March 2021 - Linux-kselftest-mirror

[PATCH v3] lib: Convert test_user_copy to KUnit test

by Vitor Massaru Iha

This adds the conversion of the runtime tests of test_user_copy fuctions, from `lib/test_user_copy.c`to KUnit tests. Signed-off-by: Vitor Massaru Iha <vitor(a)massaru.org> --- v2: * splitted patch in 3: - Allows to install and load modules in root filesystem; - Provides an userspace memory context when tests are compiled as module; - Convert test_user_copy to KUnit test; * removed entry for CONFIG_TEST_USER_COPY; * replaced pr_warn to KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE_MSG in test macro to decrease the diff; v3: * rebased with last kunit branch * Please apply this commit from kunit-fixes: 3f37d14b8a3152441f36b6bc74000996679f0998 And these from patchwork: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11676331/ https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11676335/ --- lib/Kconfig.debug | 28 ++++++++------ lib/Makefile | 2 +- lib/{test_user_copy.c => user_copy_kunit.c} | 42 +++++++++------------ 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) rename lib/{test_user_copy.c => user_copy_kunit.c} (91%) diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug index 9ad9210d70a1..f699a3624ae7 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig.debug +++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug @@ -2078,18 +2078,6 @@ config TEST_VMALLOC If unsure, say N. -config TEST_USER_COPY - tristate "Test user/kernel boundary protections" - depends on m - help - This builds the "test_user_copy" module that runs sanity checks - on the copy_to/from_user infrastructure, making sure basic - user/kernel boundary testing is working. If it fails to load, - a regression has been detected in the user/kernel memory boundary - protections. - - If unsure, say N. - config TEST_BPF tristate "Test BPF filter functionality" depends on m && NET @@ -2154,6 +2142,22 @@ config SYSCTL_KUNIT_TEST If unsure, say N. +config USER_COPY_KUNIT + tristate "KUnit Test for user/kernel boundary protections" + depends on KUNIT + depends on m + help + This builds the "user_copy_kunit" module that runs sanity checks + on the copy_to/from_user infrastructure, making sure basic + user/kernel boundary testing is working. If it fails to load, + a regression has been detected in the user/kernel memory boundary + protections. + + For more information on KUnit and unit tests in general please refer + to the KUnit documentation in Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/. + + If unsure, say N. + config LIST_KUNIT_TEST tristate "KUnit Test for Kernel Linked-list structures" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS depends on KUNIT diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile index b1c42c10073b..8c145f85accc 100644 --- a/lib/Makefile +++ b/lib/Makefile @@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_VMALLOC) += test_vmalloc.o obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_OVERFLOW) += test_overflow.o obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_RHASHTABLE) += test_rhashtable.o obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_SORT) += test_sort.o -obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_USER_COPY) += test_user_copy.o obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_STATIC_KEYS) += test_static_keys.o obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_STATIC_KEYS) += test_static_key_base.o obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_PRINTF) += test_printf.o @@ -318,3 +317,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_OBJAGG) += objagg.o # KUnit tests obj-$(CONFIG_LIST_KUNIT_TEST) += list-test.o obj-$(CONFIG_LINEAR_RANGES_TEST) += test_linear_ranges.o +obj-$(CONFIG_USER_COPY_KUNIT) += user_copy_kunit.o diff --git a/lib/test_user_copy.c b/lib/user_copy_kunit.c similarity index 91% rename from lib/test_user_copy.c rename to lib/user_copy_kunit.c index 5ff04d8fe971..a10ddd15b4cd 100644 --- a/lib/test_user_copy.c +++ b/lib/user_copy_kunit.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <kunit/test.h> /* * Several 32-bit architectures support 64-bit {get,put}_user() calls. @@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ ({ \ int cond = (condition); \ if (cond) \ - pr_warn("[%d] " msg "\n", __LINE__, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ + KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE_MSG(test, cond, msg, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ cond; \ }) @@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ static bool is_zeroed(void *from, size_t size) return memchr_inv(from, 0x0, size) == NULL; } -static int test_check_nonzero_user(char *kmem, char __user *umem, size_t size) +static int test_check_nonzero_user(struct kunit *test, char *kmem, char __user *umem, size_t size) { int ret = 0; size_t start, end, i, zero_start, zero_end; @@ -102,7 +103,7 @@ static int test_check_nonzero_user(char *kmem, char __user *umem, size_t size) return ret; } -static int test_copy_struct_from_user(char *kmem, char __user *umem, +static int test_copy_struct_from_user(struct kunit *test, char *kmem, char __user *umem, size_t size) { int ret = 0; @@ -177,7 +178,7 @@ static int test_copy_struct_from_user(char *kmem, char __user *umem, return ret; } -static int __init test_user_copy_init(void) +static void user_copy_test(struct kunit *test) { int ret = 0; char *kmem; @@ -192,16 +193,14 @@ static int __init test_user_copy_init(void) #endif kmem = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE * 2, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!kmem) - return -ENOMEM; + KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE_MSG(test, kmem == NULL, "kmalloc failed"); user_addr = vm_mmap(NULL, 0, PAGE_SIZE * 2, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, 0); if (user_addr >= (unsigned long)(TASK_SIZE)) { - pr_warn("Failed to allocate user memory\n"); kfree(kmem); - return -ENOMEM; + KUNIT_FAIL(test, "Failed to allocate user memory"); } usermem = (char __user *)user_addr; @@ -245,9 +244,9 @@ static int __init test_user_copy_init(void) #undef test_legit /* Test usage of check_nonzero_user(). */ - ret |= test_check_nonzero_user(kmem, usermem, 2 * PAGE_SIZE); + ret |= test_check_nonzero_user(test, kmem, usermem, 2 * PAGE_SIZE); /* Test usage of copy_struct_from_user(). */ - ret |= test_copy_struct_from_user(kmem, usermem, 2 * PAGE_SIZE); + ret |= test_copy_struct_from_user(test, kmem, usermem, 2 * PAGE_SIZE); /* * Invalid usage: none of these copies should succeed. @@ -309,23 +308,18 @@ static int __init test_user_copy_init(void) vm_munmap(user_addr, PAGE_SIZE * 2); kfree(kmem); - - if (ret == 0) { - pr_info("tests passed.\n"); - return 0; - } - - return -EINVAL; } -module_init(test_user_copy_init); - -static void __exit test_user_copy_exit(void) -{ - pr_info("unloaded.\n"); -} +static struct kunit_case user_copy_test_cases[] = { + KUNIT_CASE(user_copy_test), + {} +}; -module_exit(test_user_copy_exit); +static struct kunit_suite user_copy_test_suite = { + .name = "user_copy", + .test_cases = user_copy_test_cases, +}; +kunit_test_suites(&user_copy_test_suite); MODULE_AUTHOR("Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); base-commit: d43c7fb05765152d4d4a39a8ef957c4ea14d8847 -- 2.26.2

