During my testing, I found that guest debugging with 'DR6.BD' does not
work in instruction emulation, as the current code only considers the
guest's DR7. Upon reviewing the code, I also observed that the checks
for the userspace guest debugging feature and the guest's own debugging
feature are repeated in different places during instruction
emulation, but the overall logic is the same. If guest debugging
is enabled, it needs to exit to userspace; otherwise, a #DB
exception needs to be injected into the guest. Therefore, as
suggested by Jiangshan Lai, some cleanup has been done for #DB
handling in instruction emulation in this patchset. A new
function named 'kvm_inject_emulated_db()' is introduced to
consolidate all the checking logic. Moreover, I hope we can make
the #DB interception path use the same function as well.
Additionally, when I looked into the single-step #DB handling in
instruction emulation, I noticed that the interrupt shadow is toggled,
but it is not considered in the single-step #DB injection. This
oversight causes VM entry to fail on VMX (due to pending debug
exceptions checking) or breaks the 'MOV SS' suppressed #DB. For the
latter, I have kept the behavior for now in my patchset, as I need some
suggestions.
Hou Wenlong (7):
KVM: x86: Set guest DR6 by kvm_queue_exception_p() in instruction
emulation
KVM: x86: Check guest debug in DR access instruction emulation
KVM: x86: Only check effective code breakpoint in emulation
KVM: x86: Consolidate KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP check into the
kvm_inject_emulated_db()
KVM: VMX: Set 'BS' bit in pending debug exceptions during instruction
emulation
KVM: selftests: Verify guest debug DR7.GD checking during instruction
emulation
KVM: selftests: Verify 'BS' bit checking in pending debug exception
during VM entry
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 14 +--
arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h | 7 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 9 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 14 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 109 +++++++++++-------
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 7 ++
.../selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h | 3 +-
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/debug_regs.c | 64 +++++++++-
11 files changed, 167 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
base-commit: ecbcc2461839e848970468b44db32282e5059925
--
2.31.1
From: Patrick Roy <roypat(a)amazon.co.uk>
[ based on kvm/next ]
Unmapping virtual machine guest memory from the host kernel's direct map is a
successful mitigation against Spectre-style transient execution issues: If the
kernel page tables do not contain entries pointing to guest memory, then any
attempted speculative read through the direct map will necessarily be blocked
by the MMU before any observable microarchitectural side-effects happen. This
means that Spectre-gadgets and similar cannot be used to target virtual machine
memory. Roughly 60% of speculative execution issues fall into this category [1,
Table 1].
This patch series extends guest_memfd with the ability to remove its memory
from the host kernel's direct map, to be able to attain the above protection
for KVM guests running inside guest_memfd.
Additionally, a Firecracker branch with support for these VMs can be found on
GitHub [2].
For more details, please refer to the v5 cover letter [v5]. No
substantial changes in design have taken place since.
=== Changes Since v6 ===
- Drop patch for passing struct address_space to ->free_folio(), due to
possible races with freeing of the address_space. (Hugh)
- Stop using PG_uptodate / gmem preparedness tracking to keep track of
direct map state. Instead, use the lowest bit of folio->private. (Mike, David)
- Do direct map removal when establishing mapping of gmem folio instead
of at allocation time, due to impossibility of handling direct map
removal errors in kvm_gmem_populate(). (Patrick)
- Do TLB flushes after direct map removal, and provide a module
parameter to opt out from them, and a new patch to export
flush_tlb_kernel_range() to KVM. (Will)
[1]: https://download.vusec.net/papers/quarantine_raid23.pdf
[2]: https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/tree/feature/secret-hidi…
[RFCv1]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20240709132041.3625501-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/
[RFCv2]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20240910163038.1298452-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/
[RFCv3]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20241030134912.515725-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/
[v4]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250221160728.1584559-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/
[v5]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250828093902.2719-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/
[v6]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250912091708.17502-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/
Patrick Roy (12):
arch: export set_direct_map_valid_noflush to KVM module
x86/tlb: export flush_tlb_kernel_range to KVM module
mm: introduce AS_NO_DIRECT_MAP
KVM: guest_memfd: Add stub for kvm_arch_gmem_invalidate
KVM: guest_memfd: Add flag to remove from direct map
KVM: guest_memfd: add module param for disabling TLB flushing
KVM: selftests: load elf via bounce buffer
KVM: selftests: set KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD in vm_mem_add() if guest_memfd
