded = 0;
+ preempt_disable();
copy_fpregs_to_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
- __kernel_fpu_end();
+ copy_kernel_to_fpregs(&vcpu->arch.user_fpu.state);
+ preempt_enable();
++vcpu->stat.fpu_reload;
trace_kvm_fpu(0);
}
@@ -7846,7 +7838,8 @@ void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
* To avoid have the INIT path from kvm_apic_has_events() that be
* called with loaded FPU and does not let userspace fix the state.
*/
- kvm_put_guest_fpu(vcpu);
+ if (init_event)
+ kvm_put_guest_fpu(vcpu);
mpx_state_buffer = get_xsave_addr(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.state.xsave,
XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS);
if (mpx_state_buffer)
@@ -7855,6 +7848,8 @@ void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR);
if (mpx_state_buffer)
memset(mpx_state_buffer, 0, sizeof(struct mpx_bndcsr));
+ if (init_event)
+ kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
}
if (!init_event) {
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 893d6d606cd0..6bdd4b9f6611 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu {
struct mutex mutex;
struct kvm_run *run;
- int guest_fpu_loaded, guest_xcr0_loaded;
+ int guest_xcr0_loaded;
struct swait_queue_head wq;
struct pid __rcu *pid;
int sigset_active;
The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 4dca6ea1d9432052afb06baf2e3ae78188a4410b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 15:13:27 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: add missing permission check for request_key()
destination
When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it
links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key
keyring. This should require Write permission to the keyring. However,
there is actually no permission check.
This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search
permission is granted. This is because Search permission allows joining
the keyring. keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING)
then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring.
Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring.
Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this
method. Adding negative keys is trivial. Adding a positive key is a
bit trickier. It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively
instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process
keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it
initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key().
Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in
construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used.
We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that
was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key(). Also,
request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than
a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable.
We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to
continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976b59f
("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where
/sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the
original requestor's destination keyring. (I don't know of any users
who actually do that, though...)
Fixes: 3e30148c3d52 ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.13+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index c6880af8b411..114f7408feee 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -251,11 +251,12 @@ static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info,
* The keyring selected is returned with an extra reference upon it which the
* caller must release.
*/
-static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
+static int construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *dest_keyring = *_dest_keyring, *authkey;
+ int ret;
kenter("%p", dest_keyring);
@@ -264,6 +265,8 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
/* the caller supplied one */
key_get(dest_keyring);
} else {
+ bool do_perm_check = true;
+
/* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we
* find one that we actually have */
switch (cred->jit_keyring) {
@@ -278,8 +281,10 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
dest_keyring =
key_get(rka->dest_keyring);
up_read(&authkey->sem);
- if (dest_keyring)
+ if (dest_keyring) {
+ do_perm_check = false;
break;
+ }
}
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
@@ -314,11 +319,29 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
default:
BUG();
}
+
+ /*
+ * Require Write permission on the keyring. This is essential
+ * because the default keyring may be the session keyring, and
+ * joining a keyring only requires Search permission.
+ *
+ * However, this check is skipped for the "requestor keyring" so
+ * that /sbin/request-key can itself use request_key() to add
+ * keys to the original requestor's destination keyring.
+ */
+ if (dest_keyring && do_perm_check) {
+ ret = key_permission(make_key_ref(dest_keyring, 1),
+ KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+ if (ret) {
+ key_put(dest_keyring);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
}
*_dest_keyring = dest_keyring;
kleave(" [dk %d]", key_serial(dest_keyring));
- return;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -444,11 +467,15 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring)
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
- user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
- if (!user)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ ret = construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
+ if (ret)
+ goto error;
- construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
+ user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
+ if (!user) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto error_put_dest_keyring;
+ }
ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key);
key_user_put(user);
@@ -463,7 +490,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
} else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
ret = 0;
} else {
- goto couldnt_alloc_key;
+ goto error_put_dest_keyring;
}
key_put(dest_keyring);
@@ -473,8 +500,9 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
construction_failed:
key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL);
key_put(key);
-couldnt_alloc_key:
+error_put_dest_keyring:
key_put(dest_keyring);
+error:
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
The patch below does not apply to the 3.18-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From e0058f3a874ebb48b25be7ff79bc3b4e59929f90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 15:13:27 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] ASN.1: fix out-of-bounds read when parsing indefinite length
item
In asn1_ber_decoder(), indefinitely-sized ASN.1 items were being passed
to the action functions before their lengths had been computed, using
the bogus length of 0x80 (ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH). This resulted in
reading data past the end of the input buffer, when given a specially
crafted message.
