This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced.
Enforcement is only at the setsockopt level, this should be enough to ensure that the tcp_authopt_needed static key never turns on.
No effort is made to handle disabling when the feature is already in use.
Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez cdleonard@gmail.com --- Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst | 6 ++++ include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 1 + net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst index c04431144f7a..2fa992ef4e02 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst @@ -987,10 +987,16 @@ tcp_limit_output_bytes - INTEGER tcp_challenge_ack_limit - INTEGER Limits number of Challenge ACK sent per second, as recommended in RFC 5961 (Improving TCP's Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks) Default: 1000
+tcp_authopt - BOOLEAN + Enable the TCP Authentication Option (RFC5925), a replacement for TCP + MD5 Signatures (RFC2835). + + Default: 0 + UDP variables =============
udp_l3mdev_accept - BOOLEAN Enabling this option allows a "global" bound socket to work diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index fb07394de261..4e872af7b180 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -76,10 +76,11 @@ struct tcphdr_authopt { };
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tcp_authopt_needed_key); #define tcp_authopt_needed (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_authopt_needed_key)) +extern int sysctl_tcp_authopt;
void tcp_authopt_free(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info); void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk); int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key); diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c index 97eb54774924..07de2666314c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c @@ -17,10 +17,11 @@ #include <net/udp.h> #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h> #include <net/ping.h> #include <net/protocol.h> #include <net/netevent.h> +#include <net/tcp_authopt.h>
static int two = 2; static int three __maybe_unused = 3; static int four = 4; static int thousand = 1000; @@ -472,10 +473,37 @@ static int proc_fib_multipath_hash_fields(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
return ret; } #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +static int proc_tcp_authopt(struct ctl_table *ctl, + int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, + loff_t *ppos) +{ + int val = sysctl_tcp_authopt; + struct ctl_table tmp = { + .data = &val, + .mode = ctl->mode, + .maxlen = sizeof(val), + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }; + int err; + + err = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); + if (err) + return err; + if (sysctl_tcp_authopt && !val) { + net_warn_ratelimited("Enabling TCP Authentication Option is permanent\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + sysctl_tcp_authopt = val; + return 0; +} +#endif + static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = { { .procname = "tcp_max_orphans", .data = &sysctl_tcp_max_orphans, .maxlen = sizeof(int), @@ -583,10 +611,21 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = { .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax, .extra1 = &sysctl_fib_sync_mem_min, .extra2 = &sysctl_fib_sync_mem_max, }, +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + { + .procname = "tcp_authopt", + .data = &sysctl_tcp_authopt, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_tcp_authopt, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }, +#endif { } };
static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = { { diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index dd9b89b1f137..85de430d3326 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -3,10 +3,15 @@ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <net/tcp.h> #include <net/tcp_authopt.h> #include <crypto/hash.h>
+/* This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through + * a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced. + */ +int sysctl_tcp_authopt; + /* This is enabled when first struct tcp_authopt_info is allocated and never released */ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tcp_authopt_needed_key); EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_authopt_needed_key);
/* All current algorithms have a mac length of 12 but crypto API digestsize can be larger */ @@ -377,17 +382,30 @@ static int _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant(u8 *dst, memset(dst + srclen, 0, dstlen - srclen);
return err; }
+static int check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(void) +{ + if (!sysctl_tcp_authopt) { + net_warn_ratelimited("TCP Authentication Option disabled by sysctl.\n"); + return -EPERM; + } + + return 0; +} + int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tcp_authopt opt; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; int err;
sock_owned_by_me(sk); + err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); + if (err) + return err;
err = _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant((u8 *)&opt, sizeof(opt), optval, optlen); if (err) return err;
@@ -405,14 +423,18 @@ int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen)
int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + int err;
+ memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt)); sock_owned_by_me(sk); + err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); + if (err) + return err;
- memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt)); info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); if (!info) return -ENOENT;
opt->flags = info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS; @@ -475,10 +497,13 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info, *old_key_info; struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; int err;
sock_owned_by_me(sk); + err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); + if (err) + return err;
err = _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant((u8 *)&opt, sizeof(opt), optval, optlen); if (err) return err;