!= -1
KVM: selftests: Add guest_memfd based vm_mem_backing_src_types
KVM: selftests: cover GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP in existing
selftests
KVM: selftests: stuff vm_mem_backing_src_type into vm_shape
KVM: selftests: Test guest execution from direct map removed gmem
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 5 ++
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 12 ++++
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 1 +
arch/loongarch/mm/pageattr.c | 1 +
arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c | 1 +
arch/s390/mm/pageattr.c | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 3 +-
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 1 +
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 1 +
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 9 +++
include/linux/pagemap.h | 16 +++++
include/linux/secretmem.h | 18 -----
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 2 +
lib/buildid.c | 4 +-
mm/gup.c | 19 ++----
mm/mlock.c | 2 +-
mm/secretmem.c | 8 +--
.../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 2 +
.../testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h | 37 ++++++++---
.../testing/selftests/kvm/include/test_util.h | 8 +++
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/elf.c | 8 +--
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/io.c | 23 +++++++
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 61 +++++++++--------
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/test_util.c | 8 +++
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c | 1 +
.../selftests/kvm/pre_fault_memory_test.c | 1 +
.../selftests/kvm/set_memory_region_test.c | 50 ++++++++++++--
.../kvm/x86/private_mem_conversions_test.c | 7 +-
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++--
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 8 +++
30 files changed, 290 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-)
base-commit: a6ad54137af92535cfe32e19e5f3bc1bb7dbd383
--
2.51.0
This introduces signal->exec_bprm, which is used to
fix the case when at least one of the sibling threads
is traced, and therefore the trace process may dead-lock
in ptrace_attach, but de_thread will need to wait for the
tracer to continue execution.
The solution is to detect this situation and allow
ptrace_attach to continue by temporarily releasing the
cred_guard_mutex, while de_thread() is still waiting for
traced zombies to be eventually released by the tracer.
In the case of the thread group leader we only have to wait
for the thread to become a zombie, which may also need
co-operation from the tracer due to PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT.
When a tracer wants to ptrace_attach a task that already
is in execve, we simply retry the ptrace_may_access
check while temporarily installing the new credentials
and dumpability which are about to be used after execve
completes. If the ptrace_attach happens on a thread that
is a sibling-thread of the thread doing execve, it is
sufficient to check against the old credentials, as this
thread will be waited for, before the new credentials are
installed.
Other threads die quickly since the cred_guard_mutex is
released, but a deadly signal is already pending. In case
the mutex_lock_killable misses the signal, the non-zero
current->signal->exec_bprm makes sure they release the
mutex immediately and return with -ERESTARTNOINTR.
This means there is no API change, unlike the previous
version of this patch which was discussed here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/b6537ae6-31b1-5c50-f32b-8b8332ace882@hotmail.d…
See tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c
for a test case that gets fixed by this change.
Note that since the test case was originally designed to
test the ptrace_attach returning an error in this situation,
the test expectation needed to be adjusted, to allow the
API to succeed at the first attempt.
Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger(a)hotmail.de>
---
fs/exec.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++-------
fs/proc/base.c | 6 ++
include/linux/cred.h | 1 +
include/linux/sched/signal.h | 18 ++++++
kernel/cred.c | 28 +++++++--
kernel/ptrace.c | 32 +++++++++++
kernel/seccomp.c | 12 +++-
tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c | 23 +++++---
8 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
v10: Changes to previous version, make the PTRACE_ATTACH
retun -EAGAIN, instead of execve return -ERESTARTSYS.
Added some lessions learned to the description.
v11: Check old and new credentials in PTRACE_ATTACH again without
changing the API.
Note: I got actually one response from an automatic checker to the v11 patch,
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202107121344.wu68hEPF-lkp@intel.com/
which is complaining about:
>> kernel/ptrace.c:425:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) @@ expected struct cred const *old_cred @@ got struct cred const [noderef] __rcu *real_cred @@
417 struct linux_binprm *bprm = task->signal->exec_bprm;
418 const struct cred *old_cred;
419 struct mm_struct *old_mm;
420
421 retval = down_write_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
422 if (retval)
423 goto unlock_creds;
424 task_lock(task);
> 425 old_cred = task->real_cred;
v12: Essentially identical to v11.
- Fixed a minor merge conflict in linux v5.17, and fixed the
above mentioned nit by adding __rcu to the declaration.
- re-tested the patch with all linux versions from v5.11 to v6.6
v10 was an alternative approach which did imply an API change.