Fix it by rearranging the code so that the indefinite length is resolved
before the action is called.
This bug was originally found by fuzzing the X.509 parser in userspace
using libFuzzer from the LLVM project.
KASAN report (cleaned up slightly):
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy ./include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in x509_fabricate_name.constprop.1+0x1a4/0x940 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:366
Read of size 128 at addr ffff880035dd9eaf by task keyctl/195
CPU: 1 PID: 195 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0xd1/0x175 lib/dump_stack.c:53
print_address_description+0x78/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x23f/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:302
memcpy ./include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
x509_fabricate_name.constprop.1+0x1a4/0x940 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:366
asn1_ber_decoder+0xb4a/0x1fd0 lib/asn1_decoder.c:447
x509_cert_parse+0x1c7/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:89
x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850
SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Allocated by task 195:
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slab.c:3675 [inline]
__kmalloc_node+0x47/0x60 mm/slab.c:3682
kvmalloc ./include/linux/mm.h:540 [inline]
SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:104 [inline]
SyS_add_key+0x19e/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Fixes: 42d5ec27f873 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder")
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/lib/asn1_decoder.c b/lib/asn1_decoder.c
index 1ef0cec38d78..d77cdfc4b554 100644
--- a/lib/asn1_decoder.c
+++ b/lib/asn1_decoder.c
@@ -313,42 +313,47 @@ int asn1_ber_decoder(const struct asn1_decoder *decoder,
/* Decide how to handle the operation */
switch (op) {
- case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT:
- case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP:
- case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT:
- case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP:
- ret = actions[machine[pc + 1]](context, hdr, tag, data + dp, len);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- goto skip_data;
-
- case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT:
- case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP:
- case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP:
- ret = actions[machine[pc + 2]](context, hdr, tag, data + dp, len);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- goto skip_data;
-
case ASN1_OP_MATCH:
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_OR_SKIP:
+ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT:
+ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY:
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP:
+ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT:
+ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_OR_SKIP:
+ case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY:
case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP:
- skip_data:
+ case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT:
+ case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP:
+
if (!(flags & FLAG_CONS)) {
if (flags & FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH) {
+ size_t tmp = dp;
+
ret = asn1_find_indefinite_length(
- data, datalen, &dp, &len, &errmsg);
+ data, datalen, &tmp, &len, &errmsg);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- } else {
- dp += len;
}
pr_debug("- LEAF: %zu\n", len);
}
+
+ if (op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__ACT) {
+ unsigned char act;
+
+ if (op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__ANY)
+ act = machine[pc + 1];
+ else
+ act = machine[pc + 2];
+ ret = actions[act](context, hdr, tag, data + dp, len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (!(flags & FLAG_CONS))
+ dp += len;
pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
goto next_op;
The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From d9e427f6ab8142d6868eb719e6a7851aafea56b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Stancek <jstancek(a)redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2017 10:50:28 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] virtio_balloon: fix increment of vb->num_pfns in
fill_balloon()
commit c7cdff0e8647 ("virtio_balloon: fix deadlock on OOM")
changed code to increment vb->num_pfns before call to
set_page_pfns(), which used to happen only after.
This patch fixes boot hang for me on ppc64le KVM guests.
