June 2025 - Linux-kselftest-mirror

[PATCH net] selftests: drv-net: tso: make bkg() wait for socat to quit

by Jakub Kicinski

Commit 846742f7e32f ("selftests: drv-net: add a warning for bkg + shell + terminate") added a warning for bkg() used with terminate=True. The tso test was missed as we didn't have it running anywhere in NIPA. Add exit_wait=True, to avoid: # Warning: combining shell and terminate is risky! # SIGTERM may not reach the child on zsh/ksh! getting printed twice for every variant. Fixes: 0d0f4174f6c8 ("selftests: drv-net: add a simple TSO test") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> --- CC: shuah(a)kernel.org CC: willemb(a)google.com CC: linux-kselftest(a)vger.kernel.org --- tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/hw/tso.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/hw/tso.py b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/hw/tso.py index e1ecb92f79d9..150d6db241a0 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/hw/tso.py +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/hw/tso.py @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ from lib.py import bkg, cmd, defer, ethtool, ip, rand_port, wait_port_listen port = rand_port() listen_cmd = f"socat -{ipver} -t 2 -u TCP-LISTEN:{port},reuseport /dev/null,ignoreeof" - with bkg(listen_cmd, host=cfg.remote) as nc: + with bkg(listen_cmd, host=cfg.remote, exit_wait=True) as nc: wait_port_listen(port, host=cfg.remote) if ipver == "4": -- 2.49.0

8 hours, 13 minutes

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[PATCH net v2] selftests: drv-net: add configs for the TSO test

by Jakub Kicinski

Add missing config options for the tso.py test, specifically to make sure the kernel is built with vxlan and gre tunnels. I noticed this while adding a TSO-capable device QEMU to the CI. Previously we only run virtio tests and it doesn't report LSO stats on the QEMU we have. Fixes: 0d0f4174f6c8 ("selftests: drv-net: add a simple TSO test") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> --- v2: - drop NET_IP_TUNNEL v1: https://lore.kernel.org/20250602231640.314556-1-kuba@kernel.org CC: shuah(a)kernel.org CC: willemb(a)google.com CC: linux-kselftest(a)vger.kernel.org --- tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/hw/config | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/hw/config diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/hw/config b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/hw/config new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..88ae719e6f8f --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/hw/config @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CONFIG_IPV6=y +CONFIG_IPV6_GRE=y +CONFIG_NET_IPGRE=y +CONFIG_NET_IPGRE_DEMUX=y +CONFIG_VXLAN=y -- 2.49.0

9 hours, 17 minutes

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[PATCH 00/17] ARM64 PMU Partitioning

by Colton Lewis

Overview: This series implements a new PMU scheme on ARM, a partitioned PMU that exists alongside the existing emulated PMU and may be enabled by the kernel command line kvm.reserved_host_counters or by the vcpu ioctl KVM_ARM_PARTITION_PMU. This is a continuation of the RFC posted earlier this year. [1] The high level overview and reason for the name is that this implementation takes advantage of recent CPU features to partition the PMU counters into a host-reserved set and a guest-reserved set. Guests are allowed untrapped hardware access to the most frequently used PMU registers and features for the guest-reserved counters only. This untrapped hardware access significantly reduces the overhead of using performance monitoring capabilities such as the `perf` tool inside a guest VM. Register accesses that aren't trapping to KVM mean less time spent in the host kernel and more time on the workloads guests care about. This optimization especially shines during high `perf` sample rates or large numbers of events that require multiplexing hardware counters. Performance: For example, the following tests were carried out on identical ARM machines with 10 general purpose counters with identical guest images run on QEMU, the only difference being my PMU implementation or the existing one. Some arguments have been simplified here to clarify the purpose of the test: 1) time perf record -e ${FIFTEEN_HW_EVENTS} -F 1000 -- \ gzip -c tmpfs/random.64M.img >/dev/null On emulated PMU this command took 4.143s real time with 0.159s system time. On partitioned PMU this command took 3.139s real time with 0.110s system time, runtime reductions of 24.23% and 30.82%. 2) time perf stat -dd -- \ automated_specint2017.sh On emulated PMU this benchmark completed in 3789.16s real time with 224.45s system time and a final benchmark score of 4.28. On partitioned PMU this benchmark completed in 3525.67s real time with 15.98s system time and a final benchmark score of 4.56. That is a 6.95% reduction in runtime, 92.88% reduction in system time, and 6.54% improvement in overall benchmark score. Seeing these improvements on something as lightweight as perf stat is remarkable and implies there would have been a much greater improvement with perf record. I did not test that because I was not confident it would even finish in a reasonable time on the emulated PMU Test 3 was slightly different, I ran the workload in a VM with a single VCPU pinned to a physical CPU and analyzed from the host where the physical CPU spent its time using mpstat. 3) perf record -e ${FIFTEEN_HW_EVENTS} -F 4000 -- \ stress-ng --cpu 0 --timeout 30 Over a period of 30s the cpu running with the emulated PMU spent 34.96% of the time in the host kernel and 55.85% of the time in the guest. The cpu running the partitioned PMU spent 0.97% of its time in the host kernel and 91.06% of its time in the guest. Taken together, these tests represent a remarkable performance improvement for anything perf related using this new PMU implementation. Caveats: Because the most consistent and performant thing to do was untrap PMCR_EL0, the number of counters visible to the guest via PMCR_EL0.N is always equal to the value KVM sets for MDCR_EL2.HPMN. Previously allowed writes to PMCR_EL0.N via {GET,SET}_ONE_REG no longer affect the guest. These improvements come at a cost to 7-35 new registers that must be swapped at every vcpu_load and vcpu_put if the feature is enabled. I have been informed KVM would like to avoid paying this cost when possible. One solution is to make the trapping changes and context swapping lazy such that the trapping changes and context swapping only take place after the guest has actually accessed the PMU so guests that never access the PMU never pay the cost. This is not done here because it is not crucial to the primary functionality and I thought review would be more productive as soon as I had something complete enough for reviewers to easily play with. However, this or any better ideas are on the table for inclusion in future re-rolls. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/20250213180317.3205285-1-coltonlewis@google.… Colton Lewis (16): arm64: cpufeature: Add cpucap for HPMN0 arm64: Generate sign macro for sysreg Enums arm64: cpufeature: Add cpucap for PMICNTR KVM: arm64: Reorganize PMU functions KVM: arm64: Introduce method to partition the PMU perf: arm_pmuv3: Generalize counter bitmasks perf: arm_pmuv3: Keep out of guest counter partition KVM: arm64: Set up FGT for Partitioned PMU KVM: arm64: Writethrough trapped PMEVTYPER register KVM: arm64: Use physical PMSELR for PMXEVTYPER if partitioned KVM: arm64: Writethrough trapped PMOVS register KVM: arm64: Context switch Partitioned PMU guest registers perf: pmuv3: Handle IRQs for Partitioned PMU guest counters KVM: arm64: Inject recorded guest interrupts KVM: arm64: Add ioctl to partition the PMU when supported KVM: arm64: selftests: Add test case for partitioned PMU Marc Zyngier (1): KVM: arm64: Cleanup PMU includes Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 16 + arch/arm/include/asm/arm_pmuv3.h | 24 + arch/arm64/include/asm/arm_pmuv3.h | 36 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 208 +++++- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pmu.h | 82 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 15 + arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 24 +- arch/arm64/kvm/debug.c | 13 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 65 +- arch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c | 629 +---------------- arch/arm64/kvm/pmu-part.c | 358 ++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/pmu.c | 630 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 54 +- arch/arm64/tools/cpucaps | 2 + arch/arm64/tools/gen-sysreg.awk | 1 + arch/arm64/tools/sysreg | 6 +- drivers/perf/arm_pmuv3.c | 55 +- include/kvm/arm_pmu.h | 199 ------ include/linux/perf/arm_pmu.h | 15 +- include/linux/perf/arm_pmuv3.h | 14 +- include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 4 + tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 2 + .../selftests/kvm/arm64/vpmu_counter_access.c | 40 +- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 1 + 25 files changed, 1616 insertions(+), 879 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pmu.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kvm/pmu-part.c delete mode 100644 include/kvm/arm_pmu.h base-commit: 1b85d923ba8c9e6afaf19e26708411adde94fba8 -- 2.49.0.1204.g71687c7c1d-goog