But I would prefer to avoid such an API change.
The difficult part is getting the right dumpability flags assigned
before de_thread starts, hope you like this version.
If not, the v10 is of course also acceptable.
Thanks
Bernd.
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 2f2b0acec4f0..902d3b230485 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1041,11 +1041,13 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
return 0;
}
-static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
+static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal;
struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = tsk->sighand;
spinlock_t *lock = &oldsighand->siglock;
+ struct task_struct *t = tsk;
+ bool unsafe_execve_in_progress = false;
if (thread_group_empty(tsk))
goto no_thread_group;
@@ -1068,6 +1070,19 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
if (!thread_group_leader(tsk))
sig->notify_count--;
+ while_each_thread(tsk, t) {
+ if (unlikely(t->ptrace)
+ && (t != tsk->group_leader || !t->exit_state))
+ unsafe_execve_in_progress = true;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) {
+ spin_unlock_irq(lock);
+ sig->exec_bprm = bprm;
+ mutex_unlock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
+ spin_lock_irq(lock);
+ }
+
while (sig->notify_count) {
__set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(lock);
@@ -1158,6 +1173,11 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
release_task(leader);
}
+ if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) {
+ mutex_lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
+ sig->exec_bprm = NULL;
+ }
+
sig->group_exec_task = NULL;
sig->notify_count = 0;
@@ -1169,6 +1189,11 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
return 0;
killed:
+ if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) {
+ mutex_lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
+ sig->exec_bprm = NULL;
+ }
+
/* protects against exit_notify() and __exit_signal() */
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
sig->group_exec_task = NULL;
@@ -1253,6 +1278,24 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
if (retval)
return retval;
+ /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */
+ would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
+ if (bprm->have_execfd)
+ would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable);
+
+ /*
+ * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
+ * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
+ * bprm->secureexec instead.
+ */
+ if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
+ is_dumpability_changed(current_cred(), bprm->cred) ||
+ !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
+ gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
+ set_dumpable(bprm->mm, suid_dumpable);
+ else
+ set_dumpable(bprm->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
+
/*
* Ensure all future errors are fatal.
*/
@@ -1261,7 +1304,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
/*
* Make this the only thread in the thread group.
*/
- retval = de_thread(me);
+ retval = de_thread(me, bprm);
if (retval)
goto out;
@@ -1284,11 +1327,6 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
if (retval)
goto out;
- /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */
- would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
- if (bprm->have_execfd)
- would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable);
-
/*
* Release all of the old mmap stuff
*/
@@ -1350,18 +1388,6 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
me->sas_ss_sp = me->sas_ss_size = 0;
- /*
- * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
- * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
- * bprm->secureexec instead.
- */
- if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
- !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
- gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
- else
- set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
-
perf_event_exec();
__set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
@@ -1480,6 +1506,11 @@ static int prepare_bprm_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
+ if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) {
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
+ }
+
bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds();
if (likely(bprm->cred))
return 0;
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index ffd54617c354..0da9adfadb48 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2788,6 +2788,12 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
if (rv < 0)
goto out_free;
+ if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) {
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ rv = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
rv = security_setprocattr(PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm,
file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, page,
count);
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index f923528d5cc4..b01e309f5686 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ extern const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void);
extern struct cred *prepare_creds(void);
extern struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void);
+extern bool is_dumpability_changed(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
extern int commit_creds(struct cred *);
extern void abort_creds(struct cred *);
extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
diff --git a/include/linux/sched/signal.h b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
index 0014d3adaf84..14df7073a0a8 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched/signal.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
@@ -234,9 +234,27 @@ struct signal_struct {
struct mm_struct *oom_mm; /* recorded mm when the thread group got
* killed by the oom killer */
+ struct linux_binprm *exec_bprm; /* Used to check ptrace_may_access
+ * against new credentials while
+ * de_thread is waiting for other
+ * traced threads to terminate.
+ * Set while de_thread is executing.
+ * The cred_guard_mutex is released
+ * after de_thread() has called
+ * zap_other_threads(), therefore
+ * a fatal signal is guaranteed to be
+ * already pending in the unlikely
+ * event, that
+ * current->signal->exec_bprm happens
+ * to be non-zero after the
+ * cred_guard_mutex was acquired.
+ */
+
struct mutex cred_guard_mutex; /* guard against foreign influences on
* credential calculations
* (notably. ptrace)
+ * Held while execve runs, except when
+ * a sibling thread is being traced.