2 months, 1 week

4
11
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[PATCH net-next v2 0/3] net: introduce rps_default_mask

by Paolo Abeni

Real-time setups try hard to ensure proper isolation between time critical applications and e.g. network processing performed by the network stack in softirq and RPS is used to move the softirq activity away from the isolated core. If the network configuration is dynamic, with netns and devices routinely created at run-time, enforcing the correct RPS setting on each newly created device allowing to transient bad configuration became complex. These series try to address the above, introducing a new sysctl knob: rps_default_mask. The new sysctl entry allows configuring a systemwide RPS mask, to be enforced since receive queue creation time without any fourther per device configuration required. Additionally, a simple self-test is introduced to check the rps_default_mask behavior. v1 -> v2: - fix sparse warning in patch 2/3 Paolo Abeni (3): net/sysctl: factor-out netdev_rx_queue_set_rps_mask() helper net/core: introduce default_rps_mask netns attribute self-tests: introduce self-tests for RPS default mask Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/net.rst | 6 ++ include/linux/netdevice.h | 1 + net/core/net-sysfs.c | 73 +++++++++++-------- net/core/sysctl_net_core.c | 58 +++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/net/config | 3 + .../testing/selftests/net/rps_default_mask.sh | 57 +++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/net/rps_default_mask.sh -- 2.26.2