Fixes: c7cdff0e8647 ("virtio_balloon: fix deadlock on OOM")
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Cc: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang(a)intel.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c
index 7960746f7597..a1fb52cb3f0a 100644
--- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c
+++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c
@@ -174,13 +174,12 @@ static unsigned fill_balloon(struct virtio_balloon *vb, size_t num)
while ((page = balloon_page_pop(&pages))) {
balloon_page_enqueue(&vb->vb_dev_info, page);
- vb->num_pfns += VIRTIO_BALLOON_PAGES_PER_PAGE;
-
set_page_pfns(vb, vb->pfns + vb->num_pfns, page);
vb->num_pages += VIRTIO_BALLOON_PAGES_PER_PAGE;
if (!virtio_has_feature(vb->vdev,
VIRTIO_BALLOON_F_DEFLATE_ON_OOM))
adjust_managed_page_count(page, -1);
+ vb->num_pfns += VIRTIO_BALLOON_PAGES_PER_PAGE;
}
num_allocated_pages = vb->num_pfns;
From: Dexuan Cui <decui(a)microsoft.com>
Fixes: c2e5df616e1a ("vmbus: add per-channel sysfs info")
Without the patch, a device can't be thoroughly destroyed, because
vmbus_device_register() -> kset_create_and_add() still holds a reference
to the hv_device's device.kobj.
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui(a)microsoft.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin(a)microsoft.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys(a)microsoft.com>
---
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 2 ++
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
index 6a86746..4f3faf5 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
@@ -1378,6 +1378,8 @@ void vmbus_device_unregister(struct hv_device *device_obj)
pr_debug("child device %s unregistered\n",
dev_name(&device_obj->device));
+ kset_unregister(device_obj->channels_kset);
+
/*
* Kick off the process of unregistering the device.
* This will call vmbus_remove() and eventually vmbus_device_release()
--
1.7.1
This is an automatic generated email to let you know that the following patch were queued:
Subject: media: dvb_frontend: be sure to init dvb_frontend_handle_ioctl() return code
Author: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab(a)s-opensource.com>
Date: Wed Nov 1 17:05:39 2017 -0400
As smatch warned:
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c:2468 dvb_frontend_handle_ioctl() error: uninitialized symbol 'err'.
The ioctl handler actually got a regression here: before changeset
d73dcf0cdb95 ("media: dvb_frontend: cleanup ioctl handling logic"),
the code used to return -EOPNOTSUPP if an ioctl handler was not
implemented on a driver. After the change, it may return a random
value.
Fixes: d73dcf0cdb95 ("media: dvb_frontend: cleanup ioctl handling logic")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab(a)s-opensource.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Scheller <d.scheller(a)gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab(a)s-opensource.com>
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
---
diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c
index 2afaa8226342..46f977177faf 100644
--- a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c
+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c
@@ -2110,7 +2110,7 @@ static int dvb_frontend_handle_ioctl(struct file *file,
struct dvb_frontend *fe = dvbdev->priv;
struct dvb_frontend_private *fepriv = fe->frontend_priv;
struct dtv_frontend_properties *c = &fe->dtv_property_cache;
- int i, err;
+ int i, err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
dev_dbg(fe->dvb->device, "%s:\n", __func__);
@@ -2145,6 +2145,7 @@ static int dvb_frontend_handle_ioctl(struct file *file,
}
}
kfree(tvp);
+ err = 0;
break;
}
case FE_GET_PROPERTY: {
@@ -2196,6 +2197,7 @@ static int dvb_frontend_handle_ioctl(struct file *file,
return -EFAULT;
}
kfree(tvp);
+ err = 0;
break;
}
Hi,
This series corrects a number of issues with NT_PRFPREG regset, most
importantly an FCSR access API regression introduced with the addition of
MSA support, and then a few smaller issues with the get/set handlers.
I have decided to factor out non-MSA and MSA context helpers as the first
step to avoid the issue with excessive indentation that would inevitably
happen if the regression fix was applied to current code as it stands.
It shouldn't be a big deal with backporting as this code hasn't changed
much since the regression, and it will make any future bacports easier.