* Deprecated do not use in new code.
* Use exec_update_lock instead.
*/
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 98cb4eca23fb..586cb6c7cf6b 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -433,6 +433,28 @@ static bool cred_cap_issubset(const struct cred *set, const struct cred *subset)
return false;
}
+/**
+ * is_dumpability_changed - Will changing creds from old to new
+ * affect the dumpability in commit_creds?
+ *
+ * Return: false - dumpability will not be changed in commit_creds.
+ * Return: true - dumpability will be changed to non-dumpable.
+ *
+ * @old: The old credentials
+ * @new: The new credentials
+ */
+bool is_dumpability_changed(const struct cred *old, const struct cred *new)
+{
+ if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) ||
+ !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) ||
+ !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) ||
+ !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) ||
+ !cred_cap_issubset(old, new))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/**
* commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task
* @new: The credentials to be assigned
@@ -467,11 +489,7 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
/* dumpability changes */
- if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) ||
- !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) ||
- !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) ||
- !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) ||
- !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) {
+ if (is_dumpability_changed(old, new)) {
if (task->mm)
set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
task->pdeath_signal = 0;
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 443057bee87c..eb1c450bb7d7 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/uio.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
@@ -435,6 +436,28 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
if (retval)
goto unlock_creds;
+ if (unlikely(task->in_execve)) {
+ struct linux_binprm *bprm = task->signal->exec_bprm;
+ const struct cred __rcu *old_cred;
+ struct mm_struct *old_mm;
+
+ retval = down_write_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
+ if (retval)
+ goto unlock_creds;
+ task_lock(task);
+ old_cred = task->real_cred;
+ old_mm = task->mm;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, bprm->cred);
+ task->mm = bprm->mm;
+ retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, old_cred);
+ task->mm = old_mm;
+ task_unlock(task);
+ up_write(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
+ if (retval)
+ goto unlock_creds;
+ }
+
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
retval = -EPERM;
if (unlikely(task->exit_state))
@@ -508,6 +531,14 @@ static int ptrace_traceme(void)
{
int ret = -EPERM;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
+ return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
+
+ if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) {
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
+ }
+
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/* Are we already being traced? */
if (!current->ptrace) {
@@ -523,6 +554,7 @@ static int ptrace_traceme(void)
}
}
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 255999ba9190..b29bbfa0b044 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -1955,9 +1955,15 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
* Make sure we cannot change seccomp or nnp state via TSYNC
* while another thread is in the middle of calling exec.
*/
- if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC &&
- mutex_lock_killable(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
- goto out_put_fd;
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) {
+ if (mutex_lock_killable(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
+ goto out_put_fd;
+
+ if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) {
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ goto out_put_fd;
+ }
+ }
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c
index 4db327b44586..3b7d81fb99bb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c
@@ -39,8 +39,15 @@ TEST(vmaccess)
f = open(mm, O_RDONLY);
ASSERT_GE(f, 0);
close(f);
- f = kill(pid, SIGCONT);
- ASSERT_EQ(f, 0);
+ f = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_NE(f, -1);
+ ASSERT_NE(f, 0);
+ ASSERT_NE(f, pid);
+ f = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(f, pid);
+ f = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(f, -1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(errno, ECHILD);
}
TEST(attach)
@@ -57,22 +64,24 @@ TEST(attach)
sleep(1);
k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0L, 0L);
- ASSERT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN);
- ASSERT_EQ(k, -1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(k, 0);
k = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG);
ASSERT_NE(k, -1);
ASSERT_NE(k, 0);
ASSERT_NE(k, pid);
ASSERT_EQ(WIFEXITED(s), 1);
ASSERT_EQ(WEXITSTATUS(s), 0);
- sleep(1);
- k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0L, 0L);
+ k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(k, pid);
+ ASSERT_EQ(WIFSTOPPED(s), 1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(WSTOPSIG(s), SIGTRAP);
+ k = ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0L, 0L);
ASSERT_EQ(k, 0);
k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0);
ASSERT_EQ(k, pid);
ASSERT_EQ(WIFSTOPPED(s), 1);
ASSERT_EQ(WSTOPSIG(s), SIGSTOP);
- k = ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, pid, 0L, 0L);
+ k = ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0L, 0L);
ASSERT_EQ(k, 0);
k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0);
ASSERT_EQ(k, pid);
--
2.39.2
Fix compilation error in UPROBE_setup caused by pointer type mismatch
in ternary expression. The probed_uretprobe and probed_uprobe function
pointers have different type attributes (__attribute__((nocf_check))),
which causes the conditional operator to fail with:
seccomp_bpf.c:5175:74: error: pointer type mismatch in conditional
expression [-Wincompatible-pointer-types]
Cast both function pointers to 'const void *' to match the expected
parameter type of get_uprobe_offset(), resolving the type mismatch
while preserving the function selection logic.