1 year, 8 months

4
12
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[PATCH v2 net-next 0/3] ptp: Add adjust phase to support phase offset.

by vincent.cheng.xh＠renesas.com

From: Vincent Cheng <vincent.cheng.xh(a)renesas.com> This series adds adjust phase to the PTP Hardware Clock device interface. Some PTP hardware clocks have a write phase mode that has a built-in hardware filtering capability. The write phase mode utilizes a phase offset control word instead of a frequency offset control word. Add adjust phase function to take advantage of this capability. Changes since v1: - As suggested by Richard Cochran: 1. ops->adjphase is new so need to check for non-null function pointer. 2. Kernel coding style uses lower_case_underscores. 3. Use existing PTP clock API for delayed worker. Vincent Cheng (3): ptp: Add adjphase function to support phase offset control. ptp: Add adjust_phase to ptp_clock_caps capability. ptp: ptp_clockmatrix: Add adjphase() to support PHC write phase mode. drivers/ptp/ptp_chardev.c | 1 + drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c | 3 ++ drivers/ptp/ptp_clockmatrix.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/ptp/ptp_clockmatrix.h | 8 ++- include/linux/ptp_clock_kernel.h | 6 ++- include/uapi/linux/ptp_clock.h | 4 +- tools/testing/selftests/ptp/testptp.c | 6 ++- 7 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) -- 2.7.4

2 years, 2 months

5
8
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[PATCH -next] selftests/powerpc: Remove duplicated include from tm-poison.c

by Zheng Yongjun

Remove duplicated include. Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3(a)huawei.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c index 29e5f26af7b9..27c083a03d1f 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c @@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ #include <sched.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <signal.h> -#include <inttypes.h> #include "tm.h"

3 years, 1 month

2
1
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[PATCH V2 0/3] riscv: add support for restartable sequence

by Vincent Chen

Add RSEQ, restartable sequence, support and related selftest to RISCV. The Kconfig option HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API is also required by RSEQ because RSEQ will modify the content of pt_regs.sepc through instruction_pointer_set() during the fixup procedure. In order to select the config HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API, the missing APIs for accessing pt_regs are also added in this patch set. The relevant RSEQ tests in kselftest require the Binutils patch "RISC-V: Fix linker problems with TLS copy relocs" to avoid placing PREINIT_ARRAY and TLS variable of librseq.so at the same address. https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=3e7bd7f… A segmental fault will happen if binutils misses this patch. Patrick Stählin (1): riscv: add required functions to enable HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API Vincent Chen (2): riscv: Add support for restartable sequence rseq/selftests: Add support for riscv Changes since v1: 1. Use the correct register name to access pt_regs arch/riscv/Kconfig | 2 + arch/riscv/include/asm/ptrace.h | 29 +- arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S | 4 + arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c | 99 +++++ arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/rseq/param_test.c | 23 ++ tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-riscv.h | 622 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq.h | 2 + 8 files changed, 782 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/rseq/rseq-riscv.h -- 2.7.4

3 years, 3 months

3
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[PATCH v8 0/7] Syscall User Dispatch