10 hours, 50 minutes

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[PATCH v2] selftests: ir_decoder: Convert header comment to proper multi-line block

by Abdelrahman Fekry

well, i checked the script using checkpatch.pl and it shows that the patch has no warnings or errors and its ready to be sent v2: - fixed multiple trailing whitespace errors and - the Signed-off-by mismatch The test file for the IR decoder used single-line comments at the top to document its purpose and licensing, which is inconsistent with the style used throughout the Linux kernel. In this patch i converted the file header to a proper multi-line comment block (/*) that aligns with standard kernel practices. This improves readability, consistency across selftests, and ensures the license and documentation are clearly visible in a familiar format. No functional changes have been made. Signed-off-by: Abdelrahman Fekry <abdelrahmanfekry375(a)gmail.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/ir/ir_loopback.c | 23 +++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ir/ir_loopback.c b/tools/testing/selftests/ir/ir_loopback.c index f4a15cbdd5ea..c94faa975630 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/ir/ir_loopback.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ir/ir_loopback.c @@ -1,14 +1,17 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -// test ir decoder -// -// Copyright (C) 2018 Sean Young <sean(a)mess.org> - -// When sending LIRC_MODE_SCANCODE, the IR will be encoded. rc-loopback -// will send this IR to the receiver side, where we try to read the decoded -// IR. Decoding happens in a separate kernel thread, so we will need to -// wait until that is scheduled, hence we use poll to check for read -// readiness. - +/* Copyright (C) 2018 Sean Young <sean(a)mess.org> + * + * Selftest for IR decoder + * + * + * When sending LIRC_MODE_SCANCODE, the IR will be encoded. + * rc-loopback will send this IR to the receiver side, + * where we try to read the decoded IR. + * Decoding happens in a separate kernel thread, + * so we will need to wait until that is scheduled, + * hence we use poll to check for read + * readiness. + */ #include <linux/lirc.h> #include <errno.h> #include <stdio.h> -- 2.25.1

11 hours, 14 minutes

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[PATCH bpf-next v4 0/9] bpf: Mitigate Spectre v1 using barriers

by Luis Gerhorst

This improves the expressiveness of unprivileged BPF by inserting speculation barriers instead of rejecting the programs. The approach was previously presented at LPC'24 [1] and RAID'24 [2]. To mitigate the Spectre v1 (PHT) vulnerability, the kernel rejects potentially-dangerous unprivileged BPF programs as of commit 9183671af6db ("bpf: Fix leakage under speculation on mispredicted branches"). In [2], we have analyzed 364 object files from open source projects (Linux Samples and Selftests, BCC, Loxilb, Cilium, libbpf Examples, Parca, and Prevail) and found that this affects 31% to 54% of programs. To resolve this in the majority of cases this patchset adds a fall-back for mitigating Spectre v1 using speculation barriers. The kernel still optimistically attempts to verify all speculative paths but uses speculation barriers against v1 when unsafe behavior is detected. This allows for more programs to be accepted without disabling the BPF Spectre mitigations (e.g., by setting cpu_mitigations_off()). For this, it relies on the fact that speculation barriers generally prevent all later instructions from executing if the speculation was not correct (not only loads). See patch 7 ("bpf: Fall back to nospec for Spectre v1") for a detailed description and references to the relevant vendor documentation (AMD and Intel x86-64, ARM64, and PowerPC). In [1] we have measured the overhead of this approach relative to having mitigations off and including the upstream Spectre v4 mitigations. For event tracing and stack-sampling profilers, we found that mitigations increase BPF program execution time by 0% to 62%. For the Loxilb network load balancer, we have measured a 14% slowdown in SCTP performance but no significant slowdown for TCP. This overhead only applies to programs that were previously rejected. I reran the expressiveness-evaluation with v6.14 and made sure the main results still match those from [1] and [2] (which used v6.5). Main design decisions are: * Do not use separate bytecode insns for v1 and v4 barriers (inspired by Daniel Borkmann's question at LPC). This simplifies the verifier significantly and has the only downside that performance on PowerPC is not as high as it could be. * Allow archs to still disable v1/v4 mitigations separately by setting bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4(). This has the benefit that archs can benefit from improved BPF expressiveness / performance if they are not vulnerable (e.g., ARM64 for v4 in the kernel). * Do not remove the empty BPF_NOSPEC implementation for backends for which it is unknown whether they are vulnerable to Spectre v1. [1] https://lpc.events/event/18/contributions/1954/ ("Mitigating Spectre-PHT using Speculation Barriers in Linux eBPF") [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.00078 ("VeriFence: Lightweight and Precise Spectre Defenses for Untrusted Linux Kernel Extensions") Changes: * v3 -> v4: - Remove insn parameter from do_check_insn() and extract process_bpf_exit_full as a function as requested by Eduard - Investigate apparent sanitize_check_bounds() bug reported by Kartikeya (does appear to not be a bug but only confusing code), sent separate patch to document it and add an assert - Remove already-merged commit 1 ("selftests/bpf: Fix caps for __xlated/jited_unpriv") - Drop former commit 10 ("bpf: Allow nospec-protected var-offset stack access") as it did not include a test and there are other places where var-off is rejected. Also, none of the tested real-world programs used var-off in the paper. Therefore keep the old behavior for now and potentially prepare a patch that converts all cases later if required. - Add link to AMD lfence and PowerPC speculation barrier (ori 31,31,0) documentation - Move detailed barrier documentation to commit 7 ("bpf: Fall back to nospec for Spectre v1") - Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250501073603.1402960-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de/ * v2 -> v3: - Fix https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202504212030.IF1SLhz6-lkp@intel.com/ and similar by moving the bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() prototypes out of the #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL. Decided not to move them to filter.h (where similar bpf_jit_*() prototypes live) as they would still have to be duplicated in bpf.h to be usable to bpf_bypass_spec_v1/v4() (unless including filter.h in bpf.h is an option). - Fix https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202504220035.SoGveGpj-lkp@intel.com/ by moving the variable declarations out of the switch-case. - Build touched C files with W=2 and bpf config on x86 to check that there are no other warnings introduced. - Found 3 more checkpatch warnings that can be fixed without degrading readability. - Rebase to bpf-next 2025-05-01 - Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250421091802.3234859-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de/ * v1 -> v2: - Drop former commits 9 ("bpf: Return PTR_ERR from push_stack()") and 11 ("bpf: Fall back to nospec for spec path verification") as suggested by Alexei. This series therefore no longer changes push_stack() to return PTR_ERR. - Add detailed explanation of how lfence works internally and how it affects the algorithm. - Add tests checking that nospec instructions are inserted in expected locations using __xlated_unpriv as suggested by Eduard (also, include a fix for __xlated_unpriv) - Add a test for the mitigations from the description of commit 9183671af6db ("bpf: Fix leakage under speculation on mispredicted branches") - Remove unused variables from do_check[_insn]() as suggested by Eduard. - Remove INSN_IDX_MODIFIED to improve readability as suggested by Eduard. This also causes the nospec_result-check to run (and fail) for jumping-ops. Add a warning to assert that this check must never succeed in that case. - Add details on the safety of patch 10 ("bpf: Allow nospec-protected var-offset stack access") based on the feedback on v1. - Rebase to bpf-next-250420 - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250313172127.1098195-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de/ * RFC -> v1: - rebase to bpf-next-250313 - tests: mark expected successes/new errors - add bpt_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() to avoid #ifdef in bpf_bypass_spec_v1/v4() - ensure that nospec with v1-support is implemented for archs for which GCC supports speculation barriers, except for MIPS - arm64: emit speculation barrier - powerpc: change nospec to include v1 barrier - discuss potential security (archs that do not impl. BPF nospec) and performance (only PowerPC) regressions - Link to RFC: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250224203619.594724-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de/ Luis Gerhorst (9): bpf: Move insn if/else into do_check_insn() bpf: Return -EFAULT on misconfigurations bpf: Return -EFAULT on internal errors bpf, arm64, powerpc: Add bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() bpf, arm64, powerpc: Change nospec to include v1 barrier bpf: Rename sanitize_stack_spill to nospec_result bpf: Fall back to nospec for Spectre v1 selftests/bpf: Add test for Spectre v1 mitigation bpf: Fall back to nospec for sanitization-failures arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit.h | 5 + arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 +- arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c | 80 ++- include/linux/bpf.h | 11 +- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 3 +- include/linux/filter.h | 2 +- kernel/bpf/core.c | 32 +- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 633 ++++++++++-------- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h | 4 + .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_and.c | 8 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c | 66 +- .../bpf/progs/verifier_bounds_deduction.c | 45 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_ptr.c | 20 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_movsx.c | 16 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c | 65 +- .../bpf/progs/verifier_value_ptr_arith.c | 101 ++- .../selftests/bpf/verifier/dead_code.c | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/jmp32.c | 33 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/jset.c | 10 +- 19 files changed, 755 insertions(+), 410 deletions(-) base-commit: cd2e103d57e5615f9bb027d772f93b9efd567224 -- 2.49.0