Signed-off-by: Nirbhay Sharma <nirbhay.lkd(a)gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
index 874f17763536..e13ffe18ef95 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
@@ -5172,7 +5172,8 @@ FIXTURE_SETUP(UPROBE)
ASSERT_GE(bit, 0);
}
- offset = get_uprobe_offset(variant->uretprobe ? probed_uretprobe : probed_uprobe);
+ offset = get_uprobe_offset(variant->uretprobe ?
+ (const void *)probed_uretprobe : (const void *)probed_uprobe);
ASSERT_GE(offset, 0);
if (variant->uretprobe)
--
2.48.1
I've removed the RFC tag from this version of the series, but the items
that I'm looking for feedback on remains the same:
- The userspace ABI, in particular:
- The vector length used for the SVE registers, access to the SVE
registers and access to ZA and (if available) ZT0 depending on
the current state of PSTATE.{SM,ZA}.
- The use of a single finalisation for both SVE and SME.
- The addition of control for enabling fine grained traps in a similar
manner to FGU but without the UNDEF, I'm not clear if this is desired
at all and at present this requires symmetric read and write traps like
FGU. That seemed like it might be desired from an implementation
point of view but we already have one case where we enable an
asymmetric trap (for ARM64_WORKAROUND_AMPERE_AC03_CPU_38) and it
seems generally useful to enable asymmetrically.
This series implements support for SME use in non-protected KVM guests.
Much of this is very similar to SVE, the main additional challenge that
SME presents is that it introduces a new vector length similar to the
SVE vector length and two new controls which change the registers seen
by guests:
- PSTATE.ZA enables the ZA matrix register and, if SME2 is supported,
the ZT0 LUT register.
- PSTATE.SM enables streaming mode, a new floating point mode which
uses the SVE register set with the separately configured SME vector
length. In streaming mode implementation of the FFR register is
optional.
It is also permitted to build systems which support SME without SVE, in
this case when not in streaming mode no SVE registers or instructions
are available. Further, there is no requirement that there be any
overlap in the set of vector lengths supported by SVE and SME in a
system, this is expected to be a common situation in practical systems.
Since there is a new vector length to configure we introduce a new
feature parallel to the existing SVE one with a new pseudo register for
the streaming mode vector length. Due to the overlap with SVE caused by
streaming mode rather than finalising SME as a separate feature we use
the existing SVE finalisation to also finalise SME, a new define
KVM_ARM_VCPU_VEC is provided to help make user code clearer. Finalising
SVE and SME separately would introduce complication with register access
since finalising SVE makes the SVE registers writeable by userspace and
doing multiple finalisations results in an error being reported.
Dealing with a state where the SVE registers are writeable due to one of
SVE or SME being finalised but may have their VL changed by the other
being finalised seems like needless complexity with minimal practical
utility, it seems clearer to just express directly that only one
finalisation can be done in the ABI.
Access to the floating point registers follows the architecture:
- When both SVE and SME are present:
- If PSTATE.SM == 0 the vector length used for the Z and P registers
is the SVE vector length.
- If PSTATE.SM == 1 the vector length used for the Z and P registers
is the SME vector length.
- If only SME is present:
- If PSTATE.SM == 0 the Z and P registers are inaccessible and the
floating point state accessed via the encodings for the V registers.
- If PSTATE.SM == 1 the vector length used for the Z and P registers
- The SME specific ZA and ZT0 registers are only accessible if SVCR.ZA is 1.
The VMM must understand this, in particular when loading state SVCR
should be configured before other state. It should be noted that while
the architecture refers to PSTATE.SM and PSTATE.ZA these PSTATE bits are
not preserved in SPSR_ELx, they are only accessible via SVCR.
There are a large number of subfeatures for SME, most of which only
offer additional instructions but some of which (SME2 and FA64) add
architectural state. These are configured via the ID registers as per
usual.