by Gabriel Krisman Bertazi

Hi, This is v8 of syscall user dispatch. Last version got some acks but there was one small documentation fix I wanted to do, as requested by Florian. This also addresses the commit message fixup Peter requested. The only actual code change from v7 is solving a trivial merge conflict I myself created with the entry code fixup I made week and with something else in the TIP tree. I also shared this with glibc and there wasn't any complaints other than the matter about user-notif vs. siginfo, which was discussed in v7 and the understanding is that it is not necessary now and can be added later, if needed, on the same infrastructure without a new api. I'm not sure about TIP the rules, but is it too late to be queued for the next merge window? I'd love to have this in 5.11 if possible, since it has been flying for quite a while. This is based on tip/master. As usual, a working tree with this patchset is available at: https://gitlab.collabora.com/krisman/linux -b syscall-user-dispatch-v8 Previous submissions are archived at: RFC/v1: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/7/8/96 v2: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/7/9/17 v3: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/7/12/4 v4: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-kselftest/msg16377.html v5: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/8/10/1320 v6: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/9/4/1122 v7: https://lwn.net/Articles/837598/ Gabriel Krisman Bertazi (7): x86: vdso: Expose sigreturn address on vdso to the kernel signal: Expose SYS_USER_DISPATCH si_code type kernel: Implement selective syscall userspace redirection entry: Support Syscall User Dispatch on common syscall entry selftests: Add kselftest for syscall user dispatch selftests: Add benchmark for syscall user dispatch docs: Document Syscall User Dispatch .../admin-guide/syscall-user-dispatch.rst | 87 +++++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.c | 2 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/sigreturn.S | 2 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c | 15 + arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c | 2 +- fs/exec.c | 3 + include/linux/entry-common.h | 2 + include/linux/sched.h | 2 + include/linux/syscall_user_dispatch.h | 40 +++ include/linux/thread_info.h | 2 + include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 +- include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 5 + kernel/entry/Makefile | 2 +- kernel/entry/common.c | 17 + kernel/entry/common.h | 16 + kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c | 102 ++++++ kernel/fork.c | 1 + kernel/sys.c | 5 + tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + .../syscall_user_dispatch/.gitignore | 3 + .../selftests/syscall_user_dispatch/Makefile | 9 + .../selftests/syscall_user_dispatch/config | 1 + .../syscall_user_dispatch/sud_benchmark.c | 200 +++++++++++ .../syscall_user_dispatch/sud_test.c | 310 ++++++++++++++++++ 26 files changed, 833 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/syscall-user-dispatch.rst create mode 100644 include/linux/syscall_user_dispatch.h create mode 100644 kernel/entry/common.h create mode 100644 kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/syscall_user_dispatch/.gitignore create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/syscall_user_dispatch/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/syscall_user_dispatch/config create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/syscall_user_dispatch/sud_benchmark.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/syscall_user_dispatch/sud_test.c -- 2.29.2

3 years, 3 months

6
17
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[PATCH v18 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

by Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <rppt(a)linux.ibm.com> Hi, @Andrew, this is based on v5.12-rc1, I can rebase whatever way you prefer. This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm. Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings. Additionally, in the future the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host. For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/secret-memory-preloade… that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification. Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows usage of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks. The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. In addition, there is also a long term goal to improve management of the direct map. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux… v18: * rebase on v5.12-rc1 * merge kfence fix into the original patch * massage commit message of the patch introducing the memfd_secret syscall v17: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210208084920.2884-1-rppt@kernel.org * Remove pool of large pages backing secretmem allocations, per Michal Hocko * Add secretmem pages to unevictable LRU, per Michal Hocko * Use GFP_HIGHUSER as secretmem mapping mask, per Michal Hocko * Make secretmem an opt-in feature that is disabled by default v16: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210121122723.3446-1-rppt@kernel.org * Fix memory leak intorduced in v15 * Clean the data left from previous page user before handing the page to the userspace v15: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210120180612.1058-1-rppt@kernel.org * Add riscv/Kconfig update to disable set_memory operations for nommu builds (patch 3) * Update the code around add_to_page_cache() per Matthew's comments (patches 6,7) * Add fixups for build/checkpatch errors discovered by CI systems v14: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org * Finally s/mod_node_page_state/mod_lruvec_page_state/ v13: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201201074559.27742-1-rppt@kernel.org * Added Reviewed-by, thanks Catalin and David * s/mod_node_page_state/mod_lruvec_page_state/ as Shakeel suggested Older history: v12: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201125092208.12544-1-rppt@kernel.org v11: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124092556.12009-1-rppt@kernel.org v10: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org v9: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201117162932.13649-1-rppt@kernel.org v8: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201110151444.20662-1-rppt@kernel.org v7: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201026083752.13267-1-rppt@kernel.org v6: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200924132904.1391-1-rppt@kernel.org v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200916073539.3552-1-rppt@kernel.org v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200818141554.13945-1-rppt@kernel.org v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200804095035.18778-1-rppt@kernel.org v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200727162935.31714-1-rppt@kernel.org v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200720092435.17469-1-rppt@kernel.org rfc-v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706172051.19465-1-rppt@kernel.org/ rfc-v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200130162340.GA14232@rapoport-lnx/ rfc-v0: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1572171452-7958-1-git-send-email-rppt@kernel.o… Mike Rapoport (9): mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER mmap: make mlock_future_check() global riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2) arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 - arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 6 - arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h | 17 ++ arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 1 + arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 6 +- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 23 +- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 4 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c | 8 +- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 +- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 8 +- fs/dax.c | 11 +- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 + include/linux/secretmem.h | 30 +++ include/linux/set_memory.h | 16 +- include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 6 +- include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + kernel/power/hibernate.c | 5 +- kernel/power/snapshot.c | 4 +- kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 3 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/gup.c | 10 + mm/internal.h | 3 + mm/mlock.c | 3 +- mm/mmap.c | 5 +- mm/secretmem.c | 261 +++++++++++++++++++ mm/vmalloc.c | 5 +- scripts/checksyscalls.sh | 4 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 296 ++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests.sh | 17 ++ 39 files changed, 726 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c -- 2.28.0

3 years, 5 months

6
20
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[PATCH] selftests: kvm: remove reassignment of non-absolute variables

by Bill Wendling

Clang's integrated assembler does not allow symbols with non-absolute values to be reassigned. Modify the interrupt entry loop macro to be compatible with IAS by using a label and an offset. Cc: Jian Cai <caij2003(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bill Wendling <morbo(a)google.com> References: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200714233024.1789985-1-caij2003@gmail.com/ --- tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/handlers.S | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/handlers.S b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/handlers.S index aaf7bc7d2ce1..3f9181e9a0a7 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/handlers.S +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/handlers.S @@ -54,9 +54,9 @@ idt_handlers: .align 8 /* Fetch current address and append it to idt_handlers. */ - current_handler = . +0 : .pushsection .rodata -.quad current_handler + .quad 0b .popsection .if ! \has_error -- 2.29.2.576.ga3fc446d84-goog

3 years, 5 months

4
9
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[PATCH] selftests/powerpc: remove unneeded semicolon

by Yang Li

Eliminate the following coccicheck warning: ./tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/nx-gzip/gzfht_test.c:327:4-5: Unneeded semicolon Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci(a)linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee(a)linux.alibaba.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/nx-gzip/gzfht_test.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/nx-gzip/gzfht_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/nx-gzip/gzfht_test.c index 02dffb6..b099753 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/nx-gzip/gzfht_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/nx-gzip/gzfht_test.c @@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ int compress_file(int argc, char **argv, void *handle) fprintf(stderr, "error: cannot progress; "); fprintf(stderr, "too many faults\n"); exit(-1); - }; + } } fault_tries = NX_MAX_FAULTS; /* Reset for the next chunk */ -- 1.8.3.1

3 years, 5 months

2
1
0 0

[PATCH] selftests/bpf: fix warning comparing pointer to 0

by Jiapeng Chong

Fix the following coccicheck warning: ./tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fentry_test.c:76:15-16: WARNING comparing pointer to 0. Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci(a)linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong(a)linux.alibaba.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fentry_test.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fentry_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fentry_test.c index 5f645fd..d4247d6 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fentry_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fentry_test.c @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ struct bpf_fentry_test_t { SEC("fentry/bpf_fentry_test7") int BPF_PROG(test7, struct bpf_fentry_test_t *arg) { - if (arg == 0) + if (!arg) test7_result = 1; return 0; } @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(test7, struct bpf_fentry_test_t *arg) SEC("fentry/bpf_fentry_test8") int BPF_PROG(test8, struct bpf_fentry_test_t *arg) { - if (arg->a == 0) + if (!arg->a) test8_result = 1; return 0; } -- 1.8.3.1

3 years, 6 months

2
2
0 0

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Linux-kselftest-mirror March 2021