8 Feb
2021
8 Feb
'21
9:28 p.m.
On Mon, Feb 08, 2021 at 11:18:37AM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
On Mon 08-02-21 10:49:18, Mike Rapoport wrote:
From: Mike Rapoport rppt@linux.ibm.com
It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.
Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.
Does this feature need any special handling? As it is effectivelly unevictable memory then it should behave the same as other mlock, ramfs which should already disable hibernation as those cannot be swapped out, no?
As David already said, hibernation does not care about mlocked memory, so this feature requires a special handling.
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.