Protected KVM supported, with the implementation maintaining the
existing restriction that the hypervisor will refuse to run if streaming
mode or ZA is enabled. This both simplfies the code and avoids the need
to allocate storage for host ZA and ZT0 state, there seems to be little
practical use case for supporting this and the memory usage would be
non-trivial.
The new KVM_ARM_VCPU_VEC feature and ZA and ZT0 registers have not been
added to the get-reg-list selftest, the idea of supporting additional
features there without restructuring the program to generate all
possible feature combinations has been rejected. I will post a separate
series which does that restructuring.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
---
Changes in v8:
- Small fixes in ABI documentation.
- Link to v7: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250822-kvm-arm64-sme-v7-0-7a65d82b8b10@kernel.o…
Changes in v7:
- Rebase onto v6.17-rc1.
- Handle SMIDR_EL1 as a VM wide ID register and use this in feat_sme_smps().
- Expose affinity fields in SMIDR_EL1.
- Remove SMPRI_EL1 from vcpu_sysreg, the value is always 0 currently.
- Prevent userspace writes to SMPRIMAP_EL2.
- Link to v6: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625-kvm-arm64-sme-v6-0-114cff4ffe04@kernel.o…
Changes in v6:
- Rebase onto v6.16-rc3.
- Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250417-kvm-arm64-sme-v5-0-f469a2d5f574@kernel.o…
Changes in v5:
- Rebase onto v6.15-rc2.
- Add pKVM guest support.
- Always restore SVCR.
- Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250214-kvm-arm64-sme-v4-0-d64a681adcc2@kernel.o…
Changes in v4:
- Rebase onto v6.14-rc2 and Mark Rutland's fixes.
- Expose SME to nested guests.
- Additional cleanups and test fixes following on from the rebase.
- Flush register state on VMM PSTATE.{SM,ZA}.
- Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241220-kvm-arm64-sme-v3-0-05b018c1ffeb@kernel.o…
Changes in v3:
- Rebase onto v6.12-rc2.
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231222-kvm-arm64-sme-v2-0-da226cb180bb@kernel.o…
Changes in v2:
- Rebase onto v6.7-rc3.
- Configure subfeatures based on host system only.
- Complete nVHE support.
- There was some snafu with sending v1 out, it didn't make it to the
lists but in case it hit people's inboxes I'm sending as v2.
---
Mark Brown (29):
arm64/sysreg: Update SMIDR_EL1 to DDI0601 2025-06
arm64/fpsimd: Update FA64 and ZT0 enables when loading SME state
arm64/fpsimd: Decide to save ZT0 and streaming mode FFR at bind time
arm64/fpsimd: Check enable bit for FA64 when saving EFI state
arm64/fpsimd: Determine maximum virtualisable SME vector length
KVM: arm64: Introduce non-UNDEF FGT control
KVM: arm64: Pay attention to FFR parameter in SVE save and load
KVM: arm64: Pull ctxt_has_ helpers to start of sysreg-sr.h
KVM: arm64: Move SVE state access macros after feature test macros
KVM: arm64: Rename SVE finalization constants to be more general
KVM: arm64: Document the KVM ABI for SME
KVM: arm64: Define internal features for SME
KVM: arm64: Rename sve_state_reg_region
KVM: arm64: Store vector lengths in an array
KVM: arm64: Implement SME vector length configuration
KVM: arm64: Support SME control registers
KVM: arm64: Support TPIDR2_EL0
KVM: arm64: Support SME identification registers for guests
KVM: arm64: Support SME priority registers
KVM: arm64: Provide assembly for SME register access
KVM: arm64: Support userspace access to streaming mode Z and P registers
KVM: arm64: Flush register state on writes to SVCR.SM and SVCR.ZA
KVM: arm64: Expose SME specific state to userspace
KVM: arm64: Context switch SME state for guests
KVM: arm64: Handle SME exceptions
KVM: arm64: Expose SME to nested guests
KVM: arm64: Provide interface for configuring and enabling SME for guests
KVM: arm64: selftests: Add SME system registers to get-reg-list
KVM: arm64: selftests: Add SME to set_id_regs test
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 115 ++++++++---
arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h | 26 +++
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 6 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 169 ++++++++++++---
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h | 5 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h | 2 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/vncr_mapping.h | 2 +
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 33 +++
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 2 -
arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c | 89 ++++----
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 10 +
arch/arm64/kvm/config.c | 8 +-
arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c | 28 ++-
arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c | 252 ++++++++++++++++++++---
arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c | 14 ++
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/fpsimd.S | 28 ++-
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 175 ++++++++++++++--
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/sysreg-sr.h | 110 ++++++----
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 86 ++++++--
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 85 ++++++--
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c | 4 +-
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c | 6 +
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c | 17 +-
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/sysreg-sr.c | 7 +
arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c | 3 +-
arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 156 ++++++++++----
arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 141 ++++++++++++-
arch/arm64/tools/sysreg | 8 +-
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/arm64/get-reg-list.c | 15 +-
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/arm64/set_id_regs.c | 27 ++-
31 files changed, 1327 insertions(+), 303 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 062b3e4a1f880f104a8d4b90b767788786aa7b78
change-id: 20230301-kvm-arm64-sme-06a1246d3636
Best regards,
--
Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
For a while now we have supported file handles for pidfds. This has
proven to be very useful.