12 hours, 1 minute

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[PATCH bpf-next v3 00/11] bpf: Mitigate Spectre v1 using barriers

by Luis Gerhorst

This improves the expressiveness of unprivileged BPF by inserting speculation barriers instead of rejecting the programs. The approach was previously presented at LPC'24 [1] and RAID'24 [2]. To mitigate the Spectre v1 (PHT) vulnerability, the kernel rejects potentially-dangerous unprivileged BPF programs as of commit 9183671af6db ("bpf: Fix leakage under speculation on mispredicted branches"). In [2], we have analyzed 364 object files from open source projects (Linux Samples and Selftests, BCC, Loxilb, Cilium, libbpf Examples, Parca, and Prevail) and found that this affects 31% to 54% of programs. To resolve this in the majority of cases this patchset adds a fall-back for mitigating Spectre v1 using speculation barriers. The kernel still optimistically attempts to verify all speculative paths but uses speculation barriers against v1 when unsafe behavior is detected. This allows for more programs to be accepted without disabling the BPF Spectre mitigations (e.g., by setting cpu_mitigations_off()). For this, it relies on the fact that speculation barriers prevent all later instructions if the speculation was not correct: * On x86_64, lfence acts as full speculation barrier, not only as a load fence [3]: An LFENCE instruction or a serializing instruction will ensure that no later instructions execute, even speculatively, until all prior instructions complete locally. [...] Inserting an LFENCE instruction after a bounds check prevents later operations from executing before the bound check completes. This was experimentally confirmed in [4]. * ARM's SB speculation barrier instruction also affects "any instruction that appears later in the program order than the barrier" [5]. In [1] we have measured the overhead of this approach relative to having mitigations off and including the upstream Spectre v4 mitigations. For event tracing and stack-sampling profilers, we found that mitigations increase BPF program execution time by 0% to 62%. For the Loxilb network load balancer, we have measured a 14% slowdown in SCTP performance but no significant slowdown for TCP. This overhead only applies to programs that were previously rejected. I reran the expressiveness-evaluation with v6.14 and made sure the main results still match those from [1] and [2] (which used v6.5). Main design decisions are: * Do not use separate bytecode insns for v1 and v4 barriers (inspired by Daniel Borkmann's question at LPC). This simplifies the verifier significantly and has the only downside that performance on PowerPC is not as high as it could be. * Allow archs to still disable v1/v4 mitigations separately by setting bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4(). This has the benefit that archs can benefit from improved BPF expressiveness / performance if they are not vulnerable (e.g., ARM64 for v4 in the kernel). * Do not remove the empty BPF_NOSPEC implementation for backends for which it is unknown whether they are vulnerable to Spectre v1. [1] https://lpc.events/event/18/contributions/1954/ ("Mitigating Spectre-PHT using Speculation Barriers in Linux eBPF") [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.00078 ("VeriFence: Lightweight and Precise Spectre Defenses for Untrusted Linux Kernel Extensions") [3] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/softwa… ("Managed Runtime Speculative Execution Side Channel Mitigations") [4] https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3359789.3359837 ("Speculator: a tool to analyze speculative execution attacks and mitigations" - Section 4.6 "Stopping Speculative Execution") [5] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0597/2020-12/Base-Instructions/S… ("SB - Speculation Barrier - Arm Armv8-A A32/T32 Instruction Set Architecture (2020-12)") Changes: * v2 -> v3: - Fix https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202504212030.IF1SLhz6-lkp@intel.com/ and similar by moving the bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() prototypes out of the #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL. Decided not to move them to filter.h (where similar bpf_jit_*() prototypes live) as they would still have to be duplicated in bpf.h to be usable to bpf_bypass_spec_v1/v4() (unless including filter.h in bpf.h is an option). - Fix https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202504220035.SoGveGpj-lkp@intel.com/ by moving the variable declarations out of the switch-case. - Build touched C files with W=2 and bpf config on x86 to check that there are no other warnings introduced. - Found 3 more checkpatch warnings that can be fixed without degrading readability. - Rebase to bpf-next 2025-05-01 - Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250421091802.3234859-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de/ * v1 -> v2: - Drop former commits 9 ("bpf: Return PTR_ERR from push_stack()") and 11 ("bpf: Fall back to nospec for spec path verification") as suggested by Alexei. This series therefore no longer changes push_stack() to return PTR_ERR. - Add detailed explanation of how lfence works internally and how it affects the algorithm. - Add tests checking that nospec instructions are inserted in expected locations using __xlated_unpriv as suggested by Eduard (also, include a fix for __xlated_unpriv) - Add a test for the mitigations from the description of commit 9183671af6db ("bpf: Fix leakage under speculation on mispredicted branches") - Remove unused variables from do_check[_insn]() as suggested by Eduard. - Remove INSN_IDX_MODIFIED to improve readability as suggested by Eduard. This also causes the nospec_result-check to run (and fail) for jumping-ops. Add a warning to assert that this check must never succeed in that case. - Add details on the safety of patch 10 ("bpf: Allow nospec-protected var-offset stack access") based on the feedback on v1. - Rebase to bpf-next-250420 - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250313172127.1098195-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de/ * RFC -> v1: - rebase to bpf-next-250313 - tests: mark expected successes/new errors - add bpt_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() to avoid #ifdef in bpf_bypass_spec_v1/v4() - ensure that nospec with v1-support is implemented for archs for which GCC supports speculation barriers, except for MIPS - arm64: emit speculation barrier - powerpc: change nospec to include v1 barrier - discuss potential security (archs that do not impl. BPF nospec) and performance (only PowerPC) regressions - Link to RFC: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250224203619.594724-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de/ Luis Gerhorst (11): selftests/bpf: Fix caps for __xlated/jited_unpriv bpf: Move insn if/else into do_check_insn() bpf: Return -EFAULT on misconfigurations bpf: Return -EFAULT on internal errors bpf, arm64, powerpc: Add bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() bpf, arm64, powerpc: Change nospec to include v1 barrier bpf: Rename sanitize_stack_spill to nospec_result bpf: Fall back to nospec for Spectre v1 selftests/bpf: Add test for Spectre v1 mitigation bpf: Allow nospec-protected var-offset stack access bpf: Fall back to nospec for sanitization-failures arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit.h | 5 + arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 +- arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c | 80 ++- include/linux/bpf.h | 11 +- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 3 +- include/linux/filter.h | 2 +- kernel/bpf/core.c | 32 +- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 653 ++++++++++-------- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h | 4 + .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_and.c | 8 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c | 66 +- .../bpf/progs/verifier_bounds_deduction.c | 45 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_ptr.c | 20 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_movsx.c | 16 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c | 65 +- .../bpf/progs/verifier_value_ptr_arith.c | 101 ++- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/verifier/dead_code.c | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/jmp32.c | 33 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/jset.c | 10 +- 20 files changed, 771 insertions(+), 428 deletions(-) base-commit: 358b1c0f56ebb6996fcec7dcdcf6bae5dcbc8b6c -- 2.49.0