Only a call to `init_fp_ctx' will have to be trivially resolved (though
arguably commit ac9ad83bc318 ("MIPS: prevent FP context set via ptrace
being discarded"), which has added `init_fp_ctx', would be good to
backport as far as possible instead).
These changes have been verified by examining the register state recorded
in core dumps manually with GDB, as well as by running the GDB test suite.
No user of ptrace(2) PTRACE_GETREGSET and PTRACE_SETREGSET requests is
known for the MIPS port, so this part remains not covered, however it is
assumed to remain consistent with how the creation of core file works.
See individual patch descriptions for further details.
Maciej
On Mon, 2017-12-11 at 14:51 +0100, Richard Schütz wrote:
> Hello,
>
> as per netdev-FAQ.txt I'm requesting the submission of commit
> 57629915d568c522ac1422df7bba4bee5b5c7a7c ("mac80211: Fix addition of
> mesh configuration element") to stable. Because of automatic selection
> commit 76f43b4c0a9337af22827d78de4f2b8fd5328489 ("mac80211: Remove
> invalid flag operations in mesh TSF synchronization") was introduced
> into stable recently without this accompanying fix.
It seems that due to the Fixes: tag Greg should pick it up anyway, but
in any case I don't really deal with stable myself (in that sense, I
guess wireless isn't really part of netdev...)
johannes
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
All the ChaCha20 algorithms as well as the ARM bit-sliced AES-XTS
algorithms call skcipher_walk_virt(), then access the IV (walk.iv)
before checking whether any bytes need to be processed (walk.nbytes).
But if the input is empty, then skcipher_walk_virt() doesn't set the IV,
and the algorithms crash trying to use the uninitialized IV pointer.
Fix it by setting the IV earlier in skcipher_walk_virt(). Also fix it
for the AEAD walk functions.
This isn't a perfect solution because we can't actually align the IV to
->cra_alignmask unless there are bytes to process, for one because the
temporary buffer for the aligned IV is freed by skcipher_walk_done(),
which is only called when there are bytes to process. Thus, algorithms
that require aligned IVs will still need to avoid accessing the IV when
walk.nbytes == 0. Still, many algorithms/architectures are fine with
IVs having any alignment, and even for those that aren't, a misaligned
pointer bug is much less severe than an uninitialized pointer bug.
This change also matches the behavior of the older blkcipher_walk API.
Fixes: 0cabf2af6f5a ("crypto: skcipher - Fix crash on zero-length input")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
---
crypto/skcipher.c | 10 ++++------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/skcipher.c b/crypto/skcipher.c
index 778e0ff42bfa..11af5fd6a443 100644
--- a/crypto/skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/skcipher.c
@@ -449,6 +449,8 @@ static int skcipher_walk_skcipher(struct skcipher_walk *walk,
walk->total = req->cryptlen;
walk->nbytes = 0;
+ walk->iv = req->iv;
+ walk->oiv = req->iv;
if (unlikely(!walk->total))
return 0;
@@ -456,9 +458,6 @@ static int skcipher_walk_skcipher(struct skcipher_walk *walk,
scatterwalk_start(&walk->in, req->src);
scatterwalk_start(&walk->out, req->dst);
- walk->iv = req->iv;
- walk->oiv = req->iv;
-
walk->flags &= ~SKCIPHER_WALK_SLEEP;
walk->flags |= req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ?
SKCIPHER_WALK_SLEEP : 0;
@@ -510,6 +509,8 @@ static int skcipher_walk_aead_common(struct skcipher_walk *walk,
int err;
walk->nbytes = 0;
+ walk->iv = req->iv;
+ walk->oiv = req->iv;
if (unlikely(!walk->total))
return 0;
@@ -525,9 +526,6 @@ static int skcipher_walk_aead_common(struct skcipher_walk *walk,
scatterwalk_done(&walk->in, 0, walk->total);
scatterwalk_done(&walk->out, 0, walk->total);
- walk->iv = req->iv;
- walk->oiv = req->iv;
-
if (req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP)
walk->flags |= SKCIPHER_WALK_SLEEP;
else
--
2.15.0