Extend the concept to cover namespaces as well. After this patchset it
is possible to encode and decode namespace file handles using the
commong name_to_handle_at() and open_by_handle_at() apis.
Namespaces file descriptors can already be derived from pidfds which
means they aren't subject to overmount protection bugs. IOW, it's
irrelevant if the caller would not have access to an appropriate
/proc/<pid>/ns/ directory as they could always just derive the namespace
based on a pidfd already.
It has the same advantage as pidfds. It's possible to reliably and for
the lifetime of the system refer to a namespace without pinning any
resources and to compare them.
Permission checking is kept simple. If the caller is located in the
namespace the file handle refers to they are able to open it otherwise
they must hold privilege over the owning namespace of the relevant
namespace.
Both the network namespace and the mount namespace already have an
associated cookie that isn't recycled and is fully exposed to userspace.
Move this into ns_common and use the same id space for all namespaces so
they can trivially and reliably be compared.
There's more coming based on the iterator infrastructure but the series
is large enough and focuses on file handles.
Extensive selftests included. I still have various other test-suites to
run but it holds up so far.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org>
---
Christian Brauner (32):
pidfs: validate extensible ioctls
nsfs: validate extensible ioctls
block: use extensible_ioctl_valid()
ns: move to_ns_common() to ns_common.h
nsfs: add nsfs.h header
ns: uniformly initialize ns_common
mnt: use ns_common_init()
ipc: use ns_common_init()
cgroup: use ns_common_init()
pid: use ns_common_init()
time: use ns_common_init()
uts: use ns_common_init()
user: use ns_common_init()
net: use ns_common_init()
ns: remove ns_alloc_inum()
nstree: make iterator generic
mnt: support iterator
cgroup: support iterator
ipc: support iterator
net: support iterator
pid: support iterator
time: support iterator
userns: support iterator
uts: support iterator
ns: add to_<type>_ns() to respective headers
nsfs: add current_in_namespace()
nsfs: support file handles
nsfs: support exhaustive file handles
nsfs: add missing id retrieval support
tools: update nsfs.h uapi header
selftests/namespaces: add identifier selftests
selftests/namespaces: add file handle selftests
block/blk-integrity.c | 8 +-
fs/fhandle.c | 6 +
fs/internal.h | 1 +
fs/mount.h | 10 +-
fs/namespace.c | 156 +--
fs/nsfs.c | 266 +++-
fs/pidfs.c | 2 +-
include/linux/cgroup.h | 5 +
include/linux/exportfs.h | 6 +
include/linux/fs.h | 14 +
include/linux/ipc_namespace.h | 5 +
include/linux/ns_common.h | 29 +
include/linux/nsfs.h | 40 +
include/linux/nsproxy.h | 11 -
include/linux/nstree.h | 89 ++
include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 5 +
include/linux/proc_ns.h | 32 +-
include/linux/time_namespace.h | 9 +
include/linux/user_namespace.h | 5 +
include/linux/utsname.h | 5 +
include/net/net_namespace.h | 6 +
include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h | 12 +-
init/main.c | 2 +
ipc/msgutil.c | 1 +
ipc/namespace.c | 12 +-
ipc/shm.c | 2 +
kernel/Makefile | 2 +-
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 2 +
kernel/cgroup/namespace.c | 24 +-
kernel/nstree.c | 233 ++++
kernel/pid_namespace.c | 13 +-
kernel/time/namespace.c | 23 +-
kernel/user_namespace.c | 17 +-
kernel/utsname.c | 28 +-
net/core/net_namespace.c | 59 +-
tools/include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h | 23 +-
tools/testing/selftests/namespaces/.gitignore | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/namespaces/Makefile | 7 +
tools/testing/selftests/namespaces/config | 7 +
.../selftests/namespaces/file_handle_test.c | 1410 ++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/namespaces/nsid_test.c | 986 ++++++++++++++
42 files changed, 3306 insertions(+), 270 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 8f5ae30d69d7543eee0d70083daf4de8fe15d585
change-id: 20250905-work-namespace-c68826dda0d4
Hi all,
This is v2 of a short series that adds kernel support for the ratified
Zilsd (Load/Store pair) and Zclsd (Compressed Load/Store pair) RISC-V
ISA extensions. The series enables kernel-side exposure so user-space
(for example glibc) can detect and use these extensions via hwprobe and
runtime checks.