12 hours, 26 minutes

6
34
0 0

[PATCH v3 1/2] libbpf: add support for printing BTF character arrays as strings

by Blake Jones

The BTF dumper code currently displays arrays of characters as just that - arrays, with each character formatted individually. Sometimes this is what makes sense, but it's nice to be able to treat that array as a string. This change adds a special case to the btf_dump functionality to allow 0-terminated arrays of single-byte integer values to be printed as character strings. Characters for which isprint() returns false are printed as hex-escaped values. This is enabled when the new ".emit_strings" is set to 1 in the btf_dump_type_data_opts structure. As an example, here's what it looks like to dump the string "hello" using a few different field values for btf_dump_type_data_opts (.compact = 1): - .emit_strings = 0, .skip_names = 0: (char[6])['h','e','l','l','o',] - .emit_strings = 0, .skip_names = 1: ['h','e','l','l','o',] - .emit_strings = 1, .skip_names = 0: (char[6])"hello" - .emit_strings = 1, .skip_names = 1: "hello" Here's the string "h\xff", dumped with .compact = 1 and .skip_names = 1: - .emit_strings = 0: ['h',-1,] - .emit_strings = 1: "h\xff" Signed-off-by: Blake Jones <blakejones(a)google.com> --- tools/lib/bpf/btf.h | 3 ++- tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/btf.h b/tools/lib/bpf/btf.h index 4392451d634b..ccfd905f03df 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/btf.h +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/btf.h @@ -326,9 +326,10 @@ struct btf_dump_type_data_opts { bool compact; /* no newlines/indentation */ bool skip_names; /* skip member/type names */ bool emit_zeroes; /* show 0-valued fields */ + bool emit_strings; /* print char arrays as strings */ size_t :0; }; -#define btf_dump_type_data_opts__last_field emit_zeroes +#define btf_dump_type_data_opts__last_field emit_strings LIBBPF_API int btf_dump__dump_type_data(struct btf_dump *d, __u32 id, diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c b/tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c index 460c3e57fadb..7c2f1f13f958 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ struct btf_dump_data { bool compact; bool skip_names; bool emit_zeroes; + bool emit_strings; __u8 indent_lvl; /* base indent level */ char indent_str[BTF_DATA_INDENT_STR_LEN]; /* below are used during iteration */ @@ -2028,6 +2029,52 @@ static int btf_dump_var_data(struct btf_dump *d, return btf_dump_dump_type_data(d, NULL, t, type_id, data, 0, 0); } +static int btf_dump_string_data(struct btf_dump *d, + const struct btf_type *t, + __u32 id, + const void *data) +{ + const struct btf_array *array = btf_array(t); + const char *chars = data; + __u32 i; + + /* Make sure it is a NUL-terminated string. */ + for (i = 0; i < array->nelems; i++) { + if ((void *)(chars + i) >= d->typed_dump->data_end) + return -E2BIG; + if (chars[i] == '\0') + break; + } + if (i == array->nelems) { + /* The caller will print this as a regular array. */ + return -EINVAL; + } + + btf_dump_data_pfx(d); + btf_dump_printf(d, "\""); + + for (i = 0; i < array->nelems; i++) { + char c = chars[i]; + + if (c == '\0') { + /* + * When printing character arrays as strings, NUL bytes + * are always treated as string terminators; they are + * never printed. + */ + break; + } + if (isprint(c)) + btf_dump_printf(d, "%c", c); + else + btf_dump_printf(d, "\\x%02x", (__u8)c); + } + + btf_dump_printf(d, "\""); + + return 0; +} + static int btf_dump_array_data(struct btf_dump *d, const struct btf_type *t, __u32 id, @@ -2055,8 +2102,13 @@ static int btf_dump_array_data(struct btf_dump *d, * char arrays, so if size is 1 and element is * printable as a char, we'll do that. */ - if (elem_size == 1) + if (elem_size == 1) { + if (d->typed_dump->emit_strings && + btf_dump_string_data(d, t, id, data) == 0) { + return 0; + } d->typed_dump->is_array_char = true; + } } /* note that we increment depth before calling btf_dump_print() below; @@ -2544,6 +2596,7 @@ int btf_dump__dump_type_data(struct btf_dump *d, __u32 id, d->typed_dump->compact = OPTS_GET(opts, compact, false); d->typed_dump->skip_names = OPTS_GET(opts, skip_names, false); d->typed_dump->emit_zeroes = OPTS_GET(opts, emit_zeroes, false); + d->typed_dump->emit_strings = OPTS_GET(opts, emit_strings, false); ret = btf_dump_dump_type_data(d, NULL, t, id, data, 0, 0); -- 2.49.0.1204.g71687c7c1d-goog

12 hours, 57 minutes

1
1
0 0

[PATCH v2 1/2] libbpf: add support for printing BTF character arrays as strings

by Blake Jones

The BTF dumper code currently displays arrays of characters as just that - arrays, with each character formatted individually. Sometimes this is what makes sense, but it's nice to be able to treat that array as a string. This change adds a special case to the btf_dump functionality to allow arrays of single-byte integer values to be printed as character strings. Characters for which isprint() returns false are printed as hex-escaped values. This is enabled when the new ".emit_strings" is set to 1 in the btf_dump_type_data_opts structure. As an example, here's what it looks like to dump the string "hello" using a few different field values for btf_dump_type_data_opts (.compact = 1): - .emit_strings = 0, .skip_names = 0: (char[6])['h','e','l','l','o',] - .emit_strings = 0, .skip_names = 1: ['h','e','l','l','o',] - .emit_strings = 1, .skip_names = 0: (char[6])"hello" - .emit_strings = 1, .skip_names = 1: "hello" Here's the string "h\xff", dumped with .compact = 1 and .skip_names = 1: - .emit_strings = 0: ['h',-1,] - .emit_strings = 1: "h\xff" Signed-off-by: Blake Jones <blakejones(a)google.com> --- tools/lib/bpf/btf.h | 3 ++- tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/btf.h b/tools/lib/bpf/btf.h index 4392451d634b..ccfd905f03df 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/btf.h +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/btf.h @@ -326,9 +326,10 @@ struct btf_dump_type_data_opts { bool compact; /* no newlines/indentation */ bool skip_names; /* skip member/type names */ bool emit_zeroes; /* show 0-valued fields */ + bool emit_strings; /* print char arrays as strings */ size_t :0; }; -#define btf_dump_type_data_opts__last_field emit_zeroes +#define btf_dump_type_data_opts__last_field emit_strings LIBBPF_API int btf_dump__dump_type_data(struct btf_dump *d, __u32 id, diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c b/tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c index 460c3e57fadb..336a6646e0fa 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ struct btf_dump_data { bool compact; bool skip_names; bool emit_zeroes; + bool emit_strings; __u8 indent_lvl; /* base indent level */ char indent_str[BTF_DATA_INDENT_STR_LEN]; /* below are used during iteration */ @@ -2028,6 +2029,43 @@ static int btf_dump_var_data(struct btf_dump *d, return btf_dump_dump_type_data(d, NULL, t, type_id, data, 0, 0); } +static int btf_dump_string_data(struct btf_dump *d, + const struct btf_type *t, + __u32 id, + const void *data) +{ + const struct btf_array *array = btf_array(t); + __u32 i; + + btf_dump_data_pfx(d); + btf_dump_printf(d, "\""); + + for (i = 0; i < array->nelems; i++, data++) { + char c; + + if (data >= d->typed_dump->data_end) + return -E2BIG; + + c = *(char *)data; + if (c == '\0') { + /* + * When printing character arrays as strings, NUL bytes + * are always treated as string terminators; they are + * never printed. + */ + break; + } + if (isprint(c)) + btf_dump_printf(d, "%c", c); + else + btf_dump_printf(d, "\\x%02x", *(__u8 *)data); + } + + btf_dump_printf(d, "\""); + + return 0; +} + static int btf_dump_array_data(struct btf_dump *d, const struct btf_type *t, __u32 id, @@ -2055,8 +2093,11 @@ static int btf_dump_array_data(struct btf_dump *d, * char arrays, so if size is 1 and element is * printable as a char, we'll do that. */ - if (elem_size == 1) + if (elem_size == 1) { + if (d->typed_dump->emit_strings) + return btf_dump_string_data(d, t, id, data); d->typed_dump->is_array_char = true; + } } /* note that we increment depth before calling btf_dump_print() below; @@ -2544,6 +2585,7 @@ int btf_dump__dump_type_data(struct btf_dump *d, __u32 id, d->typed_dump->compact = OPTS_GET(opts, compact, false); d->typed_dump->skip_names = OPTS_GET(opts, skip_names, false); d->typed_dump->emit_zeroes = OPTS_GET(opts, emit_zeroes, false); + d->typed_dump->emit_strings = OPTS_GET(opts, emit_strings, false); ret = btf_dump_dump_type_data(d, NULL, t, id, data, 0, 0); -- 2.49.0.1204.g71687c7c1d-goog

