From: Jeff Xu jeffxu@chromium.org
Two fixes for madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) when sealed.
For PROT_NONE mappings, the previous blocking of madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) is unnecessary. As PROT_NONE already prohibits memory access, madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) should be allowed to proceed in order to free the page.
For file-backed, private, read-only memory mappings, we previously did not block the madvise(MADV_DONTNEED). This was based on the assumption that the memory's content, being file-backed, could be retrieved from the file if accessed again. However, this assumption failed to consider scenarios where a mapping is initially created as read-write, modified, and subsequently changed to read-only. The newly introduced VM_WASWRITE flag addresses this oversight.
Reported-by: Pedro Falcato pedro.falcato@gmail.com Link:https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABi2SkW2XzuZ2-TunWOVzTEX1qc29LhjfNQ3hD4Nym8U-_f... Fixes: 8be7258aad44 ("mseal: add mseal syscall") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.11.y: 4d1b3416659b: mm: move can_modify_vma to mm/vma.h Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.11.y: 4a2dd02b0916: mm/mprotect: replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.11.y: 23c57d1fa2b9: mseal: replace can_modify_mm_madv with a vma variant Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.11.y Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu jeffxu@chromium.org --- include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++ mm/mprotect.c | 3 +++ mm/mseal.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 4c32003c8404..b402eca2565a 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -430,6 +430,8 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp); #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT /* VM is sealed, in vm_flags */ #define VM_SEALED _BITUL(63) +/* VM was writable */ +#define VM_WASWRITE _BITUL(62) #endif
/* Bits set in the VMA until the stack is in its final location */ diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c index 0c5d6d06107d..6397135ca526 100644 --- a/mm/mprotect.c +++ b/mm/mprotect.c @@ -821,6 +821,9 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len, break; }
+ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) && !(newflags & VM_WRITE)) + newflags |= VM_WASWRITE; + error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot); if (error) break; diff --git a/mm/mseal.c b/mm/mseal.c index ece977bd21e1..28f28487be17 100644 --- a/mm/mseal.c +++ b/mm/mseal.c @@ -36,12 +36,8 @@ static bool is_madv_discard(int behavior) return false; }
-static bool is_ro_anon(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +static bool anon_is_ro(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { - /* check anonymous mapping. */ - if (vma->vm_file || vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) - return false; - /* * check for non-writable: * PROT=RO or PKRU is not writeable. @@ -53,6 +49,22 @@ static bool is_ro_anon(struct vm_area_struct *vma) return false; }
+static bool vma_is_prot_none(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_ACCESS_FLAGS) == VM_NONE) + return true; + + return false; +} + +static bool vma_was_writable_turn_readonly(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) && vma->vm_flags & VM_WASWRITE) + return true; + + return false; +} + /* * Check if a vma is allowed to be modified by madvise. */ @@ -61,7 +73,25 @@ bool can_modify_vma_madv(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int behavior) if (!is_madv_discard(behavior)) return true;
- if (unlikely(!can_modify_vma(vma) && is_ro_anon(vma))) + /* not sealed */ + if (likely(can_modify_vma(vma))) + return true; + + /* PROT_NONE mapping */ + if (vma_is_prot_none(vma)) + return true; + + /* file-backed private mapping */ + if (vma->vm_file) { + /* read-only but was writeable */ + if (vma_was_writable_turn_readonly(vma)) + return false; + + return true; + } + + /* anonymous mapping is read-only */ + if (anon_is_ro(vma)) return false;
/* Allow by default. */