Patches:
- Patch 1:Add device tree bindings documentation for Zilsd and Zclsd.
- Patch 2: Extend RISC-V ISA extension string parsing to recognize them.
- Patch 3: Export Zilsd and Zclsd via riscv_hwprobe.
- Patch 4: Allow KVM guests to use them.
- Patch 5: Add KVM selftests.
Changes in v2:
- Device-tree schema: simplified the rv64 validation for Zilsd by
removing a redundant `contais: const: zilsd` in the `if` clause; the
simpler `if (riscv, isa-base contains rv64i) then (riscv,
isa-extension not contains zilsd)` form is used instead. Behaviour is
unchanged, and the logic is cleaner.
- Device-tree schema: corrected Zclsd dependency to require both Zilsd
and Zca (previous `anyOf` was incorrect; now both are enforced).
- Commit message typo fixed: "dt-bidings" -> "dt-bindings" in the Patch
1 commit subject.
The v2 changes are documentation/schema corrections in extensions.yaml.
No functional changes were made to ISA parsing, hwprobe syscall, KVM
guest support or the selftests beyond ensuring the binding correctly
documents and validates the extension relationships.
Please review v2 and advise if futher changes are needed.
Thanks,
Pincheng Wang
Pincheng Wang (5):
dt-bindings: riscv: add Zilsd and Zclsd extension descriptions
riscv: add ISA extension parsing for Zilsd and Zclsd
riscv: hwprobe: export Zilsd and Zclsd ISA extensions
riscv: KVM: allow Zilsd and Zclsd extensions for Guest/VM
KVM: riscv: selftests: add Zilsd and Zclsd extension to get-reg-list
test
Documentation/arch/riscv/hwprobe.rst | 8 +++++
.../devicetree/bindings/riscv/extensions.yaml | 36 +++++++++++++++++++
arch/riscv/include/asm/hwcap.h | 2 ++
arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/hwprobe.h | 2 ++
arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 2 ++
arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c | 24 +++++++++++++
arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c | 2 ++
arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_onereg.c | 2 ++
.../selftests/kvm/riscv/get-reg-list.c | 6 ++++
9 files changed, 84 insertions(+)
--
2.39.5
Prior to commit 9245fd6b8531 ("KVM: x86: model canonical checks more
precisely"), KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE would fail if the state was captured
with L2 active, L1 had CR4.LA57 set, L2 did not, and the
VMCS12.HOST_GSBASE (or other host-state field checked for canonicality)
had an address greater than 48 bits wide.
Add a regression test that reproduces the KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE failure
conditions. To do so, the first three patches add support for 5-level
paging in the selftest L1 VM.
v1 -> v2
Ended the page walking loops before visiting 4K mappings [Yosry]
Changed VM_MODE_PXXV48_4K into VM_MODE_PXXVYY_4K;
use 5-level paging when possible [Sean]
Removed the check for non-NULL vmx_pages in guest_code() [Yosry]
Jim Mattson (4):
KVM: selftests: Use a loop to create guest page tables
KVM: selftests: Use a loop to walk guest page tables
KVM: selftests: Change VM_MODE_PXXV48_4K to VM_MODE_PXXVYY_4K
KVM: selftests: Add a VMX test for LA57 nested state
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm | 1 +
.../testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h | 4 +-
.../selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h | 2 +-
.../selftests/kvm/lib/arm64/processor.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 30 ++--
.../testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/processor.c | 80 +++++------
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/vmx.c | 6 +-
.../kvm/x86/vmx_la57_nested_state_test.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++++
8 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/vmx_la57_nested_state_test.c
--
2.51.1.851.g4ebd6896fd-goog