12 hours, 57 minutes

3
5
0 0

[PATCH v2 0/4] selftests/mm: cow and gup_longterm cleanups

by Mark Brown

The bulk of these changes modify the cow and gup_longterm tests to report unique and stable names for each test, bringing them into line with the expectations of tooling that works with kselftest. The string reported as a test result is used by tooling to both deduplicate tests and track tests between test runs, using the same string for multiple tests or changing the string depending on test result causes problems for user interfaces and automation such as bisection. It was suggested that converting to use kselftest_harness.h would be a good way of addressing this, however that really wants the set of tests to run to be known at compile time but both test programs dynamically enumarate the set of huge page sizes the system supports and test each. Refactoring to handle this would be even more invasive than these changes which are large but straightforward and repetitive. A version of the main gup_longterm cleanup was previously sent separately, this version factors out the helpers for logging the start of the test since the cow test looks very similar. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - Typo fixes. - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250522-selftests-mm-cow-dedupe-v1-0-713cee2fdd6… --- Mark Brown (4): selftests/mm: Use standard ksft_finished() in cow and gup_longterm selftests/mm: Add helper for logging test start and results selftests/mm: Report unique test names for each cow test selftests/mm: Fix test result reporting in gup_longterm tools/testing/selftests/mm/cow.c | 340 +++++++++++++++++++----------- tools/testing/selftests/mm/gup_longterm.c | 158 ++++++++------ tools/testing/selftests/mm/vm_util.h | 20 ++ 3 files changed, 334 insertions(+), 184 deletions(-) --- base-commit: a5806cd506af5a7c19bcd596e4708b5c464bfd21 change-id: 20250521-selftests-mm-cow-dedupe-33dcab034558 Best regards, -- Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>

13 hours, 12 minutes

2
19
0 0

[PATCH v2] riscv: sbi: Add SBI Debug Triggers Extension tests

by Jesse Taube

Add tests for the DBTR SBI extension. Signed-off-by: Jesse Taube <jesse(a)rivosinc.com> --- V1 -> V2: - Call report_prefix_pop before returning - Disable compressed instructions in exec_call, update related comment - Remove extra "| 1" in dbtr_test_load - Remove extra newlines - Remove extra tabs in check_exec - Remove typedefs from enums - Return when dbtr_install_trigger fails - s/avalible/available/g - s/unistall/uninstall/g --- lib/riscv/asm/sbi.h | 28 ++ lib/riscv/sbi.c | 58 ++++ riscv/Makefile | 1 + riscv/sbi-dbtr.c | 751 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ riscv/sbi-tests.h | 1 + riscv/sbi.c | 1 + 6 files changed, 840 insertions(+) create mode 100644 riscv/sbi-dbtr.c diff --git a/lib/riscv/asm/sbi.h b/lib/riscv/asm/sbi.h index a5738a5c..ce19ab89 100644 --- a/lib/riscv/asm/sbi.h +++ b/lib/riscv/asm/sbi.h @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ enum sbi_ext_id { SBI_EXT_SUSP = 0x53555350, SBI_EXT_FWFT = 0x46574654, SBI_EXT_SSE = 0x535345, + SBI_EXT_DBTR = 0x44425452, }; enum sbi_ext_base_fid { @@ -125,6 +126,17 @@ enum sbi_ext_fwft_fid { #define SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK BIT(0) +enum sbi_ext_dbtr_fid { + SBI_EXT_DBTR_NUM_TRIGGERS = 0, + SBI_EXT_DBTR_SETUP_SHMEM, + SBI_EXT_DBTR_TRIGGER_READ, + SBI_EXT_DBTR_TRIGGER_INSTALL, + SBI_EXT_DBTR_TRIGGER_UPDATE, + SBI_EXT_DBTR_TRIGGER_UNINSTALL, + SBI_EXT_DBTR_TRIGGER_ENABLE, + SBI_EXT_DBTR_TRIGGER_DISABLE, +}; + enum sbi_ext_sse_fid { SBI_EXT_SSE_READ_ATTRS = 0, SBI_EXT_SSE_WRITE_ATTRS, @@ -282,6 +294,22 @@ static inline bool sbi_sse_event_is_global(uint32_t event_id) return !!(event_id & SBI_SSE_EVENT_GLOBAL_BIT); } +struct sbiret sbi_debug_num_triggers(unsigned long trig_tdata1); +struct sbiret sbi_debug_set_shmem(void *shmem); +struct sbiret sbi_debug_set_shmem_raw(unsigned long shmem_phys_lo, + unsigned long shmem_phys_hi, + unsigned long flags); +struct sbiret sbi_debug_read_triggers(unsigned long trig_idx_base, + unsigned long trig_count); +struct sbiret sbi_debug_install_triggers(unsigned long trig_count); +struct sbiret sbi_debug_update_triggers(unsigned long trig_count); +struct sbiret sbi_debug_uninstall_triggers(unsigned long trig_idx_base, + unsigned long trig_idx_mask); +struct sbiret sbi_debug_enable_triggers(unsigned long trig_idx_base, + unsigned long trig_idx_mask); +struct sbiret sbi_debug_disable_triggers(unsigned long trig_idx_base, + unsigned long trig_idx_mask); + struct sbiret sbi_sse_read_attrs_raw(unsigned long event_id, unsigned long base_attr_id, unsigned long attr_count, unsigned long phys_lo, unsigned long phys_hi); diff --git a/lib/riscv/sbi.c b/lib/riscv/sbi.c index 2959378f..39c0d3bd 100644 --- a/lib/riscv/sbi.c +++ b/lib/riscv/sbi.c @@ -32,6 +32,64 @@ struct sbiret sbi_ecall(int ext, int fid, unsigned long arg0, return ret; } +struct sbiret sbi_debug_num_triggers(unsigned long trig_tdata1) +{ + return sbi_ecall(SBI_EXT_DBTR, SBI_EXT_DBTR_NUM_TRIGGERS, trig_tdata1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + +struct sbiret sbi_debug_set_shmem(void *shmem) +{ + phys_addr_t p = virt_to_phys(shmem); + + return sbi_debug_set_shmem_raw(lower_32_bits(p), upper_32_bits(p), 0); +} + +struct sbiret sbi_debug_set_shmem_raw(unsigned long shmem_phys_lo, + unsigned long shmem_phys_hi, + unsigned long flags) +{ + return sbi_ecall(SBI_EXT_DBTR, SBI_EXT_DBTR_SETUP_SHMEM, shmem_phys_lo, + shmem_phys_hi, flags, 0, 0, 0); +} + +struct sbiret sbi_debug_read_triggers(unsigned long trig_idx_base, + unsigned long trig_count) +{ + return sbi_ecall(SBI_EXT_DBTR, SBI_EXT_DBTR_TRIGGER_READ, trig_idx_base, + trig_count, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + +struct sbiret sbi_debug_install_triggers(unsigned long trig_count) +{ + return sbi_ecall(SBI_EXT_DBTR, SBI_EXT_DBTR_TRIGGER_INSTALL, trig_count, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + +struct sbiret sbi_debug_update_triggers(unsigned long trig_count) +{ + return sbi_ecall(SBI_EXT_DBTR, SBI_EXT_DBTR_TRIGGER_UPDATE, trig_count, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + +struct sbiret sbi_debug_uninstall_triggers(unsigned long trig_idx_base, + unsigned long trig_idx_mask) +{ + return sbi_ecall(SBI_EXT_DBTR, SBI_EXT_DBTR_TRIGGER_UNINSTALL, trig_idx_base, + trig_idx_mask, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + +struct sbiret sbi_debug_enable_triggers(unsigned long trig_idx_base, + unsigned long trig_idx_mask) +{ + return sbi_ecall(SBI_EXT_DBTR, SBI_EXT_DBTR_TRIGGER_ENABLE, trig_idx_base, + trig_idx_mask, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + +struct sbiret sbi_debug_disable_triggers(unsigned long trig_idx_base, + unsigned long trig_idx_mask) +{ + return sbi_ecall(SBI_EXT_DBTR, SBI_EXT_DBTR_TRIGGER_DISABLE, trig_idx_base, + trig_idx_mask, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + struct sbiret sbi_sse_read_attrs_raw(unsigned long event_id, unsigned long base_attr_id, unsigned long attr_count, unsigned long phys_lo, unsigned long phys_hi) diff --git a/riscv/Makefile b/riscv/Makefile index 11e68eae..55c7ac93 100644 --- a/riscv/Makefile +++ b/riscv/Makefile @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ all: $(tests) $(TEST_DIR)/sbi-deps += $(TEST_DIR)/sbi-asm.o $(TEST_DIR)/sbi-deps += $(TEST_DIR)/sbi-fwft.o $(TEST_DIR)/sbi-deps += $(TEST_DIR)/sbi-sse.o +$(TEST_DIR)/sbi-deps += $(TEST_DIR)/sbi-dbtr.o all_deps += $($(TEST_DIR)/sbi-deps) diff --git a/riscv/sbi-dbtr.c b/riscv/sbi-dbtr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fe323f0f --- /dev/null +++ b/riscv/sbi-dbtr.c @@ -0,0 +1,751 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * SBI DBTR testsuite + * + * Copyright (C) 2025, Rivos Inc., Jesse Taube <jesse(a)rivosinc.com> + */ + +#include <asm/io.h> + +#include "sbi-tests.h" + +#define INSN_LEN(insn) ((((insn) & 0x3) < 0x3) ? 2 : 4) + +#if __riscv_xlen == 64 +#define SBI_DBTR_SHMEM_INVALID_ADDR 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFUL +#elif __riscv_xlen == 32 +#define SBI_DBTR_SHMEM_INVALID_ADDR 0xFFFFFFFFUL +#else +#error "Unexpected __riscv_xlen" +#endif + +#define RV_MAX_TRIGGERS 32 + +#define SBI_DBTR_TRIG_STATE_MAPPED BIT(0) +#define SBI_DBTR_TRIG_STATE_U BIT(1) +#define SBI_DBTR_TRIG_STATE_S BIT(2) +#define SBI_DBTR_TRIG_STATE_VU BIT(3) +#define SBI_DBTR_TRIG_STATE_VS BIT(4) +#define SBI_DBTR_TRIG_STATE_HAVE_HW_TRIG BIT(5) + +#define SBI_DBTR_TRIG_STATE_HW_TRIG_IDX_SHIFT 8 +#define SBI_DBTR_TRIG_STATE_HW_TRIG_IDX(trig_state) (trig_state >> SBI_DBTR_TRIG_STATE_HW_TRIG_IDX_SHIFT) + +#define SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_SHIFT (__riscv_xlen - 4) + +#define SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL6_LOAD_BIT BIT(0) +#define SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL6_STORE_BIT BIT(1) +#define SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL6_EXECUTE_BIT BIT(2) +#define SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL6_U_BIT BIT(3) +#define SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL6_S_BIT BIT(4) +#define SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL6_SELECT_BIT BIT(21) +#define SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL6_VS_BIT BIT(23) +#define SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL6_VU_BIT BIT(24) + +#define SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL_LOAD_BIT BIT(0) +#define SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL_STORE_BIT BIT(1) +#define SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL_EXECUTE_BIT BIT(2) +#define SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL_U_BIT BIT(3) +#define SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL_S_BIT BIT(4) +#define SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL_SELECT_BIT BIT(19) + +enum McontrolType { + SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_NONE = (0UL << SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_SHIFT), + SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_LEGACY = (1UL << SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_SHIFT), + SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_MCONTROL = (2UL << SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_SHIFT), + SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_ICOUNT = (3UL << SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_SHIFT), + SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_ITRIGGER = (4UL << SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_SHIFT), + SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_ETRIGGER = (5UL << SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_SHIFT), + SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_MCONTROL6 = (6UL << SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_SHIFT), + SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_TMEXTTRIGGER = (7UL << SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_SHIFT), + SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_RESERVED0 = (8UL << SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_SHIFT), + SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_RESERVED1 = (9UL << SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_SHIFT), + SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_RESERVED2 = (10UL << SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_SHIFT), + SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_RESERVED3 = (11UL << SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_SHIFT), + SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_CUSTOM0 = (12UL << SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_SHIFT), + SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_CUSTOM1 = (13UL << SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_SHIFT), + SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_CUSTOM2 = (14UL << SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_SHIFT), + SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_DISABLED = (15UL << SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_SHIFT), +}; + +enum Tdata1Value { + VALUE_NONE = 0, + VALUE_LOAD = BIT(0), + VALUE_STORE = BIT(1), + VALUE_EXECUTE = BIT(2), +}; + +enum Tdata1Mode { + MODE_NONE = 0, + MODE_M = BIT(0), + MODE_U = BIT(1), + MODE_S = BIT(2), + MODE_VU = BIT(3), + MODE_VS = BIT(4), +}; + +struct sbi_dbtr_data_msg { + unsigned long tstate; + unsigned long tdata1; + unsigned long tdata2; + unsigned long tdata3; +}; + +struct sbi_dbtr_id_msg { + unsigned long idx; +}; + +/* SBI shared mem messages layout */ +struct sbi_dbtr_shmem_entry { + union { + struct sbi_dbtr_data_msg data; + struct sbi_dbtr_id_msg id; + }; +}; + +static bool dbtr_handled; + +// Expected to be leaf function as not to disrupt frame-pointer +static __attribute__((naked)) void exec_call(void) +{ + // skip over nop when triggered instead of ret. + asm volatile (".option push\n" + ".option arch, -c\n" + "nop\n" + "ret\n" + ".option pop\n"); +} + +static void dbtr_exception_handler(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + dbtr_handled = true; + + /* Reading *epc may cause a fault, skip over nop */ + if ((void *)regs->epc == exec_call) { + regs->epc += 4; + return; + } + + /* WARNING: Skips over the trapped intruction */ + regs->epc += INSN_LEN(readw((void *)regs->epc)); +} + +static bool do_save(void *tdata2) +{ + bool ret; + + writel(0, tdata2); + + ret = dbtr_handled; + dbtr_handled = false; + + return ret; +} + +static bool do_load(void *tdata2) +{ + bool ret; + + readl(tdata2); + + ret = dbtr_handled; + dbtr_handled = false; + + return ret; +} + +static bool do_exec(void) +{ + bool ret; + + exec_call(); + + ret = dbtr_handled; + dbtr_handled = false; + + return ret; +} + +static unsigned long gen_tdata1_mcontrol(enum Tdata1Mode mode, enum Tdata1Value value) +{ + unsigned long tdata1 = SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_MCONTROL; + + if (value & VALUE_LOAD) + tdata1 |= SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL_LOAD_BIT; + + if (value & VALUE_STORE) + tdata1 |= SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL_STORE_BIT; + + if (value & VALUE_EXECUTE) + tdata1 |= SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL_EXECUTE_BIT; + + if (mode & MODE_M) + tdata1 |= SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL_U_BIT; + + if (mode & MODE_U) + tdata1 |= SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL_U_BIT; + + if (mode & MODE_S) + tdata1 |= SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL_S_BIT; + + return tdata1; +} + +static unsigned long gen_tdata1_mcontrol6(enum Tdata1Mode mode, enum Tdata1Value value) +{ + unsigned long tdata1 = SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_MCONTROL6; + + if (value & VALUE_LOAD) + tdata1 |= SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL6_LOAD_BIT; + + if (value & VALUE_STORE) + tdata1 |= SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL6_STORE_BIT; + + if (value & VALUE_EXECUTE) + tdata1 |= SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL6_EXECUTE_BIT; + + if (mode & MODE_M) + tdata1 |= SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL6_U_BIT; + + if (mode & MODE_U) + tdata1 |= SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL6_U_BIT; + + if (mode & MODE_S) + tdata1 |= SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL6_S_BIT; + + if (mode & MODE_VU) + tdata1 |= SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL6_VU_BIT; + + if (mode & MODE_VS) + tdata1 |= SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_MCONTROL6_VS_BIT; + + return tdata1; +} + +static unsigned long gen_tdata1(enum McontrolType type, enum Tdata1Value value, enum Tdata1Mode mode) +{ + switch (type) { + case SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_MCONTROL: + return gen_tdata1_mcontrol(mode, value); + case SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_MCONTROL6: + return gen_tdata1_mcontrol6(mode, value); + default: + return 0; + } +} + +static bool dbtr_install_trigger(struct sbi_dbtr_shmem_entry *shmem, void *tdata2, + unsigned long tdata1) +{ + struct sbiret sbi_ret; + bool ret; + + shmem->data.tdata1 = tdata1; + shmem->data.tdata2 = (unsigned long)tdata2; + + sbi_ret = sbi_debug_install_triggers(1); + ret = sbiret_report_error(&sbi_ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_install_triggers"); + if (ret) + install_exception_handler(EXC_BREAKPOINT, dbtr_exception_handler); + + return ret; +} + +static bool dbtr_uninstall_trigger(void) +{ + struct sbiret ret; + + install_exception_handler(EXC_BREAKPOINT, NULL); + + ret = sbi_debug_uninstall_triggers(0, 1); + return sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_uninstall_triggers"); +} + +static unsigned long dbtr_test_num_triggers(void) +{ + struct sbiret ret; + //sbi_debug_num_triggers will return trig_max in sbiret.value when trig_tdata1 == 0 + unsigned long tdata1 = 0; + + // should be atleast one trigger. + ret = sbi_debug_num_triggers(tdata1); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_num_triggers"); + + if (ret.value == 0) + report_fail("sbi_debug_num_triggers: Returned 0 triggers available"); + else + report_pass("sbi_debug_num_triggers: Returned %lu triggers available", ret.value); + + return ret.value; +} + +static enum McontrolType dbtr_test_type(unsigned long *num_trig) +{ + struct sbiret ret; + + //sbi_debug_num_triggers will return trig_max in sbiret.value when trig_tdata1 == 0 + unsigned long tdata1 = SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_MCONTROL6; + + ret = sbi_debug_num_triggers(tdata1); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_num_triggers"); + if (ret.value > 0) { + report_pass("sbi_debug_num_triggers: Returned %lu mcontrol6 triggers available", + ret.value); + *num_trig = ret.value; + return tdata1; + } + + tdata1 = SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_MCONTROL; + + ret = sbi_debug_num_triggers(tdata1); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_num_triggers"); + *num_trig = ret.value; + if (ret.value > 0) { + report_pass("sbi_debug_num_triggers: Returned %lu mcontrol triggers available", + ret.value); + return tdata1; + } + + report_fail("sbi_debug_num_triggers: Returned 0 mcontrol(6) triggers available"); + + return SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_NONE; +} + +static struct sbiret dbtr_test_save_install_uninstall(struct sbi_dbtr_shmem_entry *shmem, + enum McontrolType type) +{ + static unsigned long test; + struct sbiret ret; + + report_prefix_push("save_trigger"); + + shmem->data.tdata1 = gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_STORE, MODE_S | MODE_S); + shmem->data.tdata2 = (unsigned long)&test; + + ret = sbi_debug_install_triggers(1); + if (!sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_install_triggers")) { + report_prefix_pop(); + return ret; + } + + install_exception_handler(EXC_BREAKPOINT, dbtr_exception_handler); + + report(do_save(&test), "triggered"); + + if (do_load(&test)) + report_fail("triggered by load"); + + ret = sbi_debug_uninstall_triggers(0, 1); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_uninstall_triggers"); + + if (do_save(&test)) + report_fail("triggered after uninstall"); + + install_exception_handler(EXC_BREAKPOINT, NULL); + report_prefix_pop(); + + return ret; +} + +static void dbtr_test_update(struct sbi_dbtr_shmem_entry *shmem, enum McontrolType type) +{ + static unsigned long test; + struct sbiret ret; + + report_prefix_push("update_trigger"); + + if (!dbtr_install_trigger(shmem, NULL, gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_NONE, MODE_NONE))) { + report_prefix_pop(); + return; + } + + shmem->id.idx = 0; + shmem->data.tdata1 = gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_STORE, MODE_S); + shmem->data.tdata2 = (unsigned long)&test; + + ret = sbi_debug_update_triggers(1); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_update_triggers"); + + report(do_save(&test), "triggered"); + + dbtr_uninstall_trigger(); + report_prefix_pop(); +} + +static void dbtr_test_load(struct sbi_dbtr_shmem_entry *shmem, enum McontrolType type) +{ + static unsigned long test; + + report_prefix_push("load_trigger"); + if (!dbtr_install_trigger(shmem, &test, gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_LOAD, MODE_S))) { + report_prefix_pop(); + return; + } + + report(do_load(&test), "triggered"); + + if (do_save(&test)) + report_fail("triggered by save"); + + dbtr_uninstall_trigger(); + report_prefix_pop(); +} + +static void dbtr_test_disable_enable(struct sbi_dbtr_shmem_entry *shmem, enum McontrolType type) +{ + static unsigned long test; + struct sbiret ret; + + report_prefix_push("sbi_debug_disable_triggers"); + if (!dbtr_install_trigger(shmem, &test, gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_STORE, MODE_S))) { + report_prefix_pop(); + return; + } + + ret = sbi_debug_disable_triggers(0, 1); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_disable_triggers"); + + if (do_save(&test)) { + report_fail("should not trigger"); + + dbtr_uninstall_trigger(); + report_prefix_pop(); + report_skip("sbi_debug_enable_triggers: no disable"); + + return; + } + + report_pass("should not trigger"); + + report_prefix_pop(); + report_prefix_push("sbi_debug_enable_triggers"); + + ret = sbi_debug_enable_triggers(0, 1); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_enable_triggers"); + + report(do_save(&test), "triggered"); + + dbtr_uninstall_trigger(); + report_prefix_pop(); +} + +static void dbtr_test_exec(struct sbi_dbtr_shmem_entry *shmem, enum McontrolType type) +{ + static unsigned long test; + + report_prefix_push("exec_trigger"); + /* check if loads and saves trigger exec */ + if (!dbtr_install_trigger(shmem, &test, gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_EXECUTE, MODE_S))) { + report_prefix_pop(); + return; + } + + if (do_load(&test)) + report_fail("triggered by load"); + + if (do_save(&test)) + report_fail("triggered by save"); + + dbtr_uninstall_trigger(); + + /* Check if exec works */ + if (!dbtr_install_trigger(shmem, exec_call, gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_EXECUTE, MODE_S))) { + report_prefix_pop(); + return; + } + report(do_exec(), "exec trigger"); + + dbtr_uninstall_trigger(); + report_prefix_pop(); +} + +static void dbtr_test_read(struct sbi_dbtr_shmem_entry *shmem, enum McontrolType type) +{ + const unsigned long tstatus_expected = SBI_DBTR_TRIG_STATE_S | SBI_DBTR_TRIG_STATE_MAPPED; + const unsigned long tdata1 = gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_STORE, MODE_S); + static unsigned long test; + struct sbiret ret; + + report_prefix_push("sbi_debug_read_triggers"); + if (!dbtr_install_trigger(shmem, &test, tdata1)) { + report_prefix_pop(); + return; + } + + ret = sbi_debug_read_triggers(0, 1); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_read_triggers"); + + report(shmem->data.tdata1 == tdata1, "tdata1 expected: 0x%016lx, found: 0x%016lx", + tdata1, shmem->data.tdata1); + report(shmem->data.tdata2 == ((unsigned long)&test), + "tdata2 expected: 0x%016lx, found: 0x%016lx", ((unsigned long)&test), + shmem->data.tdata2); + report(shmem->data.tstate == tstatus_expected, "tstate expected: 0x%016lx, found: 0x%016lx", + tstatus_expected, shmem->data.tstate); + + dbtr_uninstall_trigger(); + report_prefix_pop(); +} + +static void check_exec(unsigned long base) +{ + struct sbiret ret; + + report(do_exec(), "exec triggered"); + + ret = sbi_debug_uninstall_triggers(base, 1); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_uninstall_triggers"); +} + +static void dbtr_test_multiple(struct sbi_dbtr_shmem_entry *shmem, enum McontrolType type, + unsigned long num_trigs) +{ + static unsigned long test[2]; + struct sbiret ret; + bool have_three = num_trigs > 2; + + if (num_trigs < 2) + return; + + report_prefix_push("test_multiple"); + + if (!dbtr_install_trigger(shmem, &test[0], gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_STORE, MODE_S))) { + report_prefix_pop(); + return; + } + if (!dbtr_install_trigger(shmem, &test[1], gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_LOAD, MODE_S))) + goto error; + if (have_three && + !dbtr_install_trigger(shmem, exec_call, gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_EXECUTE, MODE_S))) { + ret = sbi_debug_uninstall_triggers(1, 1); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_uninstall_triggers"); + goto error; + } + + report(do_save(&test[0]), "save triggered"); + + if (do_load(&test[0])) + report_fail("save triggered by load"); + + report(do_load(&test[1]), "load triggered"); + + if (do_save(&test[1])) + report_fail("load triggered by save"); + + if (have_three) + check_exec(2); + + ret = sbi_debug_uninstall_triggers(1, 1); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_uninstall_triggers"); + + if (do_load(&test[1])) + report_fail("load triggered after uninstall"); + + report(do_save(&test[0]), "save triggered"); + + if (!have_three && + dbtr_install_trigger(shmem, exec_call, gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_EXECUTE, MODE_S))) + check_exec(1); + +error: + ret = sbi_debug_uninstall_triggers(0, 1); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_uninstall_triggers"); + + install_exception_handler(EXC_BREAKPOINT, NULL); + report_prefix_pop(); +} + +static void dbtr_test_multiple_types(struct sbi_dbtr_shmem_entry *shmem, unsigned long type) +{ + static unsigned long test; + + report_prefix_push("dbtr_test_multiple_types"); + + /* check if loads and saves trigger exec */ + if (!dbtr_install_trigger(shmem, &test, + gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_EXECUTE | VALUE_LOAD | VALUE_STORE, MODE_S))) { + report_prefix_pop(); + return; + } + + report(do_load(&test), "load trigger"); + + report(do_save(&test), "save trigger"); + + dbtr_uninstall_trigger(); + + /* Check if exec works */ + if (!dbtr_install_trigger(shmem, exec_call, + gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_EXECUTE | VALUE_LOAD | VALUE_STORE, MODE_S))) { + report_prefix_pop(); + return; + } + + report(do_exec(), "exec trigger"); + + dbtr_uninstall_trigger(); + report_prefix_pop(); +} + +static void dbtr_test_disable_uninstall(struct sbi_dbtr_shmem_entry *shmem, enum McontrolType type) +{ + static unsigned long test; + struct sbiret ret; + + report_prefix_push("disable uninstall"); + if (!dbtr_install_trigger(shmem, &test, gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_STORE, MODE_S))) { + report_prefix_pop(); + return; + } + + ret = sbi_debug_disable_triggers(0, 1); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_disable_triggers"); + + dbtr_uninstall_trigger(); + + if (!dbtr_install_trigger(shmem, &test, gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_STORE, MODE_S))) { + report_prefix_pop(); + return; + } + + report(do_save(&test), "triggered"); + + dbtr_uninstall_trigger(); + report_prefix_pop(); +} + +static void dbtr_test_uninstall_enable(struct sbi_dbtr_shmem_entry *shmem, enum McontrolType type) +{ + static unsigned long test; + struct sbiret ret; + + report_prefix_push("uninstall enable"); + if (!dbtr_install_trigger(shmem, &test, gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_STORE, MODE_S))) { + report_prefix_pop(); + return; + } + dbtr_uninstall_trigger(); + + ret = sbi_debug_enable_triggers(0, 1); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_enable_triggers"); + + install_exception_handler(EXC_BREAKPOINT, dbtr_exception_handler); + + report(!do_save(&test), "should not trigger"); + + install_exception_handler(EXC_BREAKPOINT, NULL); + report_prefix_pop(); +} + +static void dbtr_test_uninstall_update(struct sbi_dbtr_shmem_entry *shmem, enum McontrolType type) +{ + static unsigned long test; + struct sbiret ret; + + report_prefix_push("uninstall update"); + if (!dbtr_install_trigger(shmem, NULL, gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_NONE, MODE_NONE))) { + report_prefix_pop(); + return; + } + + dbtr_uninstall_trigger(); + + shmem->id.idx = 0; + shmem->data.tdata1 = gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_STORE, MODE_S); + shmem->data.tdata2 = (unsigned long)&test; + + ret = sbi_debug_update_triggers(1); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_ERR_FAILURE, "sbi_debug_update_triggers"); + + install_exception_handler(EXC_BREAKPOINT, dbtr_exception_handler); + + report(!do_save(&test), "should not trigger"); + + install_exception_handler(EXC_BREAKPOINT, NULL); + report_prefix_pop(); +} + +static void dbtr_test_disable_read(struct sbi_dbtr_shmem_entry *shmem, enum McontrolType type) +{ + const unsigned long tstatus_expected = SBI_DBTR_TRIG_STATE_S | SBI_DBTR_TRIG_STATE_MAPPED; + const unsigned long tdata1 = gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_STORE, MODE_NONE); + static unsigned long test; + struct sbiret ret; + + report_prefix_push("disable_read"); + if (!dbtr_install_trigger(shmem, &test, gen_tdata1(type, VALUE_STORE, MODE_S))) { + report_prefix_pop(); + return; + } + + ret = sbi_debug_disable_triggers(0, 1); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_disable_triggers"); + + ret = sbi_debug_read_triggers(0, 1); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_read_triggers"); + + report(shmem->data.tdata1 == tdata1, "tdata1 expected: 0x%016lx, found: 0x%016lx", + tdata1, shmem->data.tdata1); + report(shmem->data.tdata2 == ((unsigned long)&test), + "tdata2 expected: 0x%016lx, found: 0x%016lx", + ((unsigned long)&test), shmem->data.tdata2); + report(shmem->data.tstate == tstatus_expected, "tstate expected: 0x%016lx, found: 0x%016lx", + tstatus_expected, shmem->data.tstate); + + dbtr_uninstall_trigger(); + report_prefix_pop(); +} + +void check_dbtr(void) +{ + static struct sbi_dbtr_shmem_entry shmem[RV_MAX_TRIGGERS] = {}; + unsigned long num_trigs; + enum McontrolType trig_type; + struct sbiret ret; + + report_prefix_push("dbtr"); + + if (!sbi_probe(SBI_EXT_DBTR)) { + report_skip("extension not available"); + report_prefix_pop(); + return; + } + + if (__sbi_get_imp_id() == SBI_IMPL_OPENSBI && + __sbi_get_imp_version() < sbi_impl_opensbi_mk_version(1, 6)) { + report_skip("OpenSBI < v1.7 detected, skipping tests"); + report_prefix_pop(); + return; + } + + num_trigs = dbtr_test_num_triggers(); + if (!num_trigs) + goto error; + + trig_type = dbtr_test_type(&num_trigs); + if (trig_type == SBI_DBTR_TDATA1_TYPE_NONE) + goto error; + + ret = sbi_debug_set_shmem(shmem); + sbiret_report_error(&ret, SBI_SUCCESS, "sbi_debug_set_shmem"); + + ret = dbtr_test_save_install_uninstall(&shmem[0], trig_type); + /* install or uninstall failed */ + if (ret.error != SBI_SUCCESS) + goto error; + + dbtr_test_load(&shmem[0], trig_type); + dbtr_test_exec(&shmem[0], trig_type); + dbtr_test_read(&shmem[0], trig_type); + dbtr_test_disable_enable(&shmem[0], trig_type); + dbtr_test_update(&shmem[0], trig_type); + dbtr_test_multiple_types(&shmem[0], trig_type); + dbtr_test_multiple(shmem, trig_type, num_trigs); + dbtr_test_disable_uninstall(&shmem[0], trig_type); + dbtr_test_uninstall_enable(&shmem[0], trig_type); + dbtr_test_uninstall_update(&shmem[0], trig_type); + dbtr_test_disable_read(&shmem[0], trig_type); + +error: + report_prefix_pop(); +} diff --git a/riscv/sbi-tests.h b/riscv/sbi-tests.h index d5c4ae70..6a227745 100644 --- a/riscv/sbi-tests.h +++ b/riscv/sbi-tests.h @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ static inline bool env_enabled(const char *env) void sbi_bad_fid(int ext); void check_sse(void); +void check_dbtr(void); #endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ #endif /* _RISCV_SBI_TESTS_H_ */ diff --git a/riscv/sbi.c b/riscv/sbi.c index edb1a6be..5bd496d0 100644 --- a/riscv/sbi.c +++ b/riscv/sbi.c @@ -1561,6 +1561,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) check_susp(); check_sse(); check_fwft(); + check_dbtr(); return report_summary(); } -- 2.43.0

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