2025-09-23, 15:32:06 +1000, Wilfred Mallawa wrote:
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_main.c b/net/tls/tls_main.c index a3ccb3135e51..09883d9c6c96 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_main.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c @@ -544,6 +544,31 @@ static int do_tls_getsockopt_no_pad(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, return 0; } +static int do_tls_getsockopt_tx_record_size(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
+{
- struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
- int len;
- /* TLS 1.3: Record length contains ContentType */
- u16 record_size_limit = ctx->prot_info.version == TLS_1_3_VERSION ?
ctx->tx_record_size_limit + 1 :
ctx->tx_record_size_limit;
nit: reverse xmas tree
[...]
+static int do_tls_setsockopt_tx_record_size(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,
unsigned int optlen)
+{
- struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
- struct tls_sw_context_tx *sw_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(ctx);
- u16 value;
- if (sw_ctx->open_rec)
return -EBUSY;
- if (sockptr_is_null(optval) || optlen != sizeof(value))
return -EINVAL;
- if (copy_from_sockptr(&value, optval, sizeof(value)))
return -EFAULT;
- if (value < TLS_MIN_RECORD_SIZE_LIM)
return -EINVAL;
- if (ctx->prot_info.version == TLS_1_2_VERSION &&
value > TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
- if (ctx->prot_info.version == TLS_1_3_VERSION &&
value - 1 > TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
- /*
* For TLS 1.3: 'value' includes one byte for the appended ContentType.
* Adjust the kernel's internal plaintext limit accordingly.
*/
- ctx->tx_record_size_limit = ctx->prot_info.version == TLS_1_3_VERSION ?
value - 1 : value;
- return 0;
+}
static int do_tls_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { @@ -833,6 +898,9 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname, sockptr_t optval, case TLS_RX_EXPECT_NO_PAD: rc = do_tls_setsockopt_no_pad(sk, optval, optlen); break;
- case TLS_TX_RECORD_SIZE_LIM:
rc = do_tls_setsockopt_tx_record_size(sk, optval, optlen);
I think we want to lock the socket here, to avoid any concurrent send()? Especially now with the ->open_rec check.
@@ -1111,6 +1180,11 @@ static int tls_get_info(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, bool net_admin) goto nla_failure; }
- err = nla_put_u16(skb, TLS_INFO_TX_RECORD_SIZE_LIM,
ctx->tx_record_size_limit);
I'm not sure here: if we do the +1 adjustment we'd be consistent with the value reported by getsockopt, but OTOH users may get confused about seeing a value larger than TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE.